Beijing Hardens Language, Operations at Second Thomas Shoal

On July 20, Chinese and Philippine military personnel came to blows alongside the BRP Sierra Madre, the vessel the Philippines grounded at Second Thomas Shoal (仁爱礁, which the Philippines calls Ayungin Shoal) in 1999 in the South China Sea (SCS). The Philippine military said China Coast Guard (CCG) personnel in a rigid-hull inflatable boat struck a Philippine Navy sailor on the head with a wooden baton, injuring the sailor and damaging the boat. The CCG said the two Philippine boats ignored warnings and rammed its patrol craft, and that “Philippine personnel first used oars, long poles, and other implements to maliciously attack Chinese law enforcement personnel.”

Neither side has released full unedited footage, and the Philippine military says the version Beijing circulated was “spliced or incomplete.”

China Coast Guard Personnel Strike Philippine Navy With Wooden Batons in Ayungin Shoal Incident

The clash broke two years of relative calm. Under the provisional resupply arrangement reached in July 2024, the Philippines ran 13 rotation-and-resupply missions through March 4, 2026—roughly every six weeks—and Philippine officials said those runs passed without dangerous encounters.

The clash also overlaps with the 10th anniversary of the 2016 UNCLOS arbitral tribunal award, which struck down China’s expansion claims in the SCS, including over Second Thomas Shoal. On July 11, the United States and 13 other governments issued a joint statement to commemorate the award, calling on China to respect the findings. China’s foreign ministry responded the next day, calling the award “an illegal and void scrap of paper with no binding force” (一张非法无效没有拘束力的废纸). Chinese state media went further, calling the arbitration a “political farce dressed up in legal disguise.”

Among other things, the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruled that:

• Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation, meaning it cannot be claimed as sovereign territory by any state on its own.

• The shoal lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

• China’s “nine-dash line” claim has no legal basis under UNCLOS to the extent it exceeds the convention’s maritime entitlements.

• China interfered with the Philippines’ lawful exercise of its rights in the SCS, including on Second Thomas Shoal.

China continues to claim the area as part of its “historic rights,” and has maintained that Philippine activities there are unlawful. As a result, there have been repeated confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels around the shoal.

CCA Analysis: Beijing is hardening its rhetoric and response to the Philippines’ exercise of its lawful maritime rights on Second Thomas Shoal. The CCG’s July 20 statement included new language not found in previous announcements regarding Second Thomas Shoal, labeling the incident as a “malicious attack” (恶意攻击). The PRC foreign ministry called Philippine actions a “violent assault” (暴力袭击). For comparison, in June 2024, when Chinese personnel boarded Philippine boats armed with knives and axes and severed a Filipino sailor’s thumb, CCG statements only referred to a “dangerous approach” and “deliberate collision,” and the PRC defense ministry acknowledged only that stones had been thrown.

The wording matters because of the claim riding on it. On July 21, the CCG said it had “permitted” the Philippines to move the wounded sailor by small boat to a Philippine coast guard vessel, and that it had “supervised the transfer from start to finish.” Manila rejected the framing a day later, saying the Philippines “does not need, nor does it require, any foreign nation’s permission” inside its own exclusive economic zone, and any claim of permission is “a false narrative intended to project illegitimate authority.”

The PLA appears to have stayed out of the fray. The operation was carried out by the CCG and framed by the foreign ministry, a familiar division of labor that sustains pressure while staying below the threshold of kinetic conflict that might invoke the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. China’s defense ministry did not issue a statement and did not respond to press queries about the incident. The PLA Southern Theater Command issued a statement after the clash, protesting Philippine-organized “joint patrols” with “outside countries” but did not mention Second Thomas Shoal.

Beijing’s rejection of the arbitration ruling remains unchanged. A decade after the landmark binding judgement, China’s intransigence has caused material harm to its relations with the Philippines in diplomatic and soft power terms. But it has allowed the CCG and PLA to hone a new brand of gray-zone coercion and operational tactics. From Beijing’s perspective, the benefits of rejecting the ruling outweigh the diplomatic blowback, because acceptance would deprive China of its core claims to waters and territory in the SCS.

PLA Initiates Live-Fire Artillery Drills near Taiwan

From July 23 to 24, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) conducted live-fire artillery drills near Taiwan, in apparent response to a speech by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. The exercise occurred east and south of Dongshan Island, off Fujian province, and involved troops from the ETC’s 73^rd Group Army. It reportedly involved the amphibious assault ship Hubei, which undertook landing and take-off training and employed army helicopters.

The drills appeared to be in response to a speech given by Lai during the DPP’s annual party convention several days earlier, in which Lai called for Taiwan to oppose a “red terror” by China, adding that the DPP would never allow a “democratic Taiwan” to “regress into a ‘China’ Taiwan.” The speech drew criticism from the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, which said the remarks “expose Lai’s unchanging ‘Taiwan independence’ stance,” and that Lai had “recklessly challenged the ‘One China’ principle.”

CCA Analysis: China has boxed itself in by responding militarily to every major speech by Lai. Digging in its heels may stoke nationalist sentiment in China and help justify increased PLA training requirements near Taiwan. But this approach also takes cross-Strait relations down a narrower path with fewer avenues for de-escalation that do not involve military escalation. 2028 remains a pivotal year in both Taiwan and the United States, with presidential elections determining the future trajectory of peace and conflict across the Strait. Yet there is little evidence that Beijing is amenable to creative approaches or policies that involve engagement with Taiwanese authorities.

China’s Third Hospital Ship Sails on Its First Overseas Mission

On July 22, the PLA Navy hospital ship Auspicious Ark (吉祥方舟, hull number 868) departed a naval port in Qingdao for Africa and South Asia to carry out Mission Harmony-2026 (和谐使命-2026), the vessel’s first overseas medical deployment.

This is the twelfth Mission Harmony deployment since 2010. The first ten were conducted by the Peace Ark (和平方舟), while the Silk Road Ark (丝路方舟) conducted the eleventh, a 234-day voyage covering roughly 36,000 nautical miles across the Pacific Islands and Latin America—the longest in the series to date. The Auspicious Ark is the PLA Navy’s third 10,000-ton-class hospital ship, first unveiled in May 2025. With its entry into service, each of the PLA Navy’s three theater commands now operates one hospital ship.

CCA Analysis: Humanitarian deployments are not in themselves a new development. It is the tempo that merits attention. Deployments of three different vessels in two years represent a high operational tempo. The Peace Ark returned to port in January 2025; the Silk Road Ark deployed from September 2025 to April 2026; and the Auspicious Ark’s current deployment is scheduled to run into early 2027. With three hulls available, Beijing can now keep one ship forward-deployed on a near-continuous basis while a second undergoes refit and a third remains on domestic duty. What was once an episodic goodwill voyage has become a routine, standing presence.

The tonnage and configuration of these vessels are calibrated for long-term deployments. According to the Center for International Maritime Security, the U.S. Navy’s USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy each carry roughly 1,000 beds and 12 operating rooms, compared to approximately 300 beds and eight operating rooms aboard the Peace Ark. This is an instrument for securing strategic access rather than generating wartime medical capacity, providing a relatively low-cost means of building familiarity with foreign ports and cultivating local goodwill.

The program’s implementation details reveal its broader significance. During its last deployment, the Silk Road Ark conducted joint drills with the Fijian, Tongan, and Brazilian navies in addition to providing outpatient medical work. The PRC Ministry of National Defense has described the Auspicious Ark as having “a functional layout adapted to the demands of preparing for combat” (具有适应备战打仗需求的功能布局). Should Mission Harmony-2026 follow the same template, it would amount to naval engagement with doctors aboard and would represent an opportunity for the PLA Navy to rehearse wartime medical evacuation and treatment through military diplomacy.

Competition is inevitable—and, when governed wisely, can be a powerful driver of innovation, resilience, and human progress. Strategic instability, however, is neither inevitable nor desirable. It can and should be managed through better institutions, clearer guardrails, and sustained dialogue. The central challenge of statecraft in the age of artificial intelligence is therefore not whether to compete, but how to govern competition wisely.

Technology competition between the United States and China has entered a fundamentally new phase. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, cloud infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing no longer operate as separate policy domains. They increasingly form an integrated strategic ecosystem in which decisions affecting one technology shape outcomes across many others. Yet the institutions governing this competition remain fragmented across agencies, regulatory authorities, and policy silos that were designed for an earlier era.

Three structural shifts have outpaced the existing governance architecture.

First, technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge. Export controls, industrial policy, AI governance, biosecurity, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience are increasingly interconnected. Policies designed in isolation now generate cascading effects across the broader technology ecosystem.

Second, artificial intelligence has fundamentally changed the nature of technology governance. AI is no longer simply another strategic technology. As a general-purpose capability, it accelerates innovation across semiconductors, biotechnology, scientific research, defense, and advanced manufacturing while introducing new risks related to frontier models, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and CBRN misuse. These challenges cannot be addressed through export controls alone. They require integrated governance.

Third, bureaucratic fragmentation has become a strategic vulnerability. On both the U.S. and Chinese sides, responsibility for technology policy is distributed across multiple institutions with different authorities, incentives, and technical expertise. As technologies converge, fragmented governance limits strategic coordination, slows policy adaptation, and increases the risk of reactive escalation.

These structural changes require a new institutional response.

This special issue proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability (BoTS) as a permanent mechanism for governing technology competition across export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, semiconductor policy, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience. Rather than creating another layer of bureaucracy, the Board would integrate existing capabilities, align political leadership with technical expertise, and provide a standing framework for managing strategic competition with greater discipline, coherence, and strategic foresight.

The Board should pursue four immediate priorities.

First, modernize export controls through a standing technical review process that keeps pace with technological change while preserving restrictions on genuinely strategic capabilities.

Second, strengthen supply-chain stability through reciprocal guardrails for critical minerals and rare earths, including civilian end-use assurances, trusted-company licensing arrangements, and longer planning horizons that reduce unnecessary uncertainty while protecting national-security interests.

Third, place AI governance and biosecurity at the center of technology strategy by integrating frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, biosecurity, cybersecurity, and CBRN risk management into a common governance framework.

Fourth, establish a permanent technology dialogue to support crisis communication, improve policy transparency, and develop confidence-building measures where mutual interests exist, particularly regarding AI safety, biosecurity, and strategic supply chains.

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi provides a timely opportunity to launch such an initiative. A Board of Technology Stability would complement emerging trade and investment mechanisms by providing a durable institutional architecture for the defining technologies of the twenty-first century. Its purpose is not to reduce competition, but to ensure that competition strengthens innovation rather than undermines stability.

Competition is inevitable—and welcome. Strategic instability is optional. Through stronger institutions, wiser governance, and sustained dialogue, technology competition can become not only a source of national strength, but also a foundation for long-term strategic stability.

I. Introduction

Technology competition is rapidly becoming the defining feature of the U.S.–China relationship. Increasingly, it shapes not only economic competitiveness but also national security, industrial policy, scientific leadership, and the future balance of geopolitical influence. Yet while technology itself has evolved dramatically, the institutions governing it have changed far more slowly.

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, cloud infrastructure, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and supply chains have become deeply interconnected. Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment now influence AI capability; AI accelerates advances in biotechnology; critical minerals underpin both advanced computing and clean technologies; and supply-chain resilience has become inseparable from economic security and national security. Decisions that once affected individual sectors now increasingly reverberate across the broader technology ecosystem.

Existing governance structures were not designed for this rapidly evolving environment.

Most technology policies continue to be developed through separate bureaucratic channels responsible for export controls, industrial policy, AI regulation, public health, scientific research, investment, diplomacy, and national security. These institutions remain highly capable within their respective domains, but increasingly lack mechanisms for integrated decision-making across technologies whose strategic implications have become inseparable.

The rapid emergence of frontier AI further amplifies this challenge. Artificial intelligence is no longer simply another strategic technology. It is becoming a general-purpose capability that accelerates scientific discovery across nearly every frontier discipline, including biotechnology, materials science, robotics, and defense. At the same time, AI introduces new governance challenges involving frontier-model evaluation, cyber resilience, AI-enabled biological design, and CBRN misuse. These issues cannot be addressed through export controls alone. They require sustained coordination among technical experts, regulators, security agencies, and diplomatic institutions.

Institutional fragmentation compounds these challenges. On both sides, responsibility for technology policy is distributed across multiple ministries and agencies with overlapping responsibilities but limited mechanisms for integrated strategic coordination. As technologies become increasingly interconnected, fragmentation itself becomes a source of strategic risk.

The consequences are already visible. Export controls have been followed by reciprocal restrictions on critical minerals and rare earths. Licensing decisions increasingly shape investment, industrial planning, AI infrastructure, and global supply chains. Individual measures may each be justified on national-security grounds, yet collectively they reveal a broader reality: technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge rather than a collection of discrete policy disputes.

The central question facing policymakers is therefore no longer whether strategic competition should continue. It almost certainly will. The more important question is whether existing institutions remain capable of governing that competition in ways that strengthen national security while preserving innovation, reducing unintended economic disruption, and maintaining strategic stability.

This special issue argues that they do not. Instead, it proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability as a permanent institutional mechanism capable of integrating technology governance across export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, critical minerals, supply-chain resilience, and strategic dialogue. Rather than replacing existing agencies, the Board would bridge political authority and technical expertise, align policies that are currently managed through separate bureaucratic channels, and provide a durable framework for governing technology competition in the age of artificial intelligence.

II. Three Governance Gaps in the AI Era

The United States does not lack technology strategy. Nor does it lack technical expertise. What it increasingly lacks is an institutional framework capable of governing technology competition as an integrated strategic challenge.

Three governance gaps have emerged as technology competition has evolved. Together, they explain why existing institutions, while individually effective, are becoming collectively inadequate.

The Integration Gap

Technology competition is no longer organized around individual industries or technologies. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, cloud infrastructure, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and supply chains increasingly reinforce one another.

Semiconductor manufacturing capacity shapes AI development. AI accelerates biotechnology and scientific discovery. Critical minerals underpin advanced computing, clean technologies, and defense manufacturing. Cloud infrastructure determines access to computing power. Supply-chain resilience influences both national security and economic competitiveness.

These interactions have transformed technology competition into an interconnected strategic ecosystem.

Policy, however, remains organized around individual sectors and agencies. Export controls, industrial policy, AI governance, biosecurity, investment screening, and diplomacy continue to operate largely in parallel. Decisions taken within one policy domain increasingly generate consequences across many others.

The result is an expanding integration gap between the technologies themselves and the institutions responsible for governing them.

The Capability Gap

The second gap reflects the emergence of artificial intelligence as a general-purpose technology.

Unlike previous generations of strategic technologies, frontier AI accelerates progress across virtually every scientific and industrial domain. It influences semiconductor design, pharmaceutical discovery, biotechnology, autonomous systems, cyber operations, advanced manufacturing, and military capability simultaneously.

This convergence fundamentally changes the nature of technology governance.

National security now depends not only on controlling access to hardware but also on understanding frontier-model capabilities, evaluating AI systems, mitigating cyber vulnerabilities, managing AI-enabled biological risks, and establishing safeguards against CBRN misuse.

These challenges extend well beyond traditional export-control institutions.

No single agency currently possesses the authority or expertise to integrate AI governance, model evaluation, biosecurity, export controls, scientific research, industrial policy, and international engagement into a coherent strategic framework.

As AI continues to evolve, this capability gap will become increasingly consequential.

The Coordination Gap

The third challenge is institutional.

On both sides, technology governance remains fragmented across multiple ministries and agencies.

In the United States, Commerce, Treasury, State, Defense, Energy, HHS, NIST, the White House, and the Intelligence Community each contribute essential capabilities but operate under different statutory authorities, organizational cultures, and policy objectives.

China faces a comparable challenge. Technology policy spans MOFCOM, NDRC, MIIT, CAC, MOST, the National Health Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the broader Party leadership.

These institutions were designed to optimize individual policy domains rather than govern an increasingly interconnected technology ecosystem.

The consequence is an expertise-authority gap.

Technical institutions often possess the deepest understanding of frontier technologies but lack the authority to coordinate government-wide policy. Political leaders possess decision-making authority but rarely receive integrated assessments spanning AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, industrial policy, and supply-chain resilience simultaneously.

Technology competition therefore risks becoming increasingly reactive rather than strategic.

Why the Current Framework Is Under Strain

These three governance gaps increasingly reinforce one another.

The October 2022 semiconductor controls illustrate both the strengths and limitations of the existing framework. They successfully protected the most advanced technologies while demonstrating unprecedented coordination among allies. At the same time, rapid technological progress has outpaced portions of the original framework. Chinese manufacturers have continued advancing beyond several original thresholds, while subsequent licensing decisions—including H200-class GPUs, high-bandwidth memory controls, and repeated “is informed” letters—have required increasingly case-specific adjustments.

At the same time, China’s response has expanded beyond semiconductors. Export controls on rare earths and magnets have demonstrated that supply-chain leverage now operates in both directions. Decisions affecting semiconductor manufacturing increasingly shape critical-mineral policy, investment decisions, AI infrastructure, and industrial planning.

These developments do not suggest that export controls have failed. Rather, they demonstrate that technology competition has become too interconnected to be governed through export controls alone.

The central policy challenge has therefore shifted. It is no longer simply how to design better export controls. It is how to govern strategic competition across an increasingly integrated technology ecosystem while preserving national security, sustaining innovation, reducing unintended economic costs, and maintaining strategic stability.

This is the role a Board of Technology Stability is designed to perform.

III. A Board of Technology Stability

The three governance gaps identified above point to a common conclusion. The United States does not need another export-control mechanism. It needs a governance architecture capable of integrating technology policy across the strategic technologies that increasingly define economic competitiveness, national security, and geopolitical influence.

This paper therefore proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability (BoTS) with the Chinese side as a permanent institutional mechanism for governing technology competition in the age of artificial intelligence.

The objective of the Board is straightforward: to strengthen national security while sustaining innovation, reducing unintended economic disruption, and improving strategic stability.

BoTS would not replace existing departments or regulatory authorities. Nor would it weaken legitimate competition or dilute national-security protections. Instead, it would provide the institutional capacity to coordinate policies that are currently managed through fragmented bureaucratic structures despite becoming increasingly interconnected.

Technology competition has become systemic. Technology governance must do the same.

Managing Competition, Not Technology

The phrase Technology Stability deserves clarification.

The Board is not intended to stabilize technological progress. Innovation should continue to accelerate.

Nor is it intended to stabilize geopolitical competition. Strategic competition between major powers is likely to remain a defining feature of international affairs.

Rather, Technology Stability refers to reducing unnecessary instability generated by fragmented governance.

Its purpose is to make competition more disciplined, more predictable, and better aligned with long-term strategic objectives.

Competition without governance increases strategic risk. Governance without competition weakens innovation.

The Board seeks to reconcile both.

Why a New Institution?

Governments have repeatedly created new institutions when technological change has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape.

The National Security Council integrated military, diplomatic, and intelligence decision-making during the early Cold War.

The Financial Stability Board emerged after the global financial crisis to strengthen coordination across national regulators.

The proposed Board of Technology Stability reflects a similar need.

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, cloud infrastructure, critical minerals, and supply chains now interact too closely to be governed independently.

Existing institutions remain indispensable.

But none is responsible for integrating the technology ecosystem as a whole.

The Board would fill that gap.

Five Core Functions

The Board should perform five permanent functions.

First, Integrated Strategic Assessment

Every major technology decision should begin with an integrated understanding of its implications across the broader technology ecosystem.

Rather than assessing export controls, AI governance, critical minerals, biotechnology, and supply chains separately, the Board would evaluate their interaction and long-term strategic consequences.

Integrated assessment should become the foundation of technology statecraft.

Second, Adaptive Export Controls

Export controls remain an indispensable national-security instrument.

Their effectiveness, however, depends upon remaining targeted, technologically current, and strategically coherent.

The Board would establish a standing review mechanism to reassess technological thresholds, evaluate commercial consequences, identify second-order effects, and ensure that controls continue protecting genuinely strategic capabilities while minimizing unnecessary costs to U.S. innovation and allied supply chains.

Export controls should evolve as technology evolves.

Third, AI Governance and Biosecurity

Artificial intelligence has become both the most powerful innovation platform and the most significant governance challenge of the coming decade.

The Board would integrate frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, biosecurity, cybersecurity, CBRN safeguards, and scientific risk assessment into one coherent policy framework.

This would close one of today’s largest institutional gaps: the separation between technical AI expertise and national-security decision-making.

Rather than treating AI governance as a parallel policy discussion, it should become a central pillar of technology strategy.

Fourth, Supply-Chain Stability

Technology competition increasingly operates through global production networks rather than individual firms.

Critical minerals, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, advanced manufacturing, cloud infrastructure, and logistics have become sources of both resilience and strategic leverage.

The Board would coordinate policies affecting these interdependent systems while reducing unnecessary uncertainty for governments, businesses, and allied partners.

Supply-chain resilience should become a strategic objective rather than a crisis response.

Fifth, Strategic Dialogue

Finally, the Board should establish a permanent technology dialogue between the United States and China.

Strategic competition requires communication as much as deterrence.

Technical experts should have regular channels to discuss emerging technologies, AI safety, biosecurity, supply-chain resilience, and reciprocal concerns before they escalate into political crises.

Dialogue should not be understood as an alternative to competition.

It is one of the mechanisms through which competition can be governed responsibly.

A September Deliverable

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi offers an opportunity to move beyond tactical negotiations toward institutional innovation.

Recent discussions have focused appropriately on tariffs, trade, export controls, investment, and critical minerals.

These issues remain important. But they are increasingly symptoms of a larger structural transformation.

Artificial intelligence is reshaping every dimension of technology competition. Biosecurity has become inseparable from AI governance. Critical minerals have become strategic assets. Supply chains have become instruments of national power.

These developments require institutions capable of governing competition across the technology ecosystem rather than negotiating each issue separately.

A Board of Technology Stability would provide precisely such a framework.

It would complement the proposed Boards of Trade and Investment by focusing specifically on the technologies that increasingly determine economic security, national security, scientific leadership, and strategic stability.

More importantly, it would demonstrate that both governments recognize a fundamental reality:

Technology competition is likely to endure.

Strategic instability does not have to.

IV. Immediate Priorities

The Board of Technology Stability should focus initially on a limited set of priorities where technological change has outpaced existing policy and where coordinated action would strengthen national security, preserve innovation, and reduce strategic instability. Early success will depend less on creating new regulations than on improving coordination across existing institutions.

Priority One: Modernize Export Controls for the AI Era

Export controls remain one of the United States’ most important national-security tools. The October 2022 semiconductor controls demonstrated Washington’s ability to protect the most advanced capabilities while coordinating closely with key allies. Those objectives remain valid.

Technology, however, has evolved rapidly. Chinese manufacturers now operate beyond several of the original memory and logic thresholds, while subsequent adjustments—including licensing decisions for H200-class GPUs, new controls on high-bandwidth memory, and repeated “is informed” letters—illustrate the increasing difficulty of governing frontier technologies through static regulatory frameworks.

The objective should therefore be continuous adaptation rather than periodic revision.

The Board should establish a permanent technical review mechanism that regularly evaluates technological thresholds, commercial consequences, allied coordination, and Chinese responses. Export controls should remain targeted, technologically current, and strategically coherent. Their effectiveness should be measured not only by restricting access to frontier capabilities, but also by preserving U.S. innovation capacity, sustaining allied technological leadership, and minimizing unintended incentives for accelerated localization.

Priority Two: Stabilize Strategic Supply Chains

Supply-chain resilience has become a central dimension of technology competition.

Recent Chinese export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets demonstrate that strategic leverage increasingly extends beyond semiconductors. At the same time, the experience of the past several years has shown that not all technological chokepoints are alike.

Rare earth processing, specialized equipment, and magnet production remain highly concentrated and difficult to replicate. Semiconductor innovation, by contrast, is characterized by globally distributed ecosystems, multiple technology pathways, and strong incentives for substitution. Policy should distinguish between these fundamentally different forms of technological dependence.

The Board should therefore pursue a framework of strategic supply-chain stability.

Possible measures include reciprocal civilian end-use assurances, trusted-company licensing arrangements, multi-year licensing horizons, and structured dialogue regarding critical-mineral supply chains. Such measures would preserve legitimate national-security protections while reducing unnecessary uncertainty for governments, companies, and global markets.

The objective is not to eliminate leverage. It is to reduce unnecessary volatility in sectors critical to both strategic competition and global economic stability.

Priority Three: Place AI Governance and Biosecurity at the Center of Technology Strategy

Artificial intelligence should no longer be treated as a specialized technology issue. It has become the enabling platform for virtually every frontier technology.

Accordingly, AI governance and biosecurity should become central responsibilities of the Board rather than parallel policy discussions.

The Board should establish an integrated framework linking frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, cybersecurity, biosecurity, CBRN safeguards, and scientific risk assessment. Technical expertise from institutions such as CAISI/NIST, DOE, HHS, NIH, CDC, ASPR, BARDA, the national laboratories, and other relevant agencies should be coordinated within a single strategic process capable of informing national-level decision-making.

Internationally, the Board should support sustained technical engagement with relevant counterparts in China, including ministries, standards organizations, AI safety institutions, and public-health authorities. Such engagement would not reduce strategic competition. Rather, it would strengthen confidence-building measures in areas where mutual interests exist, particularly concerning frontier AI safety, biosecurity, and catastrophic-risk prevention.

In the age of AI, governance of biological risk should become a core function of technology strategy rather than an afterthought.

Priority Four: Institutionalize Technology Dialogue

Strategic competition increasingly unfolds through technology policy.

Yet bilateral engagement remains largely reactive, organized around successive disputes over export controls, tariffs, investment restrictions, or critical minerals.

The Board should establish a permanent channel for technology dialogue that complements existing diplomatic and economic mechanisms.

This dialogue would enable both governments to communicate policy intentions, discuss emerging technologies before they become crises, coordinate technical assessments where appropriate, and develop reciprocal guardrails in areas of shared interest.

Dialogue should not be viewed as a concession. Nor should it be confused with cooperation.

It is a mechanism for governing competition responsibly.

As strategic competition intensifies, communication becomes more—not less—important.

Priority Five: Build Institutional Capacity for Continuous Adaptation

Perhaps the Board’s most important function is also the least visible.

Technology evolves far more rapidly than government institutions. Policy reviews conducted every several years are increasingly insufficient for technologies whose capabilities can change within months.

The Board should therefore institutionalize continuous learning.

Standing technical working groups, regular strategic assessments, horizon-scanning exercises, engagement with industry and academia, and structured collaboration with allies should become permanent features of technology governance rather than ad hoc responses to individual crises.

The objective is to create an institution capable not merely of responding to technological change, but of adapting alongside it.

In an era of accelerating innovation, institutional agility is itself a strategic advantage.

V. Institutional Design

A Board of Technology Stability should be designed around one principle:

Integrate expertise without centralizing bureaucracy.

The proposal is not intended to create another large department or replace existing agencies. Rather, it seeks to provide the institutional capacity that existing structures currently lack: the ability to integrate political authority, technical expertise, and strategic decision-making across interconnected technologies.

Accordingly, the Board should distinguish clearly between political leadership and technical leadership.

Political Leadership

Political leadership should remain at the Cabinet level.

Its role is to establish strategic priorities, resolve interagency disagreements, oversee implementation, and ensure that technology policy remains aligned with broader national-security and economic objectives.

Given Treasury’s expanding role in economic security and international negotiations, the Secretary of the Treasury would be well positioned to provide overall political leadership while working closely with the White House, Commerce, State, Defense, and other relevant departments.

On the Chinese side, an equivalent political lead would require sufficient authority to coordinate across industrial policy, economic policy, AI governance, and national security. The key point is institutional: successful governance requires a political leader capable of integrating across bureaucratic boundaries.

Technical Leadership

Political leadership alone is insufficient.

The Board should also be led by a senior technical figure with deep expertise across AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, industrial policy, and global technology ecosystems.

Unlike traditional advisory structures, this role should be permanent, independent of individual departments, and capable of translating technical analysis into strategic policy recommendations.

The central purpose is to close the longstanding gap between expertise and authority.

Functional Organization

Rather than organizing the Board around agencies, it should be organized around five enduring functions:

• Technology Strategy and Integrated Assessment

• Export Controls and Industrial Competitiveness

• AI Governance, Frontier Models, and Biosecurity

• Critical Minerals and Supply-Chain Resilience

• Strategic Dialogue and International Coordination

This functional structure would encourage integrated decision-making while preserving the responsibilities of existing departments.

U.S.–China Institutional Mapping

The Board should also maintain a standing institutional map identifying the principal counterparts on both sides.

On the U.S. side, this includes Commerce, Treasury, State, Defense, Energy, HHS, NIST, the Intelligence Community, and the White House.

On the Chinese side, it includes MOFCOM, NDRC, MIIT, CAC, MOST, the National Health Commission, and the relevant Party leadership, together with technical institutions responsible for AI safety, standards, biosecurity, and industrial policy.

Detailed personnel assignments should remain flexible and evolve alongside technological developments. The Board’s strength lies not in organizational charts, but in its ability to convene the right expertise at the right time.

VI. Conclusion

Governing Competition in the Age of AI

Competition between the United States and China is likely to remain a defining feature of the international system for the foreseeable future. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and cloud infrastructure have become central to economic competitiveness, national security, and geopolitical influence. As these technologies converge, technology competition itself is becoming increasingly systemic.

The institutions governing that competition, however, have not evolved at the same pace.

For much of the past two decades, technology policy could be managed through relatively discrete instruments—export controls, industrial policy, investment review, scientific cooperation, and trade negotiations. Today, these instruments increasingly overlap. Decisions affecting semiconductors influence AI capability. AI accelerates biotechnology. Critical minerals shape industrial resilience. Supply chains have become instruments of both economic efficiency and strategic leverage.

Technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge.

This paper has argued that three governance gaps now limit effective policymaking.

The first is an integration gap between increasingly interconnected technologies and institutions that continue to govern them separately.

The second is a capability gap between the challenges created by frontier AI and biosecurity and the institutional tools available to manage them.

The third is a coordination gap between political authority and technical expertise, both within governments and across international partners.

These gaps are unlikely to narrow on their own.

They require institutional innovation.

The proposed Board of Technology Stability is intended as that innovation.

Its purpose is neither to reduce strategic competition nor to slow technological progress. Rather, it seeks to strengthen national security while preserving innovation, improving policy coherence, reducing unintended supply-chain disruption, and lowering the risk of unnecessary escalation.

Technology stability should therefore not be understood as technological stagnation.

It should be understood as strategic stability in an era of accelerating technological change.

The Board would complement—not replace—existing institutions by integrating export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, industrial policy, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience within a common strategic framework. It would connect political leadership with technical expertise, allowing governments to respond to technological change with greater agility, coherence, and foresight.

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi provides an opportunity to begin building such an architecture.

Much attention has rightly focused on tariffs, export controls, investment, and critical minerals. These issues will remain important. Yet they increasingly represent manifestations of a broader transformation rather than isolated policy disputes.

Artificial intelligence is reshaping every dimension of technology competition.

Biotechnology is becoming increasingly inseparable from AI.

Critical minerals have become strategic assets.

Supply chains have become instruments of national power.

Future competition will increasingly be defined by the interaction among these technologies rather than by any single sector.

The challenge facing policymakers is therefore no longer simply how to compete.

It is how to govern competition.

History suggests that major technological revolutions have consistently required new institutions. Nuclear technology led to new arms-control mechanisms. Globalization produced new trade and financial institutions. The AI era will likewise require governance mechanisms capable of integrating scientific innovation, national security, economic policy, and international stability.

Competition without governance increases strategic risk.

Governance without competition weakens innovation.

The challenge of statecraft in the age of AI is to build institutions capable of governing competition wisely.

A Board of Technology Stability represents one practical step toward that objective.

PLA Navy Conducts Unprecedented Submarine-launched Missile Test into Pacific

On Monday, July 6, the PLA Navy (PLAN) carried out a rare submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test with a dummy warhead from a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The missile was reportedly launched from a location south of Guangdong and flew thousands of miles across the Pacific, landing in the South Pacific near Tonga. China described the test as a “routine” military exercise.

The test is significant because it is the first publicly acknowledged SLBM test with a dummy warhead from the PLAN SSBN that traveled so far into the Pacific (approximately 7,200 kilometers). Previous SLBM tests landed in the Bohai and were not publicly announced.

The test prompted swift condemnation from the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan, who accused Beijing of “destabilizing” the region.

It appears the missile tested was the JL-2 (巨浪-2), not the JL-3 (巨浪-3). The JL-2 has a maximum range of 7,200–8,000 kilometers, while the JL-3 is 10,000-13,000 kilometers. The range of the missile test is consistent with that of the JL-2.

With this test, the PLAN has shown the capability to target the continental United States from bastions close to Chinese waters, in addition to holding U.S. allies and partners in the region at risk. The launch indicates that China now has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent and is progressing with its nuclear triad.

CCA Analysis: A test of this range is a major development that indicates that China is moving toward a more survivable and longer-range sea-based nuclear deterrent capability. The launch demonstrates that China’s nuclear deterrent is no longer centered solely on land-based missiles.

This will make Xi Jinping very happy. Conducting a launch of this magnitude implies confidence in China’s submarine crews, command and control, and missile reliability in the context of ongoing political pressure with Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and PLA purges.

It is noteworthy that China pre-notified the United States, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Taiwan - but reportedly only a few hours in advance and with limited details. The U.S. criticized the short advance notice as “insufficient” and below the notification standards generally maintained by the P5 (meaning the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). China publicly stated that it had notified “relevant countries” in advance but did not specify which countries or how much warning they received.

This contrasts with China’s September 25, 2024 ICBM test into the Pacific, when Beijing reportedly notified the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan approximately 24 hours in advance.

The rationale for the test is straightforward: in order to boast a true nuclear triad, China has to be able to demonstrate its missiles work as designed, including reaching the expected range and landing in the pre-determined target zone. In this case, it appears China and the PLAN achieved these objectives.

I wouldn’t read too much into the timing. A launch of this type was likely planned months, maybe years, in advance, and is subject to delays based on weather. Even if China intended to time the launch with a historical event, much depends on submarine crew readiness and weather, which can change at a moment’s notice.

The test will almost certainly facilitate a desire from regional powers, including U.S. allies and partners, to cooperate more, not less, with the U.S., due to greater fear and concern over China’s nuclear modernization trajectory. That is the downside of the launch from Beijing’s perspective. It will bring U.S. allies closer together and fuel concern over China’s military ambitions.

The U.S. State Department’s condemnation of the launch won’t change Beijing’s calculus on arms control or nuclear risk reduction with the United States, or Washington’s efforts to compel Beijing to agree to trilateral arms control treaties with Moscow and Washington. China believes it is still at a strategic disadvantage with the U.S. when it comes to nuclear capabilities, and in that context, will not be persuaded in the short term to agree to any sort of arms control with the U.S.

China and Russia Kick Off Joint Naval Exercises in Qingdao

On July 6, the Chinese and Russian navies launched “Joint Sea-2026” (海上联合-2026), an annual bilateral naval exercise, in Qingdao, China. The exercise is noteworthy because it involves surface combatants, submarines, rescue vessels, and joint air-defense and anti-missile training, and will be followed by a joint China-Russia maritime patrol in the Pacific Ocean.

This year’s exercise consists of an initial harbor phase, followed by at-sea operations beginning July 9. According to Chinese official reporting, the sea phase is taking place in waters and airspace near Qingdao and includes four publicly identified major training areas: joint reconnaissance, air and missile defense, attacks against maritime targets, and joint submarine rescue operations.

The harbor phase includes command and tactical-coordination activities, professional exchanges on submarine rescue technology and equipment, reciprocal ship visits, and other exchanges. Chinese personnel toured Russian ships, while Russian sailors visited the Chinese destroyer Kaifeng.

Russia has deployed a substantial contingent from its Pacific Fleet, including the Slava-class guided-missile cruiser Varyag, a corvette, a diesel-electric submarine, and the submarine-rescue vessel Igor Belousov. The participation of a Russian submarine and specialized rescue vessel is especially relevant given that joint submarine rescue is one of the exercise’s principal training areas.

On the Chinese side, the publicly identified combatants include the PLAN’s Type 052D guided-missile destroyer Kaifeng; the Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Anshan, the Type 054A guided-missile frigate Wuhu; the Type 903A comprehensive replenishment ship Kekexilihu; the Type 926 submarine support ship Yangchenghu, and one submarine that was not identified.

The publicly announced training program is significant because it goes beyond simple formation sailing or basic communications drills. The principal activities are:

• Joint reconnaissance, which includes sharing information and coordinating detection and tracking of simulated threat actors;

• Air and missile defense, which is arguably one of the most strategically significant components, requiring integration of sensors, command systems, and defensive weapons across both navies;

• Maritime strike operations, which include coordinated attacks against surface targets; and

• Joint submarine rescue, which is an area of growing China-Russia technical cooperation and a potentially important indicator of deeper submarine-force interoperability.

During the harbor phase, Chinese and Russian experts specifically discussed submarine rescue technology, equipment development, and maritime training, suggesting that this element is more than a ceremonial addition to the exercise.

Following Joint Sea-2026, some participating Chinese and Russian forces will reportedly proceed into the Pacific Ocean for a joint maritime patrol. The exact patrol route has not yet been publicly specified in the sources available, but previous China-Russia joint patrols have taken their ships through strategically sensitive areas of the western Pacific, including waters near Japan, which at times have unnerved the Japanese military.

This follow-on patrol is as strategically consequential as the exercise itself. A scripted exercise demonstrates interoperability under controlled conditions. But an operational patrol requires the two navies to coordinate over greater distances and periods of time in real-world maritime environments. On July 11, the Global Times posted a video on X of Chinese and Russian submarines conducting at-sea patrols, suggesting a new level of joint undersea warfare training in a live setting.

CCA Analysis: There are four key takeaways from this year’s “Joint Sea-2026” exercise.

First, the exercise demonstrates the continuing institutionalization of China-Russia military cooperation. The two countries have become each other’s most important foreign military exercise partners, and their exercises have progressively expanded in frequency, geographical reach, complexity, and service participation since the mid-2000s.

Second, the air and missile defense component has increased in emphasis. Effective integration of air and missile defense requires coordination in detection, tracking, information sharing, and command and control. The critical analytical question is how much tactical data the two navies actually exchange during the drill. Public information does not suggest that their combat systems are fully integrated. But the scale and scope of bilateral naval exercises is clearly intended to improve their ability to operate alongside one another, and one assumes integration has improved.

Third, Qingdao is home to major elements of China’s Northern Theater Command Navy and is an important PLAN submarine base. Conducting the exercise there and explicitly emphasizing submarine rescue gives Russia access to a strategically important Chinese naval environment that provides both navies an opportunity to deepen cooperation in an area that has traditionally involved particularly sensitive military technologies.

Fourth, the exercise occurs amid a wider surge in Chinese military activity around Taiwan. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported an upward trend in Chinese naval movements and said that four Chinese naval formations were operating in the western Pacific as of last week. Taiwanese officials have interpreted expanding China-Russia activity as part of a broader effort to counter the U.S.-led military posture along the First Island Chain.

Thus, the most important aspect of “Joint Sea-2026” is not so much the number of ships involved, but the increasing sophistication and routinization of China-Russia naval cooperation at the tactical level. The inclusion of submarine rescue operations, air and missile defense, maritime strike, reconnaissance, and subsequent operational patrols represents a substantially more meaningful form of cooperation than ceremonial port visits.

At the same time, I would not characterize China and Russia as a fully integrated military alliance. There is still limited public evidence of the kind of deeply integrated command-and-control architecture or joint operational planning associated with the United States and its allies, for example. A better characterization is that China and Russia are developing an increasingly capable, institutionalized, and strategically coordinated military partnership that gives both countries greater capacity to complicate U.S. and allied planning across multiple theaters.

Xi Promotes Two Generals, Including One to CMC; Purges Others

On July 3, Chinese President Xi Jinping promoted two PLA officers to the rank of General, and named a new head of the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s anti-corruption body.

Zhang Shuguang (张曙光), was promoted from the rank of lieutenant general to full general, was named as the new head of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission – the top military anti-corruption body – and director of the CMC’s supervision committee, replacing Zhang Shengmin. Zhang Shuguang spent most of his career as a political officer in the Air Force and Army until working in the DIC under Zhang Shengmin. His elevation to replace Zhang Shengmin is therefore not a surprise, given the patronage relationship that existed prior to his promotion.

Wang Gang (王刚) was also promoted to the rank of full general and takes over as Commander of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Wang began his career as a pilot before leading an Air Force division. Wang later served as the director of the Air Force training department (2012–2016), assistant Air Force chief of staff (2016–2019), central theater command Air Force chief of staff (2019–2022), Air Force chief of staff (2022–2025), and deputy Air Force commander (2025–2026).

The announcement comes amid an ongoing anti-corruption campaign that has led to the downfall of many of the most senior figures in the PLA.

PLA analyst Zi Yang covers the backgrounds and significance of these two generals in detail in this piece in The Diplomat.

In other recent developments, on June 26, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee announced the removal of six PLA general officers.

• Xu Xueqiang (许学强) (PLAAF), head of the Equipment Development Department and director of the Manned Space Program of PRC;

• Wang Kangping (王抗平) (PLAAF), deputy commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command;

• Li Fengbiao (李凤彪) (PLAA), political commissar of the Western Theater Command;

• Yin Hongxing (尹红星), (PLAA), political commissar of the Southern Theater Command Army;

• Guo Puxiao (郭普校), (PLAAF), political commissar of the PLA Air Force; and

• Zhang Minghua (张明华), (PLAA), commander of the PLA Cyberspace Force.

What is most noteworthy about these purges is they appear to target the Political Work department of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) more than in the past. Three are Air Force officers, with three from the PLA Army (PLAA). Up until this point, the PLAAF had largely escaped the full brunt of Xi’s corruption effort, which had disproportionately targeted the PLA Army, Navy, Rocket force, and equipment forces. The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief has a helpful write-up of these recent purges and their significance.

CCA Analysis: It is safe to say this latest round of purges is focused primarily on dismantling the residual patronage network around the former CMC vice chair Zhang Youxia (张又侠), who became one of Xi’s highest-profile purges of senior PLA officers when he was removed from office on January 24, 2026.

It was also noteworthy that Defense Minister Dong Jun and General Han Shengyan, commander of the Central Theatre Command, were pictured on July 1 seated next to each other at a gala marking the 105th anniversary of the Communist Party’s founding. It was the first time they had been pictured alongside other senior PLA commanders.

This could be an indication that both Dong and Han may be on track to become CMC members as well.

Given the two new promotions to General, if I were to guess, the new CMC leadership in 2027 could include Zhang, Wang, Dong, Han, and Yang Zhibin, who was appointed commander of the Eastern Theatre Command in December. But we will have to wait and see.

Written by Kate Logan, Director of the China Climate Hub

In May, China’s power sector capacity breached 4000 gigawatts (GW) – exceeding the total magnitude of the U.S., EU, Indian, Russian and Japanese power sectors combined. The paradox of this scale, of course, is that China leads the world in clean power installations and is approaching a power sector based primarily on non-fossil sources while still burning the most coal of any country, accounting for over half of the global total.

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Beijing recently released its 15th five-year plan for building a new-type energy system, which introduced little by way of flashy new targets for clean energy or emissions control. But asking why officials avoided any surprises, along with a deeper read of the plan, can reveal useful insights about how domestic policymakers are approaching China’s energy transformation. In particular, three points deserve attention from those aiming to understand how Beijing intends to thread the needle between the triple imperatives of economic growth, energy security, and decarbonization.

First, the plan centers the next phase of China’s efforts to safeguard its energy security as it emerges from the Hormuz energy crisis relatively unscathed.

Recent weeks have seen a flurry of media coverage declaring China to be the “winner” from the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis. While some analysts were surprised by China’s relative ability to weather deep shocks to global energy markets, Beijing emerged from the crisis with greater confidence, reaffirming its conviction to double down on energy independence and self-sufficiency. The new plan places energy security at the center while outlining how officials plan to reduce China’s remaining import dependencies. This focus is evident from the opening paragraphs, which foreground compounding security risks while framing energy security and supply adequacy as the prerequisite for economic viability, technological innovation, and decarbonization.

The document outlines a variety of steps for further substituting imported fuels with domestic alternatives, while pledging that “energy imports will be diversified and controllable.” Major components of this strategy include expanding the development of coal-based synthetic fuels; expanding and commercializing green fuels, including by increasing green hydrogen output eightfold by 2030; and deepening electrification of heavy-duty trucking and marine shipping. In the power sector, natural gas, which already plays a minimal role in electricity generation, is to be constructed “rationally” while scaling up domestically produced gas turbines. China will also aim for 35 percent electrification by 2030, five years ahead of a newly proposed global target.

For China’s emissions, the implications of this strategy are likely mixed. On one hand, further minimizing oil and gas use and accelerating electrification will deepen reductions. However, even with the emphasis on green fuels, renewed political support for coal-to-chemicals investments risks unleashing a massive new emissions “bomb” – and one that may become increasingly difficult to track via official statistics.

Second, the plan’s emphasis on enhancing grid flexibility signals Beijing’s concern over high levels of “wasted” renewables, which are a bottleneck for both economic growth and decarbonization.

With newly installed wind and solar capacity growing at record rates in recent years, China’s relatively inflexible grid has struggled to integrate this sudden influx of intermittent power. Just last year, China added 434 gigawatts of wind and solar, a figure nearly one and a half times the size of Japan’s entire power sector. Official data now place renewable energy curtailment at just under the government’s recently-established limit of 10 percent, which was doubled from 5 percent last year. Analysts, however, believe that the actual curtailment figure is substantially higher than official figures suggest. High curtailment is impeding clean power from keeping up with

China’s rapidly growing power demand, which increased by around 5 percent last year, forcing greater coal consumption than it would be otherwise.

The solution – making China’s power sector more flexible – is at the core of the new plan. It includes a new target for the grid’s “regulating capacity” to rise by over 40 percent, which serves as a proxy for the grid’s adaptability. Details about how this will look in practice are vague, however, and the language seems to indicate Beijing’s intention to continue “bundling” coal alongside cleaner sources of generation. But several additional targets for 2030 provide a strong growth incentive for cleaner means of balancing load variation: raising “new energy storage,” which includes batteries, to 300 GW; increasing pumped-storage hydropower to 160 GW; and expanding vehicle-to-grid capacity and virtual power plant capacity to 50 GW each. Some of these targets fall short of industry association benchmarks, but they are more ambitious than the objectives around clean energy installations – reflecting Beijing’s focus on making the existing system work better before adding even more new energy.

Third, the plan reaffirms Beijing’s shift away from control-based targets and toward an “additive” approach that leverages China’s clean technology dominance as the main driver of decarbonization.

For those hoping for firmer signals on how China will limit fossil fuels and cap its emissions, the new plan will disappoint. Although the overall 15th Five-Year Plan pledges to peak oil and coal consumption – and another recent initiative integrates oil and coal use totals into local cadres’ evaluations – the new energy plan provides no additional details about the timing and level of such peaks. This is despite earlier indications in state media that oil consumption will likely peak around 2026 and coal consumption around 2027. On renewables, the plan mostly consolidates existing targets, including 2030 goals for non-fossil energy to account for 25 percent of total energy consumption and for “new energy generation” – i.e., wind and solar – to reach 30 percent of total power generation. An additional, new target for all non-fossil sources to comprise over half of power generation would still leave room for overall emissions to rise.

From Beijing’s perspective, these conservative renewables targets and the absence of hard caps on fossil fuels allow China the flexibility to grow its economy and weather potential geopolitical shocks while remaining on track to peak its emissions before 2030, as Xi pledged in 2020. They also underscore that Beijing’s level of ambition is likely to be driven less by climate commitments than by economic incentives from its leading clean technology industries, as my colleagues Neil Thomas and Guoguang Wu argued in a recent CCA report. Innovation will be an important part of China’s recipe: the plan puts forth new targets for international patent applications to rise by 5 percent and for over 100 “first-of-its-kind” demonstration projects to be launched by 2030. The plan also elevates a May 2025 policy calling for computing power demand to be met with green sources, marking the first time that “computing power” was referenced in a national energy plan.

Observers may debate whether Beijing’s new energy strategy meets the moment, especially whether it balances economic and security interests with the realities of climate change: in 2025, China suffered over $35 billion in economic losses from natural disasters, and Xi recently chaired a Politburo study session on emergency management in the wake of disastrous flooding in China’s Southern regions this year. Even without ambitious targets, however, Beijing would argue that it has already demonstrated the essential role of electrification for bolstering energy security in a volatile world. With an electrification rate significantly higher than those of the United States or Europe, China may also be better positioned to transform a wide range of industrial sectors while reducing both energy costs and carbon emissions.

Executive Summary

• This analysis argues that the next U.S.-China AI safety dialogue will be constrained not only by mistrust or geopolitical competition, or by lack of political will on both sides, but by a more practical bureaucratic problem: neither government yet has an institutional architecture that combines technical model-evaluation capacity, national-security authority, industrial-policy awareness, diplomatic coordination, and access to top-level political decision-making that could lead to real outcomes enforceable in both countries and acceptable to the global AI safety community.

• The core analytical frame is the expertise-authority gap. In both systems, the actors with the deepest AI model evaluation and testing knowledge often lack regulatory or political authority, while the actors with authority often have not exercised that authority within a broader policy process and critically lack the specialized capacity to evaluate frontier models. This makes even politically endorsed dialogue difficult to translate into a durable process.

• In the United States, CAISI, Commerce/NIST, NSA, CISA, DOE/NNSA, ONCD, OSTP, Treasury, and State all bring some assets to the frontier-AI governance game, but no single institution clearly owns model evaluation, release decisions, let alone bilateral risk-reduction diplomacy. The June 2026 executive order begins to build a classified cyber-focused evaluation process, but it remains voluntary, contested, and incomplete, with multiple players vying for primacy.

• China faces a parallel but differently structured problem. CAC, MIIT, NDRC, MOST, MFA, MSS, MPS, the PLA, and emerging technical networks such as CnAISDA all have relevant equities, yet Beijing still lacks a clearly empowered frontier-AI risk evaluator. This fragmentation matters because effective cooperation will require counterpart capacity: both sides need institutions able to speak the same language, define risk thresholds, evaluate capabilities, and speak with enough authority to sustain agreements.

• Thus what will likely emerge over the what will be at least a one to two year process will not be a single bilateral arms-control treaty or simply a purely technical exchange, but a layered and flexible architecture that could include at least some of the following elements: technical evaluation channels between expert bodies, political oversight through national-security and diplomatic institutions, and narrowly scoped confidence-building measures beginning with risks both sides already recognize, such as cybersecurity, and biosecurity misuse at a minimum, and potentially RSI and loss of control in the most optimistic scenario.

  

Bureaucratic Capacity Matters

This causal claim is deliberately bounded. Trust deficits and strategic competition remain fundamental, but bureaucratic fragmentation explains why even moments of political will may fail to generate operational cooperation, and particular across administrations in the U.S., where there is significant turnover of bureaucratic leadership every four years. Without agencies that can evaluate models, define thresholds, coordinate across economic and security equities, and authorize follow-through, leader-level endorsement produces a channel rather than a process.

The emerging U.S.-China AI governance and safety discussion, one of, if not the most important of the key deliverables of the May 2026 U.S. China Summit in Beijing between Presidents Trump and Xi, has usually been treated as a problem of strategic engagement and trust in the wake of a rapidly developing technology. The new government-to-government talks will commence as Washington and Beijing continue to contest the AI space as governed by bilateral competition over AI hardware, commercial ecosystems, military applications, talent, and the broader geopolitical advantages associated with leadership at the frontier edges of AI. These conditions make any bilateral discussion of AI safety vulnerable to concerns over intent, access, verification, security, and relative advantage. It is telling that the new dialogue was announced as a formal summit outcome by Beijing, while Washington has so far issued no parallel statement of its own, an early indicator of the asymmetries in institutional readiness described below.^[1]

But bureaucratic capacity may be the more immediate constraint through which strategic mistrust becomes operationally binding. As CCA Honorary Fellow Paul Triolo recently wrote, the governance of frontier AI models and the upcoming U.S.-China dialogue will involve interactions between a complex array of agencies, overlapping mandates and authorities, that pose significant institutional and political challenges. Neither the United States nor China has yet built a fully mature institutional system for governing frontier AI as a national-security technology. Both governments have agencies with partial responsibility for the issue, but neither has a settled architecture capable of integrating all the critical dimensions that will be needed: technical evaluation, national-security considerations, industrial-policy impacts, diplomatic coordination, and political decision-making, to name the most obvious. This is a faster-moving version of a familiar institutional lag. The early nuclear age also forced governments to build governance structures only after new technology had transformed strategic competition and there had been a Trinity Moment. But frontier AI is more diffuse and there will not be a Trinity Moment to focus minds on both sides: it is driven by private firms, the first time for a technology of this importance and wide ranging consequences not developed by government or incubated by government deployed through commercial platforms, improved through rapid software iteration, and relevant across cyber, biosecurity, military, economic, and information domains, all at once. Two superpowers are attempting to put guardrails around a rapidly developing technology without the needed bureaucratic scaffolding to both develop and implement agreements. Accelerating the development of this scaffolding both domestic and bilaterally this will be critical for not just the two countries, but the entire sector and the broader world.

To be sure, the two governments have been here once before, and the precedent is instructive. A first intergovernmental dialogue on AI was held in Geneva in May 2024, led on the U.S. side by the NSC’s senior director for technology and national security and the State Department’s then acting special envoy for critical and emerging technology, and on the Chinese side by the MFA’s Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs.^[2] Later that year, Presidents Biden and Xi affirmed in Lima the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, which remains the only concrete bilateral AI understanding to date.^[3] The Geneva channel and the State Department’s position did not survive the U.S. political transition, primarily because it was staffed by generalist diplomatic and NSC channels rather than by institutions with technical capacity over and authority for frontier models, which, as this piece argues, both sides still lack. Things are somewhat more favorable now for the participation of the requisite technical expertise sorely lacking in Geneva, but there is still no process or clear delegation nor authority that would facilitate real progress. The lesson for the new dialogue then is that leader-level endorsement without bureaucratic scaffolding produces a channel, not a process likely to endure on such a complex topic.

This reality, in the near term, is likely to constitute a major bottleneck for progress on AI safety cooperation. Frontier AI models and platforms do not fit neatly into the categories through which modern states have traditionally managed strategic risk. The most consequential models have capabilities that can spill across traditional national security areas such as cyber operations and critical infrastructure vulnerability, biological agent design, military integration, and intelligence analysis, to broader areas such as scientific discovery, economic growth across most sectors, and future risks such as recursive self-improvement (RSI) and loss of control. The technology is cross-domain, while the state remains organized by domain. Ideally, the U.S. China bilateral AI dialogue itself will spur both sides to accelerate progress towards the type of institutional authority that the age of AI, RSI, AGI (artificial general intelligence), and ASI (artificial superintelligence) require, both domestically and in time, forming the foundation of a global organization that can tackle a minimally viable AI governance framework. For longer term discussions that go beyond the most pressing near-term CBRN safety concerns into RSI and other issues, it would also be helpful to review a recent paper “Beyond Rivalry” from CCA Sr. Fellow, Alvin W. Graylin, who provides a comprehensive framework for cooperative efforts to reduce risks around runaway AI, capex overbuild, model bias, economic instability and geopolitical equity.

The U.S.’s Frontier AI Model Governance System: Many Capabilities, No Settled Owner

The U.S. landscape can be read across five functions: technical evaluation, national-security review, industrial-policy consequences, diplomatic coordination, and political authorization. The problem is not that the United States lacks relevant institutions; it is that these functions sit in different places, and no agency yet combines all five. The graphical diagram of the key parties and their relationships below can help bring more clarity on the situation.

In the United States, relevant expertise across these areas of potential discussion is dispersed across multiple institutions, while authorities specific to the most frontier AI models, such as monitoring, evaluation, release power, are all basically non-existent. Because Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has a long-standing interest in AI and has been given the authority by the President to lead the trade negotiations out of which the AI Dialogue has materialized, he will play an important role in managing the diplomatic and interagency dimensions of the U.S. China AI track, especially where AI security intersects with financial stability, cyber resilience, and broader economic-security policy. But the Treasury Department is not traditionally a major player in the AI domain within the U.S. interagency, so Bessent’s small staff will be stretched to coordinate with the many other players who will seek a seat at the table.

Cyber and security agencies: authority without the full frontier-model remit

The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the intelligence community illustrate the authority side of the gap. They bring cyber, classified, and threat-assessment capacity, but frontier-model governance extends beyond network defense into model behavior, deployment conditions, biosecurity, and commercial release decisions.

For example, the White House cyber apparatus and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), under National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross,^[4] has made a major power play to become the lead agency on frontier model governance, playing a major role in the drafting of the recent executive order on the topic. To be sure, ONCD brings cyber authorities and coordination capacity, but the Office is not a natural fit for leadership domestically, because the issue is bigger than just cybersecurity, and the natural focus of the organization is network defense, critical infrastructure, ransomware, and state-backed cyber operations. ONCD’s mandate centers on cyber coordination rather than frontier-model evaluation, and its institutional weight in this arena is limited relative to Treasury, which is close to the President, and to technically capable organizations such as NSA. Other players also involved in the process that led to the EO, specifically CISA and NSA, adding operational and technical expertise, including on defensive tools and classified cyber capabilities. The intelligence community assesses adversary capabilities and strategic threats. NSA has much greater bureaucratic heft than any of the other players and will insist on a major role in assessing frontier model capabilities and determining how and when they are released, given its dual offensive and defensive cyber mission. NSA clearly brings significant AI expertise to the game, but as a core intelligence organization is not necessarily a logical candidate to participate in the initial stages of the U.S. China AI Dialogue, until the scope and key issues become clearer.

Commerce, NIST, and CAISI: technical evaluation without regulatory control

The Department of Commerce, however, including NIST, remains central to standards, measurement, technology controls, and industrial policy. The NIST-subordinate Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), formerly the U.S. AI Safety Institute, is the single largest reservoir of frontier AI model evaluation and testing expertise within the U.S. government, and any serious effort to engage China on frontier model governance will need to include CAISI. OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft, Google/DeepMind, and xAI have all entered into arrangements allowing CAISI to evaluate advanced models. These agreements have strengthened the argument that CAISI should receive substantially greater funding because it is now expected to perform independent evaluations of systems costing billions of dollars to train. CAISI has been caught in the politics of frontier AI model governance. In April 2026 its newly appointed leader, former Anthropic researcher Collin Burns, was pushed out by the White House four days into the job over his prior stint with Anthropic, currently a controversial player in the sector after ongoing tussles with the Department of War and the former and still influential White House AI Czar David Sacks; the Commerce Department subsequently turned to Chris Fall, a former director of the Energy Department’s Office of Science, to lead the center.^[5] In June 2026, administration officials also reportedly directed CAISI to pause publication of its model evaluation reports while the new executive order is implemented, a move that underscores how contested the center’s public-facing role remains.^[6] The Commerce export control apparatus also has become involved with the recent order based on Export Administration Regulations (EAR) statutes, to bar use of Anthropic’s Fable 5 model by “foreign nationals” due to the potential for the model be subject to “jailbreaks” by foreign adversaries and non-state actors. This action may have highlighted the need for companies and national leaders around the world to ensure AI sovereignty, pushing them to evaluate Chinese open-source models that would be freed from such regulatory actions.

While NSA falls bureaucratically under the Defense Department, its director is also dual hatted as commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and the organization has a role in leveraging AI for military applications and reducing operational risk. OSTP and other White House and interagency actors are also involved in the emerging frontier-AI security framework. OSTP in particular, under Director Michael Kratsios, has been heavily involved on the AI promotion side, having a hand in drafting last summer’s U.S. AI Action Plan. Kratsios also maintains close relations with Undersecretary of State Jacob Helberg, whose Pax Silica initiative is designed to shore up the U.S. AI data center supply chain. While both Kratsios and Helberg could be candidates for participation in a U.S. China AI Dialogue given their bureaucratic remit, neither appear to have focused significant effort on the issue of governance of frontier AI models.

Mirroring the Chinese side to some degree, where some AI issues fall with the purview of the arms control elements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, under the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is explicitly responsible for strategic stability, escalation risk, arms control, deterrence, and emerging-technology challenges, which makes it the natural home for the arms-control dimension of a U.S.–China AI dialogue.

But if the dialogue is more focused on laying the groundwork for bilateral agreement on scaffolding around the testing and release of frontier AI models, the arms control framework may prove to be unworkable, given the significant economic and commercial interests that are at play here. It is worth recalling that the 2024 Geneva round was not run by arms controllers on either side: the U.S. delegation was led by the NSC and the State Department’s special envoy for critical and emerging technology, while China fielded the MFA’s North American and Oceanian Affairs Department rather than its Department of Arms Control.^[7] Where each government chooses to house the new dialogue will itself be a signal of how it conceptualizes the problem.

The expertise-authority gap

The United States still has not decided where frontier-model evaluation belongs inside the government. Existing agencies can assess many related risks, but none clearly owns the question of when a model’s capabilities should trigger government review before deployment. CAISI has already been playing a significant role here but is not a regulatory body. Rather, it serves as a guiding organization which can make recommendations. This has produced an expertise-authority gap: some of the agencies with the strongest national-security authorities are not built around frontier-model evaluation, while the institutions with deeper technical expertise may lack political standing or decision-making power. This situation is rapidly changing in the wake of the June executive order, but there is still considerable churn within the administration of authorities and leadership in this rapidly changing arena.

CAISI is closest to the technical evaluation function, though its authority remains limited. It is not a licensing body and does not control model release, all its arrangements with the leading labs are voluntary. Its role is better understood as a technical bridge between frontier AI developers and parts of the national-security state. That makes CAISI indispensable for any serious discussion of model evaluation, including Chinese frontier models, but also politically awkward as a formal diplomatic counterpart: the same expertise that makes it useful for dialogue also ties it to sometimes politicized U.S. assessments of Chinese company frontier capabilities.

This points to a broader expertise-authority gap. Security agencies can evaluate adversaries, vulnerabilities, and strategic threats, but they are less directly built for model testing, including assessing emergent capabilities, interpreting benchmark results, or judging how deployment conditions affect risk. These are specialized capabilities that require regular interaction with the leading AI labs that currently only CAISI really has. The debate over giving CAISI a larger role in frontier-model review reflects this institutional gap.

One important pocket of capacity sits outside the cyber-centric framework altogether. The Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are the only parts of the U.S. government that have actually run classified evaluations of frontier models as an ongoing practice: since April 2024, NNSA and the national laboratories have assessed Anthropic’s models for nuclear and radiological proliferation risk in a Top Secret environment, and the two sides have co-developed nuclear safeguards classifiers whose methodology is being shared with other developers through the Frontier Model Forum.^[8] If a bilateral agenda with Beijing eventually extends beyond cyber to the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) risks both governments have flagged in official documents, China’s own AI Safety Governance Framework explicitly lists misuse in nuclear, biological, and chemical domains, then DOE and NNSA expertise will be hard to leave out of the room, and the CBRN lane may in fact offer the most tractable early agenda for technical exchange, since neither side wants proliferation-relevant capabilities diffusing to third parties. But there is an important distinction here between the C and the BRN. Recent revelations of Chinese cyber operations targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, distillation of U.S. frontier models, and broader and longer-term U.S. concern about China’s cyber theft of IP make this domain particularly sensitive to discuss in the context of AI-enabled offensive and defensive cyber operations.

The June 2026 executive order as a first test case

Complicating the issue is the fact that the June 2026 AI Executive Order establishes what is effectively the first U.S. government framework for classified evaluation of frontier AI models based on national security capabilities rather than general AI safety concerns. The centerpiece is a classified benchmarking process, led by national security agencies in coordination with CAISI, to assess advanced cyber capabilities and determine when a system qualifies as a “covered frontier model.” The benchmark itself would be classified, reflecting concerns that publicly disclosing capability thresholds could reveal sensitive information about offensive and defensive cyber operations. The framework is focused primarily on cyber-enabled risks, including vulnerability discovery, exploit development, and critical infrastructure impacts, rather than broader questions of misinformation, bias, or societal harms.

From a strategic perspective, the EO is attempting to move frontier AI governance closer to an arms-control and strategic stability model. Developers of covered frontier models are encouraged to provide the government with up to 30 days of pre-release access for classified evaluation, allowing agencies to assess whether emerging systems could alter the cyber offense-defense balance or create new national security risks. While participation remains voluntary, the EO creates an institutional mechanism for government visibility into the most capable AI systems before deployment. In effect, the United States is beginning to treat certain frontier AI models less like commercial software and more like strategically significant technologies requiring specialized government assessment, a development that could eventually inform future discussions with China on AI risk reduction, strategic stability, and confidence-building measures.

But this is very much work in progress, and many within the industry are uncomfortable with a classified evaluation process and will likely push back on this process. In addition, a further political difficulty is that even a voluntary review process can be seen by some actors as the beginning of a de facto licensing regime. That concern is especially strong when many policymakers view regulatory constraints through the lens of U.S.-China technological competition. At the same time, placing frontier AI too narrowly inside cyber-focused institutions could mischaracterize the problem. Cybersecurity is central, but frontier AI safety also raises questions around biosecurity, autonomous behavior, model control, misuse, and broader social risks. A process designed mainly for cyber defense may not capture the full range of frontier-model concerns. A broader model-release or licensing framework would be a later, even more involved step.

U.S. versus China: Industry and technical counterparts

Finally, the role of industry here in the process of setting up the dialogue remains complex. The expertise in frontier AI model development, testing, and deployment ultimately rests within small teams with all the leading labs. Any agreement between the two governments will have to establish a mechanism for inputs from both AI safety organizations such as CAISI and China’s CnAISDA, from other pools of expertise such as the Frontier Model Forum (FMF), and the labs themselves. CnAISDA, the China AI Safety and Development Association unveiled in February 2025 around the Paris AI Action Summit, deserves a precise read: it is not a CAISI-style government agency but a network of existing institutions, convened with backing from senior figures such as Turing Award winner Andrew Yao and Tsinghua’s Xue Lan, whose members include Tsinghua’s Institute for AI International Governance (AIIG), the Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute, the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, the Shanghai AI Laboratory (SAIL), CAICT, and the MIIT-affiliated think tank CCID. The network itself does not test or evaluate models, although several member institutions do.^[9] That asymmetry of institutional form, an agency on one side and a network on the other, could complicate any effort to designate formal technical counterparts, though it is likely that the U.S. China AI dialogue could force consolidation of frontier AI model testing capabilities into a smaller and empowered subset of CnAISDA member organization. Indeed, this would be a desired outcome. On the U.S. side, players such as Sacks could also be part of the mix, or better, whoever replaces him in the position of White House AI Czar^[10], should President Trump decide to appoint a suitable replacement, ideally someone who can straddle industry and government and help shape the development of the U.S. bureaucratic organization structure optimized for frontier AI model governance, and serve as bridge both between industry and the government, and for bilateral and multilateral discussions of the issue as a logical focal point that can reach out across the U.S. interagency for expertise and authority as required.

China’s Frontier AI Model Governance System: Emerging but Dynamic Ecosystem

As with the U.S. graphical diagram, the relevant Chinese parties and their relationships below should be studied closely to provide a visual understanding of the counterparts we will be working with.

China’s system can be mapped through the same five functions. CAC is central to online information, algorithm governance, and data security; MIIT to industrial policy and technical standards; NDRC to planning and infrastructure; MOST to research and innovation; MFA to external governance; MPS and MSS to cyber, public-security, and intelligence enforcement; and the PLA to military risk. The problem is that no single body specializes in frontier-model risk evaluation while also holding authority across these domains.

Major government actors: authority distributed across competing mandates

Ministries, administrations, and standards bodies in Beijing have issued a large volume of AI regulations and policy guidance, especially around algorithms, generative AI services, synthetic content, data compliance, online information control, and industrial development over the past three years. But like the U.S., Beijing has not chosen to establish an agency designed specifically to evaluate frontier AI risk. The CAC has authority over online information, public opinion, algorithm governance, content security, and data-related controls. MIIT is more closely linked to industrial policy and technical standards. MPS, through cyber and public-security channels, brings enforcement capacity over network security, cybercrime, and the security implications of deployment. NDRC’s expanding AI role points to planning, investment coordination, strategic resource allocation, and the integration of AI into broader economic policy. MOST remains relevant through science and technology policy, research funding, and innovation strategy, and a MOST Vice Minister has periodically represented China at international AI safety fora, including at Paris in 2025.

MFA has the external-facing function of engaging in global AI governance. That external engagement increasingly runs through Beijing’s preferred multilateral vehicles: the Global AI Governance Initiative of October 2023, the Global AI Governance Action Plan released at the July 2025 World AI Conference, and the proposed World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO, to be headquartered in Shanghai, which Xi personally promoted at APEC in November 2025. Any bilateral dialogue will be shaped by Beijing’s effort to route AI governance through these China-led and UN channels. MSS and MPS are both centers of strong cyber and security expertise: MSS on intelligence and state-security risks, MPS on public-security enforcement, cybercrime, and protection of critical information infrastructure. The PLA has also been a reservoir of cybersecurity-related capabilities, and has clear stakes, given the cyber and military implications of frontier AI model capabilities, which have reportedly featured in recent military conflicts.

Chinese Technical Institutions

China also has an array of capable technical bodies. Institutions such as CAICT and emerging AI safety-focused organizations can provide practical expertise on testing, standards, and security assessment. The most concrete artifact of this technical layer is the AI Safety Governance Framework, issued in September 2024 and upgraded to version 2.0 on September 15, 2025, by TC260, China’s national cybersecurity standards committee, together with CNCERT/CC under CAC guidance. Version 2.0 explicitly addresses misuse in cyber and CBRN domains and loss-of-control risks and introduces a risk grading system, making it the closest thing China has to an official frontier-risk taxonomy and a natural reference document for any bilateral technical agenda.^[11] A handful of institutions are also building genuine evaluation muscle: SAIL, for example, under Director Zhou Bowen, published a Frontier AI Risk Management Framework with Concordia AI in July 2025; the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (BAAI), added to the Entity List by the Biden Administration in 2025, a status that would make its participation awkward; and the Beijing Institute of AI Safety and Governance, established in February 2025 under Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) scientist Zeng Yi.^[12] Zeng, who serves as a member of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Body on AI, is a widely respected AI safety expert who brings both technical expertise and multilateral engagement experience to the table. We will be watching for his inclusion in the Chinese team as a sign of how Beijing will approach the dialogue.

Research institutes linked to public-security, state-security, and cybersecurity systems may also be involved where frontier AI intersects with cyber operations, intelligence, and domestic-security concerns. The result is a policy field in which expertise, authority, and political access are distributed across different actors.

As in the United States, effective frontier-AI governance in China would require some combination of overall policy development, still lacking, coupled with technical competence, national-security authority, and access to top-level political decision-making. NDRC has gained influence over AI policy, but it is not primarily a technical agency and focuses primarily on domestic AI data center infrastructure and industrial policies related to the AI stack, not frontier model safety. MFA may become the visible face of China’s international AI governance efforts, while more powerful actors, including parts of the security apparatus, remain less visible. Technical institutions may be able to assess models, but they may not have the authority to define national-security priorities, and they do not appear, like CAISI, to have developed equivalent relationships with key expert bodies related to cybersecurity and biosecurity or with MPS-linked operational channels to enable testing of models under controlled or classified conditions. CnAISDA appears to have good relations with leading Chinese AI labs, but there does not appear to have been the deep integration of AI testers and evaluators within U.S. AI labs that CAISI has pioneered in the U.S. This reflects a familiar Chinese governance pattern: when a policy issue touches many priorities at once, many institutions can claim relevance, while ownership remains blurred.

Chinese AI governance must therefore reconcile competing mandates within a single political system. Frontier AI touches growth, security, ideology, diplomacy, military modernization, private-sector dynamism, and regime security at the same time. Internal coordination becomes politically and bureaucratically demanding.

This has direct implications for a Track 1 U.S.-China AI safety channel. A serious bilateral process will require counterpart capacity. Meaningful dialogue will be hard to sustain if the two systems lack functionally comparable institutional counterparts with enough authority and technical depth to scope and iterate a discussion of containing frontier-model risk. It also requires a shared understanding of what kind of risk is being discussed. If one side frames AI safety mainly as cyber defense while the other emphasizes access to systems for evaluation, the two sides can quickly talk past each other, making the collaboration framework moot.

This risk is already visible in debates over model access and evaluation. Chinese researchers have argued that meaningful safety assessment requires access to the systems being evaluated. In Washington, such arguments can easily be read as pressure for access to sensitive U.S. technology. Meanwhile, close cooperation between the U.S. government and leading AI firms can reinforce Beijing’s perception that American frontier labs are increasingly integrated into the national-security state. These perceptions make even technical exchanges politically charged.

Both sides will likely need new mechanisms that can evaluate emerging capabilities, define risk thresholds, and coordinate across multi agencies with competing mandates. Personnel continuity will also matter. Leader-level endorsement has elevated AI safety as a priority in the bilateral relationship, but it cannot substitute for institutional capacity to move the conversation forward.

History suggests that when transformative technologies emerge, governments often spend years building the bureaucracies needed to govern them. Nuclear technology eventually produced institutions such as the Atomic Energy Commission and later the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Financial crises led to new regulatory structures after 2008. Frontier AI may now be at a similar stage.

Appendix: Who is Who in China’s AI governance system

China’s AI governance system is fragmented by design. Multiple agencies and political networks shape policy, often advancing overlapping agendas while checking one another’s authority. This pattern has become more pronounced since the 20th Party Congress, as Xi Jinping has balanced the portfolios of senior leaders rather than placing the full AI agenda under a single bureaucratic chain. The result is a coordination problem that will shape China’s response to frontier AI and limit what interlocutors can deliver in U.S.-China AI dialogues.

Formal negotiators may therefore not control the institutions that matter most. MOFCOM and MFA can participate in talks, but they do not have the domestic authority to align China’s military, security, industrial, and economic-planning systems. The key question is which officials and agencies can make frontier AI legible to Xi and influence his assessment of its opportunities and risks. Some of the most important players on AI may rarely interact directly with U.S. or multilateral counterparts but can still shape the advice and constraints facing China’s negotiators.

Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi could become a key player in the emerging U.S. China AI dialogue process. As perhaps the closest confidante of President Xi Jinping and the fifth-ranking member of the PBSC and director of the Central General Office, he is Xi’s chief of staff and one of the most important enforcers of ideological discipline, who also has responsibilities that touch on the risks and opportunities of frontier AI model deployments. His positions in the Central National Security Commission and the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which sits over CAC, give him influence over the party-state’s information control and security apparatus.

Through the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, Cai has direct visibility into the Cyberspace Administration of China, the main regulator for online content, data security, and algorithm governance. The CAC has been led since 2018 by Zhuang Rongwen, who concurrently directs the commission’s general office and serves as a deputy head of the party’s Propaganda Department, a triple hat that ties AI regulation directly to the information-control apparatus. CAC’s filing and registration system functions as the primary clearance mechanism for generative AI services. It requires security assessments for developers of foundational large language models and works with technical bodies such as CNCERT/CC and emergency-response entities linked to MIIT and MPS. Because Cai sits above the cyberspace system, AI threat assessments generated through CAC and related security channels are likely to move quickly toward the top leadership.

Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang sits on the development and technology side of the system. As the sixth-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee and executive vice premier, he oversees macroeconomic planning, public finance, innovation policy, and the national science and technology agenda. Through the Central Science and Technology Commission, he helps coordinate major state-backed programs in AI, semiconductors, and data infrastructure. The commission is a strategic coordinator that identifies local policy experiments and scales selected models through the Ministry of Science and Technology and provincial party science-and-technology committees.

Vice Premiers He Lifeng and Zhang Guoqing occupy adjacent but important lanes. He, a Politburo member and vice premier, oversees finance, domestic commerce, monetary policy, and U.S.-China trade negotiations. His network also retains influence inside the NDRC, despite Ding’s formal portfolio. Zhang Guoqing, also a Politburo member and vice premier, manages the industrial base, informatization, and state-owned assets. Through MIIT and SASAC, he has influence over the physical backbone of China’s AI ecosystem, including computing infrastructure, industrial automation, hardware standards, and procurement rules affecting foreign AI chips in state systems.

The military operates through a parallel channel. The CMC Science and Technology Commission and its National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Groups monitor commercial breakthroughs and connect them to military users. Established in 2018, these groups function as local sensors for civil-military fusion, with visible activity in cities such as Chongqing, Xi’an, and Shenzhen. Despite recent PLA purges, including the March 2026 delisting of Liu Guozhi, who led the CMC Science and Technology Commission from 2016 to 2021, from the Chinese Academy of Sciences academician roster,^[13] open-source records suggest that these local nodes have continued to operate. This gives the PLA a direct mechanism for tracking frontier AI and passing military-relevant assessments upward.

The NDRC is emerging as another important coordination platform. Formally under Ding’s portfolio but also shaped by He Lifeng’s personnel network, the commission operates as a high-level strategy and evaluation body. Its AI and civil-military fusion work appears to rely on agile task forces that draw personnel from local development and reform commissions and other ministries. A reported Leading Group on Semiconductor Industry Development has its Office located at NDRC, and includes semiconductor component and an AI specific organization, managed by Xiangli Bin and Huang Ru, respectively. Huang is a microelectronics academician and NDRC vice chair; together these offices focus on semiconductor supply chains, hardware, computing infrastructure, and cross-agency coordination. The NDRC’s role in cases involving AI firms and overseas restructuring suggests that it is gaining leverage over the boundary between technology policy, capital control, and national security.

The National Data Administration, established under the NDRC in 2023, adds another piece to the system. Its mandate is to build a national data market and reduce the proprietary data silos controlled by large technology firms. That task is central to China’s AI ambitions, but implementation has been difficult. Firms have strong incentives to protect commercially valuable data, and early efforts to inventory corporate data assets have reportedly met resistance.

MPS is important for cybersecurity and public security. Through its 11th Bureau, the Cybersecurity Protection Bureau, it regulates enterprise network security under the graded protection system. As AI risks become more visible, MPS is increasingly focused on AI-related vulnerabilities and the security risks created by deployment. Its role overlaps with CAC’s authority over cyberspace governance and with the security services’ broader interest in cyber and intelligence risks.

China’s diplomatic interlocutors face clear constraints. MFA represents China in international AI talks and can frame broad principles on safety, sovereignty, and global governance. But it lacks the technical capacity, rank, and budget to direct the institutions that manage the AI ecosystem, including NDRC, CAC, MIIT, MPS, and the PLA. MFA also depends heavily on outside experts and think tanks, including the Tsinghua Institute for AI International Governance, led by founding dean Xue Lan, who also chairs the national New Generation AI Governance Expert Committee, with former vice minister Fu Ying as honorary dean.^[14] That gives it intellectual support, but not the in-house capacity or mandate to assess specific frontier-model risks.

MOFCOM has more direct policy leverage through export controls and trade tools. It can shape technology governance when AI intersects with external pressure, sanctions, or cross-border transactions. But its autonomy is limited. In sensitive cases, MOFCOM may initiate or manage parts of the process, but higher-ranking bodies such as the NDRC can still step in when strategic technology, capital, or national-security concerns are involved.

An expert ecosystem that can bridge the two systems is starting to form. CnAISDA knits together the institutions most engaged on frontier risk, and several of its convening figures carry considerable weight inside the system: Turing laureate Andrew Yao and Tsinghua AIR dean Zhang Yaqin have co-signed the International Dialogues on AI Safety red-lines statements alongside Western counterparts, Zeng Yi runs the Beijing Institute of AI Safety and Governance under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Zhou Bowen’s Shanghai AI Lab has published a frontier AI risk management framework with Concordia AI, the most active Track 2 connector between the two safety communities.^[15] None of these actors holds formal negotiating authority, but they are the likeliest source of the working-level technical expertise and trust a government channel will need, and any U.S. coalition strategy should map and engage this network deliberately rather than treating the official organs as the only interlocutors. So far, U.S. officials, including from CAISI, have not engaged seriously with China’s AI safety community, either at major international fora such as the Bletchley Park AI Summits or at other international AI fora where Chinese players have been present.

The challenge for U.S.-China AI dialogue is whether China can bring the above security, military, industrial, and planning systems into alignment, and which bureaucratic channels can translate frontier AI risks into language and priorities that reach top leadership.

[1] Center for Strategic and International Studies, analysis of the May 2026 Trump-Xi Beijing summit and its technology deliverables, May 2026, csis.org; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs summit readout, May 2026, fmprc.gov.cn.

[2] The White House, “Statement from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson on the U.S.–PRC Talks on AI Risk and Safety,” May 13, 2024, bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, readout of the first meeting of the China–U.S. intergovernmental dialogue on artificial intelligence, May 15, 2024, fmprc.gov.cn.

[3] The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” Lima, Peru, November 16, 2024, bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov.

[4] Wall Street Journal reporting on implementation of the June 2, 2026, executive order, June 2026; The White House, “Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security,” Executive Order, June 2, 2026, whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions.

[5] Washington Post, reporting on the removal of Collin Burns as CAISI lead and the selection of Chris Fall, April 24, 2026, washingtonpost.com.

[6] Wall Street Journal, reporting that CAISI was directed to pause public model-evaluation reports during executive order implementation, June 2026, wsj.com.

[7] See the White House NSC statement of May 13, 2024, and the PRC MFA readout of May 15, 2024, cited above.

[8] Anthropic, “Developing nuclear safeguards for AI through public-private partnership,” August 21, 2025, anthropic.com; Axios, reporting on the first frontier model evaluation in a Top-Secret environment beginning April 2024, November 14, 2024.

[9] Scott Singer, “How Some of China’s Top AI Thinkers Built Their Own AI Safety Institute,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2025, carnegieendowment.org; Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute, readout of the CnAISDA unveiling on the sidelines of the Paris AI Action Summit, February 2025.

[10] Reuters and Bloomberg, reporting on David Sacks stepping down as White House AI and crypto czar at the 130-day special government employee limit and becoming PCAST co-chair, March 26, 2026.

[11] National Technical Committee 260 on Cybersecurity and CNCERT/CC, AI Safety Governance Framework 2.0, September 15, 2025, tc260.org.cn; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “How China Views AI Risks and What to Do About Them,” October 2025.

[12] Shanghai AI Laboratory and Concordia AI, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework, July 2025; Concordia AI, AI Safety in China updates on the establishment of the Beijing Institute of AI Safety and Governance under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, February 2025, concordia-ai.com.

[13] South China Morning Post, reporting on Liu Guozhi’s removal from the Chinese Academy of Sciences academician roster, March 19, 2026, scmp.com.

[14] Tsinghua University Institute for AI International Governance, institutional pages on its founding dean, honorary dean, and role supporting the New Generation AI Governance Expert Committee, aiig.tsinghua.edu.cn.

[15] International Dialogues on AI Safety, consensus statements (Ditchley Park 2023; Beijing 2024; Venice 2024), idais.ai; Concordia AI, State of AI Safety in China reports, 2023–2025, concordia-ai.com.

Old Wine, New Bottle: Why “Combat Effectiveness” Remains an Elusive Endeavor

You can learn a lot about PLA weaknesses simply from reading what they emphasize. In particular, three recent PLA Daily articles collectively illustrate a deliberate effort by political work departments within the PLA to reshape the values, training incentives, and leadership practices of the force. Read another way, their repeated emphasis on “combat effectiveness” and “political reliability” suggests training standards are not meeting expectations and ongoing purges in the PLA are having lasting reverberations throughout the military.

Although the articles focus on different services — including operational units, support organizations, and defense researchers — the common thread is that officers should prioritize long-term contributions to combat capability, organizational effectiveness, and national defense modernization over individual accolades.

Correcting Political Performance

The most prominent theme across the three articles is the need to establish a “correct political performance outlook” (政绩观). One article highlights an Air Force brigade explicitly warning against allowing short-term metrics to shape military activities, stating that personnel had developed a “utilitarian mindset that prioritizes evaluations and scores over practical utility” (重考核,轻实用的功利思想). Brigade leaders concluded that “simply staring at the current report card and not aiming at success on the battlefield of the future” (只盯着当前成绩单,不瞄准未来战场打赢) represented “a deviation in the view of political performance” (政绩观出现偏差). It added: “If not corrected in time, it will inevitably damage the combat effectiveness of the troops.”

Similarly, another article focused on the revolutionary PLA defense scientists who created China’s first ICBM and nuclear warhead, praising the older generation for “consciously making political achievements for the people and making political achievements with practical work” (自觉为民造福,以实干创政绩). It further encourages contemporary researchers to pursue achievements with the mindset that “I do not have to personally achieve success, but I must contribute to achieving success” (功成不必在我,功成必定有我).

“Combat Effectiveness” as the Central Standard

The three articles repeatedly emphasized “combat effectiveness” (战斗力) as the organizing principle for political work. The Air Force brigade article directly states that officers and soldiers must “resolutely correct ideological understandings and training styles that deviate from the combat effectiveness standard” (坚决纠正偏离战斗力标准的思想认识和训练作风). The brigade subsequently emphasized the principle of “how to fight, how to train” (怎么打仗就怎么训练), promoting realistic combat courses and developing complex opposition environments. One brigade officer summarized this approach: “Training is not for first place, but only for winning on the battlefield” (训练不是为了争第一,而是为了战场打赢). Likewise, an article about the party committee of an Information Support Force unit argues that resolving “long-standing administrative issues” allows officers and soldiers to “devote more energy to the main responsibility and main business of training and preparation for war” (把更多精力投入练兵备战主责主业).

Overcoming “Short-Termism” Through Party Committee Leadership

A third theme is an admonition not to pursue short-term behavior and rewards at the expense of long-term combat effectiveness goals, portraying party committees as essential actors in improving military effectiveness. The Information Support Force article credits the new party committee with taking historical problems as “an important annual task” (作为年度重要任务来抓) and maintaining continuity during leadership transition. The Air Force article describes party committee members conducting research, identifying shortcomings, and leading personnel to front-line training sites to solve difficult operational problems.

The same article offered this anecdote to underscore the leading role of party committees:

“For a period of time in the past, the brigade’s training courses did not match the actual combat requirements. At one meeting of the brigade, when the relevant departments of the organ and the major teams reported on the training situation, the members of the brigade party committee team raised a sharp question: the training content was old-fashioned and lacked breakthroughs, and new courses could not be added based on the requirements of the actual battlefield. In the face of the merciless questioning of the members of the party committee, the head of the training section of the brigade said frankly: “When formulating the training plan, there is indeed a preference for emphasizing evaluation and neglecting practical application; for the new courses that need to be tackled, due to the long effect cycle and the difficulty of quantifying the results, they are not included in the daily training plan.”

Finally, the article on missile scientists similarly connects political values and scientific innovation, praising earlier generations who “served the country wholeheartedly and worked tirelessly” (赤诚报国,忘我奉献). In each article, party organizations are presented as responsible for aligning personnel behavior with organizational goals and military requirements.

CCA Analysis: Taken together, these articles suggest that the PLA leadership remains concerned about organizational behaviors that can undermine military effectiveness, including what the PLA calls “careerism,” leadership turnover, bureaucratic incentives, and training practices disconnected from operational requirements. The recurring theme of “correcting deviations in political performance” and “focusing all minds and energy on combat effectiveness” indicates an effort to align individual incentives with the demands of military modernization.

The articles also imply that the PLA increasingly views professional competence and institutional responsibility as important components of political reliability. By linking political work to combat readiness and innovation, these narratives seek to shape the behavior of officers, commanders, and defense researchers as the PLA prepares for more complex operational missions and continued force modernization.

But all these traits — including seeking individual rewards and “box-ticking” training exercises — are deeply ingrained in the culture of the PLA. Clearly, the PLA is worried its lack of battlefield experience will impact its ability to simulate and achieve a high standard of “combat effectiveness” in training. What was noteworthy was the continued emphasis that party committees are taking the lead in holding the PLA to a higher standard. Given all the purges of senior officers in the Political Work department, one interpretation of this emphasis is that Xi Jinping and the CMC are worried about the image of the Political Work officers, especially political commissars.

Liaoning aircraft carrier task force completes one of the longest far-sea combat trainings on record

Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning concluded 40 days of far-sea combat training and returned safely to its home port of Qingdao on Monday, June 22, the Chinese navy reported.

During the training, the task force operated in multiple sea and air spaces, including the South China Sea and the western Pacific, conducting carrier-based aircraft tactical flight drills and task force search and rescue exercises. The task force included the cruiser CNS Wuxi (104), destroyer CNS Kaifeng (124), frigate CNS Luohe (545), and fast combat support ship CNS Hulunhu (901). The Type 075 amphibious assault ship Anhui also took part in the exercises.

Footage was released appearing to show the first public video of a J‑15T carrier‑borne fighter jet being refueled in mid‑air from a PLAAF Yun‑20U tanker. Tanker refueling operations are a critical component of China’s blue water naval ambitions.

During the training, China’s Ministry of National Defense claimed that Japanese vessels and aircraft repeatedly conducted “close-range tracking and surveillance,” causing “disturbances and provocations.” The Global Times later released a video on X claiming to support China’s claim of harassment.

While China claimed the training was a “routine exercise in accordance with the PLA Navy’s annual plan,” Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) reportedly shadowed the carrier group as it passed through the Okinawa and Miyako islands into the Philippine Sea, as it has done in the past in this strategically important waterway. Tokyo confirmed it monitored the fighter launches and movements, and later issued a statement that Japanese self-defense forces will “continue to conduct professional and steady vigilance in the surrounding sea and airspace of our country…under a calm and resolute stance.”

CCA Analysis: The current 40-day far-sea combat training deployment appears to be either the longest or tied for the longest continuously reported deployment in Liaoning’s operational history. Chinese state media explicitly emphasized the unusually long duration and the extensive combat-oriented nature of the training.

Several previous deployments approached this duration:

• December 2021: The Liaoning operated in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and western Pacific for roughly three weeks before returning to port.

• May 2022 western Pacific deployment: The carrier group conducted extensive operations near Japan’s southwestern islands and recorded more than 300 aircraft sorties over about 20 days at sea.

• September–October 2024 Joint Sword-related operations: The Liaoning participated in extended exercises around Taiwan and the western Pacific lasting approximately two to three weeks.

• June 2025 dual-carrier operations with Shandong: The Liaoning spent several weeks operating in the western Pacific alongside China’s second carrier, the Shandong, but publicly available reporting did not indicate a deployment exceeding one month.

Based on the publicly available record, this recent deployment is very likely the longest continuously reported operational deployment in Liaoning’s 14-year service history. It also appears to be the longest far-sea training deployment ever publicly acknowledged by the PLA Navy for any Chinese aircraft carrier. The PLA Navy rarely publishes precise deployment start and end dates, and some earlier deployments may have involved brief port calls or logistics stops that were not publicly disclosed. As a result, it is difficult to establish a definitive historical record of China’s aircraft carrier deployments.

Finally, regarding the accusation that Japan “interfered” with PLA operations, we have seen this movie before. The video evidence does not support the claim. In fact, my review of the footage suggests the Japanese military maintained a safe distance and operated professionally. This is more about Sino-Japanese politics than it is about operational safety.

CCTV Reveals New Details of the “Nantianmen Project” — China’s Futuristic Space Combat Force

On May 31, CCTV.com revealed the latest progress of the “Nantianmen Project” (南天门计划) – a future-oriented aviation-themed science fiction program under development since 2017. The project is a Chinese aerospace science fiction universe combining novels, videos, concept art, air-show exhibits, and full-scale mockups of futuristic military systems. It is an imaginative framework that integrates hypersonic flight, air-space vehicles, dual-mode aerospace propulsion, directed-energy weapons, metamaterial stealth, and AI-assisted autonomous swarms and drones into a future military ecosystem. The project is part of China’s long-term plan to construct a global space-based strategic defense system consisting of large strategic aerospace carrier platforms and aerospace fighters.

CCTV-7’s National Defense and Military Channel (国防军事频道) introduced new conceptual designs of the project, which included the 100,000-ton-class aerospace carrier “Luan Niao” (鸾鸟); the unmanned aerospace fighter “Xuan Nü” (玄女); a full-band stealth fighter “Bai Di” (白帝); and a universal vertical takeoff and landing platform “Zi Huo” (紫火).

Screenshot of the “Luan Niao” aerospace carrier. Source: CCTV News

The project aligns with Shanghai’s “15th Five-Year Plan” strategic deployments regarding the digitalization of cultural tourism, commercial aerospace, artificial intelligence, and intelligent robots. The project recently opened an exhibit in the Lingang New Area aerospace industry cluster in Shanghai, creating China’s first immersive cultural tourism science fiction park based on aviation science fiction IP. Lingang New Area is at the forefront in positioning Shanghai as a globally influential science and technology innovation center.

The Nantianmen Project was created by AVIC Global Culture & Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the SOE conglomerate Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). AVIC envisioned using real-world technology to construct a science fiction world for the future aerospace era.

The three previously unveiled concept fighter jets differ from modern fighter jets already in existence in terms of aerodynamic layout, drive engine, flight mode, and payload.

The centerpiece of the universe is the “Luan Niao,” an enormous “aerospace carrier” capable of operating in near-space and launching multiple subordinate aircraft. It is often depicted as a strategic command platform. It is 100,000 tons, 242 meters long, has a wingspan of 684 meters, and is capable of carrying 88 “Xuan Nü” fighter jets.

The “Xuan Nü” fighter jet is conceptually designed as an unmanned air superiority fighter. It features meson circulation generators on both sides of the fuselage, and is capable of using particle acceleration cannons, hypersonic missiles, and other weapons. Combined with its forward-swept wing design, it has a visually striking effect and can operate outside the Earth’s atmosphere.

The “Bai Di” full-band stealth fighter jet employs full-band stealth and can switch between manned and unmanned flight modes. It uses a variable-wing structure to adjust its aerodynamic layout in real time according to altitude, speed, and flight attitude.

Finally, the “Zi Huo” is a universal vertical takeoff and landing platform featuring a sharply defined fuselage, a force field duct, and a tiltable power nacelle. A prototype was unveiled at the 7th China Tianjin International Helicopter Exposition in October 2025.

“Zi Huo” multi-purpose vertical takeoff and landing platform. Source: Global Times

CCA Analysis: None of these capabilities have been demonstrated in reality. For the PLA, the Nantianmen Project is therefore best interpreted as a window into China’s aspirational aerospace future rather than a catalog of actual PLA capabilities. Nonetheless, the project provides a venue for Chinese engineers, designers, and science-fiction enthusiasts to conceive of future aerospace warfare without committing to specific procurement programs, and many concepts could influence real research decades later. Chinese state media have explicitly framed the project as a way to popularize aerospace science and inspire young people to pursue careers in aviation and defense technology.

Many of the systems, like the “Luan Niao,” are almost Star Wars-esque in their rendering with a Chinese twist. The appearance of full-scale mockups at major air shows inevitably blurs the line between fiction and future capability. Some Chinese analysts believe this helps generate discussion about China’s long-term aerospace ambitions, even if the systems themselves are fictional.

For analysts of Chinese military modernization, the Nantianmen Project is useful because it offers insight into how components of China’s aerospace-industrial community envision warfare in the 2040–2060 timeframe. Many of the themes align with real-world PLA and Chinese aerospace research priorities, such as the integration of air and space operations and distributed swarm technology.

China Launches Naval and Coast Guard Drills Near Taiwan

In the past week, China has deployed both the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the PLA Navy to signal opposition to expanding Japan–Philippines security cooperation, particularly Tokyo and Manila’s decision to begin maritime boundary delimitation talks in waters that overlap with maritime areas near Taiwan that are claimed by Beijing.

Between June 1 and 7, China’s Ministry of Transport (MoT) announced a “Special Maritime Traffic Law Enforcement Action” and for the first time dispatched MoT vessels alongside CCG vessels to patrol east of Taiwan. The “law enforcement patrols” explicitly linked the operation to the Japan–Philippines maritime boundary initiative, which Beijing described as an “infringement” on China’s maritime rights.

Taiwan subsequently reported increased Chinese maritime activity in waters southeast of Taiwan, including near Orchid Island (Lanyu) and the strategically important Pratas (Dongsha) Islands. Chinese coast guard vessels repeatedly entered waters claimed by Taiwan around Pratas, leading to multiple confrontations with Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. One confrontation included a tense exchange between the Taiwanese and Chinese coast guard in which a Taiwan coast guard officer relayed the following message over the radio: “China Coast Guard, these are not your waters. You don’t belong here. Turn around and leave now!”

Screenshot of a China Coast Guard social media post tracking the movements of CCG vessel 2502 east of Taiwan. Source: China Coast Guard Via Weibo.

Around the same time, the PLA Navy maintained a higher operational tempo in the western Pacific. Japan reported that the aircraft carrier Liaoning and its escorts conducted extensive flight operations east of the Philippines, including roughly 170 aircraft and helicopter sorties, demonstrating China’s ability to operate beyond the First Island Chain.

CCA Analysis: The delimitation talks are problematic for Beijing because they implicitly treat waters east of Taiwan as an area that can be legally negotiated between Japan and the Philippines without Chinese participation. China has therefore used Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan to reinforce its claim that Taiwan-related maritime zones fall under Chinese jurisdiction. The choice of the CCG rather than an overt PLA Navy operation is consistent with China’s broader “gray-zone” approach of asserting sovereignty and jurisdiction while remaining below the threshold of a major military confrontation.

The Chinese response appears calibrated to send three messages. First, to show Japan and the Philippines that Beijing rejects any maritime arrangements that could strengthen legal or operational cooperation in waters it claims. Second, to show Taiwan that China is increasingly using the Coast Guard to normalize its presence around Taiwan-controlled islands and challenge Taipei’s jurisdiction. This is the first time MoT and CCG vessels have conducted coordinated patrols east of Taiwan, and it represents a new form of MoT-CCG integration near Taiwan. Finally, it sends a message to the broader region that carrier operations east of the Philippines and coast guard patrols east of Taiwan demonstrate China’s ability to apply pressure simultaneously in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific.

From a PLA-watching perspective, the noteworthy trend is the growing integration of CCG “law enforcement’ operations with PLA military signaling, allowing Beijing to apply pressure below the threshold of major military exercises while steadily expanding its operational presence around Taiwan.

We’re glad to have you here for the inaugural issue of the China Energy Brief, a monthly newsletter from the China Climate Hub. Each issue offers forward-looking, evidence-based insights into the forces shaping China’s green tech and energy action—and what it means for the U.S. and beyond.

This month, we take you onto the floor of the world’s largest-ever Beijing Auto Show, where the future of the electric vehicle industry was on full display. Beyond the gleaming new models, we unpack two trends with far-reaching implications: the accelerating global push of China’s cleantech exports, and how those tailwinds are reshaping Beijing’s leverage in its dealings with the rest of the world.

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China Energy Brief: Issue 1

Written by Kate Logan, Director of the China Climate Hub

The Beijing Auto Show was held from April 24 to May 3, setting an official record as the world’s largest auto show by both scale and vehicle count. What was once a standard car exhibition has morphed into a showcase for the forefront of electric vehicle innovation. I visited this year’s show, which coincided with the lead-up to Trump’s recent summit with Xi in Beijing and took place as the global energy crisis from the Iran conflict entered its third month. Beyond the shiny new car models, two important trends reflect how China and its leading firms are approaching their global strategies.

First, China’s cleantech exports will grow even stronger, which will pivot cleantech companies’ hypercompetitive mindsets into the global domain.

The official tagline of the Beijing Auto Show was translated as “future of intelligence.” But a secondary, unofficial theme permeating countless booths was “made in China, for the world”—underscoring the shift from serving the domestic market to serving overseas consumers. This trend is driven by both domestic and international factors.

Within the Chinese market, demand for EVs and other cleantech is waning, especially as incentives are removed and prices and purchases adjust accordingly. Weakening demand started “pushing” Chinese cleantech exports toward global markets well before the current energy crisis. One analyst shared that they had to revise their earlier projections that EV exports would slow by mid-2025 after observing sustained strong flows, especially in markets with few trade barriers, such as Australia and the Philippines. Export growth has been further amplified in recent months by the “pull effect” from international consumers looking to take advantage of low-cost clean energy amid spiking fuel prices. In April, domestic auto sales fell for the seventh straight month and were down 21.6% year-on-year, while EV and plug-in hybrid exports surged to more than double the same month a year prior.

Amid the Auto Show’s 17 massive exhibition halls spanning two separate conference centers, nearly every major automaker showcased a new, competitively priced luxury electric or hybrid-electric SUV—a trend that surprised me given the international obsession with China’s uber-affordable electric sedans, such as the BYD Seal. The factors elevating SUVs to the forefront reflect shifting market dynamics. Some of these vehicles will be sold domestically in an attempt to recover declining revenues. But with many of these models appearing nearly identical, many brands emphasized their desire to court global consumers, especially in high-end markets, including the Middle East. In Europe, hybrid vehicles are not subject to the same tariffs as EVs, paving the way for these battery-electric hybrids to make greater inroads.

While the show was about cars, batteries were the real stars. Attendees clustered around the pavilions of CATL and BYD’s battery arm, both of which featured cold chambers to showcase their batteries’ consistent performance even in Arctic environments ranging from –30 to –50 degrees Celsius (approximately –22 to –59 degrees Fahrenheit). While BYD emphasized the speed of its flash chargers—“ready in 5, full in 9”—CATL’s centerpiece was battery swapping, with a working model demonstrating the speed and convenience of swapping. CATL has touted its use of large language models (LLMs) to revolutionize battery chemistry research, thus freeing up revenues to spend on other areas of its global strategy.

The technologically sleek, all-electric vehicles of Chinese firms stood in contrast to those of several legacy foreign automakers, such as BMW, Audi, and Mercedes-Benz, which positioned some of their most historic vehicles as the centerpieces of their pavilions—as if to remind consumers that they had invented the internal combustion engine that powered the original automobile revolution.

Second, the tailwinds behind China’s exports have empowered Beijing to wield its leverage in responding to various demands from other countries.

In the weeks before the Trump-Xi Summit, letters emerged from House Democrats and Republicans, respectively—followed by bipartisan House and Senate bills—urging President Trump to prevent Chinese EVs from entering the U.S. market. Legislators feared he might strike a deal with Xi, akin to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s offer, in which Canada would import a limited number of Chinese EVs in exchange for Chinese investments into Canada.

But few in Beijing were closely following each escalation of this American pushback. Instead, Chinese players are eyeing more compelling opportunities elsewhere. This dynamic is perhaps also underscored by the Chinese companies invited by Xi to the state banquet with Trump during the summit: the overall absence of China’s cleantech darlings, save for perhaps tech brand Xiaomi, reflects Beijing’s hesitation to push deals if Washington remains ambivalent about accepting them.

The lingering effects of China’s October 2025 export controls on rare earth elements and lithium-battery materials still loom large, with companies lacking confidence that bilateral relations are stable enough to guarantee that Beijing will renew its temporary suspension. Moreover, Chinese companies that had been pursuing deals involving international tech transfer in other markets are facing down bureaucratic uncertainty from their own government. As one example, Chinese battery maker Hithium’s proposed partnership with Indian renewable conglomerate Reliance has yet to move forward despite sustained efforts. The important role of China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) as a closed-door arbiter introduces significant procedural uncertainty into potential deals; new State Council regulations on overseas investment will further compound this. Beyond bureaucratic factors, competition among leading cleantech firms with similar products is so intense that preserving leverage vis-à-vis rivals may further dampen companies’ willingness to share their technology.

Commercial interests are most attracted to those markets that have issued some sort of political signal that Chinese firms are welcome to invest. As one example, while cynicism abounds toward the EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act—especially since Japanese and Korean firms would be exempt from the various strings attached to future Chinese investments—enthusiasm for the Spanish market remains strong in the wake of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s trip to Beijing. Following the visit, SAIC Motor announced its decision to locate a new EV factory in Spain rather than Hungary, underscoring how political signals can tilt Chinese investment decisions even at the margins. Reports also indicate that wind manufacturer Ming Yang, fresh off a UK rejection on security grounds, is now eyeing the Spanish market.

These two trends will no doubt accelerate global electrification—but they will also pose tough questions for international markets, especially those struggling to preserve their local industries. As I wandered around the show, I could not help but wonder how long global consumers could resist the high quality and marked affordability of the products I was seeing. Will other markets continue doubling down on trade barriers, or will they reconsider them? And will Beijing be willing to engage with increasingly restrictive investment environments, or will it start abandoning them in lieu of those that welcome Chinese firms?

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1. At Shangri-La, China Saves Its Fire for Japan

What Happened: From May 29 to 31, world leaders and defense officials from about 45 countries gathered in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit. The forum has historically given Beijing a platform to articulate its regional security positions, but this year’s dialogue was shaped less by direct U.S.-China confrontation than by broader concerns over strategic mistrust, rising defense spending, military modernization, and lessons from Ukraine.

Why it Matters: For the second year in a row, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun skipped the forum, signaling Beijing’s reduced interest in a venue where it is often scrutinized over its regional behavior. While China’s delegation criticized “certain countries” for “hegemonism” and “bloc confrontation,” the overall U.S.-China exchange was tame. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said bilateral ties were “better than they’ve been in many years” and avoided direct mention of Taiwan in his prepared remarks. The sharper exchange came instead between Beijing and Tokyo: China accused Japan of reviving militarism and questioned whether it could “win the trust of the international community,” while Japan criticized China’s military expansion and warned against changing the status quo by force. The contrast suggests that, even as Beijing manages optics with Washington after the recent Trump-Xi summit, it remains willing to pressure U.S. allies — especially Japan — over regional security issues.

By Kristina Lozinskaya, Schwarzman Fellow and Junior Fellow on China-Russia Relations at the Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “PLA Watch,” a monthly newsletter centered on delivering insights into China’s military affairs on the Center for China Analysis Substack.

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The latest on what’s happening in China from Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

THIS WEEK:

China targets Japan at Shangri-La, Beijing tightens overseas investment rules, Xi touts youth exchanges, policymakers advance urban renewal, and Xi spotlights future industries.

Read back issues in the China 5 Archive.

Police officers stand on patrol during the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue at the Shangri-La Hotel on May 29, 2026 in Singapore. (Photo by Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)

1. At Shangri-La, China Saves Its Fire for Japan

What Happened: From May 29 to 31, world leaders and defense officials from about 45 countries gathered in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit. The forum has historically given Beijing a platform to articulate its regional security positions, but this year’s dialogue was shaped less by direct U.S.-China confrontation than by broader concerns over strategic mistrust, rising defense spending, military modernization, and lessons from Ukraine.

Why it Matters: For the second year in a row, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun skipped the forum, signaling Beijing’s reduced interest in a venue where it is often scrutinized over its regional behavior. While China’s delegation criticized “certain countries” for “hegemonism” and “bloc confrontation,” the overall U.S.-China exchange was tame. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said bilateral ties were “better than they’ve been in many years” and avoided direct mention of Taiwan in his prepared remarks. The sharper exchange came instead between Beijing and Tokyo: China accused Japan of reviving militarism and questioned whether it could “win the trust of the international community,” while Japan criticized China’s military expansion and warned against changing the status quo by force. The contrast suggests that, even as Beijing manages optics with Washington after the recent Trump-Xi summit, it remains willing to pressure U.S. allies — especially Japan — over regional security issues.

By Kristina Lozinskaya, Schwarzman Fellow and Junior Fellow on China-Russia Relations at the Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “PLA Watch,” a monthly newsletter centered on delivering insights into China’s military affairs on the Center for China Analysis Substack.

2. China Expands Oversight of Overseas Investment

What Happened: Beijing issued sweeping new rules on June 1 that expand regulators’ authority over overseas investment involving Chinese investors, technology, data, and national security. The State Council regulation requires approval for overseas transfers of export-controlled goods, technologies, services, and related data, and bars indirect transfers through cross-border personnel deployment, consulting, and training arrangements. Building on the National Development and Reform Commission’s 2017 outbound investment rules, the new framework extends oversight to a broader range of overseas interests acquired directly or indirectly by firms, organizations, and individuals.

Why It Matters: The changes signal a shift from traditional outbound investment controls toward a more integrated national security regime. While earlier frameworks primarily targeted corporate outbound investments, the new rules also extend explicit regulatory reach to individual investors and non-traditional channels, especially with respect to sensitive technologies and data. This arrives as Beijing has already launched a crackdown on offshore trading platforms accused of helping retail investors bypass capital controls, while regulators have also moved against brokerages like Tiger and Futu over illegal cross-border securities operations.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Watch “Are Export Controls Working? Field Notes from China’s AI Frontlines,” with Scott Kennedy, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Paul Triolo, CCA Honorary Senior Fellow on Technology, moderated by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee.

3. China Sets National Framework for Urban Renewal

What Happened: The 15th Five-Year Plan for Urban Renewal was released on May 28, turning a patchwork of local policy experiments into a national framework for long-term urban redevelopment. The plan reflects Beijing’s effort to move beyond the era of rapid outward city expansion and toward upgrading existing urban stock: improving older housing, pursuing adaptive reuse of old districts and factories, strengthening public services, and balancing development with cultural-heritage protection. It also explicitly warns against “large-scale demolition and construction” and “fake reconstruction,” marking a shift away from earlier redevelopment models that frequently relied on tearing down low-value areas for higher-density commercial projects. The key financing change is that eligible urban-renewal projects can now use local-government special-purpose bonds as project capital.

Why It Matters: Beijing is trying to redirect developers, construction demand, and local-government investment away from the land-financing model that contributed to China’s property crisis. The plan’s financing architecture also shows how difficult that shift will be. It combines special bonds, policy-bank lending, REITs, public-private partnerships, and utility-pricing reforms to make projects viable while avoiding new hidden local debt. If it works, urban renewal could become a more disciplined model for upgrading aging cities and infrastructure without fully reviving land-finance dependence. If returns on new projects disappoint, however, Beijing risks creating another channel for local debt.

By Jeremiah May, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “China’s Property Rebalancing: The Long Road to a New Development Model,” by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee and David Zhang, Analyst at Trivium.

4. Xi Jinping on Developing China’s Future Industries

What Happened: In the June 1 issue of Qiushi, Xi Jinping published “Looking Ahead to the Future and Developing Industries,” an article based on his January 30 speech during the 24th collective study session of the 20th CPC Central Committee Political Bureau. The article calls for developing future industries through innovation and strategic planning, with a focus on sectors such as quantum technology and biomanufacturing. It also highlights the importance of enterprises, supportive policies, governance, and international cooperation in advancing China’s long-term development goals.

Why It Matters: Xi’s speech and Qiushi article signal China’s strategic priorities for achieving technological self-reliance and economic competitiveness in emerging industries. By emphasizing frontier sectors alongside stronger enterprise participation and policy support, Beijing is positioning future industries as key drivers of innovation, industrial upgrading, and long-term national development.

By Taylah Bland, Fellow on Climate and the Environment, Center for China Analysis (@Taylahbland)

Learn More: Follow China’s DeepSeek Moment, CCA’s webinar series examining key moments in China’s technological rise and their implications for global competition.

5. Xi Highlights Early Success of U.S.-China Youth Exchange Initiative

What Happened: Xi Jinping responded to a letter from students participating in a U.S.-China youth exchange program, highlighting that since he launched the initiative in November 2023 to “invite 50,000 American youth to China for exchanges and study over five years,” they have exceeded this goal and achieved the target two and a half years early. Xi noted that these exchanges have deepened mutual understanding, fostered lasting friendships, and opened a new chapter in people-to-people ties between China and the United States.

Why It Matters: The “50,000 in Five Years” initiative was announced during Xi’s 2023 visit to California for his meeting with then-President Biden, marking his first trip to the United States since the pandemic. Supported largely through programs such as the Young Envoys Scholarship (YES) initiative, the effort was initially met with skepticism regarding both its feasibility and strategic intent. Its completion well ahead of schedule nevertheless demonstrates that when top leaders on both sides actively support engagement—and neither side erects significant political obstacles—certain areas of U.S.–China cooperation can transcend partisan divisions and outperform expectations. Going forward, it will be important to watch whether Beijing and Washington continue to prioritize youth exchanges as a means of sustaining long-term people-to-people ties and cultivating a new generation of bridge-builders across the Pacific.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Global Perceptions of China: Insights from the Next Generation,” featuring four winning essays from emerging young scholars around the world on how China is viewed from their corners of the globe.

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1. Xi Reportedly Planning North Korea Trip

What Happened: A possible visit by Xi Jinping to North Korea is being actively discussed by regional governments and media outlets. According to a May 20 Reuters report citing South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency, Xi could travel to Pyongyang in late May or early June. Reuters also reported that Chinese security and protocol teams had recently visited Pyongyang, often a sign of preparations for a high-level state visit. The Chinese government has not officially confirmed the trip, however.

Why it Matters: The proposed trip would be highly significant for China–DPRK relations. It would be Xi’s first visit to North Korea since 2019, following Xi’s recent summits in Beijing with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. The visit could also signal a shift in China’s approach toward “denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula. China continues to publicly endorse “denuclearization” in principle, but recent statements suggest a growing emphasis toward “stability,” “dialogue,” and opposition to “deterrence and pressure.” Finally, the trip could help Beijing shore up its influence over Pyongyang. Beijing has arguably lost leverage since Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed a strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 that includes a mutual defense provision widely interpreted as a de facto mutual defense pact.

By Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis (@LyleJMorris)

Learn More: Read the roundtable report from “The China–Russia–North Korea Nexus,” a closed-door discussion convened by the Sungkyun Institute of China Studies (SICS) and the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

2. Beijing Tightens Expectations for Advisors Through Revised Responsibility Guidelines

What Happened: Wang Huning, a Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), recently chaired a meeting calling on CPPCC members to strengthen research and consultation around key tasks set by the CCP Central Committee. Wang urged members of the Party’s political advisory body to offer policy recommendations that are forward-looking, targeted, and practical. The meeting also approved revised guidelines on “Strengthening the Responsibility and Commitment of CPPCC Members.”

Why It Matters: The specific revisions have not yet been disclosed. But when the guidelines were first introduced in 2020, their core message was that CPPCC members—who serve as part of the Party-state’s advisory and policy consultation apparatus—should “be neither magpies nor crows, but only woodpeckers.” In practice, this means they are expected neither to exaggerate positive news nor amplify pessimistic narratives, but instead to identify concrete problems and propose workable solutions. This principle has become an important guideline for Chinese scholars and policy experts, many of whom are CPPCC members, when engaging with overseas think tanks and foreign interlocutors.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China” by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

3. China Expands Social Insurance Access for Migrant Workers

What Happened: On May 22, China’s State Council announced new measures to encourage migrant workers to enroll in social insurance programs where they work, regardless of their hukou—China’s household registration system. The move affects China’s 357 million migrant workers, including gig economy workers on ride-hailing and food delivery platforms. The reforms aim to simplify cross-regional insurance transfers, with officials framing the changes as a way to help narrow the rural-urban gap, accelerate urbanization, and boost consumption.

Why It Matters: The move is part of China’s broader effort to dismantle the hukou system. To boost domestic consumption, Beijing recognizes the need to equalize access to public services, including education and healthcare, that remain tied to residents’ place of household registration. The reform also addresses mounting pressure on China’s social insurance system, which faces rapid population aging, sluggish contribution growth, and uneven participation among migrant and informal workers under the existing pay-as-you-go framework. Extending access to these workers could expand the social insurance system’s contribution base and improve its long-term fiscal sustainability.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Who Will Till the Land? Conflicting Narratives About Rural China’s Demographic Future,” by Vivianne Zhang Wei, founder of Chinese Farm Chronicles, and CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee.

4. Li Qiang Highlights Energy and Food Security in Zhejiang Visit

What Happened: Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited several strategic storage and logistics facilities in Zhejiang province, including the Zhoushan National Petroleum Reserve Base, a bulk agricultural product storage and transportation base, and the Ningbo Daxie commercial petroleum reserve project. During the tour, Li emphasized the need to maintain adequate reserves of “bulk commodities and important materials” amid growing uncertainty in the external environment. He also called for expanding reserve capacity, accelerating storage infrastructure construction, improving technological and digital management systems, and strengthening coordination between strategic and commercial reserves.

Why It Matters: While China’s reserve expansion is not new, the political signaling behind Li’s visit is significant. Senior Chinese leaders do not choose inspection stops randomly, and the focus on petroleum and grain reserves underscores Beijing’s growing emphasis on economic security and resilience in a more unstable geopolitical environment. The call to better coordinate strategic and commercial reserves also suggests China is building a more comprehensive resilience system to withstand supply disruptions and political shocks. More broadly, the visit reflects how Beijing increasingly views energy and food security as core components of national security.

By Li Shuo, Director of China Climate Hub, and Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Why Food Security is a Top Priority for China” by former Research Associate Genevieve Donnellon-May.

5. Deadly Shanxi Mine Explosion Exposes Safety Failures

What Happened: On May 22, a gas explosion occurred at the Liushenyu mine in Qinyuan County, Changzhi, Shanxi. After initial uncertainty over the death toll, authorities now say 82 people are dead, two are missing, and more than 120 have been hospitalized. Xi Jinping and Li Qiang have framed the disaster, now under State Council investigation, as a warning for the country amid broader efforts to improve workplace safety.

Why It Matters: Reporting by Chinese state media has pointed to poor business practices and systematic rule evasion by the mining company, Shanxi Tongzhou Group. These include the company’s failure to maintain an accurate count of workers underground, as well as its outsourcing of labor to contractors under arrangements that weakened accountability and prioritized production over safety. Some reports also point to unregulated mining areas omitted from official maps, including the use of so-called “yin-yang drawings,” in which one set of drawings was submitted for regulatory filings while another guided actual mining operations. Following the incident, public commentary on Chinese social media has emphasized how catastrophic industrial accidents reflect long-term failures in enforcement and organizational cultures that normalize risk. There is also concern that local authorities initially minimized the death toll, reporting only eight deaths.

By Michael Cerny, Affiliated Researcher, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “China’s New Climate Targets Decoded: Cautious Progress or Missed Opportunity?” by CCA Senior Program Officer Taylah Bland.

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Recent Southern Theater Command Exercises Highlight New Joint Training Thinking

A PLA Daily article, published on May 23, highlights ongoing efforts within the PLA to pursue joint, “real combat” training criteria over individual accolades. Of course, “jointness” is not a new push within the PLA, but the specifics of this report reveal new dimensions, and struggles, in honing a truly joint force.

The PLA Daily reporter follows several recent joint training exercises in the Southern Theater Command (STC), in particular involving the PLA Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF). During one exercise, a pilot reportedly locks onto enemy aircraft, ready to fire, but the “real-time data-sharing and integrated battlefield awareness” (数据链实时共享战场态势一体感知) detects that friendly forces have not yet completed their attack deployment. The pilot assesses that launching an attack would “prematurely expose their own position, disrupt the entire combat plan, and even lead to the failure of the system-wide operation.” (提前暴露己方位置，打乱整个作战部署，甚至导致体系作战失利). The report says the pilot immediately abandons his attack and disengages to coordinate with friendly forces, concluding that “the system’s power created a formidable synergy, allowing them to quickly gain the upper hand on the complex and ever-changing battlefield” (体系威力形成强大合力，让他们很快在复杂多变的战场上占据主动).

The takeaway, according to the after-action report, is as follows:

“In the past, we always focused on individual air combat performance and the pass rate of individual subjects; but when we actually went to the joint training ground, we realized that no matter how excellent an individual is, it is difficult to form a cohesive force without the system; no matter how outstanding the performance is, it is difficult to achieve effective training without coordination.” (过去, 我们总盯着单机空战成绩, 单课目优秀率; 可真到联合训练场上才明白: 个体再优秀, 脱离体系也难成合力; 成绩再突出, 没有协同也难有练兵实效).

The unit’s leader explained that every officer and soldier should have this sense of the “big picture” in mind when training within joint simulated environments.

The article went on to describe the ongoing challenge for troops and officers in changing their mindset from seeking individual accolades and scores to adopting “joint force” standards. The author repeatedly mentioned instances of pilots and officers sacrificing personal rewards for the betterment of the joint force. Or, as the article says, “pooling their collective wisdom around the principles of ‘unified command, unified discourse, and unified action’” (统一指挥, 统一话语, 统一行动集智攻关), and “breaking away from traditional evaluation models to adopt the system contribution rate as the main standard for measuring training effectiveness” (打破传统考评模式，将体系贡献率作为衡量训练质效的主要标准).

CCA Analysis: This is a useful reminder that the PLA has a long way to go to achieve a true joint force. The examples cited in the article about progressing step by step from joint training with the “same type of aircraft,” to “mixed training with different types of aircraft,” and then to “integrated ship-aircraft training” are illuminating. For the U.S. joint force, many of these scenarios would seem rudimentary (granted, the U.S. military has by no means “perfected” joint operations; it is always a work in progress). It is also illuminating to read what a massive mindset shift is required for the PLA to train under true joint requirements and environments. This is a historically army-based military which, as the article concedes, has relied on individual exercise scores that likely inflate their sense of accomplishment. For all the handwringing these days in Washington that the PLA is 10-feet tall and outpacing the United States in several net assessment metrics, it still struggles with adopting a joint force mindset and accurately assessing training in joint settings. To me, RAND’s 2015 report on “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” still applies to the PLA in 2026.

“Comradeship Should Not Become a Loophole in Discipline”: PLA Discipline Organs Target Officers’ “Social Circles”

The PLA is in the midst of one of the largest purges of senior officers in recent history. This is no surprise to anyone who has followed recent developments involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, for example.

But a recent PLA Daily article identifies a new campaign undertaken by Party Committees and Discipline Inspection departments within the PLA — cracking down on “personal social circles” among PLA officers, especially while off duty.

The article, titled “An Army Unit Strictly Regulates the ‘Social Circles’ of Its Leading Cadres,” follows a “leading cadre” who recently took leave and received several phone calls from former comrades and family members asking for favors. The article reads as both a cautionary tale and a training guide, warning PLA cadres of new regulations imposing restrictions on meeting with and doing favors for family and friends while on vacation.

The scenarios themselves are revealing: one involves a call from a former comrade-in-arms who invites the officer out to drink; another from a family member who requests the officer’s help getting his nephew a civilian position in a local PLA unit; and a third from a manager of a local construction company.

The first scenario paints the following picture: a retired army veteran reaches out, asking to get together. He says, “It’s been a long time since we’ve seen each other. You’re the only one still in the army. Let’s get together and catch up!” The officer responds, “Feelings are feelings, and discipline is discipline. Our camaraderie doesn’t need to be maintained by eating and drinking. Let’s play a game of badminton tomorrow morning, work up a sweat, and chat. Wouldn’t that be great?” The friend agrees and, after badminton, asks the officer, “Does your company need to purchase training equipment recently? I have resources and connections.”

Upon hearing this, the officer waves his hand and says, “Lao Liu, if you’re going to talk about this, then that’s enough for today. You know the regulations in the army. We’re comrades-in-arms, but there’s no room for personal relationships when it comes to rules. Don’t make me make a mistake.”

The second scenario involved a phone call with a relative, during which a military officer was asked to use his connections to help a nephew secure a civilian position in another military unit. The cousin urged him to “put in a good word” and ask recruiters to “‘take care’ of him.” The officer firmly refused, explaining that the recruitment process is now “entirely supervised by the discipline inspection department” and that every stage is “open and transparent.” When the cousin expressed disbelief that he lacked enough “influence” after years in the military, the officer responded that “this isn’t about saving face; it’s about the bottom line of discipline.” He emphasized that cadres are prohibited from using their authority to benefit relatives and concluded that if the nephew truly wanted the position, he should “prove himself based on his abilities.”

The last scenario starts when the officer receives a call from a local construction company manager inviting him to “relax” at a newly opened fishing park, insisting they “absolutely would not talk about work.” The officer recognizes the caller as a manager from a company that had recently lost a bid for a military repair project. Rejecting the overture, the officer bluntly explains that the company failed in its bid not because it lacked “connections in the military,” but because “your quote and proposal were indeed inferior to those of the winning bidder.” Recalling a corruption case in which a PLA official was gradually compromised through seemingly harmless leisure invitations, the officer stressed that PLA engineering projects are now “completely open and transparent,” with the Discipline Inspection Commission supervising “the entire process.” He added that “if the conditions are met, there’s no need to treat anyone to meals or entertainment,” before ending the call.

CCA Analysis: This article is super interesting for several reasons. First, the three scenarios reveal sources of corruption that have long plagued the PLA for decades: family members and business colleagues using “guanxi” networks within the PLA to enrich themselves. Zhang Youxia was reportedly accused of failing to control “close associates, family members and relatives” tied to graft networks, and Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were also accused of abusing their authority over procurement within the Central Military Commission (CMC) Equipment Development Department in exchange for financial gain and political favors. There has also been speculation that China’s nuclear silo lids not operating properly as a result of embezzlement.

More noteworthy is the fact that the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission (中央军委纪律检查委员会) has apparently launched new “anti-corruption education classes” throughout the PLA, including having Party Committee Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries to conduct “one-on-one reminder talks” with members of the unit leadership teams on “hunting” scenarios involving family members and business associates. To quote the article, “purify your ‘three circles’ (自觉净化 “三圈”) (i.e. circles of influence, social circles, and personal relationships), and that the use of power must be “based on evidence and interactions must leave a trace.” (用权需有据, 交往应有痕).

The article is almost comical in its admonition for officers not to speak with or attend social gatherings with family friends or close associates during leave. But it’s no laughing matter: this is one of the most common avenues for corruption to take place in the PLA. Good luck enforcing it.

Liaoning Departs for Another Exercise Near Japan

On May 19, the PLA dispatched the Liaoning — China’s first aircraft carrier — for a new round of naval exercises in the western Pacific that included live-fire drills, tactical flight operations, and support missions, according to the Ministry of National Defense website. The PLA Navy described the drills as “routine annual exercises” intended to improve combat readiness and operational capabilities.

A day later, Japan’s joint staff tweeted that its JASDF Southwestern Air Defense Force’s fighters scrambled to interdict suspected PLA intrusions into Japan’s airspace over the East China Sea.

The PLA Navy deployment follows a series of increasingly ambitious Chinese naval operations beyond the first island chain, including previous exercises east of the Miyako Strait and near Guam. Last year, Chinese and Japanese aircraft were involved in a tense encounter near Okinawa during a similar carrier deployment, with Japan accusing Chinese J-15 fighters of locking fire-control radar onto Japanese aircraft.

CCA Analysis: China is still seething over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks that a Taiwan Strait crisis could justify Japanese military intervention, comments Beijing condemned as crossing a “red line.” China is sending the PLA to remind Tokyo of Beijing’s indignation. China has noticeably expanded unilateral military activity around Japanese territory, with Japan’s latest defense white paper warning that growing Chinese military operations in nearby waters and airspace pose a threat to Japan’s security. Sino-Japan relations have reached the lowest level in years, and these latest carrier drills are China’s attempt at normalizing sustained naval and air operations in the western Pacific near Japan.

1. Beijing Defines “Constructive Strategic Stability” After Trump-Xi Summit

What Happened: The most important new framing to emerge from the Trump-Xi summit was the idea of “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.” Beijing has elevated this as the summit’s defining outcome, with similar language echoed by the White House. Chinese officials and state media are presenting it as guidance for the next three years and beyond, even elevating it as a major Xi-era innovation in great-power relations. The concept moves beyond Cold War-style strategic stability rooted in rivalry and mutually assured destruction. Instead, Beijing’s official interpretation stresses expanding shared interests, avoiding zero-sum competition, preventing sharp swings in ties, and steering clear of conflict, confrontation, or war.

Why It Matters: Beijing’s motivation behind “constructive strategic stability” reflects both confidence and anxiety. On one hand, China wants this framework to reduce external volatility amid China’s domestic economic weaknesses, elevate Xi as the central architect of leader-level diplomacy, and position China as a historic power shaping a new paradigm with the United States. On the other hand, the push also reflects mounting pressure stemming from China’s economic slowdown, geopolitical headwinds, uncertainty surrounding the Iran crisis and resulting global turmoil, and fears that unmanaged competition with Washington could harden into confrontation, or worse. The appeal of this concept is that it allows China to seek guardrails while positioning itself as an equal to the United States, while preserving room for cooperation in critical areas such as public health and AI safety, even as strategic competitive fundamentals intensify.

By Lizzi C. Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy, Center for China Analysis (@wstv_lizzi)

Learn More: Explore “The Avoidable War: An Alternative Future for U.S.-China Relations,” an ASPI initiative on alternative futures for U.S.-China relations, and read “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping,” Kevin Rudd’s framework for managing strategic divergence and cooperation within a stable long-term relationship.

2. April Data Shows China’s Uneven Recovery

What Happened: April data revealed the fragility of China’s domestic recovery. Retail sales slowed to just 0.2 percent year-on-year, fixed-asset investment fell back into contraction, private investment weakened, and the property slump showed few signs of easing. Exports remained a key cushion, but their strength was increasingly concentrated in tech and high-end manufacturing—sectors that boost output and headline growth but do not generate enough broad-based employment or income support to revive household confidence.

Why It Matters: The Trump-Xi summit may have temporarily eased tensions, as reflected in MOFCOM’s readout on bilateral trade, but China’s deeper challenge lies at home. Households are borrowing less, spending cautiously, and deleveraging amid a weak labor market and prolonged property downturn. Private firms, especially smaller firms in traditional sectors, are being squeezed from both sides: weak domestic demand limits pricing power, while higher energy prices linked to the conflict in Iran are raising input and supply chain costs. China’s tech engine is buoying sentiment, but it is not pulling the wider economy or the labor market along with it.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, and Lizzi C. Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy, Center for China Analysis (@wstv_lizzi)

Learn More: Read “China’s Property Rebalancing: The Long Road to a New Development Model,” by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee and David Zhang, Analyst at Trivium.

3. Xi Hosts Putin Five Days after Trump in a Bid for Reassurance

What Happened: Five days after President Xi held a high-stakes summit with President Trump, Beijing welcomed President Putin with comparable grandeur. Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the “China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination,” Xi praised their strategic cooperation as reaching a “historic high,” while Putin hailed the two as a stabilizing force in the world. The leaders signed around 40 agreements focused on the economy, trade, education, science, and technology.

Why It Matters: Putin’s 25th visit to China, coming on the heels of Xi’s historic meeting with Trump, is meant to reassure Moscow of its continued importance to Beijing while projecting a united front amid lingering tensions with the United States after the Trump-Xi summit. In an indirect jab at Washington, the two leaders warned of the unprecedented damage caused by unilateralism and hegemony. They criticized the war in Iran as a violation of international law, called the United States “irresponsible” for allowing the New START nuclear treaty to expire, and condemned Trump’s proposed Golden Dome missile defense system as a threat to global stability. At the same time, the visit revealed limits in the bilateral relationship. The two sides failed to reach a breakthrough on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would have doubled Russia’s natural gas exports to China, underscoring Beijing’s reluctance to deepen long-term dependence on Russian gas despite mounting concerns over energy security. The Chinese foreign ministry also refuted reports that Xi had told Trump that Putin might regret his 2022 invasion of Ukraine, raising questions about the extent of China’s support for Russia in the war.

By Kristina Lozinskaya, Schwarzman Fellow and Junior Fellow on China-Russia Relations, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Watch “China’s Role in and Perception of a Post-Ukraine Conflict Scenario,” with CCA Non-Resident Senior Fellow Ambassador Pierre Andrieu and CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris.

4. Record EV Exports Sustain China’s Cleantech Momentum

What Happened: Analysis of monthly data from China’s General Administration of Customs indicates that China’s cleantech exports in April 2026 remained close to record highs, despite changes to tax rebate policies that were expected to reduce solar and battery exports. Although solar and battery exports declined, they remained considerably above pre-Strait of Hormuz crisis levels. At the same time, a surge in electric vehicle (EV) exports drove monthly export volumes to a record USD 9.4 billion, more than offsetting the decline in solar and battery exports.

Why It Matters: Against the backdrop of ongoing geopolitical tensions and instability in global energy markets, the April data provides the clearest evidence yet that disruption to the Strait of Hormuz is accelerating demand for Chinese clean technology products. This is especially visible in the EV sector, where electrification offers an alternative to dependence on traditional internal combustion engines. Continued strength in overall cleantech exports also suggests that demand has remained resilient despite policy adjustments aimed at reducing solar and battery export volumes.

By Taylah Bland, Fellow on Climate and the Environment, Center for China Analysis (@Taylahbland)

Learn More: Read “The Evolving Politics of Climate Change in China“ by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu and CCA Fellow Neil Thomas.

5. Xi Calls for Accelerating China’s Independent Discourse and Knowledge System

What Happened: On May 17, Xi Jinping issued instructions on promoting the development of China’s philosophy and social sciences at a symposium. He called for deeper systematic and academic study and interpretation of the Chinese Communist Party’s innovative theories, while accelerating the construction of an independent Chinese knowledge system in philosophy and social sciences. Separately, more than 200 representatives from China’s social science community gathered in Beijing for a two-day symposium to study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.

Why It Matters: In order to promote its own discourse system and value standards, the CCP has historically sought to create new governing concepts, propositions, and theoretical frameworks, such as the concept of “One Country, Two Systems.” Since Xi came to power, Beijing has accelerated these efforts. In politics, Xi introduced the concept of “whole-process people’s democracy” while in economics, he promoted the idea of “new quality productive forces.” More recently, during his meeting with Trump, Xi proposed a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” between China and the United States, extending the same impulse to shape how China’s role is described in the international arena. Through these formulations, Beijing seeks not only to shape international narratives, but also define the terms on which China is understood.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China” by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

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Over the past 14 months, the Trump administration has presided over a significant loosening of export controls on AI chips to China – including the relicensing of H20 and H200 chips, and the establishment of a revenue-sharing agreement between NVIDIA and the U.S. government.

At each step, proponents of relaxation have insisted these chips are “deprecated,” a generation or more behind the cutting edge, and maintained that denying them accomplishes nothing while China builds its own alternatives. It is better, they claim, to keep Chinese developers hooked on NVIDIA’s software ecosystem — such as CUDA and related libraries and optimization tools — than to force Chinese AI developers into using Huawei’s Ascend chips and prompt China to build its own technology stack.

A growing chorus of industry-aligned analysts and consultants has amplified this logic into a broader indictment of the United States’ broader project to control technology exports to China. The “small yard, high fence” doctrine, they argue, has expanded beyond its initial remit — provoking retaliatory Chinese restrictions on rare earths, damaging U.S. chipmakers’ revenue and R&D capacity, and accelerating the very Chinese self-sufficiency it was designed to prevent. The Asia Society’s Paul Triolo, for example, has advocated lifting controls altogether on memory chips, redefining “advanced” upward to exclude everything but the absolute frontier, and effectively returning to the pre-2022 status quo.

This diagnosis gets the problem exactly backward.

China’s “Acceleration” Is Not What It Appears

The most commonly held argument for loosening export controls is that they have backfired — either by accelerating China’s domestic chip industry by forcing investments in self-sufficiency that Beijing might otherwise have deferred; or by forcing Chinese companies to work begrudgingly with Huawei when they otherwise would not have.

This narrative overstates both the pace and the quality of Chinese substitution in the AI industry. China has pursued semiconductor self-sufficiency since 2014, spending hundreds of billions of dollars and squandering billions more in waste, fraud, and abuse. It is important to understand that U.S. export controls did not create the Chinese government’s interest in indigenization — they forced Chinese firms to adopt inferior alternatives during a critical window of the industry’s development, with material impact to China’s hardware and software industry. SMIC’s 5nm-class chip fabrication process is estimated to be 40 to 50 percent more expensive than TSMC’s equivalent, with yields reportedly around one-third of TSMC’s on the same node.

Chinese developers are already beginning to feel the effects of this widening compute moat. Successfully forcing Chinese AI companies to turn to inferior hardware or foreign rental during a period of explosive AI growth is not a failure of export controls; it is direct evidence of the strategic friction the controls were meant to impose. Directly selling H200 — or better — chips to China directly undercuts the intended frictions that previous controls imposed.

Moreover, China’s AI chip fabs face component shortages far beyond lithography equipment. They compete against NVIDIA and AMD for access to the very same TSMC fabrication and packaging lines that produce the chips Washington is trying to deny. As things stand, Chinese chipmakers are not capable of supplying enough high-bandwidth memory or advanced packaging to build large numbers of AI accelerators on pace with the United States. This means that selling completed NVIDIA modules to Chinese AI labs hands them chips they could never have fabricated themselves, assembled from materials they cannot yet produce at scale, on production lines where their own designs are queued behind American orders.

Providing Chinese AI labs with more compute only strengthens their capacity to train and run inference for globally competitive AI services, while also freeing up Huawei’s scarce compute for potential export along a “Digital Silk Road.” Selling scarce chips directly to Chinese developers strengthens their ability to compete against U.S. companies in global markets.

There Has Never Been a More Important Time to Restrict China’s Access to Compute

Critics of U.S. technology restrictions are correct to point out that, despite being made to rely on a smaller quantity of less-performant hardware, Chinese AI labs have succeeded in building globally competitive models with a fraction of the compute available to their American counterparts. DeepSeek’s R1 rivaled frontier American systems at a fraction of the training cost; and Chinese open-source models — led by Qwen and DeepSeek — now account for nearly thirty percent of global open-source AI usage.

But there is a world of difference between building a model and serving it to the planet. The latter is the crux of the diffusion race U.S. and Chinese AI labs today find themselves locked into. Even though H200 exports to China will primarily serve domestic AI workloads, the absolute increase in compute will allow Chinese AI companies to more readily serve their products to global publics — undercutting the Trump administration’s aspiration to export the American AI stack.

Chinese labs continue to face critical compute shortages. Zhipu AI, which released its open-weight GLM 4.7 model in December, was forced to cap new sign-ups for its coding product to 20 percent of prior daily registrations after demand overwhelmed its servers. DeepSeek logs a steady drumbeat of service degradation events — the telltale signs of an inference fleet straining under load.

Proponents of relaxing U.S. export controls have consistently described the Trump administration’s decision to resume licenses for H20 and H200 as harmless because they trail the cutting edge by a generation. This misunderstands what the chips are for. Chinese AI companies do not necessarily need Blackwell-class GPUs to serve inference at global scale; they need a prodigious volume of decent compute to keep their APIs responsive and their prices low as they expand into markets from the Gulf to Southeast Asia to Latin America. Chinese AI executives themselves identify computational power as the one bottleneck constraining their global competitiveness. The correct response to that admission is to tighten the pressure, not ease it.

A Higher Fence Prevents the Yard from Expanding Further

If there is a legitimate criticism of the current U.S. technology control framework, it is not that the yard is too large but that the fence is too short. The $2.5 billion Supermicro indictment exposed an uncomfortable truth long known to U.S. export control enforcement officers: The current U.S. compliance system, which runs on paper declarations, end-use certificates, and the good faith of intermediaries stretching across dozens of jurisdictions, can be defeated through a method as simple as relabeling shipments in a rented warehouse.

The Chip Security Act, which the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced on a bipartisan basis this week, could address this problem. Location verification for exported chips does not expand the yard, but raises the fence for protected technologies. Such an approach is fundamentally pro-diffusion: if the United States can confirm that chips shipped to Abu Dhabi or Singapore have not, in fact, been rerouted to Shenzhen, the case for loosening license requirements for other global markets is made materially stronger.

America’s technology siege is working as intended. The task now is to maintain it – and reinforce it where the fence has gaps — long enough for American compute, software, and APIs to embed in global markets, before Chinese chipmakers become capable of contesting the global AI market on their own terms.

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China Sentences Two Former Ministers of Defense to Death with Reprieve

On May 7, Xinhua News reported that a PRC military court sentenced the last two disgraced PRC Ministers of Defense, Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) and Li Shangfu (李尚福), to death with a two-year reprieve for corruption. Below is a rough translation of the article:

“On May 7, 2026, the military court lawfully pronounced judgment on the bribery case of Wei Fenghe, former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. Wei Fenghe was found guilty of bribery and sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. After the two-year reprieve period expires, his sentence will be commuted to life imprisonment in accordance with the law, and he will be imprisoned for life without the possibility of commutation or parole. On May 7, 2026, the military court lawfully pronounced judgment on the bribery case of Li Shangfu, former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. The court found Li Shangfu guilty of bribery and offering of bribes, and sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. After the two-year reprieve period expires, his sentence will be commuted to life imprisonment in accordance with the law, and he will be imprisoned for life without the possibility of commutation or parole.”

CCA Analysis: The swift sentencing of Wei and Li marks a dramatic downfall for the two former CMC members. China rarely sentences CMC members — let alone former ministers of defense — to death. They are the first known cases of Chinese ministers of defense receiving death sentences with reprieve.

In 2023, Air Force General Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲) was given a suspended death sentence for corruption. Liu was formerly the Political Commissar of the PLA National Defence University and Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region Air Force. The last corruption-related scandal of a former CMC member was for former CMC Chief of the General Staff Fang Fenghui (房峰辉), who was purged in 2017 and received a life sentence in 2019. Before Fang, the last PLA general sentenced to death was former lieutenant general Gu Junshan (谷俊山), who received a suspended death sentence in August 2015 for corruption-related crimes. Gu served as the deputy director of the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) from December 2009 to February 2012.

One also recalls the recent cases of former CMC Vice Chairs Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄), who received life imprisonment in 2016 for corruption, and Xu Caihou (徐才厚), who died of cancer in 2015 before trial proceedings concluded on charges of corruption.

The last major upheaval of this proportion occurred in the wake of the Lin Biao (林彪) purge in the 1970s. General Huang Yongsheng (黄永胜) reportedly received a death sentence with reprieve during the “Lin Biao clique” purge by Mao, later commuted; and Lieutenant General Wu Faxian (吴法宪), also reportedly sentenced to death with reprieve after the Lin Biao affair, later commuted.

For Xi to hand out suspended death sentences, Wei and Li likely engaged in other serious crimes beyond corruption, like leaking secrets or harming national security.

China Discloses Fifth-Generation Fighter Export Variant

During a May 1 Labor Day special program aired on China Central Television (CCTV), footage showed a J-35 stealth fighter with the serial number “0001” and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) markings emerging from a hangar. The aircraft appeared without PLA Air Force insignia and was presented in an unpainted light grey finish, suggesting it may be an export variant of the J-35, called “J-35AE.”

Chinese military commentator Fu Qianshao said that the configuration — specifically a single-wheel nose landing gear rather than the reinforced dual-wheel system typically associated with carrier operations — indicates a land-based variant rather than a naval carrier-based model. The serial number “0001,” together with AVIC branding on the fuselage, further suggests a distinct production line separate from PLA operational inventory. In fact, months ago, the AVIC had already displayed a scale model of the J-35A at the 2026 Singapore Airshow, signaling export positioning in advance of the CCTV appearance.

So far, Pakistan has been widely assessed as a likely customer. In earlier days, Pakistani officials publicly stated that China had offered to sell 40 J-35 aircraft alongside KJ-500 airborne early warning platforms and HQ-19 air defense systems. On May 7, 2026, a senior Pakistan Air Force official further confirmed that an initial collaborative mechanism for the J-35AE had been signed, though contract details were not disclosed.

CCA Analysis: The emergence of the J-35AE in public signals that China is moving forward with a fifth-generation fighter export market. If confirmed at scale, this would represent a notable shift in the global stealth fighter landscape, where the United States has cornered the operational export market for fifth-generation fighters (The Russian SU-57 is excluded as there is no verified information or public disclosure of buyers so far).

It should be noted that the picture of the J-35AE was embedded within a broader state enterprise showcase, rather than a formal export announcement. Thus, some ambiguity remains over whether the disclosure was primarily informational, promotional, or deliberate signaling. Even so, the parallel confirmation from Pakistani officials of an initial collaborative agreement, combined with design features consistent with export configuration, indicates an institutionalized pathway toward foreign acquisition, with Pakistan as the most likely recipient.

More broadly, the development reflects how China’s defense export model is increasingly evolving beyond platform delivery toward integrated support arrangements. The reported presence of AVIC technical personnel in Pakistan during the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis suggests a model in which Chinese systems are accompanied by embedded operational and technical support under real conflict conditions. Arms sales to Pakistan, including the recent delivery of the Hangor-class attack submarine, provide China with opportunities to expand influence and test its operational and support capabilities on the battlefield.

At the same time, it remains uncertain whether such an export program can scale in a manner comparable to the U.S. F-35 ecosystem. The U.S. model is anchored in alliance structures, long-term interoperability frameworks, and security guarantees that China currently does not yet replicate. While China may be entering the stealth fighter export space, its ability to turn this into a durable global network remains unproven.

The PLA Showcases Counter-Drone Air Defense Capabilities

China continues to publicly showcase its counter–unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities. According to CCTV in early May, the PLA Navy recently completed a “finalization test” (定型试验) of a new terminal air defense and anti-missile weapon system in the Bohai Sea. The test involved multiple drone targets simulating ultra-low-altitude sea-skimming profiles and low-observable penetration tactics under complex electromagnetic conditions. The test was designed to stress the system’s interception performance in realistic threat environments. The term “finalization test” indicates that a late-stage verification process in which a system that has largely completed development is moving toward production and deployment.

Chinese state media also publicized directed-energy counter-UAS systems. A recent CCTV program presented simulated engagements involving the “Guangjian-11E” (光箭-11E) and “Guangjian-21A” (光箭-21A) laser systems. The Guangjian-11E was shown in a “soft-kill” (软杀伤) role, disrupting drone sensors and communication links through pulsed laser effects, while the Guangjian-21A was demonstrated in a hard-kill (硬杀伤) role, physically damaging airframes and internal electronic components. The demonstrations included engagements against low-altitude targets and fiber-linked drones.

CCA Analysis: The development reflects a broader shift in which counter-UAS capability is increasingly treated as a core requirement of modern force design rather than auxiliary air defense. Operational experience from Ukraine and the Middle East has demonstrated that small, low-cost drones can generate disproportionate battlefield effects through reconnaissance, targeting support, saturation attacks, and one-way strike missions against high-value platforms. This has prompted the PLA to adapt layered air defense systems utilizing counter-UAS, particularly in maritime and littoral environments.

The PLA’s emphasis on ultra-low-altitude sea-skimming (超低空掠海), concealed penetration (隐蔽突防), and complex electromagnetic environments (复杂电磁环境) reflects concern over drone employment concepts designed to exploit radar coverage gaps. These characteristics are particularly relevant in a Taiwan contingency environment, where U.S. and Taiwan defense discussions increasingly emphasize a drone-enabled “hellscape” concept in the Taiwan Strait, intended to increase operational cost and delay PLA maneuver and landing operations.

From a capability development perspective, the PLA systems being demonstrated suggest an emerging layered counter-UAS structure combining soft-kill and hard-kill directed-energy options, typified by the Guangjian platforms. China’s development of high-power microwave (HPM) systems, including the “Hurricane-3000” (飓风-3000) we previously covered, offer another example of the PLA’s interest in counter-swarm applications. Compared to lasers, HPM systems are generally better suited to area effects, with the potential to disrupt multiple drone systems simultaneously through electromagnetic interference.

However, compared to laser-based systems, publicly observable evidence of operational HPM field employment remains limited. This may indicate that while the capability is being developed and tested, it has not yet reached the same level of operational maturity in the PLA. U.S. development programs such as the Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) and its follow-on Mjölnir similarly suggest that HPM systems face persistent constraints in power generation, thermal management, beam control, and system integration under operational conditions.

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1. Beijing Deploys Legal Tools to Counter U.S. Sanctions

What Happened: On May 2, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued a prohibition order under its 2021 Blocking Rules, ordering domestic companies not to recognize or enforce U.S. sanctions on five Chinese petrochemical firms linked to Iranian oil transactions. The directive shields private Chinese refiners from U.S. sanctions tied to the Iranian oil trade and prohibits domestic compliance. This marks a stark departure from Beijing’s longstanding approach of publicly criticizing U.S. sanctions while often allowing major firms to comply to preserve access to the U.S. financial system.

Why It Matters: Beijing is now using the legal tools it built between 2020 and 2022, including its formalized export control regime, to counter U.S. “long-arm jurisdiction.” This escalation puts pressure on Chinese banks and corporations, leaving them caught between domestic mandates and international financial compliance. Ultimately, both Washington and Beijing are aggressively testing each other’s boundaries, capacities, and economic leverage just one week before the high-stakes Trump-Xi summit in Beijing.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China“ by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

2. Wang–Rubio Call Spotlights Taiwan Ahead of Beijing Summit

What Happened: On April 30, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, held a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss U.S.-China relations and prepare for the upcoming Trump-Xi summit. The two officials discussed Iran, the war in Ukraine, and U.S. sanctions and technology controls on China, among other hot-button issues. Taiwan, in particular, was discussed at length. Wang Yi reiterated that Taiwan is a non-negotiable “core interest,” warning against U.S. support for Taipei, while Rubio emphasized deterrence and support for Taiwan, framing it in terms of democracy and regional stability.

Why It Matters: Their positions on Taiwan remain fundamentally incompatible, setting up a delicate discussion between Trump and Xi in Beijing. Trump could ease tensions by shifting U.S. rhetoric—for example, by publicly stating that the United States “opposes Taiwan independence” as Beijing desires. Such a move could reduce friction over the thorniest issue in U.S.-China relations by signaling clearer limits on U.S. support for Taiwan independence. However, any rhetorical shift has risks: it would likely face pushback in Congress, draw concern in Taiwan, and could prompt Congress to insert new legislative language pushing back on Trump’s formulation.

By Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis (@LyleJMorris)

Learn More: Read “Xi Travels Less but the World Is Coming to Beijing“ by CCA Fellow Neil Thomas and CCA Intern Yuxuan Wei.

3. Taiwan’s President Lai Visits Eswatini Despite Airspace Disruptions

What Happened: On May 5, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te returned to Taipei after completing a state visit to Eswatini, its only African diplomatic ally. China reportedly pressured three Indian Ocean states—Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar—to revoke overflight permission for Lai’s aircraft, delaying the trip by about ten days from its original April 22 start date for King Mswati III’s 40th accession anniversary. Lai ultimately flew aboard the private jet of the King, with the return trip taking a sweeping southern detour through the Indian Ocean. Three Taiwanese Air Force F-16s escorted the aircraft as it re-entered Taiwanese airspace.

Why It Matters: Taiwan’s successful visit demonstrates its resilience in maintaining formal partnerships under pressure, including through the use of “arrive then announce” diplomacy to circumvent interference from China. Meanwhile, China’s pressure on Eswatini reflects its broader strategy to raise the political and reputational costs of maintaining ties with Taiwan. The episode also suggests this competition is extending into more operational domains—such as overflight permissions and transit access—creating a more restrictive environment in which Taiwan’s external engagement increasingly relies on ad hoc arrangements.

By Feifei Hung, Affiliated Researcher, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure“ by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris and CCA Intern Sheng-Wen Cheng.

4. Australia and China Advance Jet Fuel Cooperation

What Happened: From April 28 to 30, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong traveled to China to meet her counterpart, Wang Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. The pair convened the eighth China-Australia Foreign and Strategic Dialogue to foster mutual trust and cooperation. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of their bilateral relationship and commitment to deeper collaboration. Wong also announced that China agreed to cooperate with Australian businesses on jet fuel shipments.

Why It Matters: Amid ongoing instability and energy market volatility from tensions over the Strait of Hormuz, China-Australia cooperation is vital in bolstering energy security for both nations and regional partners. Since March, China has reduced its fuel exports to protect its domestic supply. However, China’s openness to working with Australia lends credibility to reports that it may loosen its restrictions on fuel exports this month.

By Taylah Bland, Fellow on Climate and the Environment, Center for China Analysis (@Taylahbland)

Learn More: Read “The Evolving Politics of Climate Change in China“ by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu and CCA Fellow Neil Thomas.

5. Xi Urges Youth to Serve National Priorities

What Happened: Ahead of China’s Youth Day, Xi Jinping sent a letter to representatives of Chinese youth, urging them to follow the Party’s guidance and dedicate themselves to frontline sectors like technological innovation, rural revitalization, social services, and border defense. The letter calls on young people to align their personal ambitions with the broader goals of national development. This message comes as 2026 marks the first year of the 15th Five-Year Plan, presenting new opportunities for youth to drive national progress.

Why It Matters: During his first term, Xi introduced China’s first central-level youth development blueprint—the Medium- and Long-Term Youth Development Plan (2016–2025)—which promoted youth advancement across ten key areas, including ideology, education, health, employment, and entrepreneurship. In the ideological sphere, Beijing launched initiatives such as the “Young Marxists Training Project,” aimed at cultivating no fewer than 200,000 young Marxists annually. While the CCP likely does not lack young political loyalists, the more pressing question is whether it faces a shortage of talent capable of driving national strategic priorities. How Beijing plans to cultivate such talent over the next decade will be an important issue to watch.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “The 19 Percent Revisited: How Youth Unemployment Has Changed Chinese Society“ by CCA Fellow Barclay Bram.

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Washington’s AI strategy reflects genuine strategic concerns: that the United States is locked in a decisive race with China for artificial general intelligence (AGI), that whoever crosses the finish line first wins a permanent strategic advantage, and that maximum acceleration, paired with maximum denial of chips and technology to Beijing, is the only rational play. While the competition with China is real and the risks are genuine, key elements of this narrative deserve closer examination. And building a strategy on an incomplete understanding risks producing outcomes far worse than the threat it purports to address.

I write this not to minimize real security concerns, nor to suggest naïveté about Chinese strategic ambitions. After 35 years helping U.S. MNCs build technology businesses in China and leading AI, semiconductor and cybersecurity efforts across both ecosystems, I have seen how quickly assumptions about technological dominance can unravel. The argument here is simply this: we need to reexamine the race we think we’re running, the game we think we’re playing, and the strategy we’ve chosen. Because right now, the evidence suggests our current strategy may be incomplete or overconcentrated on a single dimension of competition.

Questioning the Decisive Strategic Advantage Thesis

The dominant narrative in Washington’s AI policy circles goes something like this: whoever achieves AGI first will gain a decisive strategic advantage (DSA), a durable, possibly permanent lead that reshapes the global balance of power. This belief drives hundreds of billions in capex commitments, aggressive export controls, and a general willingness to treat AI development as a wartime mobilization.

The DSA thesis depends on several assumptions, each of which deserves scrutiny. First, that there is a clear finish line. There is not. AI development is a continuous, multi-dimensional process with no single threshold that confers omnipotence. AGI, however defined, would not be a static superweapon but a rapidly evolving ecosystem that competitors can and will replicate. History reminds us: America’s nuclear monopoly lasted just four years.

Second, the thesis assumes that model capability gaps can be maintained through compute denial. Recent market data point in a different direction. The U.S.-China frontier model gap, once estimated at 12-14 months, has narrowed to roughly two to three months, during a period when the U.S. has steadily ramped up export controls on even mid-tier data center GPUs. On the April Monthy 2026 OpenRouter leaderboard, four of the top six most-used models globally were Chinese. MiniMax, Kimi, DeepSeek, Xiaomi and Zhipu models are all surging in popularity, driven by their cost advantages and the thirst for highly capable open-source models by AI agents. In video generation, Kuaishou’s Kling 3.0 and ByteDance’s Seedance 2.0 significantly outperform OpenAI’s Sora and Google’s Veo on independent benchmarks and real-world use cases as discussed in my recent CCA essay.

Third, the DSA narrative assumes a winner-take-all dynamic. In practice, AI models are rapidly commoditizing. Cursor usage data from 2025 shows the top model changing nearly every month, with no single lab holding sustained dominance. The recent batch of China models launched around Lunar New Year all are within a few percent of leading U.S. frontier models (at the time of release) but available at approximately 1/10^th the API price. There are now even small models from Qwen which perform at about the level of frontier models from a year ago that can run natively on an iPhone. When the commodity is cheap and abundant, strategic advantage shifts from who builds the best model to who deploys AI most effectively across their economy.

And this is precisely where the current strategy is most in tension with its own goals. While Washington and Silicon Valley pours massive resources into chasing the elusive AGI finish line, Chinese companies are deploying “good enough” AI at massive scale. ByteDance’s Doubao chatbot exceeded 100 million daily active users. Alibaba’s Qwen models have surpassed 700 million downloads globally, spawning 180,000+ derivative models. Chinese open-source models are becoming the de facto platform for sovereign AI efforts across the Global South’s 150 Belt and Road Initiative partner countries. Leading open-source models are usually much smaller than closed-source frontier models, so they can be downloaded and installed on smaller on-premise systems, and the smaller models will run smoothly on personal laptops and even modern phones. This is a significant diffusion advantage by offering greater data sovereignty and privacy, while also enabling lower deployment costs domestically and globally.

Today, most Chinese models are designed to run on Nvidia chips, but the Chinese are already developing alternatives to Nvidia’s GPUs, and a number of the new Chinese models (e.g., Deepseek and Zhipu) are already being optimized for them with some already trained on them. As Chinese domestic chips mature, the long term plan is to offer full stack solutions to the international market. Denying US chips to Chinese ecosystem now will only accelerate the drive for domestic alternatives, speeding local innovation and reducing reliance on US technology.

Beyond the Arms Race Framework

The U.S. approach treats the AI competition as an arms race: zero-sum, secretive, defined by denial and containment. But what’s actually unfolding looks far more like a platform race and an innovation race, where value expands, multiple winners coexist, and the key metric is diffusion, how broadly and effectively AI is adopted across industries--not who achieves the highest benchmark score this week.

Consider the four types of AI competition. In a simple race (first to a benchmark), there’s a clear finish line and a single winner, but in practice, benchmark leads flip monthly and confer no durable advantage. In an arms race, secrecy and denial dominate, but the AI technology stack is too diffuse and fast-moving to contain. In an innovation race, the game is multi-turn with many winners—think robotics, agentic AI, and clean energy integration. In a platform race, it’s an infinite game where ecosystem adoption determines outcomes—think open-source AI, cloud APIs, global developer communities.

The United States is investing heavily in an arms race and simple race dynamics. China, increasingly, is competing in the innovation and platform quadrants (which offer more long-term value). The results speak for themselves: China leads in 66 of 74 critical technologies tracked by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, dominates open-source AI model offerings, accounts for 54% of global industrial robot installations, produces about half of the world’s AI researchers, and builds more new electricity capacity annually than the rest of the world combined. These are the foundations of AI deployment at scale, and chip denial alone can’t offset them.

There are claims that most Chinese AI advances are due to stealing technology or distilling models from the United States. Given that now more than 40% of the world’s AI papers are published by researchers in China, and about half of the world’s AI researchers are born and educated in China, it’s hard to justify this claim. For some background on the practice of distilling models, it’s commonly recognized that most/all labs practice this internally and on each other (even domestically) to optimize model accuracy and efficiency. Since the frontier U.S. models are closed-source, Chinese labs are more easily tracked if and when they do it. Whereas most Chinese models are open-source, so the models can be run on the users’ local machines or hosted by each country’s domestic cloud services, thus Chinese labs cannot track their models’ detailed usage. Recently Cursor got into PR issues when it claimed to have trained its own advanced AI coding model (Composor 2), when it turned out that they just fine-tuned the Chinese Kimi K2.5 model. Additionally, Chinese labs usually publish their new technical findings as detailed papers with each major release of models, thus the need for U.S. labs to distill for learning breakthroughs from new Chinese models are reduced.

Rethinking the Strategic Framework

Washington’s strategic framework implicitly models the U.S.–China AI dynamic as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game where defection (competing aggressively, withholding cooperation) is the dominant strategy. But this framing has two fatal flaws.

First, the Prisoner’s Dilemma assumes a one-shot game with no communication. We live in a multi-turn world where actions are observable, reputations accumulate, and in such a case, the mathematically optimal strategy is tit-for-tat, starting with cooperation. We can see China’s actions and words. They can see ours. We are not in separate interrogation rooms.

Second, and more fundamentally, we are playing the wrong game entirely. The better model is the Stag Hunt. In this classic game, two hunters enter a forest and must decide: cooperate to catch a stag that feeds both for a month, or hunt hares separately that provide a week’s sustenance each. The stag requires both hunters working together. If one goes for the stag while the other chases hares, the stag hunter goes home empty-handed.

The United States is currently going after the stag, the projected artificial superintelligence (ASI) that promises permanent dominance. China, meanwhile, hunts the hares: practical AI diffusion across manufacturing, healthcare, education, and sovereign AI platforms for the developing world. The Stag Hunt has two Nash equilibria: both cooperate (stag) or both hunt alone (hares). But the worst outcome is precisely where the United States finds itself now: pursuing the stag alone while the other player collects reliable, real-world gains from hares. The more accurate and nuanced game theory representation of the world today is likely closer to a multi-turn Stag Hunt for the commercial market portion and a multi-turn Prisoner’s Dilemma for the national security portion. In both cases, increasing communication and finding common ground would create a better outcome for both sides. A more effective approach is to adopt a multi-turn Stag Hunt strategy where we first prioritize the hare equilibrium (diffusion focus) to address immediate risks and garner AI’s economic benefits, then later jointly pursue the long-term stag equilibrium in collaboration with China when we have a better sense of how to manage the shared safety risks of a truly transformative AI (ASI). Given the clear interdependence of both sides across multiple dimensions, this would deliver the optimal outcome, without the excessive capex costs or potential societal and safety risks of our current path.

The consequences of this mismatch are not theoretical. U.S. tech firms have committed over $800 billion annually in AI capex for 2025–2027, while job openings in the United States have declined sharply since 2022 even as the S&P 500 soared, a divergence that recent Stanford research attributes to AI automation of early-career positions in software development and customer service. World Bank data shows the U.S. workforce faces over 60% AI exposure, the highest globally, compared to about 40% in China. We are building the most powerful automation technology in history while having no plan for the workers it will displace.

The loudest proponents of the DSA narrative are AI labs and their investors who have strong commercial interests in lighter regulation and increased government funding. The refrain from Silicon Valley labs that “we can’t be regulated because if we slow down, China won’t” is not based on facts. China’s AI industry is one of the most heavily regulated in the world and their infrastructure buildout is just a fraction of the size of the United States. Putting in some sensible guardrails and regulations for AI development and deployment around safety, privacy, and security would not slow down the United States, but rather help ensure a less chaotic diffusion into broader society. In fact, China is slowing down their own AI labs but restricting their ability to buy Nvidia GPUs. Even after U.S. export control restrictions allowed for H200 GPUs to be sold to China, the Chinese government has required approvals for their companies to buy them. Recent remarks from Howard Lutnick suggest that to date, zero H200 GPUs have been sold to China.

The Military Dimension: From Benchmarks to Operational Readiness

Proponents (government and industry) of the current strategy often invoke national security: “If China gets AGI first, they’ll weaponize it against us or would prevent us from winning.” This is a legitimate security concern worthy of serious attention. However, the military advantage argument warrants closer examination. What the military needs is not the latest frontier model. It needs models that are fit to task, certified, tested, and integrated into operational systems. Here, strategic advantage depends not just on the invention of frontier models but on the institutional capacity to operationalize them, integrating them into doctrine, training personnel, and adapting operational concepts to leverage their capabilities.

The U.S. military’s vendor and model certification process can take over 12 months for national security level accreditation (DoD IL6). Recent reports suggest that the recent Iran military operations were planned using the 20-month-old Claude 3.5 Sonnet model, not because newer models didn’t exist but because the certification pipeline couldn’t keep pace, in addition to the need to remove standard safety guardrails from the base consumer model. Meanwhile, Chinese government agencies have far fewer testing and evaluation (T&E) delays, and their AI models already go through review by the government before public release. The gap between invention and deployment matters more than the gap between benchmarks.

In military settings, the tangible advantage may lie less in who trains the most capable model than in who can certify, integrate, and deploy usable systems fastest. On that metric, the current U.S. system is a structural disadvantage. But even if we achieve ASI first and can somehow expedite the certification process, unless we are willing to deploy it untested in a pre-emptive all-out strike against China, the temporal advantage could evaporate in a matter of weeks or months. It’s unclear that this result would justify the trillions in spend. And even if such an attack succeeds in taking down China’s infrastructure, the inevitable response will be swift and devastating for both sides. It’s the exact reason why we have not seen the use of nuclear weapons in real conflict for over 80 years.

In recent weeks, the new Anthropic Mythos model has attracted a lot of attention for its cybersecurity prowess, and some point to this as an example that the United States is “winning” and the current strategy is correct. Unlike large amounts of fissile materials, securing software and know-how is almost impossible. There are already reports that the Mythos model is now accessible to unauthorized personnel, not to mention the recent unintended leak of the full source code of Anthropics’ Claude Code solution. Recent new benchmarks are also showing that the OpenAI GPT 5.5 model is actually as performant in cybersecurity capabilities as Mythos and that model is publicly available to all users, thus showing that any perceived cyber advantages are highly temporary. We need to accept that any software-based advantage is temporary and adjust our strategy to the reality that DSA may just be a mirage. In fact, the bigger and more certain threat is the misuse of these advanced models by bad actors. Hackers and terrorists would not hesitate to make use of these models for nefarious purposes, whereas state actors still fear reprisals and the risk of escalation. This is a shared risk for both the United States and China, and a place where we can find common ground for cooperation.

What We’re Not Seeing: A Competitive Ecosystem, Not a Monolith

Washington tends to view Chinese AI as a state-directed monolith. The reality is a fiercely competitive commercial ecosystem where Chinese labs compete with each other (just to survive) far more than they coordinate to conspire against the United States. ByteDance’s Doubao is a closed-source consumer product fighting for domestic market share. Z.AI generates over 60% of its revenue from enterprise on-premise deployments. MiniMax earns roughly 70% of revenue from international API sales. Moonshot AI’s Kimi competes directly with all of them in consumer chatbots and AI agent inference. As an example, neither the Chinese nor U.S. government had any significant idea about DeepSeek’s innovations prior to its rise to prominence in January 2025.

The open-source strategy that has made Chinese models globally ubiquitous is an emergent outcome of commercial competition, not a directed national strategy. Alibaba open-sourced Qwen to drive cloud adoption; DeepSeek open-sourced to attract research talent; MiniMax did so to build developer ecosystems. Even within these companies, there are significant internal tensions. Alibaba is actively debating open-source diffusion versus revenue protection, and Tencent faces similar strategic discussions on agent-focused models. Framing this diverse, commercially motivated ecosystem as a unified strategic threat leads to policy responses that are simultaneously too broad (restricting all Chinese AI) and too narrow (focused on chips while ignoring the deployment gap). That said, while these firms operate with substantial commercial independence, they remain embedded in a system where the Chinese state retains the ability to shape or direct their alignment when it perceives critical national interests to be at stake. The recent push by the Chinese government for some of its leading labs to optimize models for local chip offerings before release is an example of this.

Additionally, it’s worth mentioning that U.S. export control policies also exist around advanced tools and equipment targeting chip and semiconductor manufacturing players (e.g., Huawei and SMIC) with it’s core aim to constrain compute supply to Chinese AI labs. These players have a clear association with the state, and such restrictions have shown near-term effect in limiting their capabilities, but has also clearly accelerated the development of domestic alternatives, albeit still one to two generations behind the most advanced Western offerings. As the two ecosystems bifurcate, there will be increasingly less dependency on the United States and less leverage for future negotiations.

A Different Path Forward

None of this means we should be complacent about security. Genuine threats exist: AI-enabled CBRNE (Cyber, Bio, Radioactive, Nuclear, Explosive) risks, autonomous weapons proliferation, and the misuse of AI by bad actors. But these threats are best addressed through targeted, narrowly scoped controls and shared intelligence, not through a blanket technology-denial strategy that was designed for a world that no longer exists.

The “small yard, high fence” doctrine, originally conceived as a targeted national security tool, has expanded into a comprehensive technology approach that now touches chips, lithography, EDA software, HBM, chemicals, and advanced AI models, as discussed in a recent CCA article. This expansion has paradoxically accelerated China’s drive toward full supply chain independence, fueled innovations born of constraint (like DeepSeek’s efficiency breakthroughs), and alienated allied semiconductor industry firms who see shrinking addressable markets. That said, export controls serve legitimate national security purposes, and policymakers may be operating with intelligence assessments and threat evaluations not available in the public domain.

Adjusting course does not require abandoning competition. It requires reframing it. Three shifts would immediately improve America’s strategic position:

First, make efforts to narrow export controls to genuine military and CBRNE threats, not all advanced technology. The current regime tries to prevent China from developing any frontier capability, which is both unenforceable and counterproductive. In fact, given Chinese labs’ propensity for open-sourcing their models, most advances they produce will naturally flow into U.S. models rapidly, turning them into subsidiary development arms for U.S. players. It must still be noted that in the unlikely event of direct conflict, having some export controls may still buy time for domestic adaptation, alliance coordination, and military hardening even if such controls cannot achieve the wished-for permanent dominance.

Second, shift from a Cold War arms-race mental model to a Space Race innovation model. The Space Race generated GPS, Teflon, the internet’s precursor, bringing massive spillover benefits for the whole economy. An AI innovation race focused on healthcare, climate, education, and productivity could do the same, with far more participants winning. It would also encourage the U.S. labs to release comparable level open-source models to China so our tech stack can compete on a level playing field for global diffusion. Additionally enacting some reasonable safety and socially responsible regulations on U.S. labs (as China has already done) will lessen the growing societal fear over AI that’s been brewing domestically which is certain to hinder the nation’s ability to deploy this technology effectively into the economy and reduce our global competitiveness.

Third, open bilateral and multilateral channels on AI safety. The Stag Hunt only works when hunters can communicate before entering the forest. Both China’s “Global AI Governance Action Plan” and America’s “AI Action Plan” were released in July 2025, and neither mentions the other country. We cannot manage the multifaceted risks of the most powerful technology in human history while refusing to talk to the other nation building it. There’s clear common ground on AI safety; both countries want to avoid catastrophic risks from runaway AI; and both have a shared interest in preventing AI-enabled bad actor proliferation.

Conclusion: There Is No Finish Line, but Many Medals to Win

A race is not a race if the competitors are headed to different destinations. The United States is sprinting toward AGI and ASI as if crossing that threshold confers permanent dominance. China is building industrial AI infrastructure that will shape how much of the world deploys this technology for decades. Both paths have value, and neither inherently zero-sum, if proper coordination occurs.

The biggest risks we face from AI are misuse by bad actors, mass displacement of workers, concentration of economic power, and escalation of military conflict. These are shared risks that require shared solutions. Every dollar spent on denial should be matched by greater investment in national preparedness for AI diffusion and adaptation. Every diplomatic channel closed over chips is a safety conversation not happening. A deeper discussion on the underlying technology issues and a detailed framework for addressing both economic and geopolitical issues around the AI race can be found in this Stanford paper, Beyond Rivalry.

It is time to lift the veil of assumptions that have constrained our thinking. The playing field is not the one we were told exists. But the real one offers enormous opportunities if we have the clarity to see it and the courage to adjust course. There is no finish line in AI, but along the way, there will be many medals awarded. We should make sure America is competing for the ones that actually matter.

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1. China Blocks Meta’s Manus Acquisition

What Happened: On April 27, the foreign investment security office of China’s National Development and Reform Commission ordered the unwinding of Meta’s roughly $2 billion acquisition of Manus, a Chinese-founded AI agent startup based in Singapore. The decision followed U.S. sanctions on Hengli Petrochemical’s Dalian refinery over Iranian oil purchases and comes amid broader pressure on Chinese firms in sensitive supply chains.

Why It Matters: Chinese AI application developers face a monetization gap at home — domestic willingness to pay is low, and capital markets are thin. The decision signals to Chinese AI entrepreneurs and investors that nominal offshore corporate structure offer limited protection from political risk. Beijing risks narrowing the very exit pathways that make Chinese AI ventures financeable. AI startups are likely to either move abroad from the outset or rely more heavily on domestic markets and capital to avoid regulatory risk.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “China’s AI Token Drive is Really About Upgrading Inland Economies,” an opinion piece by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee.

2. Pakistan President’s China Visit Puts CPEC Back in Focus

What Happened: On April 25, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari began a week-long visit to China, with scheduled stops in Hunan and Hainan to advance economic cooperation and the next phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In Hunan, discussions centered on seed technology, agricultural research, machinery, mineral processing, and industrial collaboration. In Hainan, China’s southern free-trade port province, Zardari expressed interest in port development, fisheries, and strengthening trade and investment ties. The visit also coincides with Pakistan’s announcement of new transit routes linking Gwadar, a port in Pakistan, to the Iranian border.

Why It Matters: Zardari’s trip highlights the core challenge of CPEC 2.0: shifting from infrastructure buildout to commercial productivity. Pakistan is looking to Hunan for agricultural and industrial inputs and to Hainan as a model for port-led trade and logistics, aimed at making better use of existing CPEC infrastructure, including Gwadar. At the same time, new transit routes to Iran position Gwadar within a broader regional trade network, especially as instability near the Strait of Hormuz increases demand for alternative routes. Yet success will depend on whether these efforts translate into sustained investment, exports, and cargo flows, and not leave CPEC underutilized.

By Jie Gao, Research Associate on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “The Electoral Equation: China’s BRI Investments Amid Political Transitions” by ASPI Director of South Asia Initiatives Farwa Aamer and Blake Berger.

3. China-India Defense Ministers Hold Talks as Tensions Ease

What Happened: China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun met with his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh on April 28 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Defense Ministers’ meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The meeting addressed tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the disputed Himalayan border, with both ministers calling for “peace and tranquility.”

Why It Matters: This was not the first meeting between Dong and Singh — they met in Qingdao in June last year, and before that in November 2024 — but the tone suggests some improvement in relations between the militaries of the two Indo-Pacific powers. Efforts to stabilize the Sino-Indian relationship have accelerated since the Trump Administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, and the two ministers also addressed the situation in the Middle East, where they share common interests. Dong’s position as a PLA Navy admiral, rather than in the ground forces that have faced off along the LAC over the past five years, could aid his efforts to engage more constructively with Indian counterparts. However, without a position on the Central Military Commission, his military and political authority is more constrained than that of his predecessors, such as Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe.

By Andrew Chubb (@zhubochubo), Foreign Policy and National Security Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations” by CCA Senior Fellow Philippe Le Corre.

4. Beijing Tightens Political Control While Expanding Protections for Gig-Economy Workers

What Happened: Beijing recently issued new guidelines on strengthening the management and services for “new employment groups,” referring largely to gig-economy and flexible workers. The directive outlines two primary objectives: first, to ensure that these workers are guided by Xi Jinping Thought, reinforcing their alignment with the Party and deepening their political, ideological, theoretical, and emotional identification with it; and second, by 2027, to achieve comprehensive coverage of Party organizations within these groups, while gradually standardizing labor practices, improving working conditions, and more effectively safeguarding workers’ legal rights.

Why It Matters: As the lead-up to the 2027 Party Congress intensifies, Beijing is focused on ensuring that the country’s roughly 84 million gig-economy workers do not become a source of social instability. At the same time, authorities are increasingly concerned about what they see as weakening political and ideological identification among younger generations with the Party. As a result, the central leadership is reportedly paying greater attention to causes of declining patriotic consciousness among young people and signs of weakening ideals and convictions among young cadres. Youth accounted for approximately 26% of China’s population in 2025, underscoring the scale and urgency of this challenge.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “The 19 Percent Revisited: How Youth Unemployment Has Changed Chinese Society“ by CCA Fellow Barclay Bram.

5. Southern China Battles Extreme Rainfall

What Happened: On April 26, torrential rainfall struck Qinzhou, a city in Guangxi, southern China. Qinzhou authorities said the city’s meteorological station recorded over 270 millimeters of rainfall (about 10 inches) during a 24-hour period. The rain forced the evacuation of more than 200 residents, submerged vehicles, and caused waterlogging, as rescue crews were deployed to help those trapped in their homes. Rainfall of this magnitude typically occurs in mid- to late May, after the arrival of the summer monsoon.

Why It Matters: The rare timing and intensity of this downpour in southern China reinforces that climate impacts in the form of extreme weather are still occurring. With the monsoon season yet to start and the summer months still to come, China must continue to prioritize adaptation and resilience. Beyond policy, continued coordination across departments on emergency management and early warning is crucial to safeguarding communities and infrastructure.

By Taylah Bland (@Taylahbland), Fellow on Climate and the Environment, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Unpacking China’s New Headline Climate Targets” by CCA Senior Fellow Li Shuo and Fellow Kate Logan.

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Y-20B’s First Overseas Mission Highlights Advances in China’s Military Airlift Capacity

On April 20, 2026, the PLA Air Force deployed the Y-20B heavy transport aircraft for the first time to South Korea to carry out the 13th repatriation mission for the remains of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army soldiers from the Korean War. Chinese state media noted that this marked the Y-20B’s first deployment for such a mission and first publicly confirmed overseas flight. Upon re-entering Chinese airspace, the aircraft was escorted by four J-20 fighters. The Y-20B’s primary upgrade over the baseline Y-20 is the replacement of Russian D-30KP-2 engines with domestically produced WS-20 turbofan engines that improve range, payload capacity, and fuel efficiency. While the mission itself was ceremonial, China chose to publicly announce the overseas operation to highlight the Y-20B’s operational debut.

The Y-20B sits within a broader, layered Chinese military airlift architecture. At the top tier, the Y-20A, Y-20B, and YY-20 tankers represent the PLA’s long-range strategic airlift and aerial refueling capabilities. The medium tier features the Y-30 – a four-turboprop medium tactical transport aircraft. In December 2025, the Y-30 completed its maiden flight at Xi’an. The Y-30 is designed for point-to-point distribution to forward and austere locations, with short-takeoff-and-landing capability on unpaved runways suited to environments such as South China Sea outposts and Himalayan border positions. At the lower tier, the Y-8 and Y-9 form the backbone of China’s special mission aviation. The Y-8 has been adapted for electronic reconnaissance, maritime patrol, and airborne early warning variants since the 1980s. The Y-9 has emerged as the next-generation successor in the special mission role. At the September 2025 military parade, the PLA displayed for the first time a coordinated formation of three Y-9 special-mission types: the Y-9Q maritime patrol and ASW aircraft, the Y-9DZ electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and the Y-9LG standoff jamming aircraft.

CCA Analysis: The Y-20B demonstrates the PLA’s evolution in reducing external dependence on propulsion systems for its large military transport aircraft. Early Y-20s relied on Russian D-30KP-2 engines. The adoption of the WS-20 engine marks the first case of China achieving indigenous development over both the airframe and engine of a heavy transport platform, utilizing 3D printing technology for part of the manufacturing process. The PLA has launched aerial refueling variants of the Y-20, such as the YY-20, as well as the KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control aircraft. The KJ-3000, which completed its maiden flight in late 2024, is based on the Y-20B airframe and is believed to have the capability of detecting stealth aircraft.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 Report noted that China is progressing on indigenous engine development, while cautioning that advancement will likely be gradual as China works to resolve longstanding technological barriers in advanced propulsion.

PLA Rocket Force Unit Experiments with Anonymous Online Message Board Feedback

A People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) unit created an anonymous online message board on its internal “Strong Army Website” (强军网) to allow officers and enlisted personnel to directly raise complaints, concerns, and suggestions to leadership. The initiative, reported by the PLA Daily, came after the unit’s Party Committee found during a soldiers’ reception day that many grassroots concerns were either not being addressed or were being distorted as they moved up the chain of command.

The unit Party Committee decided to establish a platform modeled on local government “online governance” systems. Despite concerns that the board could become a venue for negativity or harm internal relations, leadership insisted that Party organs must prioritize “grassroots first, soldiers first” and treat solving soldiers’ practical problems as a key measure of performance.

Once launched, soldiers raised issues ranging from malfunctioning duty-room equipment and broken family-compound fitness machines to outdated library resources in remote posts. One notable case involved a staff officer who assigned multiple reports on a Friday night with a Sunday deadline, prompting a soldier to complain that “one word from headquarters, and the grassroots are running themselves ragged” (机关一句话，基层跑断腿). The officer publicly apologized and promised immediate correction, while senior leaders identified the deeper issue as a weak service mentality toward grassroots units.

CCA Analysis: This is an interesting trial for improving internal governance, morale, and combat readiness within the PLA. Rather than relying on formal reporting channels, the unit is experimenting with direct feedback mechanisms through social media to ensure leadership hears frontline concerns unfiltered. In that sense, the platform is a problem-solving mechanism and a channel for strengthening trust between leadership and troops.

This reflects a broader political priority within the PLA of streamlining direct feedback from “grassroots units” to solve practical problems for soldiers. The unit Party Committee explicitly frames this as rejecting “vanity projects” and evaluating cadres based on whether they address real troop concerns, reinforcing Xi Jinping’s longstanding emphasis on combat effectiveness and addressing the welfare of soldiers.

The article also suggests that morale and operational performance are closely connected. Leadership argues that when soldiers feel heard and supported, their sense of belonging and ownership increases, which translates into stronger commitment during training and missions. The article closes by linking the success of the feedback system to strong performance during a recent live-fire assault exercise, implying that improved welfare and trust directly support readiness.

Sensitive Waterways, Sharp Signals: China and Japan’s Escalating Naval Standoff

On April 17, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait from 4:02 a.m. to 5:50 p.m. for approximately 14 hours. The transit fell on the 131st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the 1895 unequal treaty under which the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. The war is a recurring symbol of national humiliation in Chinese historical memory.

China’s Ministry of National Defense condemned the transit as a “deliberate provocation” (蓄意挑衅) and lodged a formal protest with Tokyo, accusing Japan of sending the wrong signal to Taiwan independence forces. In a commentary, PLA Daily accused Tokyo of “harming the feelings of the Chinese people” by timing the transit to coincide with the anniversary.

On April 19, the Eastern Theater Command announced that PLA Navy 133rd task group, centered on Type 052 destroyer Baotou (包头), had transited the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific for open-water training exercises. The Eastern Theater Command characterized the deployment as “routine annual training” conducted in accordance with international law and “not directed at any specific country.”

On April 20, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected the aircraft carrier Liaoning (辽宁) transiting the Taiwan Strait southward. The PLA Navy simultaneously announced that the Sichuan (四川), China’s first Type 076 amphibious assault ship, had departed Shanghai for the South China Sea for sea trials and training. These movements coincided with the opening of US-Philippines “Balikatan 2026,” in which Japan participated for the first time in a combat capacity. On April 22, PLA Navy 133rd task group completed its Western Pacific exercises and returned via the Yonaguni-Iriomote Strait, which runs close to Taiwan’s eastern coast.

CCA Analysis: This was the first time that the PLA proactively announced a Yokoate Channel transit. In the past, Japan was the first to disclose such operations. Beijing’s decision to get ahead of the news cycle can be interpreted as an expression of displeasure over Japan’s Taiwan Strait transit and a willingness to publicize naval movements as a signal of deterrence. This episode is just the latest iteration of an ongoing cycle of reciprocal operational deterrence signaling by both sides.

The JS Ikazuchi‘s transit was Japan’s fourth through the Taiwan Strait since September 2024. Its 14-hour duration and timing with the Treaty of Shimonoseki anniversary gave Beijing grounds to frame the passage as politically provocative rather than a routine freedom of navigation action. China’s response was swift, dispatching the PLA Navy’s 133rd Task Group through the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific just 48 hours later. The deployment of the Liaoning through the Taiwan Strait and the Sichuan’s training in the South China Sea coincided with the opening of “Balikatan 2026” joint exercise between the United States, Philippines and Japan.

The Balikatan 2026 added another layer to an already charged week. Japan joined for the first time in a combat role, deploying roughly 1,400 troops and conducting live-fire sinking drills using Type 88 anti-ship missiles off northern Luzon. It was the first time Japanese forces have used the system outside their territory at a location facing the Taiwan Strait. It was also the first time the JMSDF projected forces into the South China Sea for joint exercises.

The geographic scope of China-Japan maritime interaction has expanded considerably since late 2025. Friction that was previously concentrated around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Miyako Strait has extended into the Western Pacific and the eastern side of the First Island Chain. CSIS ChinaPower data shows the PLA conducted a record 163 operations in the South China Sea in 2025, while the aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong combined for 58 days of operations beyond the First Island Chain, up from 32 days in 2024.

China’s Navy Anniversary Film Points to Nuclear Carrier, Sends Message on Taiwan

On April 22, the PLA Navy released a seven-minute promotional film titled Toward the Ocean (向大洋) to mark the 77th founding anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The film follows four characters whose names are Mandarin homophones of China’s three active carriers: Liao Ning (辽宁/Liaoning), Shan Dong (山东/Shandong), and Fu Jian (福建/Fujian), alongside a new recruit named He Jian (何剑). The name He Jian is a near-homophone of “nuclear vessel” (核舰, hé jiàn) in Mandarin. In the film, He Jian is aged 19, which follows sequentially from the hull numbers of China’s three existing carriers (16, 17, 18), leading analysts to interpret the character as an allusion to a forthcoming nuclear-powered fourth carrier. His noticeably taller backpack was further interpreted as a hint at greater displacement, beyond the Fujian’s 80,000 tons, toward the 100,000-ton class of U.S. supercarriers.

The film closes with a scene at Unification Road Primary School (统一路小学) in Weihai city, where one of the characters picks up his son, nicknamed “Xiao Wan” (小湾) — a common affectionate abbreviation for Taiwan. The boy says he does not want to go home yet, and his father replies that his mother is waiting. The exchange was widely read as an allegory for Taiwan’s eventual “reunification” with the mainland. Some commentators also noted that the phrase “don't be shameless” (别耍赖皮) contains the character “Lai,” a homophone for Lai (赖) as in President Lai Ching-te (賴清德). The framing of Taiwan’s current leader as the obstinate child refusing to come home was a clear symbol of Beijing’s frustration over Lai’s “pro-independence” policies.

CCA Analysis: The video’s rich symbolism offers a window into PLA Navy political and capability priorities. The He Jian character appears to be a deliberate reference to the Type 004 carrier currently under construction at Dalian Shipyard. Janes’s satellite imagery analysis from December 17, 2025 confirmed that construction of the carrier is underway. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 Report assessed that China plans to field nine carriers by 2035, of which six may be Type 004-class vessels.

The closing sequence is a clear reference to Taiwan. The film was released 12 days after KMT chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) met Xi Jinping in Beijing. The choice of Weihai’s Unification Road School as the closing location also carries historical resonance. The city has deep historical ties with Wokou (倭寇) pirates — the Japanese and Chinese coastal raiders who harassed China’s coastline from the 13th to 17th centuries. It is also associated with the Battle of Weihaiwei (威海卫之战) in 1895, where China’s Beiyang Fleet (北洋水师) was destroyed in the First Sino-Japanese War. In 1950, newly appointed PLAN Navy commander Xiao Jingguang (肖劲光) visited nearby Liugong Island (刘公岛) by fishing boat, lamenting that the PLAN’s weakness in a remark since inscribed on a monument there. Closing a naval power narrative at this location links the current era into a century of maritime humiliation and recovery, with Taiwan remaining the only piece of “lost territory” yet to be “reunified” with the mainland.

1. China’s Humanoid Robots Break Men’s World Record in Beijing Half-Marathon

What Happened: On April 19, Honor’s humanoid robot “Lightning” won the Beijing E-Town Half Marathon in 50 minutes and 26 seconds, surpassing the men’s world record and outpacing all 12,000 human competitors. The event drew over 300 robots from more than 100 teams.

Why It Matters: The race is as much industrial policy as it is spectacle. Humanoid robot development is a stated priority in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, and investment in embodied AI reached 73.5 billion yuan in 2025. Chinese firms AGIBOT, Unitree, and UBTech lead global vendors by humanoid shipment volume. But doubts remain: only 40% of robots ran autonomously, and ultimately, humanoid robots may struggle to translate into real-world applications, such as in elder-care settings. Beijing’s playbook of high-visibility demonstrations to accelerate commercialization has worked before with EVs and AI, but whether humanoids follow the same trajectory remains an open question.

By Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Watch "DeepSeek Moment, One Year Later: The State of U.S.-China AI Competition," moderated by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee with CCA Honorary Senior Fellows Alvin Wang Graylin and Paul Triolo.

2. Central Inspection Teams Target China’s Security and Stability Sectors

What Happened: China’s central discipline inspection teams launched a new round of inspections across 36 central institutions in the security and social stability sectors, including the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, and the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration. According to the announcement, the inspections aim to reinforce loyalty to Xi Jinping while ensuring that the central leadership’s major decisions are fully implemented. During this period, dedicated hotlines and mailboxes have been established to receive complaints, particularly those involving disciplinary violations by senior officials.

Why It Matters: The previous round of inspections in regions such as Xinjiang helped drive high-level purges, including Politburo member Ma Xingrui. Reports indicate that more than 60% of major corruption cases stem from public tip-offs submitted during inspection periods. As a result, the coming months could see further investigations or purges targeting senior officials in the political-legal affairs, social stability, and public welfare systems. Amid intensified political scrutiny, the 36 institutions under inspection are likely to exercise greater caution when handling major issues.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “What Will Xi Jinping’s Priorities Be in 2026?” by CCA Fellow Neil Thomas and Lobsang in China 2026: What to Watch.

3. China Warns Travelers Off Seattle Airport

What Happened: China warned its citizens to avoid Seattle-Tacoma International Airport after reports that roughly 20 Chinese scholars were denied entry to the United States despite holding valid visas. Chinese officials accused U.S. border authorities of “malicious interrogation,” framing the episode as a consular and treatment issue rather than an isolated immigration case.

Why It Matters: The incident reflects a broader shift in how both governments are managing cross-border academic exchange. The United States has increased scrutiny of Chinese researchers on national security grounds, while China has become more willing to respond publicly through travel advisories and diplomatic signaling. These actions are raising the uncertainty and cost of routine mobility. Over time, unpredictable entry conditions may discourage early-career scholars and weaken one of the few remaining channels of stable U.S.–China engagement. The dynamic also risks becoming self-reinforcing: heightened screening invites reciprocal warnings, which in turn strengthen the case for further restrictions, narrowing the space for scientific collaboration, especially in sensitive or strategic fields.

By Emma Zang (@DrEmmaZang), Fellow on Chinese Society, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Watch “What is the Cost to Global Science? U.S.-China Relations and the Future of Innovation” featuring Yasheng Huang, CCA Honorary Senior Fellow, Susan Shirk, Director Emeritus of the 21st Century China Center, and others.

4. PLA Warships Transit Near Southwest Japan Following Taiwan Strait Passage

What Happened: China and Japan conducted closely timed naval activities, with each side transiting through sensitive waterways. On April 22, two PLA Navy vessels returned from the western Pacific via the Yonaguni–Iriomote Waterway following what Beijing described as a routine exercise, days after the same formation transited through the Yokoate Waterway in the first publicly recorded PLA transit of that channel. Both passages are strategically significant as they run along Japan’s southwest island chain near military facilities and potential intervention corridors tied to Taiwan and the East China Sea.

Why It Matters: This episode reflects a pattern of reciprocal deterrence signaling through operational activity between China and Japan. The PLA transit followed Japan’s April 17 Taiwan Strait passage — which Beijing criticized — and served as a deterrent signal directed at Tokyo over Taiwan-related activity. Days earlier, Japan fully participated for the first time in the annual U.S.–Philippines Balikatan exercise, highlighting its expanding role in regional contingency planning. This dynamic is likely to lead to a more entrenched rivalry in which Beijing frames Japan’s naval moves through the lens of remilitarization and historical revisionism, complicating near-term diplomatic engagement.

By Jie Gao, Research Associate on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: “A Stress Test for Resilience: Risks & Opportunities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Director of Political-Security Affairs and Deputy Director at Asia Society Policy Institute.

5. China’s Clean Tech Exports Surge amid Middle East Energy Crisis

What Happened: China’s exports of solar panels and batteries jumped sharply in March, both month-on-month and year-on-year, offering early evidence that global demand for Chinese clean-tech products is being buoyed by volatility stemming from the conflict in Iran and the broader Middle East crisis. According to data released by China’s General Administration of Customs on April 18, exports of lithium-ion batteries, electric vehicles, and solar cells grew by 34%, 53%, and 80%, respectively, on an annual basis.

Why it matters: This surge builds on a wave of overseas sales already driven by China’s cost competitiveness, rising global energy demand, and accelerating fuel switching. The war in Iran is likely to intensify that trend. With its domestic economy relatively insulated from oil and gas price shocks and its clean-tech industries primed for export, China is emerging as one of the long-term energy winners of this crisis.

By Li Shuo, Director of China Climate Hub, and Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “The Evolving Politics of Climate Change in China” by CCA Fellow Neil Thomas and Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

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1. China Expresses Alarm Over U.S. Blockade of Strait of Hormuz

What Happened: Chinese officials labeled President Donald Trump’s decision to blockade the Strait of Hormuz as “dangerous,” “irresponsible,” and against global interests. The remarks from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs came after the United States began enforcing a blockade on Iranian ports along the Strait on Monday. President Trump ordered the blockade after peace talks with Tehran collapsed this weekend. Beijing warned the move risks further escalation and disruption of global energy flows, which China heavily relies upon.

Why It Matters: China’s diplomatic posture toward U.S.–Iran developments — especially around the Strait of Hormuz — has been consistent but more sharply articulated in recent days. China is positioning itself as a forceful voice for de-escalation, implicitly blaming U.S. actions for jeopardizing fragile diplomatic progress. Given China’s recent behind-the-scenes brokering of a ceasefire through Islamabad, Beijing is taking a more active diplomatic approach in Iran and the Middle East in general. Ultimately, however, China is keenly aware that true peace flows through the corridors of Washington, Tehran, and Jerusalem.

By Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security (@LyleJMorris)

Learn More: Read “PLA Watch,” a monthly newsletter centered on delivering insights into China’s military affairs on the Center for China Analysis’s Substack.

2. KMT Chair Meets Xi in Beijing

What Happened: On April 10, KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun met with Xi Jinping in Beijing. At a post-meeting press conference, Cheng relayed Xi's closed-door remarks, stating that mainland China respects the social system and way of life chosen by Taiwan compatriots. Xi also stressed the importance of in-person meetings and indicated that cross-Strait exchanges should not be limited to KMT–CCP interactions. Cheng emphasized that if the KMT returns to power in 2028, the party would pursue an institutionalized cross-Strait peace framework. The following day, the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office released ten policy measures spanning direct flights, tourism, agricultural and fisheries trade, cultural exchanges, and KMT–CCP communication mechanisms.

Why It Matters: The meeting was a win for both Cheng and Xi, but its impact is uncertain. For the KMT, the visit allows Cheng to demonstrate tangible achievements ahead of upcoming elections in Taiwan, bolstering her legitimacy within the KMT base and reinforcing her position that engagement can bring about cross-Strait stability. For Beijing, the meeting and subsequent policies are policy incentives designed to cater to Taiwan’s opposition party. The meeting also signals to Washington that cross-Strait relations can be managed peacefully, albeit in a way that bypasses Taiwan's ruling government. However, it remains unclear how Taiwanese voters will respond to the visit, especially at the ballot box.

By Sheng-Wen Cheng, Research Intern, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure” by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris and Sheng-Wen Cheng.

3. China Unveils Counter-Sanctions Framework Targeting Foreign Firms

What Happened: China enacted the “Anti-Foreign Unjustified Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Regulations,” a formal legal framework designed to counter measures it deems as unlawfully extraterritorial, including foreign sanctions. Its centerpiece is the “Malicious Entity List,” similar to the U.S. Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals list. The regulation targets foreign entities and individuals who promote or enforce “unjustified” sanctions against China, subjecting them to penalties, including trade bans, data transfer blocks, and entry restrictions.

Why It Matters: This is the latest case of Beijing seeking to build its strategic leverage by mirroring the established sanctions toolkits of the United States and the EU, shifting from passive defense to an active, institutionalized posture. For global firms, complying with Western sanctions could now trigger direct, legally binding retaliation from China. Crucially, the regulation includes a “penetration rule,” mirroring the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control 50% rule, meaning penalties automatically extend to any subsidiaries actually controlled by a blacklisted entity.

By Lizzi C. Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy (@wstv_lizzi), and Shengyu Wang, Research Assistant, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “China’s Rare Earth Export Controls” on the Center for China Analysis’s Substack, by CCA Honorary Senior Fellow Paul Triolo and Senior Partner at Tidalwave Solutions Cameron Johnson.

4. Beijing Tightens Control Over Industry Associations While Steering International Engagement

What Happened: Beijing recently issued new guidance aimed at deepening reforms of China’s industry associations and chambers of commerce. The most significant provisions require organizations to adhere to Xi Jinping Thought, strengthen internal Party-building, and adopt governance structures consistent with the socialist market economy. The directive also mandates the establishment of formal reporting mechanisms for major issues, requiring associations to report to and seek “instructions” from Party authorities. Oversight will be tightened in key areas, including asset and financial management, foreign exchanges and international cooperation, and ideological work.

Why It Matters: China currently has more than 100,000 registered industry associations and chambers of commerce, with a combined membership of roughly 7.7 million companies. The new guidance signals a dual objective in the realm of international engagement, encouraging organizations to establish or participate in international economic and trade dialogue mechanisms, while formalizing adherence to Party leadership and Xi Jinping Thought in international exchanges. Taken together, these changes suggest that most industry associations will face tighter constraints in global engagement. Those that remain active on the international stage are likely to be organizations that have received explicit institutional authorization and support from Beijing.

By Lobsang Tsering, Senior Research Associate on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis

Learn More: Read “The Art of Dealing with China“ by CCA Fellow Lizzi C. Lee, CCA Co-Founder and Managing Director Jing Qian, and CCA Senior Fellow Craig Allen.

5. Australia–China Deepen Clean Energy Ties but Energy Security Risks Linger

What Happened: On April 7, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese spoke by phone with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. The two leaders discussed further cooperation in clean energy and electric vehicles while underscoring the importance of continued bilateral cooperation in light of ongoing geopolitical instability. Albanese said the two discussed regional energy security, but the Xinhua readout made no mention of energy security or fuel. Albanese is set to attend the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting later this year, where he is expected to meet with Premier Li.

Why It Matters: Amid ongoing tensions due to the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict and associated strains on energy security and supply chains, China has imposed fuel export bans to protect its domestic industry. China is a major supplier of Australian jet fuel, so any tightening of Chinese export controls could have downstream effects on Australia’s aviation sector and broader energy supply. The call also highlights the need to balance deeper cooperation in future-facing sectors like clean energy, while addressing immediate vulnerabilities exacerbated by an uncertain geopolitical environment.

By Taylah Bland, Fellow on Climate and the Environment, Center for China Analysis (@Taylahbland)

Learn More: Read “The Evolving Politics of Climate Change in China” by CCA Fellow Neil Thomas and Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

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