China Sentences Two Former Ministers of Defense to Death with Reprieve

On May 7, Xinhua News reported that a PRC military court sentenced the last two disgraced PRC Ministers of Defense, Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) and Li Shangfu (李尚福), to death with a two-year reprieve for corruption. Below is a rough translation of the article:

“On May 7, 2026, the military court lawfully pronounced judgment on the bribery case of Wei Fenghe, former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. Wei Fenghe was found guilty of bribery and sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. After the two-year reprieve period expires, his sentence will be commuted to life imprisonment in accordance with the law, and he will be imprisoned for life without the possibility of commutation or parole. On May 7, 2026, the military court lawfully pronounced judgment on the bribery case of Li Shangfu, former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. The court found Li Shangfu guilty of bribery and offering of bribes, and sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. After the two-year reprieve period expires, his sentence will be commuted to life imprisonment in accordance with the law, and he will be imprisoned for life without the possibility of commutation or parole.”

CCA Analysis: The swift sentencing of Wei and Li marks a dramatic downfall for the two former CMC members. China rarely sentences CMC members — let alone former ministers of defense — to death. They are the first known cases of Chinese ministers of defense receiving death sentences with reprieve.

In 2023, Air Force General Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲) was given a suspended death sentence for corruption. Liu was formerly the Political Commissar of the PLA National Defence University and Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region Air Force. The last corruption-related scandal of a former CMC member was for former CMC Chief of the General Staff Fang Fenghui (房峰辉), who was purged in 2017 and received a life sentence in 2019. Before Fang, the last PLA general sentenced to death was former lieutenant general Gu Junshan (谷俊山), who received a suspended death sentence in August 2015 for corruption-related crimes. Gu served as the deputy director of the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) from December 2009 to February 2012.

One also recalls the recent cases of former CMC Vice Chairs Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄), who received life imprisonment in 2016 for corruption, and Xu Caihou (徐才厚), who died of cancer in 2015 before trial proceedings concluded on charges of corruption.

The last major upheaval of this proportion occurred in the wake of the Lin Biao (林彪) purge in the 1970s. General Huang Yongsheng (黄永胜) reportedly received a death sentence with reprieve during the “Lin Biao clique” purge by Mao, later commuted; and Lieutenant General Wu Faxian (吴法宪), also reportedly sentenced to death with reprieve after the Lin Biao affair, later commuted.

For Xi to hand out suspended death sentences, Wei and Li likely engaged in other serious crimes beyond corruption, like leaking secrets or harming national security.

China Discloses Fifth-Generation Fighter Export Variant

During a May 1 Labor Day special program aired on China Central Television (CCTV), footage showed a J-35 stealth fighter with the serial number “0001” and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) markings emerging from a hangar. The aircraft appeared without PLA Air Force insignia and was presented in an unpainted light grey finish, suggesting it may be an export variant of the J-35, called “J-35AE.”

Chinese military commentator Fu Qianshao said that the configuration — specifically a single-wheel nose landing gear rather than the reinforced dual-wheel system typically associated with carrier operations — indicates a land-based variant rather than a naval carrier-based model. The serial number “0001,” together with AVIC branding on the fuselage, further suggests a distinct production line separate from PLA operational inventory. In fact, months ago, the AVIC had already displayed a scale model of the J-35A at the 2026 Singapore Airshow, signaling export positioning in advance of the CCTV appearance.

So far, Pakistan has been widely assessed as a likely customer. In earlier days, Pakistani officials publicly stated that China had offered to sell 40 J-35 aircraft alongside KJ-500 airborne early warning platforms and HQ-19 air defense systems. On May 7, 2026, a senior Pakistan Air Force official further confirmed that an initial collaborative mechanism for the J-35AE had been signed, though contract details were not disclosed.

CCA Analysis: The emergence of the J-35AE in public signals that China is moving forward with a fifth-generation fighter export market. If confirmed at scale, this would represent a notable shift in the global stealth fighter landscape, where the United States has cornered the operational export market for fifth-generation fighters (The Russian SU-57 is excluded as there is no verified information or public disclosure of buyers so far).

It should be noted that the picture of the J-35AE was embedded within a broader state enterprise showcase, rather than a formal export announcement. Thus, some ambiguity remains over whether the disclosure was primarily informational, promotional, or deliberate signaling. Even so, the parallel confirmation from Pakistani officials of an initial collaborative agreement, combined with design features consistent with export configuration, indicates an institutionalized pathway toward foreign acquisition, with Pakistan as the most likely recipient.

More broadly, the development reflects how China’s defense export model is increasingly evolving beyond platform delivery toward integrated support arrangements. The reported presence of AVIC technical personnel in Pakistan during the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis suggests a model in which Chinese systems are accompanied by embedded operational and technical support under real conflict conditions. Arms sales to Pakistan, including the recent delivery of the Hangor-class attack submarine, provide China with opportunities to expand influence and test its operational and support capabilities on the battlefield.

At the same time, it remains uncertain whether such an export program can scale in a manner comparable to the U.S. F-35 ecosystem. The U.S. model is anchored in alliance structures, long-term interoperability frameworks, and security guarantees that China currently does not yet replicate. While China may be entering the stealth fighter export space, its ability to turn this into a durable global network remains unproven.

The PLA Showcases Counter-Drone Air Defense Capabilities

China continues to publicly showcase its counter–unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities. According to CCTV in early May, the PLA Navy recently completed a “finalization test” (定型试验) of a new terminal air defense and anti-missile weapon system in the Bohai Sea. The test involved multiple drone targets simulating ultra-low-altitude sea-skimming profiles and low-observable penetration tactics under complex electromagnetic conditions. The test was designed to stress the system’s interception performance in realistic threat environments. The term “finalization test” indicates that a late-stage verification process in which a system that has largely completed development is moving toward production and deployment.

Chinese state media also publicized directed-energy counter-UAS systems. A recent CCTV program presented simulated engagements involving the “Guangjian-11E” (光箭-11E) and “Guangjian-21A” (光箭-21A) laser systems. The Guangjian-11E was shown in a “soft-kill” (软杀伤) role, disrupting drone sensors and communication links through pulsed laser effects, while the Guangjian-21A was demonstrated in a hard-kill (硬杀伤) role, physically damaging airframes and internal electronic components. The demonstrations included engagements against low-altitude targets and fiber-linked drones.

CCA Analysis: The development reflects a broader shift in which counter-UAS capability is increasingly treated as a core requirement of modern force design rather than auxiliary air defense. Operational experience from Ukraine and the Middle East has demonstrated that small, low-cost drones can generate disproportionate battlefield effects through reconnaissance, targeting support, saturation attacks, and one-way strike missions against high-value platforms. This has prompted the PLA to adapt layered air defense systems utilizing counter-UAS, particularly in maritime and littoral environments.

The PLA’s emphasis on ultra-low-altitude sea-skimming (超低空掠海), concealed penetration (隐蔽突防), and complex electromagnetic environments (复杂电磁环境) reflects concern over drone employment concepts designed to exploit radar coverage gaps. These characteristics are particularly relevant in a Taiwan contingency environment, where U.S. and Taiwan defense discussions increasingly emphasize a drone-enabled “hellscape” concept in the Taiwan Strait, intended to increase operational cost and delay PLA maneuver and landing operations.

From a capability development perspective, the PLA systems being demonstrated suggest an emerging layered counter-UAS structure combining soft-kill and hard-kill directed-energy options, typified by the Guangjian platforms. China’s development of high-power microwave (HPM) systems, including the “Hurricane-3000” (飓风-3000) we previously covered, offer another example of the PLA’s interest in counter-swarm applications. Compared to lasers, HPM systems are generally better suited to area effects, with the potential to disrupt multiple drone systems simultaneously through electromagnetic interference.

However, compared to laser-based systems, publicly observable evidence of operational HPM field employment remains limited. This may indicate that while the capability is being developed and tested, it has not yet reached the same level of operational maturity in the PLA. U.S. development programs such as the Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) and its follow-on Mjölnir similarly suggest that HPM systems face persistent constraints in power generation, thermal management, beam control, and system integration under operational conditions.

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Y-20B’s First Overseas Mission Highlights Advances in China’s Military Airlift Capacity

On April 20, 2026, the PLA Air Force deployed the Y-20B heavy transport aircraft for the first time to South Korea to carry out the 13th repatriation mission for the remains of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army soldiers from the Korean War. Chinese state media noted that this marked the Y-20B’s first deployment for such a mission and first publicly confirmed overseas flight. Upon re-entering Chinese airspace, the aircraft was escorted by four J-20 fighters. The Y-20B’s primary upgrade over the baseline Y-20 is the replacement of Russian D-30KP-2 engines with domestically produced WS-20 turbofan engines that improve range, payload capacity, and fuel efficiency. While the mission itself was ceremonial, China chose to publicly announce the overseas operation to highlight the Y-20B’s operational debut.

The Y-20B sits within a broader, layered Chinese military airlift architecture. At the top tier, the Y-20A, Y-20B, and YY-20 tankers represent the PLA’s long-range strategic airlift and aerial refueling capabilities. The medium tier features the Y-30 – a four-turboprop medium tactical transport aircraft. In December 2025, the Y-30 completed its maiden flight at Xi’an. The Y-30 is designed for point-to-point distribution to forward and austere locations, with short-takeoff-and-landing capability on unpaved runways suited to environments such as South China Sea outposts and Himalayan border positions. At the lower tier, the Y-8 and Y-9 form the backbone of China’s special mission aviation. The Y-8 has been adapted for electronic reconnaissance, maritime patrol, and airborne early warning variants since the 1980s. The Y-9 has emerged as the next-generation successor in the special mission role. At the September 2025 military parade, the PLA displayed for the first time a coordinated formation of three Y-9 special-mission types: the Y-9Q maritime patrol and ASW aircraft, the Y-9DZ electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and the Y-9LG standoff jamming aircraft.

CCA Analysis: The Y-20B demonstrates the PLA’s evolution in reducing external dependence on propulsion systems for its large military transport aircraft. Early Y-20s relied on Russian D-30KP-2 engines. The adoption of the WS-20 engine marks the first case of China achieving indigenous development over both the airframe and engine of a heavy transport platform, utilizing 3D printing technology for part of the manufacturing process. The PLA has launched aerial refueling variants of the Y-20, such as the YY-20, as well as the KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control aircraft. The KJ-3000, which completed its maiden flight in late 2024, is based on the Y-20B airframe and is believed to have the capability of detecting stealth aircraft.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 Report noted that China is progressing on indigenous engine development, while cautioning that advancement will likely be gradual as China works to resolve longstanding technological barriers in advanced propulsion.

PLA Rocket Force Unit Experiments with Anonymous Online Message Board Feedback

A People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) unit created an anonymous online message board on its internal “Strong Army Website” (强军网) to allow officers and enlisted personnel to directly raise complaints, concerns, and suggestions to leadership. The initiative, reported by the PLA Daily, came after the unit’s Party Committee found during a soldiers’ reception day that many grassroots concerns were either not being addressed or were being distorted as they moved up the chain of command.

The unit Party Committee decided to establish a platform modeled on local government “online governance” systems. Despite concerns that the board could become a venue for negativity or harm internal relations, leadership insisted that Party organs must prioritize “grassroots first, soldiers first” and treat solving soldiers’ practical problems as a key measure of performance.

Once launched, soldiers raised issues ranging from malfunctioning duty-room equipment and broken family-compound fitness machines to outdated library resources in remote posts. One notable case involved a staff officer who assigned multiple reports on a Friday night with a Sunday deadline, prompting a soldier to complain that “one word from headquarters, and the grassroots are running themselves ragged” (机关一句话，基层跑断腿). The officer publicly apologized and promised immediate correction, while senior leaders identified the deeper issue as a weak service mentality toward grassroots units.

CCA Analysis: This is an interesting trial for improving internal governance, morale, and combat readiness within the PLA. Rather than relying on formal reporting channels, the unit is experimenting with direct feedback mechanisms through social media to ensure leadership hears frontline concerns unfiltered. In that sense, the platform is a problem-solving mechanism and a channel for strengthening trust between leadership and troops.

This reflects a broader political priority within the PLA of streamlining direct feedback from “grassroots units” to solve practical problems for soldiers. The unit Party Committee explicitly frames this as rejecting “vanity projects” and evaluating cadres based on whether they address real troop concerns, reinforcing Xi Jinping’s longstanding emphasis on combat effectiveness and addressing the welfare of soldiers.

The article also suggests that morale and operational performance are closely connected. Leadership argues that when soldiers feel heard and supported, their sense of belonging and ownership increases, which translates into stronger commitment during training and missions. The article closes by linking the success of the feedback system to strong performance during a recent live-fire assault exercise, implying that improved welfare and trust directly support readiness.

Sensitive Waterways, Sharp Signals: China and Japan’s Escalating Naval Standoff

On April 17, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait from 4:02 a.m. to 5:50 p.m. for approximately 14 hours. The transit fell on the 131st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the 1895 unequal treaty under which the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. The war is a recurring symbol of national humiliation in Chinese historical memory.

China’s Ministry of National Defense condemned the transit as a “deliberate provocation” (蓄意挑衅) and lodged a formal protest with Tokyo, accusing Japan of sending the wrong signal to Taiwan independence forces. In a commentary, PLA Daily accused Tokyo of “harming the feelings of the Chinese people” by timing the transit to coincide with the anniversary.

On April 19, the Eastern Theater Command announced that PLA Navy 133rd task group, centered on Type 052 destroyer Baotou (包头), had transited the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific for open-water training exercises. The Eastern Theater Command characterized the deployment as “routine annual training” conducted in accordance with international law and “not directed at any specific country.”

On April 20, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected the aircraft carrier Liaoning (辽宁) transiting the Taiwan Strait southward. The PLA Navy simultaneously announced that the Sichuan (四川), China’s first Type 076 amphibious assault ship, had departed Shanghai for the South China Sea for sea trials and training. These movements coincided with the opening of US-Philippines “Balikatan 2026,” in which Japan participated for the first time in a combat capacity. On April 22, PLA Navy 133rd task group completed its Western Pacific exercises and returned via the Yonaguni-Iriomote Strait, which runs close to Taiwan’s eastern coast.

CCA Analysis: This was the first time that the PLA proactively announced a Yokoate Channel transit. In the past, Japan was the first to disclose such operations. Beijing’s decision to get ahead of the news cycle can be interpreted as an expression of displeasure over Japan’s Taiwan Strait transit and a willingness to publicize naval movements as a signal of deterrence. This episode is just the latest iteration of an ongoing cycle of reciprocal operational deterrence signaling by both sides.

The JS Ikazuchi‘s transit was Japan’s fourth through the Taiwan Strait since September 2024. Its 14-hour duration and timing with the Treaty of Shimonoseki anniversary gave Beijing grounds to frame the passage as politically provocative rather than a routine freedom of navigation action. China’s response was swift, dispatching the PLA Navy’s 133rd Task Group through the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific just 48 hours later. The deployment of the Liaoning through the Taiwan Strait and the Sichuan’s training in the South China Sea coincided with the opening of “Balikatan 2026” joint exercise between the United States, Philippines and Japan.

The Balikatan 2026 added another layer to an already charged week. Japan joined for the first time in a combat role, deploying roughly 1,400 troops and conducting live-fire sinking drills using Type 88 anti-ship missiles off northern Luzon. It was the first time Japanese forces have used the system outside their territory at a location facing the Taiwan Strait. It was also the first time the JMSDF projected forces into the South China Sea for joint exercises.

The geographic scope of China-Japan maritime interaction has expanded considerably since late 2025. Friction that was previously concentrated around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Miyako Strait has extended into the Western Pacific and the eastern side of the First Island Chain. CSIS ChinaPower data shows the PLA conducted a record 163 operations in the South China Sea in 2025, while the aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong combined for 58 days of operations beyond the First Island Chain, up from 32 days in 2024.

China’s Navy Anniversary Film Points to Nuclear Carrier, Sends Message on Taiwan

On April 22, the PLA Navy released a seven-minute promotional film titled Toward the Ocean (向大洋) to mark the 77th founding anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The film follows four characters whose names are Mandarin homophones of China’s three active carriers: Liao Ning (辽宁/Liaoning), Shan Dong (山东/Shandong), and Fu Jian (福建/Fujian), alongside a new recruit named He Jian (何剑). The name He Jian is a near-homophone of “nuclear vessel” (核舰, hé jiàn) in Mandarin. In the film, He Jian is aged 19, which follows sequentially from the hull numbers of China’s three existing carriers (16, 17, 18), leading analysts to interpret the character as an allusion to a forthcoming nuclear-powered fourth carrier. His noticeably taller backpack was further interpreted as a hint at greater displacement, beyond the Fujian’s 80,000 tons, toward the 100,000-ton class of U.S. supercarriers.

The film closes with a scene at Unification Road Primary School (统一路小学) in Weihai city, where one of the characters picks up his son, nicknamed “Xiao Wan” (小湾) — a common affectionate abbreviation for Taiwan. The boy says he does not want to go home yet, and his father replies that his mother is waiting. The exchange was widely read as an allegory for Taiwan’s eventual “reunification” with the mainland. Some commentators also noted that the phrase “don't be shameless” (别耍赖皮) contains the character “Lai,” a homophone for Lai (赖) as in President Lai Ching-te (賴清德). The framing of Taiwan’s current leader as the obstinate child refusing to come home was a clear symbol of Beijing’s frustration over Lai’s “pro-independence” policies.

CCA Analysis: The video’s rich symbolism offers a window into PLA Navy political and capability priorities. The He Jian character appears to be a deliberate reference to the Type 004 carrier currently under construction at Dalian Shipyard. Janes’s satellite imagery analysis from December 17, 2025 confirmed that construction of the carrier is underway. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 Report assessed that China plans to field nine carriers by 2035, of which six may be Type 004-class vessels.

The closing sequence is a clear reference to Taiwan. The film was released 12 days after KMT chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) met Xi Jinping in Beijing. The choice of Weihai’s Unification Road School as the closing location also carries historical resonance. The city has deep historical ties with Wokou (倭寇) pirates — the Japanese and Chinese coastal raiders who harassed China’s coastline from the 13th to 17th centuries. It is also associated with the Battle of Weihaiwei (威海卫之战) in 1895, where China’s Beiyang Fleet (北洋水师) was destroyed in the First Sino-Japanese War. In 1950, newly appointed PLAN Navy commander Xiao Jingguang (肖劲光) visited nearby Liugong Island (刘公岛) by fishing boat, lamenting that the PLAN’s weakness in a remark since inscribed on a monument there. Closing a naval power narrative at this location links the current era into a century of maritime humiliation and recovery, with Taiwan remaining the only piece of “lost territory” yet to be “reunified” with the mainland.

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow

Jie Gao, Research Associate

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern

Xi Jinping Launches First-Ever Military-Wide Senior Officer Training Program

On April 8, Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony of the first-ever military-wide training program for senior PLA officers held at the National Defense University. Xi delivered a speech emphasizing the need for “ideological rectification” (思想整风) and “political consolidation” (政治整训) within the PLA. The only remaining CMC Vice Chairman, Zhang Shengmin (张升民) hosted the ceremony, with top PLA leadership, including Defense Minister Dong Jun (董军) and Central Theater Command Commander Han Shengyan (韩胜延) in attendance.

Eastern Theater Command Commander Yang Zhibin (杨志斌), who was promoted to full general with Han Shengyan in December 2025, was not present. On the same day, an article authored by Yang was published in the Central Party School’s newspaper, referencing the need to draw lessons from the cases of disgraced senior military officials involved in “serious discipline and law violations” (汲取军队落马高级干部严重违纪违法问题深刻教训).

Xi’s remarks centered on three topics. First, officers must ground their political loyalty in the theoretical study of Marxism and Xi Jinping Thought. Second, Xi stressed that the Party represents the fundamental interests of the people and holds “no special interests of its own,” emphasizing that “all acts of self-interest and corruption are fundamentally incompatible with the Party’s nature and purpose.” He also called on senior officers to restore the military’s “revolutionary roots,” and said that CCP regulations apply “equally to all,” with no “special status” (没有特殊) and “no exceptions” (没有例外) in their implementation. Third, Xi invoked the historical observation that the Party and military have grown stronger through sustained struggle against “erroneous ideological and behavioral tendencies” (各种错误思想作风), expressing confidence that the PLA would achieve “unprecedented unity” (空前团结统一) heading into 2027.

CCA Analysis: This is indeed notable, as it represents the first-of-a-kind military-wide training program overseen by Xi. It marks a significant escalation of Xi’s effort to consolidate CMC authority over the officer corps. The term zhengfeng (ideological rectification, 整风) harkens back to Mao’s Yan’an Rectification Movement during the 1940s, which Xi revitalized during the 2024 CMC Political Work Conference in Yan’an. Xi is positioning the program within a longer tradition of Party self-renewal through top-down political discipline and ideological consolidation.

Xi’s repeated emphasis on “struggle” against “ideological and behavioral tendencies” can be read multiple ways. There are rumors that the recent purges in the PLA are related to Xi’s dissatisfaction with PLA training and modernization. To the extent that those rumors are true, this new training course could be Xi’s way of strengthening oversight and discipline over PLA training. Second, it suggests that Xi is dissatisfied with feedback on training metrics and standards within the PLA. In that sense, it could be read as a signal that the PLA must step up its game or else come under additional scrutiny.

The program is clearly designed to respond to pervasive corruption within the PLA. Xi’s emphasis that regulations apply “equally to all” is an admission that some senior leaders in the PLA enjoyed special treatment. It is a direct response and a warning to the deep-seated patronage networks and rent-seeking culture of the PLA that business as usual is no longer tolerated. By connecting the campaign to the 2027 centenary milestone, Xi has elevated military compliance from a disciplinary matter to a historical obligation. The key question is whether this campaign will strengthen command cohesion and discipline through frank feedback or prompt senior officers to become even more risk-averse to avoid scrutiny.

The PLA Responds to Japanese Deployment of Long-Range Missiles

On March 31, Japan deployed the Type 25 surface-to-ship missile (SSM) at the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Kengun base in Kumamoto, prompting a stern response from China. The currently deployed Block 1 variant has a range of about 900 kilometers, while the Block 2 variant, expected to be completed by 2027, is projected to reach beyond 2,000 kilometers. Japanese Defense Minister Koizumi Shinjiro characterized the deployments as a necessary step to bolster Japan’s deterrent capabilities.

Days after the deployment, the PLA sent a group of PLA Navy (PLAN) ships to the Sea of Japan via the Tsushima Strait. The group included a Type 055 destroyer, two Type 052D destroyers, a Type 815A advanced electronic reconnaissance ship (AGI), and a Type 903A replenishment ship. This PLAN task force was likely a direct response to Japan’s posture enhancements.

This follows a broader trend of China and the PLA calling out “Japanese militarism.” One PLA Daily article accused Japan’s defense industry of accelerating military expansion. It singled out Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries as having participated in wartime atrocities before “reinventing themselves” as defense contractors operating under “civilian cover.” It added that Japan has allocated 17.5 billion yen in 2025 for civilian-to-military technology conversion — roughly 18 times the 2022 figure, and that it established a U.S. DARPA-style Defense Innovation Science and Technology Institute in 2024 to channel civilian R&D into military applications. The article further warned that Japan’s plutonium stockpile was sufficient to produce approximately 5,500 nuclear warheads, stating that Japan already possesses nearly all the material and technical prerequisites for nuclear weapons production and could become “a de facto nuclear-armed state in an extremely short period” (能在极短时间内成为事实上的拥核国家).

One week later, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) condemned Japan’s planned revision of its Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology as a “serious violation” of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang (张晓刚) separately characterized Japan’s missile deployments as a “complete betrayal” of its pacifist constitution and warned that China maintained sufficient capability to make aggressors “pay an unbearable price.”

CCA Analysis: This recent incident is part of a broader campaign by China to smear Japan, and stems from the Japanese prime minister Takaichi’s Taiwan-related remarks in late 2025. The deployment of the Type 25 missiles had been planned for many years, and is part of Japan’s regional anti-access and denial deterrent modernization program. Japan sees this program as reducing dependence on U.S. military support and redistributing firepower platforms along the first island chain. From China’s perspective, such systems are an unwarranted escalation of offensive capabilities targeting China.

Furthermore, the PLA Daily’s criticism of Japanese dual-use technology transfer is in tension with China’s own Military-Civil Fusion strategy. For example, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, revealed last month during the Two Sessions, explicitly calls for a “green channel” that promotes the transfer of civilian technology to military domains (健全前沿科技成果”民参军”绿色通道). It is reasonable to assume that Beijing sees the value of such pathways, after watching the United States leverage its own civil-military fusion programs. By invoking Japan’s WWII atrocities, Beijing’s playbook is to cast Japan’s current military developments as a continuation of the legacy of Japanese “militarism,” depicting Japan, not China, as the source of regional instability.

China’s Heavy Cargo Drone Completes Maiden Flight in China, Raising Questions About Military Applications

On March 31, one of China’s largest cargo drones, the Changying-8 (长鹰-8, CY-8), completed its maiden flight in Zhengzhou, Henan province. The aircraft has a take-off weight of 7 tons, a payload capacity of 3.5 tons, and a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers (approximately 200 to 300 meters for take-off and landing). Developed by a subsidiary of China North Industries Group Corporation Limited, it is capable of short take-off and landing operations on austere runways in high-altitude and island environments. Designed for dual military and civilian use, it reportedly allows a single operator to control up to eight CY-8s simultaneously. Mass production is expected before year-end.

At the Ministry of Defense’s April 9 press conference, a reporter mentioned that Taiwanese public opinion described the CY-8 as a potential new “aircraft carrier killer” (反航母利器) and that there was concern in Taiwan that China’s unmanned combat system developments would enhance the PLA’s capacity to deter and strike against “Taiwan independence forces.” Without commenting on the drone’s specific military applications, Zhang stated that the PLA would resolutely oppose any form of separatism and external interference, and that capabilities relevant to “anti-secession and anti-intervention” (反分裂反干涉) missions would continue.

CCA Analysis: The CY-8 gives the PLA enhanced logistics capabilities in operationally constrained environments. Its 15-minute cargo loading cycle gives the PLA additional cargo capacity in geographic areas that have limited infrastructure. Although China has not officially specified its military applications, coverage by Chinese state media and PLA official social media accounts suggests military interest in the platform. As noted by both Chinese military commentators and the CY-8’s developers, operational roles are likely to include resupply and border patrol missions for a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency.

The characterization of the CY-8 as an “aircraft carrier killer” is traceable to Lai Yue-qian (賴岳謙), a Taiwanese political analyst whose remarks were picked up by Chinese media outlets, including during the Ministry of Defense press conference. As cross-Strait tensions have increased, China has used announcements of new weapons programs as a public relations campaign to warn Taiwanese “independence forces.” For example, our previous edition’s coverage of the two newly commissioned Type 055 destroyers included PLA references to Taiwan.

One of Lai’s arguments is that the CY-8 can operate as a military cargo drone designed to carry significant military hardware, and that its 3.5-tonne payload capacity could theoretically accommodate a single YJ-12 anti-ship missile, posing a threat to U.S. carrier strike groups. However, while technically feasible, significant limitations remain. A one-drone, one-missile model would be operationally inefficient since the CY-8 is a non-stealthy platform that would likely become an easy target for U.S. operations. Such an approach would also fail to exploit the aircraft’s large 18-cubic-meter cargo bay.

A more likely scenario is the CY-8 being deployed as part of a broader containerized drone swarm system. This concept mirrors the U.S. military’s Rapid Dragon system, which ejects pallets from the aircraft’s rear ramp via parachute. Once deployed, the system releases dozens or even hundreds of drones or loitering munitions to saturate carrier air defenses, creating a far more credible threat than a single missile.

China has demonstrated relevant capabilities in this domain. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (中国电子科技集团公司) released footage of a containerized swarm system capable of launching 48 drones of varying types from a single vehicle. The system is so efficient that a single operator could control nearly 100 aircraft across missions.

Whether analogous systems could be adapted for airborne delivery remains an open question. But the technical trajectory is clear. If the PLA seeks to combine heavy anti-ship missiles with drone swarm delivery at scale, the CY-8’s 3.5-ton payload limit is a constraint. The Jiutian (九天) drone, which completed its maiden flight in December 2025, offers a more effective payload capacity (6 tons) for multi-missile or high-density swarm missions.

Next, we examine the recently-concluded China-Vietnam Border Defense Friendship Exchange, including the 40th joint patrol in the Beibu Gulf. Finally, we highlight an uptick in PLA commentary on U.S. wartime use of artificial intelligence (AI) and how the PLA is framing AI in the military.

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow

Jie Gao, Research Associate

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern

More Defense Industry Purges Tied to the PLA

In mid-March, China’s defense-industrial and military research organizations saw a series of high-profile personnel changes. Three academicians with defense backgrounds—Wu Manqing (吴曼青), Zhao Xiangeng (赵宪庚), and Wei Yiyin (魏毅寅)—were removed from the official roster of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院), with their names and profiles no longer publicly listed. The academicians—an elite honorific awarded to elected fellows of China’s top scientific institutions—were associated with radar and electronic information systems, nuclear engineering, and missile guidance and aerospace technology, respectively.

Two days after the event, the profile of Yang Wei (杨伟), the chief designer of the J-20 fighter, also disappeared from the Chinese Academy of Sciences website, and he had reportedly not appeared in public for over a year. Yang previously led development work on both the J-10 and J-20 and held a senior executive role at Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC, 中国航空工业集团有限公司).

At the same time, the corruption case against Tan Ruisong (谭瑞松), former AVIC Chairman, concluded on March 25. Tan was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, along with full confiscation of personal assets. Charges against Tan include bribery, embezzlement, insider trading involving more than US$89 million, and the disclosure of confidential information over a long period. Official statements reported that he used restructuring, project contracting, and personnel or resource arrangements in the defense sector for private gain.

CCA Analysis: The current wave of scrutiny reflects a continued expansion of investigations into Chinese academics involved in the research and engineering of PLA weapons systems. Earlier rounds have already swept through the Rocket Force and major defense-industrial firms, with multiple senior figures removed and at least nine academicians stripped of their titles in recent years.

The Tan Ruisong case further illustrates the deep integration of China’s defense sector with capital markets and resource allocation. These enterprises could become financial hubs for senior officials, who can leverage their political authority to engage in rent-seeking during R&D, procurement, and export. However, extending state discipline to elite scientists and chief designers introduces a risky trade-off between political control and technical autonomy. This tension embodies economist Barry Naughton’s “impossible trinity,” which suggests the state cannot simultaneously achieve firm autonomy, strict oversight, and policy-driven goals. Therefore, the future of PLA modernization depends on the nature of this scrutiny. More targeted interventions may improve institutional coordination without stalling progress. Conversely, broad or sustained crackdowns risk destabilizing the concentrated expertise and long-term leadership required for defense innovation, weakening the very program execution and system integration China seeks to perfect.

Type 055 Destroyers Debut in the Eastern Theater Command

Recently, two newly commissioned PLA Navy Type 055 destroyers assigned to the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Navy—the Dongguan (东莞) and Anqing (安庆)—began their first public round of post-commissioning training in the East China Sea.

Their disclosed training included air defense, anti-surface strike, anti-submarine warfare, and multi-domain coordination. Reporting also emphasized operations under complex electromagnetic conditions, including target detection, data-link sharing, and fire control coordination. Anti-submarine drills involved towed sonar, unmanned shipborne helicopters, and sonobuoys to hone undersea warfare capabilities. Later releases showed live-fire activity involving countermeasure deployment and formation maneuvering, though the locations of the drills, the munitions used, and detailed performance results were not disclosed.

Beyond the operational details, official coverage framed the exercises within a broader political narrative. References to deterring “Taiwan independence” and safeguarding maritime security were presented alongside the training, linking capability development to cross-strait signaling.

Since 2020, including the two newly commissioned vessels, a total of 10 Type 055 destroyers have entered service. As a key surface combatant in the PLA Navy, the platform continues to undergo incremental upgrades and weapons testing. A recent example was the finalization test of a hypersonic anti-ship missile, which we covered earlier this January.

CCA Analysis: The speed with which Dongguan and Anqing have been integrated into the theater commands is noteworthy. Their assignment to the Eastern Theater Command is particularly notable given its focus on the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea contingencies. Deploying advanced surface combatants to the ETC strengthens air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and command capabilities in scenarios most directly tied to cross-strait operations.

Official coverage also emphasized the Type 055’s role as a high-end operational node capable of operating in contested electromagnetic environments, sharing targeting data across platforms, and integrating unmanned systems into anti-submarine operations. Together, these elements point to a “system-of-systems” combat approach featured prominently in PLA discussions of modern warfare.

Meanwhile, the political framing is equally notable. By pairing the ships’ commission and training with messaging directed at Taipei, official narratives connect naval modernization more directly to Taiwan-related deterrence, reinforcing that capability development is not only a signal of military modernization but of sustained day-to-day cross-strait deterrence.

China–Vietnam Joint Patrol and South China Sea Contrast

From March 16 to 20, China and Vietnam conducted their 10th Border Defense Friendship Exchange, including the 40th joint patrol in the Beibu Gulf (北部湾). The naval component took place on March 19 and 20, with both sides sending two vessels to patrol along the China–Vietnam maritime boundary.

The exercise included alternating command responsibilities and the sharing of maritime domain awareness (MDA) during the patrol. Training focused on joint escort missions, anti-piracy, search and rescue, formation maneuvering, and command and control coordination. Public reporting also highlighted live-fire drills with light weapons, marking a modest expansion in the scope of training from previous years.

The maritime engagement took place in tandem with higher-level political coordination, including the first China–Vietnam “3+3” strategic dialogue covering foreign affairs, defense, and public security. Wang Yi, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, mentioned that both sides should “enhance cooperation through multilateral platforms and properly manage maritime issues.”

During the same period, friction between China and the Philippines continued in the South China Sea. Chinese authorities reported “warning off” Philippine aircraft near disputed features by the China coast guard (CCG). The Philippines, on the other hand, continued to publicize footage and statements tied to resupply operations and maritime encounters, claiming that the CCG conducted unsafe maneuvers towards Philippe vessels.

CCA Analysis: The Beibu Gulf patrol reflects a continuing pattern of relatively low-profile military cooperation between two countries with disputed maritime territory. By concentrating on escort, anti-piracy, and search and rescue, both sides can sustain military interaction without directly engaging the more politically sensitive parts of their maritime disputes. All of these efforts are enabled by a cooperative institutional framework of joint fisheries patrols in the Beibu Gulf.

This is juxtaposed with China’s interactions with the Philippines in the South China Sea, in which tension and clashes are the norm. These operations are closely intertwined with a public narrative battle over moral authority. The Philippines has continued to use transparency measures to shape external perceptions, while China frames Philippine actions as unilateral provocations that exacerbate the disputes.

China’s approach to Vietnam and the Philippines offers a useful test case for cooperation and coercion: institutionalized cooperation in areas where operating rules are relatively clear, and persistent gray zone pressure in more contested waters. This dual-track approach has become a more recognizable feature of Beijing’s regional behavior.

China Criticizes U.S. Battlefield AI Use While Advancing Its Own Intelligentized Warfare Framework

On March 11, China’s Ministry of National Defense cautioned against the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in battlefield decisions involving lethal force, warning that excessive reliance could weaken accountability and ethics in war. The statement stressed that AI applications should remain under human control and called for greater international coordination on governance frameworks. The remarks were made in response to a question about reported tensions between the Pentagon and U.S. domestic technology companies over expanding military access to AI systems, as well as reports that such tools had been used in operations related to Venezuela and Iran. In contrast, recent PLA commentary continues to frame AI as central to “intelligentized” (智能化) warfare, highlighting its role in multi-domain sensing, data processing, manned-unmanned coordination, and system-level integration across platforms.

CCA Analysis: There has been a marked increase in attention to AI-enabled or “intelligentized” warfare within the PLA. The PLA is highly attuned to how data, algorithms, and computing power can reshape decision-making, compress command timelines, and enhance overall combat effectiveness. U.S. military operations in Iran have likely heightened this awareness. Across multiple articles, AI is framed not merely as a supporting tool, but as a core enabler of military operations, particularly in real-time battlefield situational awareness. In several cases, this is explicitly linked to faster OODA (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act, 观察—判断—决策—行动) loops, with the aim of enabling commanders to process information and act more quickly than an adversary.

At the same time, these discussions consistently emphasize the need to maintain human control over AI-enabled systems. Some writings explicitly warn against the risks of overreliance on automated decision-making, including what has been described as a “Tacitus Trap,” where repeated system errors or lack of transparency could erode trust in AI-assisted decisions and undermine command authority. References to human supervision, responsibility boundaries, and alignment between human intent and machine behavior appear alongside calls for greater autonomy and deeper operational integration.

Beijing’s criticism of U.S. battlefield AI use is ultimately hypocritical, however, as it belies the PLA’s own efforts to advance AI-enabled warfare capabilities, which the PLA will almost certainly employ in future scenarios. The fact of the matter is both the U.S. and China are grappling with how AI should be incorporated into military operations, particularly in defining the boundary between machine autonomy and human judgment in future warfare.

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the INSS Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of National Defense University, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.

PLA Autonomy and the Chinese Military Purges

This essay assesses Xi Jinping’s January 2026 purge of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chair Zhang Youxia and Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli. The analysis focuses on the extent to which Xi Jinping grants the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) autonomy in the military sphere.

Many analyses of party-army relations in China assume a tacit bargain by which the party grants the PLA a degree of autonomy on military issues in exchange for the military’s political loyalty, sometimes called the “conditional compliance” model.1 Since assuming his role as Chairman of the CMC, Xi has emphasized the power of the CMC’s “Chairman Responsibility System” (CRS) to assert the right to make all military decisions, but in practice, he continued to respect many PLA institutional equities. The current purges of senior PLA leaders, however, suggest that Xi has intervened decisively in the military sphere and that the past assumption of a tacit bargain that grants the PLA a significant degree of autonomy may no longer be valid.

This analysis provides context for understanding Xi’s unprecedented purge of senior PLA officers and concludes by assessing four models that Xi might use to tighten future control over the PLA. It assesses the impact of each on party control and operational effectiveness. None seems likely to solve what may be an unsolvable problem. The most likely approach could involve a mix of younger generals who might be more honest and more politically compliant, and further efforts to strengthen the political work system and monitoring capabilities.

My central argument is that despite Xi Jinping asserting his authority to make military decisions through the CRS, in practice, Xi has continued to respect many PLA institutional equities. The most recent round of purges challenges the validity of this assumption going forward.

The Current Purge in Context

The current purges differ from Xi’s efforts to clean house in the PLA in 2013-15. In addition to targeting rampant corruption, those purges sought to remove generals loyal to Xi’s political rivals, assert control over the PLA, and reduce resistance to ambitious military reform plans.2

Yet there were limits on how far Xi could go.

Joel Wuthnow’s piece in the China Leadership Monitor (finished prior to Zhang Youxia’s purge) compares the first PLA purges with the current round (2023-2026).3 One of Wuthnow’s notable findings is that the earlier round of purges largely left the PLA’s most senior leaders, and especially operational commanders, in place, despite their complicity in widespread corruption. Fang Fenghui, then head of the General Staff Department (the rough equivalent of the CJCS), was the most senior operator purged in the first round.

By contrast, the current round is targeting senior leaders and operational commanders, albeit in a strategic, phased manner that isolated Zhang before moving against him.

Dr. Wuthnow’s earlier work on PLA senior promotions found considerable respect for PLA institutional equities: every part of the force received its proportional share of promotions, and promotions proceeded by age cohort, with generals who waited their turn eventually getting a chance to compete for the top jobs.4

Earlier NDU work, including a Wuthnow & Saunders journal article on party-army relations, found that current institutional arrangements essentially rely on the PLA to police itself through uniformed political commissars and discipline inspectors.5 The 2016 reforms strengthened emphasis on political work and party organs inside the PLA and made institutional changes to strengthen monitoring mechanisms (including the discipline inspection system), but maintained this basic institutional arrangement.6

Given that he couldn’t do everything himself (the CRS runs up against the First Saunders Theorem—“the scarcest resource in government is high-level attention”), Xi was forced to find allies within the PLA that he could trust to carry out his wishes. However, respect for PLA equities meant that Xi had to select from a limited pool of officers with the requisite age and experience, even though most (and maybe all) of them were complicit in widespread corruption (including paying for senior positions). General Zhang Youxia appeared to be the most important of these allies, but obviously, the relationship soured.

This can be understood within a “conditional compliance” model of party-army relations dating back to Deng Xiaoping, which describes a bargaining relationship which gave the PLA considerable autonomy over military affairs in exchange for its political loyalty to the party.

The current purges, which are far more intrusive and comprehensive than the 2013-15 round, end this past respect for PLA institutional equities and may break this tacit bargain with the PLA.

Senior PLA leaders and the operational elite have been targeted so comprehensively that lower-ranking generals have no one left to protect them. (The extent of the purges is illustrated in an interactive infographic in a New York Times article, “China’s Disappearing Generals.”)7

Zhang Shengmin is the last general standing, despite evidence that he was also under investigation for corruption in September 2023.8 One has to conclude that at some point, he flipped on his peers and helped Xi assemble the dirt on other senior generals, though this may not be enough to secure his long-term future.

Although we don’t know the inner workings of party-army relations with much fidelity, I suspect that after the PLA Rocket Force and weapons development system scandals, Xi concluded that the current model of running the PLA through trusted generals and letting the PLA monitor itself wasn’t working. It’s not clear the extent to which this judgement rests on concerns about corruption, political loyalty, responsiveness to his orders, or a failure to meet the demands of producing a modernized, capable military.

Once Xi decided a comprehensive purge of the top brass was necessary to fix these problems (in whatever order of weighting), he executed it strategically to isolate Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli before they finally got the axe. He likely tried to convince Zhang that he was part of the solution rather than the ultimate target of the purges.

Four Models for Party-Army Relations

What happens next? Here are four options Xi might consider for managing party-army relations in the future:

1) Keep the same basic structure, but with younger generals who are more capable, less corrupt, and have limited independent power bases. Given that most operational commanders are posted in only one geographic area until they reach deputy corps leader grade, their political networks within (and beyond) the PLA are likely shallower than those of more senior military leaders, possibly making them more compliant. Xi Jinping’s desired mix of “red vs. expert” in new PLA leadership is unclear, but he would still be selecting new PLA leaders from a somewhat dirty pool of candidates.

2) Restructure the political work and supervision/monitoring apparatus to inculcate more loyalty and make officers too scared to be corrupt. The problem is that Xi did this in the 2016 reforms, and it didn’t work.9 We would look for more intrusive monitoring of communications and activities of generals, tighter scrutiny of anything involving contracts and money, and periodic rotation of assignments so that the political commissars and discipline inspection commission officers don’t have established ties with those they are supposed to be monitoring. All of this was tried before and proved insufficient, likely because the supposed monitors were eventually corrupted (probably including Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s longtime civilian aide and eyes and ears inside the CMC General Office, and Admiral Miao Hua, who had primary responsibility for maintaining political dossiers and recommending senior officers for promotion in his capacity as Director of the CMC Political Work Department until he was purged in November 2024).10 Xi would need to either get personally involved in making senior officer promotion decisions or find a trusted officer who would implement his preferences.

3) “Permanent Revolution” with periodic transfers and purges of senior brass so that they are never in place long enough, or confident enough, to disobey or engage in corruption. Xi Jinping has been talking about “self-revolution” within the party since at least 2024. The problem is that senior officers would not be in place long enough to learn their jobs, build relations with new peers and subordinates, and operate effectively in a conflict. Moreover, they would always be wondering when the axe might fall, disrupting their focus on their military responsibilities. This solution prioritizes political control at the expense of operational effectiveness (which is something Xi also wants). It might also prove counter-productive by stimulating scared generals to seek to remove Xi.

4) Get outside monitors to watch the PLA and potentially compete with its internal security mission. Many authoritarian systems rely on multiple and competing mechanisms to manage domestic security and monitor their militaries, but this solution has been off the table in China due to PLA autonomy. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission was intended to monitor PLA party committees but proved ineffective in preventing wide-scale corruption.11 Xi could set up the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), or both as monitors of PLA loyalty, with intrusive access into PLA communications and operations. (Secrecy and control over military information have historically been a key source of PLA bureaucratic power.)12 Xi could rely more on the local National Security Commission system and provincial military committees to monitor the PLA at the provincial/major city level. A variant would use independent media and legislative monitoring to watch the PLA, but this is highly unlikely given Xi’s emphasis on party control. Xi could also give the People’s Armed Police (PAP), MSS, and/or MPS more responsibility for domestic security.

None of these solutions is necessarily off the table, but none seem likely to solve what may be an unsolvable problem.

A Prediction

If pressed to predict, the most likely approach would involve a mix of younger generals who might be more honest and more compliant and modest efforts to strengthen the political work system and monitoring capabilities. Xi will probably also have to personally devote more time to watching the PLA.

Recent PLA Daily editorials appear intended to explain the purges and to convey the new reality to remaining PLA leaders, couching the purges as necessary to achieve shared modernization goals.13 The purges will also provide new professional opportunities for younger generals with the requisite political loyalty and operational skills (in whatever ratio Xi sees as best).14 Xi’s remarks to PLA and PAP delegates at the National People’s Congress suggest that political loyalty will be an essential criterion.15

That raises the question of how Xi, or a trusted subordinate (who?) will make those evaluations and select new PLA leadership. It is also unclear whether any of the senior officers currently under investigation will come out the other side with a clean bill of health and possible promotion to the many senior positions that are currently vacant.

This wholesale purge of the PLA senior ranks will be very disruptive and have a negative impact on PLA readiness and ability to perform the coordinated tasks needed for large-scale military operations such as an invasion of Taiwan.16 The impact on smaller-scale operations and military training will likely be much more limited.17 Over the medium term, PLA capabilities may improve as younger, better-educated officers who have reached professional maturity inside the theater command system and who have more experience with joint operations move into senior positions.18

A longer-term question is how party-army relations will evolve after Xi is gone. Xi is currently at the height of his power, as demonstrated by his ability to remove so much of the senior PLA leadership. A future successor would almost certainly have less power within the party, less knowledge of military issues, and a weaker network of PLA contacts, making it hard to assert and maintain control over the military. This might prompt a recalibration of the conditional compliance bargain, which cedes more autonomy back to the PLA.

13

“Firmly believe in the inevitable victory against corruption and the inevitable achievement of a strong military” [坚定反腐必胜、强军必成的信念信心], PLA Daily, January 31, 2026. For a partial translation, see Manoj Kewalramani, Tracking People’s Daily Substack, “PLA Daily Commentary on Purge of Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli: ‘Special Tempering’ Underway; ‘Diseased Trees’ Being Uprooted; & New-Era Officers to Take Charge,” January 31, 2026,

Tracking People's Daily

PLA Daily Commentary on Purge of Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli: 'Special Tempering' Underway; 'Diseased Trees' Being Uprooted; & New-Era Officers to Take Charge

***Corrected the earlier oversight in classification of the PLA Daily piece from editorial to commentary…

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3 months ago · 13 likes · 2 comments · Manoj Kewalramani

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow

Jie Gao, Research Associate

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern

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China Absent From Planned Joint Drill with Iran and Russia Amid Renewed Escalations

The PLA appears to have missed a key joint military exercise with Iran and Russia in the Strait of Hormuz before the United States and Israel launched a new round of attacks against Tehran. In late January and early February, multiple media outlets cited Iran’s semi-official Tasnim News Agency, which reported that Iran, Russia, and China would conduct the eighth “Maritime Security Belt” joint naval exercise in the Northern Indian Ocean in mid-February. On February 17, a Russian official confirmed in an interview that Russia, China, and Iran would hold routine joint naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz under the “Security Belt 2026” framework.

Currently, the only military activity reported by major international media sources is the February 19 bilateral naval exercise between Russia and Iran in the Gulf of Oman. The Russian Ministry of Defense described the activity as a “pre-planned” joint drill and did not use the designation “Maritime Security Belt-2026” in its official statement. Nor did it mention Chinese participation.

Based on currently available public information, China’s Ministry of National Defense and Chinese state media have not issued any formal announcement confirming that the PLA Navy (PLAN) participated in this round of exercises. Although Iranian media in late January and Patrushev’s February 17 remarks characterized the activity as a trilateral “Security Belt 2026” exercise, the only verifiable military activity at present remains a bilateral operation between Russia and Iran.

On February 28, President Trump authorized Operation Epic Fury against Iran. After losing its supreme leader and other senior officials, Tehran launched retaliatory attacks on U.S. facilities in the Gulf region.

CCA Analysis: It is plausible that China foresaw the possibility of Washington’s preemptive attacks against Tehran when it postponed or canceled the joint drill. By avoiding force deployment near the flashpoint, Beijing appears to have minimized the risks of unwanted entanglement or misperception by Washington amid imminent escalation.

In previous episodes of U.S.-Iran confrontations, Beijing did not withdraw from the joint drills with Iran when the attacks were exchanged through the proxies. In December 2019, despite the Trump administration’s ongoing “maximum pressure” campaign, China launched the inaugural “Security Belt” exercise together with Iran and Russia. Ahead of the March 2024 joint drill, the U.S. Air Force launched a series of airstrikes targeting Iran’s forces and proxies in Iraq and Syria. Yet China dispatched its naval force to the Gulf of Oman, labeling the drills as regular military exchanges on maritime safety.

In the past, Beijing tried to downplay political sensitivities related to its military drills in regional hotspots by presenting them as non-combat activities, including anti-piracy operations, merchant ship escorts, and search-and-rescue missions. However, as the United States intensifies military pressure on Tehran, China increasingly risks being perceived as part of an “anti-West” quasi-alliance, particularly due to Russia’s involvement. As the Xi-Trump summit approaches, Beijing is likely to prioritize a stable strategic environment and avoid opening a new front in the Middle East against Washington.

However, the absence of the PLAN alone does not necessarily indicate strategic distance. Beijing can keep defense ties with Iran without deploying naval assets in a high-visibility drill. Although Beijing has denied recent reports regarding Tehran’s potential acquisition of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China, it remains plausible that China will provide intelligence support and transfer dual-use electronics and components to Iran, as has occurred with supplies to Russia in Ukraine.

Read more: Jie Gao, Re-Engaging With the World: China’s Military Diplomacy in 2023

Nuclear Test Allegations Renew U.S.-China Arms Control Frictions

Washington has ratcheted up pressure on Beijing over allegations that China carried out a covert nuclear test in 2020. On February 6, a U.S. official alleged that China conducted a “yield-producing” underground nuclear explosive test near Lop Nur — China’s former nuclear test site in Xinjiang — on June 22, 2020. Speaking at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, he also suggested Beijing may be preparing more low-yield tests and using “decoupling” techniques to reduce seismic detectability.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) responded that its International Monitoring System (IMS) did not detect an event consistent with a nuclear weapon test at that time. Chinese diplomats pointed to that statement to reject the U.S. charge as “completely groundless” and criticized Washington for manufacturing a pretext to resume nuclear testing.

The dispute intensified after the U.S. Assistant Secretary Christopher Yeaw cited a magnitude 2.75 seismic signal recorded at 09:18 UTC on June 22, 2020 by a station in Kazakhstan. He argued that it resembled a single underground explosion rather than an earthquake or routine mining, while acknowledging that possible “decoupling” could muffle the signal, making the true yield hard to classify.

The CTBTO later clarified that it did detect two very small seismic events 12 seconds apart near the area, but said they were far below its identification threshold and insufficient, by themselves, to determine the cause.

During the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue in Washington, D.C., Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno later briefed Japan on the test, underscoring an effort to alert allies and partners about the gravity of the incident.

China’s nuclear weapons testing is overseen by the Central Military Commission, executed by PLA testing units at Lop Nur, and scientifically led by the China Academy of Engineering Physics — not by a single civilian government agency.

CCA Analysis: This is one of the first instances of a U.S. official publicly disclosing a nuclear test outside the confines of the treaty. It represents an effort by Washington to put pressure on Beijing to enter a new trilateral arms control treaty with the U.S. and Russia, citing Beijing’s rapidly expanding arsenal over the past decade. Beijing views the accusation as a deliberate attempt to coerce China into joining arms control dialogue with Washington, given the expiration of New START — the last binding cap on U.S. and Russian strategic warheads. Chinese officials likely view the Lop Nur claim as a means to justify expanded U.S. options, including renewed nuclear testing, if China refuses to engage.

However, such a public pressure campaign is unlikely to bring Beijing to the negotiation table. In its November 2025 arms control white paper, China argued that those with the biggest arsenals (i.e., Russia and the U.S.) should lead on arms control and warhead reductions, while wider multilateral negotiations should proceed only when “conditions are conducive.” It also presents nuclear transparency as a voluntary, confidence-building practice shaped by each country’s security environment.

In that context, Beijing is unlikely to be persuaded to join formal arms control talks with Washington, especially if it believes it would be negotiating from a disadvantageous position. Chinese writings suggest that treaty-style caps and intrusive verification could constrain modernization and transparency in ways that weaken a smaller force’s survivability — especially given concerns about U.S. missile defense and long-range conventional strike. As a result, U.S. efforts to use allegations and public messaging to compel negotiations may exert limited coercive leverage over Beijing.

Read more: Unpacking Chinese Views of Deterrence

China Makes Waves with New Nuclear-powered Submarine

Commercial satellite imagery dated February 9 showed what analysts believe to be the first Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) at Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry (BSHIC) in Huludao, Liaoning. Additional imagery dated February 13 indicated that the Type 095 hull had been moved into a launch bay or flooded drydock at the same facility.

The clearest change analysts noticed from imagery is the SSN’s new hull and tail design, increasing its stealth capabilities. This includes a new “X-tail” rudder configuration — a first for Chinese SSN — as well as improved underwater maneuverability and hydrodynamics. These design features will significantly reduce acoustic noise and increase survivability.

Based on satellite-derived estimates, the Type 095 is roughly 110 meters long, with a beam of approximately 12–13 meters and a displacement of 9,000 tons. Open-source assessments suggest the Type 095 may include vertical launch systems (VLS) for cruise missiles and torpedoes, which would enhance the PLA Navy’s land-attack and anti-ship capabilities. All indications suggest the Type 095 has similar capabilities to the U.S. Virginia-class SSN and Russian Yasen-class SSN.

The Type 095 is likely to be fully operational by 2029.

CCA Analysis: The Type 095’s appearance is notable for several reasons. First, it will likely be much quieter and more survivable compared to older models. An Office of Naval Intelligence assessment highlighted how the Type 094’s noise made it easier to track. Acoustic noise reduces a submarine’s survivability, thereby limiting China’s sea-based deterrence credibility and range.

Second is the implications for regional deterrence. When operationally deployed, the Type 095 will provide the PLAN with an enhanced deterrence posture beyond the first island chain. China’s existing SSNs have a limited range due to noise and stealth limitations. This new variant will allow China to operate farther out into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bringing nations such as Australia and India into range. The U.S. Navy (USN) is the only military power in the region that can match the PLAN in quantitative and qualitative capabilities. As a result, allies and partners will rely even more than before on USN undersea capabilities to offset the threat from China’s burgeoning SSN assets.

Finally, the Type 095’s appearance at BSHIC in Huludao suggests an accelerated operational timeline surpassing regional expectations. According to an IISS analysis, from 2021 to 2025, China’s nuclear submarine launches and aggregate tonnage exceeded U.S. totals. This will compel the U.S. and key allies to plan against a larger and faster-growing undersea inventory, with rising ASW demand under shorter force-planning timelines.

Read more: Unpacking Chinese Views of Deterrence

Xi Jinping Reviews PLA Combat Readiness and Issues Spring Festival Guidance

On February 11, Chairman Xi Jinping reviewed the combat readiness and ongoing operations of the PLA via video link in Beijing, while delivering Spring Festival greetings to military personnel. The remarks reinforced themes of political loyalty, anti-corruption efforts, and sustained operational vigilance during the holiday period.

Speaking on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, Xi extended greetings to PLA personnel, PAP forces, civilian staff assigned to nine PLA and PAP units across different services, as well as reserve and militia members, emphasizing continued top-level oversight of operational readiness and morale.

Xi characterized the previous year as “highly unusual and extraordinary,” highlighting progress in political rectification, management of risks and challenges, and intensified anti-corruption efforts within the armed forces. He described these reforms and the corruption campaign as a form of “revolutionary tempering.”

Xi praised officers and enlisted personnel — particularly at the grassroots level — for demonstrating loyalty to the Party and reliability in executing assigned missions, reinforcing the primacy of political discipline within military professionalism.

Finally, Xi emphasized that maintaining combat readiness during major holidays remains a core PLA tradition and called for continued vigilance to protect national security and public well-being during the Spring Festival period.

CCA Analysis: It was notable that Xi virtually briefed the PLA this year. During last year’s Lunar New Year message, for example, Xi visited the PLA Northern Theater Command to personally deliver the message. Given the unprecedented purges in the PLA, the recent upheaval is the likely reason for the virtual format. The remarks were clearly targeting themes of political control and anti-corruption, suggesting continued concern over trust issues within the PLA. Also notable was the inclusion of the Aerospace, Cyberspace, and Information Support Forces as units receiving the remarks, which had not been featured in previous Spring Festival reviews.

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Neil Thomas

Xi’s Military Purge: What Happened, Why It Matters, and What Comes Next

Xi Jinping has now overseen one of the most significant purges of China’s military leadership in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The investigation of his top general, Zhang Youxia, and the chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli, has left the Central Military Commission (CMC) with just two of its original seven member…

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4 months ago · 67 likes · 6 comments · Neil Thomas

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This issue of PLA Watch examines Chinese arms exhibitions at the 2026 World Defense Show (WDS) and the Singapore Airshow; new unveilings of long-range unmanned aerial systems; and the expulsions of senior defense industry officials from China’s National People’s Congress.

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow

Jie Gao, Research Associate

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern

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Dual Showcases: China’s Defense Export Signaling at WDS 2026 and the Singapore Airshow

Over the past two weeks, Chinese defense state-owned enterprises (SOEs) unveiled cutting-edge weapons and equipment at the 2026 World Defense Show (WDS) and the Singapore Airshow.

The WDS, which kicked off on February 8 in Riyadh, is a biennial international defense exhibition held in Saudi Arabia. Compared to 2024, China’s presence this year expanded significantly, positioning itself as the second-largest participant behind host Saudi Arabia. A total of 204 Chinese-registered entities participated, compared to 158 U.S.-registered entities. While exhibitor numbers do not equate to technological capability or market share, they nevertheless provide a reference point for assessing China’s overseas commercial mobilization and export engagement.

Against this backdrop, the structure of China’s display reflected themes Beijing has recently emphasized, from traditional heavy platforms toward unmanned, intelligent, and system-level export solutions. In the naval domain, China showcased the 075E export amphibious assault ship and the 052DE export destroyer, alongside a conceptual 20,000-ton export landing platform dock (LPD). In parallel, China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) displayed the SDV-01 swimmer delivery vehicle, a wet submersible designed for underwater insertion and special operations missions.

Taken together, these platforms presented a maritime portfolio spanning amphibious lift, area air defense, and subsurface capabilities.

Unmanned systems formed the central focus of the exhibition. In addition to the established Wing Loong (翼龙) and Caihong (CH, 彩虹) series drones, China displayed the Wing Loong-X anti-submarine warfare (ASW) variant, an extended endurance and long-range maritime mission variant of the Wing Loong. Similarly, the CH-9 was presented as a longer-range, heavy-payload UAV platform. Meanwhile, the China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) exhibited the FL-300C loitering munition and introduced the Sharp Shark-10 unmanned surface vessel (USV) concept, combining unmanned platforms with expendable precision strike capability.

On land, the Robotic Wolf unmanned ground vehicle demonstrated swarm-based operational concepts, while the Saudi-optimized VT-4 main battle tank and the FL-50 armored vehicle highlighted desert adaptability.

Finally, in aerospace and air defense, China showcased the JF-17 Block III, J-10CE, and HQ-9BE systems, emphasizing integrated air defense and multi-target interception capabilities.

Beyond WDS, China also exhibited advancements in Chinese-manufactured air assets. Seven J-10C fighters flew in formation supported by a Y-20A aerial refueling tanker. The J-10C, equipped with an AESA radar and compatible with PL-10 and PL-15 air-to-air missiles, was presented as a cost-effective 4.5-generation export fighter. At the same time, indoor exhibits featured models of next-generation stealth platforms such as the J-35A and the J-20.

CCA Analysis: These displays are juxtaposed to surprising decreases in Chinese arms exports worldwide. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2024, the combined revenue of top Chinese arms companies fell by approximately 10% to 145 billion, [JL1] driven by internal corruption and project delays. This drop contrasts sharply with rising global arms sales, with major firms like NORINCO seeing revenues plunge by 31%.

Despite these setbacks, China is positioning itself as a supplier-of-choice for cross-domain packages rather than individual platforms. The combination of amphibious assault ships, destroyers, long-endurance ASW UAVs, heavy-payload drones, unmanned surface vessels, and subsurface assets signal an effort to market multi-domain operational architectures instead of discrete systems.

In particular, China is positioning itself as one of the most potent suppliers of unmanned platforms. ASW-configured UAVs with longer endurance that can extend beyond traditional ISR position China into a lucrative market for maritime surveillance, anti-access, and strategic strike scenarios.

In Asia, the Singapore Airshow showcased China’s attempt to make inroads into a market dominated by U.S. airframes. With approximately 300 F-35s projected to be operational in the Asia-Pacific by 2035, including major fleets in Japan, Australia, and South Korea, the United States retains structural advantages in networked airpower integration. Yet China’s share of arms sales to Southeast Asia has grown [JL2] significantly over the past decade at the same time that U.S. and Russia’s shares have decreased. While most of these sales have been for land-based assets, China hopes that its fourth and fifth-generation fighters will become the next big package that attracts air forces of Southeast Asia.

China’s Un-crewed Systems Trajectory: YH-1000S Maiden Flight and GJ-21 Testing on Type 076

Two recent developments have drawn attention to China’s burgeoning unmanned systems portfolio: 1) the maiden flight of the CH YH-1000S hybrid-powered unmanned transport aircraft; and 2) the GJ-21 stealth attack UAV, with photos circulating on social media appearing to show the aircraft on the deck of the PLA Navy’s Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan during recent testing.

The CH YH-1000S is an upgraded variant of the CH YH-1000 and uses a hybrid propulsion system combining a fuel engine and an electric motor. Official reporting claimed the configuration can shorten takeoff and landing distances and improve payload and range. As a reference point, previously reported CH YH-1000 parameters include a 1,200 kg cargo capacity, 1,500 km range, and over 10 hours of endurance, with the ability to operate in complex terrain.

Separately, photos circulating online show a covered fixed-wing airframe on the Sichuan’s deck during sea trials. Some observers have speculated the aircraft could be the GJ-21 stealth attack UAV, but the timing, location, and platform identity remain unconfirmed. Observers have dubbed the Type 076 a “drone carrier,” reflecting an expectation that the platform is intended to operate fixed-wing unmanned aircraft from an amphibious deck. The introduction of the GJ-21 from the 076’s flight deck only underscores this operational concept.

CCA Analysis: China has long invested in unmanned ISR and strike platforms. But what stands out with these two developments is the advancement of longer-range capabilities and the ability to employ such systems from longer-range assets, such as the Type 076.

What sets the YH-1000S apart is the larger payload (1,200 kg), range (1,500 km) and short-takeoff/landing (STOL) capability, allowing it to operate in rough terrain and support autonomous, 24-hour logistics operations. Only the U.S. fields UAVs with similar capabilities, which offers China the ability to operate from austere runways while reducing logistical constraints. A platform like this could sustain high-frequency, small-batch deliveries of ammunition, spare parts, communications equipment, or medical supplies for civilian or military needs.

Deploying the GJ-21 from the Type 076’s “drone carrier” gives China a new dimension of airpower from amphibious assets. Fixed-wing stealth UAVs—whether the GJ-21 or another platform—would support persistent maritime ISR and strike options beyond what helicopter-centric amphibious ships can currently generate.

This matters a great deal for a Taiwan Strait scenario. Sustained fixed-wing UAV sorties from a large-deck amphibious ship provide the PLA Navy and Marines aircover during potential landing operations and joint firepower campaigns. In parallel, the more China can operate large airframe UAVs, such as the YH-1000S from austere airfields, the better the PLA can resupply and support dispersed operations near or on Taiwan. While such systems need to be integrated into joint PLA command platforms, the assumption is that such integration will be achieved as the PLA conducts more sophisticated and larger-scale exercises around Taiwan.

China Expels Defense Industry Officials from Legislature Amid Corruption Crackdown

China’s unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in the PLA has broadened in recent weeks to ensnare senior leaders within China’s defense sector. On February 4, China’s top legislative body, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, announced the removal of three senior officials—former Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) chairman Zhou Xinmin, veteran nuclear technologist Luo Qi, and former China Academy of Engineering Physics head Liu Cangli—from their positions as 14th NPC deputies.

All three spent decades at the core of China’s military-industrial and strategic technology systems. Their cases are not isolated, coming on the heels of investigations involving colleagues or predecessors within the same defense organizations. At AVIC, Zhou’s predecessor Tan Ruisong was placed under investigation in 2024, while China’s nuclear and aerospace systems have seen multiple senior technologists and executives removed or prosecuted in recent years.

Separately, on February 10, authorities announced that the investigation into Zhang Jianhua, former deputy director of the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, had concluded and that his case had been transferred to prosecutors for review and indictment. During his tenure, Zhang exercised long-standing authority over defense project review, budgeting, auditing, and, for a period, military export administration.

CCA Analysis: The officials affected in these cases were deeply embedded in weapons research, industrial production, project approval, and funding oversight. Their roles intersected with procurement cycles, classified programs, and large capital flows. As previously reflected in PLA Watch coverage of cases involving major defense conglomerates, these positions have increasingly become focal points for anti-corruption investigations. Moreover, these cases signal that seniority and technical authority offer no insulation from Xi’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign increasingly targeting the defense sector.

Importantly, there is no public indication that these cases are directly linked to the more recent purges of senior Central Military Commission leaders, such as Zhang Youxia. Instead, they appear to reflect a parallel track aimed at tightening discipline within the defense industrial base itself. This suggests Beijing is prioritizing governance, cost control, and reliability in weapons development as the PLA accelerates modernization, treating industrial accountability as a prerequisite for combat readiness rather than a secondary concern.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow

Jie Gao, Research Associate

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern

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Chinese and Russian Defense Ministers Held Video Conference

Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held a video conference on Jan 26. The call focused on the state of China–Russia military relations and the implementation of agreements reached by the two countries’ leaders. Both defense ministers emphasized strategic communication, practical cooperation, and coordination on international and regional security issues, without disclosing specific agenda items or outcomes.

The Chinese readout highlighted the importance of maintaining close defense ties under the guidance of leader-level consensus, reiterating Beijing’s support for deepening military exchanges and cooperation. While Belousov brought up Venezuela and Iran during the opening remarks in a video published online, the official press release did not disclose specific language from their discussions on these two hot topics.

CCA Analysis: The Dong–Belousov video conference occurred amid a volatile international environment. The meeting marked one of the first senior China–Russia military exchanges following heightened tensions involving Venezuela and Iran. Public messaging from both sides continued to emphasize shared opposition to what they describe as U.S. intervention in other countries’ internal affairs. At the same time, the broader context suggests that the discussions may have extended beyond rhetorical alignment to include practical assessments of regional risks and partner capabilities.

Recent developments in Venezuela underscore potential challenges for both Moscow and Beijing as defense partners. Despite Caracas’ adoption of Russian air defense systems and Chinese radar technologies, U.S. military operations appeared to negate Venezuela’s ability to detect or deter U.S. aircraft. Some analysts attribute this outcome largely to issues of system integration, readiness, and operational execution rather than equipment performance alone. Nonetheless, the episode may prompt reflection in both capitals on the effectiveness of exported systems and the broader implications on bilateral coordination in addressing capability and integration gaps.

Iran’s security environment adds another layer of complexity. Although China, Russia, and Iran do not maintain a formal alliance, their regular trilateral and multilateral military exercises suggest ongoing efforts to build coordination mechanisms and shared operational familiarity. With Iran facing sustained U.S. military pressure, Beijing and Moscow may see value in aligning assessments of escalation risks and potential responses, even if such coordination remains informal and discreet.

The timing of the call also coincides with renewed diplomatic activity surrounding the war in Ukraine, including recent trilateral engagements involving Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. While no details were disclosed, developments on the Ukrainian front and the trajectory of negotiations will likely impact China–Russia defense consultations, particularly as Moscow manages multiple strategic challenges and Beijing continues to emphasize stability and risk management in its external security environment.

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PLA Trains for Saturation Swarms and Sustainable Intercepts

In recent weeks, the PLA has publicized training activities and operational messaging related to unmanned aerial systems and counter-drone capabilities. On January 4, China Central Television (CCTV) footage showed a PLA Navy unit, at the start of its 2026 training cycle, employing “blue force” opposition force training. The “blue force” used multiple attack drones to simulate ultra-low-altitude penetration strikes against maritime targets, while the “red force” responded with shipborne missiles and interception systems. The report said the unit recreated a battlefield environment featuring multi-wave suicide-drone attacks to test countermeasure equipment. Days later, on January 20, CCTV disclosed details of an AI-enabled drone-swarm test by the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT, 中国人民解放军国防科技大学). It stated that a single soldier could control a swarm of more than 200 drones, relying on artificial intelligence and data links to launch them in large numbers within a short period. The system allocates tasks through autonomous algorithms and shifts between reconnaissance, diversion, and strike roles.

In parallel, China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO, 中国北方工业集团有限公司) released partial specifications for its truck-mounted Hurricane 3000 (飓风3000) high-power microwave counter-drone system, which was displayed during the military parade in Beijing last September. NORINCO claims the Hurricane 3000 has an effective interception range of 3 km against small UAVs and drone swarms, and describes employment as a standalone asset or as part of a networked “iron triangle” with laser weapons and conventional artillery. On the external-operational front, the PLA Southern Theatre Command said it conducted “completely legitimate and lawful” routine flight training in airspace around what it calls Dongsha (Pratas) Island, while Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that a PLA reconnaissance drone briefly entered the island’s airspace and said it issued warnings over international radio channels.

CCA Analysis: The PLA views drone operations at a key feature of future combat. What is most noteworthy is that the PLA has regularized drone warfare into annual PLA training requirements, as opposed to one-off exercises. The PLA Daily describes the current equipment shift in terms of “unmanned (无人化), intelligent (智能化), and clustered (集群化)” capabilities, and argued that warfare is moving from “platform-centric warfare (平台中心战)” toward “system-versus-system confrontation (体系对抗).” Recent training coverage focuses on the employment of multiple suicide drones flying at low altitudes to generate saturation pressure, then rehearsing shipborne interception against multi-wave attacks. Furthermore, NUDT’s swarm tests appear to be focusing on the integration of AI into data-enabled battlefield concepts, emphasizing single-soldier control, rapid mass launch, autonomous task allocation, and role switching. On the defensive side, NORINCO’s high-power microwave system points to a more sustainable counter-swarm approach, emphasizing longer-range interception and networked employment with lasers and conventional fires. Operationally, unmanned platforms support real-world operational training, as reflected in the PLA’s recent flights near Dongsha/Pratas Islands and Taiwan’s reporting of a brief drone entry.

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PLA Aviation Progress in Stealth Mass Production and Kill Chain Integration

Recent flight tests of China’s fifth generation stealth fighter — the J-20A — indicate that the aircraft is approaching operational effectiveness. The Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) showcased multiple “yellow-coat” J-20As, prompting speculation about improvements in engine technology, dorsal avionics, and AI integration. Simultaneously, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) has operationalized a new assembly facility to support another fifth-gen fighter – the J-35 – suggesting an ability to deliver large batches of the aircraft.

Beyond fighter platforms, recent official coverage has reframed the role of the H-6J bomber, highlighting its evolution into an integrated sensor node. Specifically, a recent showcase of the bomber revealed for the first time specialized reconnaissance pods on its outer wing pylons. Reconnaissance pods turn bombers into high-end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms without permanently modifying the aircraft, which enhance ISR sharing between bombers, fighter jets, and drones.

Finally, recent state media reports provide clarity on how the PLA is integrating the WZ-8 UAV into a broader array of high-altitude, high-speed ISR capabilities. Utilizing a rocket-powered design, the WZ-8’s “Double 2” capability - which can reach 20,000-meters at Mach 2 speeds – provides the PLA added capability to penetrate carrier strike group air defenses. In particular, the WZ-8’s will have an important role in providing terminal targeting data required for long-range anti-ship systems, closing the kill chain against high-value targets.

CCA Analysis: Accelerated production of the J-20A and J-35 signifies that the PLA’s stealth fighter development has entered an industrialized mass delivery phase. External estimates from RUSI suggest the PLA Air Force has deployed over 300 J-20s across 13 regimental units, with J-20A annual production projected to reach 120 units by late 2025. If true, such scale will erode U.S. and allied stealth combat advantages within the First Island Chain. The completion of SAC’s new assembly facilities moves the J-35/A from a Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase into industrialized production at scale.

Concurrently, the PLA is “nodalizing” legacy platforms to optimize long-range strike chains. Recent disclosures regarding the H-6J highlight its evolution from a pure missile bomber into an aerial sensor node for ISR, bridging a critical gap in over-the-horizon (OTH) maritime strikes. This shift, supported by regularized South China Sea deployments, allows the PLA to utilize the H-6J for additional roles, such as for extending kill-chain strikes over contested waters. When paired with the WZ-8 UAV, the PLA is formalizing an ISR architecture designed to bypass existing air defense grids and provide terminal guidance for standoff anti-ship assets.

Strategically, the combination of industrial capacity and distributed nodes significantly bolsters the resilience of the PLA’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) framework. As stealth platforms become ubiquitous, secondary assets like the H-6J and WZ-8 provide additional sensing capabilities. As a result, potential adversaries like the United States face a more lethal strike network that is increasingly difficult to counter.

Welcome to the first issue of PLA Watch in 2026! Thank you to everyone who shared feedback through our readers survey.

To meet the insatiable appetite for PLA updates, we’re excited to shift the PLA News section to a bi-weekly schedule starting now.

As always, we’ll continue to cover PLA strategy and modernization, and we’ll share the latest PLA Observer list at the end of the month. Keep an eye out for Special Issues landing in your inbox as well. Lyle will also be sharing his takeaways from the PLA’s “Justice Mission – 2025” exercises around Taiwan very soon. Stay tuned!

Cheers,

Jie

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China Announces Senior Military Promotions Amid Ongoing High-Level Personnel Adjustments

On December 22, 2025, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) held a promotion ceremony for the rank of general (上将) in Beijing. Eastern Theater Command commander Yang Zhibin (杨志斌) and Central Theater Command commander Han Shengyan (韩胜延) were promoted. Both officers are PLA Air Force-origin and were born in 1963.

Before his current assignment, Yang transferred in March 2023 from deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command to deputy commander of the Western Theater Command. Han, then a lieutenant general, was moved in late 2018 from deputy commander of the Western Theater Command to commander of the Central Theater Command Air Force.

The ceremony’s optics were notable: only four generals, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), Zhang Shengmin (张升民), Liu Zhenli (刘振立), and Dong Jun (董军) ,were present, a sharp contrast with the December 23, 2024, promotion ceremony, which reportedly had around 20 generals in attendance. The promotion cadence also appears compressed. Since late 2019, the CMC General Office has pushed to rationalize rank-to-billet correspondence, and China has generally held at least two full general promotion ceremonies annually. While the frequency rose to four ceremonies in 2023 and three in 2024, 2025 had only this single event.

Days after the promotion ceremony, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) announced the termination of the deputy credentials of several military-affiliated representatives to the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC). Those removed included former CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong (何卫东); He Hongjun (何宏军), formerly the Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department and expelled from the PLA in October 2025 alongside He Weidong; lieutenant general Wang Peng (王鹏), previously the director of the CMC Training and Administration Department; Wang Renhua (王仁华), previously in charge of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission; and Zhang Hongbing (张红兵), the political commissar of the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The NPCSC notice did not provide investigative details, but it formalized outcomes that had been widely speculated amid these officials’ noticeable absences from major public events in recent months.

CCA Analysis: Yang and Han’s promotion is a rapid backfilling in sensitive theaters amid continued turbulence. The Eastern Theater Command has cycled through four commanders since 2016; two of the first three, He Weidong and Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), have reportedly fallen, with Lin officially expelled from the CCP and PLA in October 2025, and transferred to military prosecutors. The Central Theater Command has seen even higher churn: seven commanders in roughly a decade. The previous commander, Wang Qiang (王强), appointed in summer 2024, was widely viewed as purged in 2025 after missing major public appearances.

Both promotions were signaled in advance. Han served as commander of the PLA military parade on September 3, 2025, an assignment normally held by the Central Theater Command commander, given Beijing’s jurisdiction. Wang Qiang’s absence from the late-July PLA anniversary reception in Beijing followed by his non-appearance in the parade reinforced succession speculation. Yang likewise gained visibility ahead of his promotion: At the December 13, 2025, annual Nanjing Massacre memorial ceremony, which the Eastern Theater Command’s top commanders typically attend, state media showed Yang and his current political commissar standing prominently in the front row. With the latest promotion, Yan and Han have now positioned themselves as top candidates for CMC promotions in the years ahead.

Meanwhile, despite the sharply reduced attendance of generals at the December 22 promotion ceremony, the PLA is keen to signal that this episode of elite turbulence remains insulated from combat readiness. Only a week after Yang Zhibin’s promotion, the Eastern Theater Command announced the large-scale “Justice Mission-2025 (正义使命-2025)” exercises around Taiwan. This could suggest that, despite leadership turnover, the theater-level command chain remains intact and operational tempo has not been disrupted. Alternatively, it may indicate that such major exercises are centrally scripted in advance, leaving limited room for individual commanders to shape execution beyond adhering to pre-set directives. Finally, another theory suggests that such exercises are orchestrated to counter a public perception that PLA readiness has eroded.

China-Pakistan Co-Produced JF-17 Fighter Emerges as Centerpiece of Pakistan’s Expanding Arms Export Push

Recent reporting suggests new appeal for the JF-17 “Thunder” fighter from Muslim countries looking to upgrade their fleets. The aircraft is a Pakistan–China co-developed platform and may prove to be a success story of one of China’s first co-produced fighter aircraft on the international arms market.

Islamabad is reportedly engaged in discussions with the Libyan National Army and with Sudan over broader weapons packages that may include JF-17 fighters, though details and timelines remain unclear. Saudi Arabia is also reported to be in exploratory talks over a potential arms-for-debt arrangement valued at roughly US$2–4 billion, in which the JF-17 has been described as a primary option rather than a confirmed purchase. At the same time, Indonesia is reported to be in more advanced discussions over a large defense package that could involve more than 40 JF-17s, alongside drones, air-defense systems, and training support. Separate reports suggest that Bangladesh and Iraq are in preliminary discussions for the fighters. Beyond new prospective customers, Azerbaijan has expanded an existing order, while the JF-17 is already in operation in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Nigeria.

CCA Analysis: Expanding markets for the JF-17 serve several Chinese objectives. While Pakistan manages production and marketing, key components of the aircraft such as radars, engines, and datalinks are manufactured by China. Adoption of the platform integrates Chinese components and standards into foreign air forces, signaling a degree of trust in Chinese military technology. This could potentially open the door for future purchases of other Chinese-made platforms.

Skeptics say some buyers may ultimately favor Western aircraft for performance and interoperability. Yet the aircraft fills a mid-range niche that Western suppliers often neglect, complementing, rather than directly displacing, top-tier systems. Over time, a larger customer base could generate revenues and production volumes that support economies of scale across China’s defense industry.

For prospective buyers, the aircraft offers a cost-effective, combat-tested option that sits between aging legacy jets and expensive Western high-end platforms. JF-17’s combat deployment during the May 2025 India–Pakistan air clashes has featured prominently in Pakistani public messaging, even as specific battlefield claims remain contested. Interest from multiple countries reflects broader efforts to diversify defense suppliers away from Western nations.

China Led Joint Naval Exercises with BRICS Countries

On January 10, the opening ceremony for the “Peace Will-2026” joint maritime exercise was held at Simon’s Town port in Cape Town. PLA reporting described China as the host and listed China, Russia, and South Africa as participating BRICS members. Additional reporting suggested that Iran, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the UAE may also have participated. The exercise took place from January 9–16.

The theme of the exercise was “joint actions to safeguard the security of important shipping lanes and economic activities.” China deployed the PLAN 48th Gulf of Aden escort task force’s Type 052DL destroyer Tangshan and replenishment ship Taihu, an embarked helicopter, and dozens of special operations personnel. The exercises featured communications drills, formation maneuvers, anti-surface strikes, and a hostage ship rescue scenario.

The drills build on earlier China–Russia–South Africa exercises in November 2019 and February 2023 (previously known as Exercise Mosi), which also centered on protecting shipping and maritime economic activity. The latest iteration was reportedly postponed from November 2025 to avoid overlapping with the G20 summit in Johannesburg.

CCA Analysis: Chinese commentary frames these drills as serving three overlapping purposes. First, to build confidence with partner navies along busy sea lines of communication where piracy and other maritime security risks persist. Second, expanding PLA familiarity with distant sea operations and honing practical experience in port calls, maintenance, crew rotation, and resupply for future PLAN escort missions. And third, mutual learning with other navies by comparing command processes, threat assessments, communications procedures, and approaches to international law at sea—while exchanging practices in counter-piracy, counterterrorism, maritime rescue, and limited strike scenarios.

Participation and conducting drills with partners such as Russia and Iran, who face international opprobrium and sanctions, serves China’s broader goals of aligning with states in the crosshairs of Western criticism and scrutiny.

Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missile Finalization Test from Type 055 Destroyer

Official military media recently released footage showing a PLA Navy Type 055 destroyer, Wuxi (无锡), conducting a ship-to-ship missile “finalization test.” The video shows a missile launching from the ship’s vertical launch system (VLS) using a cold-launch method, in which the missile is ejected from the cell before its motor ignites and then climbs away. Official messaging stated the missile successfully hit and destroyed its target but did not disclose the specific time or location of the test.

The footage is also the first official public release to identify the missile as the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile and shows it being fired live from a surface combatant. Related reporting noted that the missile’s terminal phase appeared to feature a near-vertical impact angle and high-speed penetration characteristics. The footage marks the first time official channels have released “finalization test” imagery for the system following its earlier public appearance.

CCA Analysis: Publicly framing the event as a “finalization test” suggests the YJ-20 has cleared key design-validation milestones and is close to operational fielding. More importantly, the footage confirms integration with the Type 055’s common shipboard VLS architecture, enabling the PLA Navy to employ an anti-ship strike option from frontline surface combatants.

In terms of weapon characteristics, official and semi-official narratives emphasize three core features: hypersonic flight, terminal maneuverability, and high-angle terminal attack – resembling aspects of a ballistic missile trajectory. The design both extends range and stresses air-defense and missile-defense systems of larger surface ships. Compared with defenses oriented around sea-skimming, horizontal approaches, a steep terminal profile can compress reaction time and stress traditional adversary naval defense architectures.

Operationally, this implies the YJ-20’s potential target set extends beyond general surface combatants to include high-value platforms such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. Coupled with the Type 055’s far-seas operating capacity, sensors, and command-and-control systems, this pairing expands the PLAN’s options for holding at risk carrier strike groups at greater distances.

Photos Suggest Modular Military Systems Tested on Civilian Container Ship

Multiple sets of photos circulating online appear to show the container ship Zhong Da 79 (中达79) berthed in Shanghai with containerized military systems on its deck.[1] Most noteworthy was the deployment on the ship of a modular, road-mobile, electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) catapult capable of launching advanced fixed-wing combat drones. The same cargo vessel was seen days before configured as an improvised surface combatant, with roughly 60 vertical launch system (VLS) containerized cells, radars, and close-in defenses.

The images indicate the ship carried different modular configurations at different times rather than a single fixed fit. Some containers are marked “containerized weapon module development suite (货柜化武器模组研发套件),” while others display slogans referencing “maritime rejuvenation (海洋强国復兴)” and a “maritime community with a shared future for mankind (海洋人类命运共同体规划).”

Open-source geolocation has placed them at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding in Shanghai, where the Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan is being built. In at least one configuration, Zhong Da 79 appears near the Type 076 within the same yard. Later images tied to the same ship show a new deck configuration featuring a modular system assembled from multiple low-bed trucks, consistent with a rapidly deployable, reconfigurable setup. All this suggests that Zhong Da 79 may be serving as an experimental test platform for integrating modular military systems on a civilian hull.

CCA Analysis: Equipping civilian merchant cargo ships with containerized VLS cells and UAVs is not a new concept in naval warfare. But the fact that China openly displayed the layout for open-source analysis suggests a level of comfort in this technology.

These photos raise more questions than answers. Whether or not a catapult system composed of multiple segmented components would be stable enough for use on a cargo ship with less stability on the high seas than a traditional warship is unclear. It’s also unclear if this was purely a public reveal campaign by the PLA and civilian shipping industry, with no near-term practical use.

Nonetheless, this development fits a broader PRC trajectory of exploring how civilian shipping can be incorporated for wartime use. Recent PLA exercises and reporting have repeatedly surfaced signals of civilian-vessel participation with different conversion concepts tailored to specific missions. Tom Shugart, a defense analyst, has been at the forefront of highlighting China’s strategy of integrating its massive civilian fleet (ferries, cargo ships) for military purposes, especially for a potential Taiwan contingency, by retrofitting them to carry troops and equipment In that context, Zhong Da 79’s modular configurations can be interpreted as introducing reconfigurable, scalable military platforms on civilian cargo ships in new and innovative ways.

The effort points to an attempt to package “scalable VLS firepower” and “distributed fixed-wing UAV launch capacity” into standardized modules that can be fielded at relatively low-cost. The value of the former is its ability to generate mass quickly and impose stress on an adversary’s air-defense and anti-access systems early in a conflict. The latter would externalize fixed-wing UAV launch capabilities from high-value military decks into a dispersible, modular options using civilian decks.

From a U.S. perspective, China’s use of civilian assets for military purposes complicates considerations of use of force equations, especially for rules-of-engagement against quasi-civilian assets.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Sheng-Wen Cheng, Intern, Center for China Analysis

[1] These include https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3337842/china-quietly-preparing-cargo-ships-transform-military-vessels-case-war#selection-899.89-906.0; https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3338331/chinas-truck-mounted-catapult-system-enabling-merchant-aircraft-carriers; https://militarnyi.com/en/news/china-converted-a-container-ship-into-an-arsenal-ship-with-a-salvo-of-60-missiles/; https://news.usni.org/2026/01/07/chinese-merchant-ship-sports-electromagnetic-drone-launcher-vertical-launching-systems.

While many of you may be ready to switch into holiday mode in December, the PLA appears to have skipped the year-end slowdown. This month featured a series of military activities near Japan, to include a joint China-Russia strategic bomber patrol and a separate naval exercise through the Miyako Strait. Meanwhile, the PLA was particularly active in military diplomacy, conducting joint drills in Singapore, Pakistan, and the UAE. At the policy level, we took note of a PLA Daily commentary on Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy and highlighted some key policy proposals in China’s first arms control white paper in two decades.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Sheng-Wen Cheng, Intern, Center for China Analysis

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Section I: PLA News

China-Russia Conducted Joint Activities in the East China Sea

On December 9, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) confirmed that the PLA conducted a “joint aerial strategic patrol” with Russian air forces. This included on the Russian side two Russian bombers (Tu-95); an early warning aircraft (A-50); and two fighter aircraft (Su-30); and on the Chinese side two Chinese bombers (H-6) and eight fighter aircraft (J-16). The aircraft rendezvoused in the East China Sea and conducted a long-distance joint flight from the East China Sea to the Pacific off the coast of Shikoku. In addition to those flights, the Japanese said one Russian A-50 and two Russian Su-30s were also spotted north of Japan in the Sea of Japan.

In response, the Japanese military scrambled fighter aircraft from the Air Self-Defense Force’s Southwest Air Defense Force to intercept the joint flights. South Korea also sent fighters in response, as the Chinese-Russian joint flight briefly flew into Korea’s Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ).

A spokesperson from the PRC Ministry of National Defense said the joint patrol “showed their resolve and capability to address regional security challenges and safeguard peace and stability,” noting that this was the 10th such mission between the two militaries and was carried out under their “annual cooperation plan.”

CCA Analysis: These joint strategic flights near Japan serve two purposes from Beijing’s perspective. First, the involvement of Russian nuclear-capable bombers exercising alongside PLA aircraft offers a strong strategic signal to Tokyo. They aim to deter what China regards as creeping Japanese “militarism,” assert influence, and challenge the status quo in the East China Sea. And second, they showcase the enhanced interoperability between the Russian and Chinese air forces. The fact that these exercises targeted Japan and, to a small extent, South Korea, is sure to add anxiety in Tokyo and Seoul over a burgeoning Russia-China military alliance in Northeast Asia.

Japan Reported Radar Incidents as the PLA Continued High-Frequency Exercises Nearby

Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported two separate incidents on December 6th, involving the PLA. Tokyo protested that J-15 fighters from the Chinese carrier Liaoning intermittently illuminated Japan’s F-15 fighters with radar over international airspace southeast of Okinawa. Japan called the behavior “dangerous” and argued the radar pattern was inconsistent with routine airborne “surrounding observation.” On the other hand, China rejected Japan’s account, saying Japanese aircrafts “repeatedly approached the PLA Navy’s training sea and airspace and made harassment.”

Japan then reported high flight activity from Liaoning with roughly 100 takeoffs/landings between December 7th and 8th, continuing the rise in PLA operations since last month after PM Takaichi’s comments on a Taiwan contingency. Japan also tracked PLAN ships near its southwest islands on December 11th.

CCA Analysis: Some may recall the January 2013 radar “lock” incidents, when Tokyo claimed a PLAN frigate directed fire-control radar at a Japanese helicopter and later at the destroyer JS Yudachi. Much like today’s rise in China–Japan tensions following Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan, those episodes occurred at the height of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In both cases, alleged radar illumination appeared during periods of political friction and heightened military activity, pointing to a recurring pattern in which Beijing signals warnings through assertive behavior framed as routine operations.

Yet, such practice may give way to unintended escalations. While fire-control radar sits just below the threshold of kinetic action, it communicates readiness and resolve yet preserving plausible deniability. The problem, however, is that such signaling unfolds in close-range, high-tempo environments, shaped by frequent PLA carrier flight operations and repeated intercepts, which shorten reaction times and limit room for correction. Thus, actions meant to warn or deter can instead amplify uncertainty on both sides, increasing the risk of misjudgment or accident even when neither side intends escalation.

PLA Strengthened Military Ties with Singapore, UAE, and Pakistan through Joint Exercises

December marks a busy month for the PLA’s military diplomacy. In addition to joint exercises with Russia, China also conducted separate drills with Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. While the PLA sent its army to Singapore and Pakistan for counter-terrorism (CT) practice, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) traveled to the UAE for their third joint air force exercise. Below are a few highlights from these activities.

First, the seventh edition of China-Singapore joint army exercise, Exercise Cooperation, featured a battalion-level field training exercise at Safti City, Singapore’s first high-rise urban training facility - for the first time. The drill employed reconnaissance robots and drones to support simulated encirclement, sniper control, rapid entry, firepower strikes and hostage rescue.

Second, unmanned equipment also featured prominently in the China-Pakistan joint CT exercise Warrior-IX held in Pabbi. In the final phase, Chinese and Pakistani forces conducted a live-fire, full-spectrum field drill involving combined air-land operations. Participating troops employed a range of unmanned systems, including long-endurance drones, drone swarms, loitering munitions, and explosive ordnance disposal robots, to carry out reconnaissance, area control, clearance, and pursuit missions against simulated targets.

In particular, Z-10 attack helicopters also participated in the exercise. In August, when asked about reports that Pakistan had inducted the Z-10ME, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that “China was willing to share its equipment development achievements with friendly countries.” Against this backdrop, the Z-10’s appearance in a joint exercise may suggest that the PLA is demonstrating the helicopter’s operational capabilities to potential buyers.

Third, unlike the previous two China-UAE joint air force exercises held in Xinjiang, this year’s “Falcon Shield-2025” took place in the UAE for the first time. While training in Xinjiang was previously framed by Chinese officials as offering similar climate conditions, it also carried political signaling, including messaging toward Uyghur activists in China and the Middle East. By deploying the PLAAF to the UAE this year, Beijing further underscores its growing security ties with Abu Dhabi, which may also serve as a form of deterrence toward overseas “separatist” activities.

Beyond political signaling, the China–UAE air force exercises also offer learning opportunities for both sides. For the PLA, the drills provide chances to observe and collect insights on Western-origin platforms. In previous iterations of Falcon Shield, Chinese J-10/J-16 fighters trained alongside French-made Dassault Mirage 2000-9 aircraft - of note given that the Taiwanese military also operates Mirage 2000s. As the UAE and Taiwan have overlaps in aircraft procurement, access to such platforms through joint air drills are critical to the PLA’s understanding of its potential adversaries.

For the UAE, joint drills with the PLA offer opportunities to evaluate Chinese aircraft as potential procurement options. Chinese defense companies have been active participants in the UAE’s major airshows. In 2022, the Gulf state announced plans to procure 12 L-15 trainer jets at UMEX, the UAE’s Unmanned System Exhibition and conference. These aircrafts made their debut with the UAE Air Force at the Dubai Airshow this November. As the UAE continues to diversify its arms suppliers, Chinese platforms may increasingly emerge as viable candidates.

CCA Analysis: Taken together, these December activities point to several evolving trends in the PLA’s joint exercise portfolio. First, counterterrorism and urban operations remain a core entry point for military engagement, particularly with partners in Southeast Asia and South Asia, allowing Beijing to frame cooperation as politically low-risk while still advancing practical training objectives. Second, the consistent integration of unmanned systems across exercises suggests the PLA is using overseas drills to normalize new operational concepts and showcase emerging capabilities in realistic settings. Third, exercises increasingly serve dual diplomatic and industrial functions: platforms such as the Z-10 appear not only as training assets but also as implicit demonstrations to potential buyers. Finally, the geographic diversification of drills—especially the decision to deploy the PLAAF to the UAE—highlights how joint exercises are being used to deepen security ties beyond China’s immediate periphery, while offering the PLA exposure to foreign platforms, operational environments, and force employment practices that may be relevant to future contingencies.

China’s Newest Carrier Makes First Taiwan Strait Transit Amid Sustained PLA Activity

On December 17th, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said China’s newest aircraft carrier, Fujian, transited the Taiwan Strait on December 16th, marking its first reported transit since entering service in November 2025. Taipei assessed the carrier was likely en route to Shanghai for maintenance, noting that no aircraft was observed on the deck. Beijing has not publicly commented on the transit. On the same day, Taiwan also tracked a PLA “joint combat readiness patrol” involving 23 Chinese warplanes.

In briefing lawmakers, Taiwan’s MND emphasized that Taiwan’s forces are capable of rapid response under a more decentralized command concept, explicitly framed against concerns Beijing could convert “drills” into “combat operations” with little warning. In parallel, regional reporting indicated a surge in China’s maritime presence across East Asian waters, with more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels reportedly deployed at one point. This region-wide show of force prompted public expressions of concern from both Taiwan and Japan on December 5th.

CCA Analysis: The Fujian’s first reported transit of the Taiwan Strait since entering service appears aimed at normalizing the presence of China’s newest carrier in a politically sensitive corridor. Conducted alongside a same-day PLA “combat readiness patrol,” the move fits a broader pattern in which high-visibility platform deployments are embedded within routine air and maritime activity, reducing their appearance as discrete escalatory events while increasing their cumulative signaling effect.

Taipei’s emphasis on decentralized rapid response reflects concerns that drills could transition into combat operations with limited warning, underscoring the challenge of decision latency under sustained pressure. By shortening its response cycle, Taiwan seeks to match a PLA posture designed to compress warning time, a dynamic that may narrow Beijing’s room for ambiguity while increasing the risk that routine activity triggers faster defensive reactions. Regionally, the reported maritime surge and coordinated Taiwan–Japan concern suggest these dynamics are increasingly extending beyond the Strait itself.

Section II: PLA Strategy

PLA Responses to Trump’s recalibrated China policy and publication of National Security Strategy

On November 4, President Trump released his National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, laying out the U.S. administration’s policy and approach to foreign and security policy during his second term. The document offered a stark contrast to the Biden administration’s approach to national security, injecting ideology and renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. It also highlighted a new approach to China, including an intent to pursue a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with China,” despite rhetoric elsewhere in the document about China’s unfair trade practices.

Despite its seemingly conciliatory tone on trade, it featured a more hawkish tone on China’s military ambitions and policy towards Taiwan and the South China Sea. On Taiwan, the document said “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” It also underscored that the U.S. will “maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” Finally, on the South China Sea, it stated that “strong measures must be developed along with the deterrence necessary to keep those lanes open, free of ‘tolls,’ and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country.”

The PLA took note of the document. In an article in PLA Daily, titled, “The New US National Security Strategy: A Guide to Cost Reduction and Efficiency Improvement for Hegemonism (美国新版国家安全战略：一部霸权主义的“降本增效”指南), one commentator offered a scathing critique of the strategy. Here are a few key passages from the article:

“This seemingly sober and pragmatic shift actually has ulterior motives.”

“The so-called ‘abandonment of global hegemony’ is merely a shift in power from a globally ‘spread’ deployment to a concentration in key regions”

“This is by no means a strategic shift of ‘laying down the butcher’s knife and becoming a Buddha,’ but rather the US withdrawing its overreaching fingers, clenching its fist, and then striking more precisely and forcefully at what it considers its ‘most urgent needs.’ In other words, the US aims to grant its own companies priority in mining and operating resources, turning Latin America into a resource warehouse exclusively for the US, with the intention of firmly controlling Venezuela’s oil, Chile’s lithium mines, Mexico’s rare earth elements, and Brazil’s agricultural products.”

“Its attitude towards its traditional European allies has almost completely broken off relations. The report devoted two and a half pages to lecturing Europe. The report openly states its intention to cultivate resistance forces in Europe and support so-called ‘patriotic European parties.’ This is tantamount to fostering far-right forces in Europe and blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of European countries while still demanding that Europe obediently follow the United States’ lead.”

“These 33 pages are far from a genuine declaration of strategic retrenchment; rather, they are a hegemonic ‘cost-cutting and efficiency-enhancing’ plan.”

“Its adjustment of its Indo-Pacific strategy is not a genuine attempt to ease tensions, but rather a way to allow allies to take the lead in the conflict, calculating how to maintain its regional presence in a lower-cost and more targeted manner.“

“The US has not become more ‘humble’ or more ‘responsible,’ but simply more petty and blatant.”

“Adhering to a ‘zero-sum game’ strategic mindset, the United States has intensified its ‘America First’ mentality into ‘America Only,’ resembling those evil empires in history that ultimately collapsed, and is rushing headlong towards its twilight.”

Days later, a spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of National Defense offered a more diplomatic response to the NSS, with some pointed remarks on Taiwan. On Taiwan, he said “How to resolve the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese people themselves, and brooks no external interference. Any attempt to ‘use Taiwan to contain China’ is futile.”

On the broader topic of China in the NSS, the spokesperson said, “We hope the US will correct its strategic perception of China, meet China halfway, adhere to the principle of non-conflict and non-confrontation, and promote the building of a stable and positive military-to-military relationship based on equality, respect, peaceful coexistence, and mutual respect, adding certainty and positive energy to the development of bilateral relations and world peace and stability.”

CCA Analysis: The PLA, like many elites in China, sees the U.S. through jaundiced eyes. So such a heavy dose of skepticism from PLA observers that the NSS may usher in a new era of American restraint on the global stage is not surprising. What was noteworthy in the commentary was the absence of critiques about the China content in the NSS. Indeed, the author took pains to avoid highlighting the specific rhetoric about Taiwan, the South China Sea, or China’s military ambitions. Instead, the focus was on the hypocritical nature of “hegemony masked as restraint,” suggesting that U.S. foreign policy under Trump is not fundamentally different from previous administrations and that “cost-cutting measures” are simply a method for the U.S. to manipulate allies and partners. It appears that some observers in the PLA are not convinced that the NSS’s reorientation towards threats to the U.S. homeland, and focus on Latin America, will fundamentally change the terminal trajectory of U.S. decline.

Section III: PLA Modernization

China’s New White Paper on Arms Control in 20 Years

China’s November 2025 white paper, China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, is the country’s “first comprehensive arms control white paper” in two decades and the third overall after 1995 and 2005. Like the 2005 version, it reiterates Beijing’s long-standing positions, such as commitment to a defensive national defense policy, adherence to no-first-use (NFU), and opposition to extended deterrence. The 2025 document also continues to stress restraint in nuclear development, framing China’s force as maintained at the “lowest level required for national security.”

At the same time, the 2025 white paper introduces notable new aspects. It substantially expands coverage of emerging domains, including outer space, cyber operations, and military applications of artificial intelligence. Compared with 2005, the document is more explicit about ongoing nuclear modernization. Unlike the earlier white paper’s focus on declaratory restraint, it references operational capabilities such as strategic early warning, command and control, survivability, and rapid response. These efforts are framed as necessary to ensure the effectiveness of China’s self-defensive nuclear deterrent and maintain strategic stability.

CCA Analysis: The continuity and change reflected in the 2025 white paper suggest China’s effort to reconcile its expanding nuclear capabilities with self-image as a responsible arms control stakeholder. While Beijing continues to reject arms racing rhetorically, the more detailed discussion of early warning and rapid response reflects a maturing nuclear force structure. The document does not frame these developments as contradictory to arms control; instead, it presents modernization as a prerequisite for stability. This narrative may indicate growing confidence that a larger, more sophisticated arsenal can coexist with declaratory restraint, even as it raises questions for future crisis stability and dialogue with other nuclear powers.

Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Cognitive Decoding of Threat Intent in Strategic Warning: A Three-Dimensional Analytical Framework Based on Cognitive Schema Theory [战略预警威胁意图认知解码：基于认知图式理论的三维分析框架]

Authors: CHEN Ye [陈烨], MA Xiaojuan [马晓娟], and WEN Jie [闻杰]

Affiliation: College of International Studies, National University of Defense Technology

Publisher: Information Studies: Theory & Application [情报理论与实践]

Date: 2025-12-01

Abstract: [Purpose/significance] This study explores the practical dilemmas faced by intent analysis in strategic warning such as “emphasizing behavior over cognition” and “emphasizing outcomes over cognition.” Addressing the shortcomings of existing frameworks, it constructs an intent analysis framework with explanatory power and operability based on the cognitive schema theory. [Method/process] Through conceptual analysis and theoretical integration, this study clarifies the internal mechanism of intent as an intermediary variable between cognition and action. Combined with the cognitive schema theory, it explores the compatibility between the theory and intent analysis in terms of subject cognition, scenario construction, and meaning interpretation, constructs a three-dimensional analytical framework consisting of situational perception, motivational interpretation and action orientation, and verifies its feasibility through historical case studies. [Result/conclusion] The three-dimensional framework can effectively reveal the generative logic and evolutionary mechanisms of intent. Motivational interpretation parses the generation path of the motivational system to realize cognitive decoding of intent’s action-oriented attributes. Action orientation assesses the feasibility and stability of intent-to-action transformation. The framework provides a systematic and iterative pathway for intent assessment in strategic warning.

DOI: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.1762.G3.20251201.1358.002

Title: The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence and the Evolution of Warfare Forms: An Investigation from the Perspective of Human Security and the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [人工智能武器化与战争形态演变：以人类安全与俄乌冲突为视角的探讨]

Authors: LI Hongzhou¹ [李宏洲], and LIU Xiaoyuan² [刘晓源]

Affiliation: 1. School of International Relations, University of International Business and Economics [对外经济贸易大学国际关系学院]; 2. Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University [南开大学周恩来政府管理学院]

Publisher: Russian, Eastern European & Central Asian Studies [俄罗斯东欧中亚研究]

Date: 2025-12-05

Abstract: The process of the weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI) is accelerating. From the perspective of “human security,” it can be observed that AI is giving rise to new forms of warfare and posing profound challenges to the ethics of just war. On one hand, the weaponized application of AI has transformed traditional warfare forms, blurred the boundary between wartime and peacetime, and made war a routine phenomenon. This has led to permanent changes in the state of human security, manifesting in crises of human subjectivity, erosion of cognitive autonomy, and the militarization of economic life. On the other hand, current intelligent warfare has transcended traditional humanitarian ethical norms, leading to problems such as ambiguous war responsibility, the failure of just war standards, and the generalization of war objectives. The Russia–Ukraine conflict that broke out in 2022 is one of the most typical cases of AI weaponization. From the perspective of human security, this case demonstrates the evolution of warfare forms and the collapse of war norms, reveals the challenges faced by people in both countries, and provides insights into how to reshape war norms. In conclusion, in the era of AI weaponization, balancing the deep contradictions between technological development and the construction of ethical norms requires rebuilding the governance framework and restructuring ethical standards based on the concept of human security.

Section V: PLA Observers

Derek Solen, “Aerial Refueling Added to Flight Academies’ Transition Training Curriculum,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, Dec. 1, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4344507/aerial-refueling-added-to-flight-academies-transition-training-curriculum/.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China’s Spratly ISR and EW Upgrades,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS), Dec. 2, 2025, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-spratly-isr-and-ew-upgrades/.

Ying Yu Lin and Tzu-Hao Liao, “China Coast Guard Increasingly Assertive,” The Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 4, 2025, https://jamestown.org/china-coast-guard-increasingly-assertive/.

Niharika Mandhana, Daniel Kiss, and Carl Churchill, “See How a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Could Unfold,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/how-china-chinese-invasion-taiwan-ba7e3916.

Derek Solen, “Intermediate Flight Training Shifting to Aviation University,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, Dec. 8, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4344509/intermediate-flight-training-shifting-to-aviation-university/.

Victor Cha, “Creeping Sovereignty? China’s Maritime Structures in the Yellow Sea (West Sea),” Beyond Parallel (CSIS), Dec. 9, 2025, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/creeping-sovereignty-chinas-maritime-structures-in-the-yellow-sea-west-sea/.

Sabine Mokry, “The PRC’s Expanding Arms Control Agenda,” The Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/the-prcs-expanding-arms-control-agenda/.

China Aerospace Studies Institute, “ITOW: Lectures from Course Book on the Taiwan Strait’s Military Geography,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, Dec. 15, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4300964/itow-lectures-from-course-book-on-the-taiwan-straits-military-geography/.

James Palmer, “What’s It Like to Be a Chinese Soldier?,” Foreign Policy, Dec. 16, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/16/china-military-pla-soldier-history-veteran/.

Sam Roggeveen, “A red banner year for the PLA,” Lowy Institute, Dec. 17, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/red-banner-year-pla.

Shanshan Mei and Dennis J. Blasko, “A Changing World, a Constant Priority: China’s Homeland Defense,” War on the Rocks, Dec. 17, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/a-changing-world-a-constant-priority-chinas-homeland-defense/.

This has been an eventful month for PLA watchers. We start out with news of PLA activity around Taiwan following remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about a Taiwan contingency; the barring of four Chinese universities from PLA procurement activities; the official unveiling of China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian; and the completion of the first sea trial of the amphibious assault ship Sichuan. On PLA Strategy, we unpack a recent commentary in People’s Daily by CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia, where he lays out PLA strategy following the 4th Plenum in Beijing. Finally, for PLA Modernization, we dissect a new film by the PLA Air Force featuring how the service is integrating unmanned systems into the fleet.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Sheng-Wen Cheng, Intern, Center for China Analysis

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Section I: PLA News

China–Japan Tensions Escalate Following Taiwan-Related Remarks and Regional Military Activity

Bilateral tensions between China and Japan rose sharply in November after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a contingency involving the use of force against Taiwan could constitute a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Her remarks, delivered during Diet deliberations, indicated that Japan could consider deploying Self-Defense Forces under its security legislation. Beijing issued formal protests in response, summoning Japan’s ambassador and urging Tokyo to retract the comments.

Chinese state media and official outlets criticized Japan for what they characterized as interference in China’s internal affairs, with the PLA’s official newspaper warning of serious consequences should Japan intervene militarily in a Taiwan scenario. The diplomatic dispute coincided with increased Chinese Coast Guard activity near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and a PLA unmanned aircraft flight that prompted Japan to scramble fighters. Japan, in turn, expressed concern about Chinese rhetoric and protested statements made by PRC officials that Tokyo deemed inappropriate.

In parallel, debate intensified around Japan’s evolving defense posture, including its first delivery of domestically produced Patriot interceptor missiles to the United States under existing licensing arrangements. Chinese officials used the episode to argue that Japan was abandoning longstanding self-imposed restrictions and accelerating its rearmament trajectory.

CCA Analysis: The November exchanges underscore how closely developments around Taiwan are now linked to the broader trajectory of China–Japan relations. Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks reflected growing Japanese concern that a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would directly affect Japan’s security environment. However, Beijing interpreted the remarks as a serious security provocation and a signal of Japan tilting toward the U.S.-aligned regional posture, triggering diplomatic retaliation. China’s combination of diplomatic pressure, media messaging, and maritime presence near disputed areas appears aimed at deterring Tokyo from adopting a more active security role. At the same time, Beijing’s sharp responses may reinforce Japan’s already strong domestic momentum toward expanding its defense capabilities and deepening coordination with Washington. The episode illustrates the narrowing space for crisis-management diplomacy between the two countries and highlights the risk that future cross-strait tensions could rapidly spill over into China–Japan relations. For the United States, this dynamic increases the importance of alliance coordination to prevent miscalculation and maintain regional stability.

PLA Bars Four Universities from Procurement Activities Following Bid-Rigging Investigation

On November 9th, the PLA suspended four major Chinese universities—Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT), Beijing Jiaotong University (BJTU), Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), and Harbin Engineering University (HEU)—from participating in military procurement activities within the Central Theater Command. According to procurement notices briefly posted on the PLA’s official bidding platform, the four universities were cited for coordinated bidding on two R&D projects involving engineering-condition simulation analysis and the development of an intelligent data-correlation algorithm model.

The notices stated that the institutions submitted mutually synchronized bids for identical project requirements. BIT was also cited for transferring benefits during the bidding process. Based on the violations, BIT received an indefinite procurement ban, while BJTU, HIT, and HEU were suspended for two to three years. The Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Mechanics was also listed as disqualified from bidding on related projects. The penalties drew attention because three of the sanctioned institutions—BIT, HIT, and HEU—are core members of China’s “seven sons of national defence,” a group of universities closely tied to defense research and equipment development. Due to the sensitivity of the case and its potential implications for the PLA’s procurement governance, the notices were taken down shortly after publication.

CCA Analysis: This is not the first time that the PLA banned universities from procurement due to unfair practices. In fact, the BIS was also suspended from PLA procurement last September. It reflects a tightening of oversight at a time when Beijing is emphasizing clean governance in military modernization. By publicly identifying coordinated bidding and benefit transfers, even on technically complex projects, the PLA is signaling that academic institutions embedded in its research ecosystem will be held to the same compliance standards as defense enterprises.

In the near term, the suspensions will likely affect the continuity of several research programs. The sanctioned universities serve as primary partners for modeling, simulation, and algorithm-development work central to advanced weapons research. Their temporary exclusion may delay project timelines, require reallocation of specialized tasks, and impose additional compliance demands on alternative institutions stepping in to fill the gap.

Over the longer horizon, the episode highlights a shift in China’s defense science & technology governance. Innovation is increasingly expected to coexist with transparency and procedural discipline. As Beijing pushes forward with military–civil fusion and technological self-reliance, universities may need to strengthen internal oversight, adjust bidding practices, and improve auditing mechanisms to remain competitive in the defense procurement arena.

Aircraft Carrier Fujian Officially Commissioned into PLA Navy Service

On November 5th, China commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, during a ceremony at the Sanya naval. Senior political and military leaders attended the event, where the vessel’s commanding officers formally received the service flag from president Xi Jinping. However, aside from Zhang Shengmin, the newly promoted Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), there was not a single four-star general or admiral at the ceremony. Many military leaders who would normally attend such a celebration were absent, including Xu Xueqiang, Director of the CMC Equipment Development Department; Wu Yanan, Commander of the PLA Southern Theater Commander; Wang Wenquan, Political Commissar of the PLA Southern Theater Command; and Hu Zhongming, Commander of the PLA Navy. All are assumed to be under disciplinary investigation.

The ceremony showcased the carrier’s indigenous electromagnetic catapult system and presented several new carrier-based aircraft on deck, including advanced fighter and airborne early-warning platforms. The Fujian is China’s first CATOBAR (Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier and its largest domestically built warship. State media described the commission as marking China’s entry into a new stage of carrier aviation development. Following the ceremony, the carrier and its strike group launched into a series of live-fire exercises on November 18th, testing operations with multiple aircraft types.

The ship had already completed multiple sea trials verifying electromagnetic launch and recovery for the J-35 stealth fighter, J-15T, and KJ-600 early-warning aircraft. According to the Chinese media, the Fujian will be home-ported in the PLA Southern Theater Command to operate in the South China Sea.

​​CCA Analysis: The Fujian’s commissioning represents a notable leap in China’s carrier program. The adoption of electromagnetic catapults, previously fielded only by the U.S. Navy, significantly expands the range of aircraft the PLAN can operate from its decks and increases sortie-generation potential. Early test footage suggests that carrier integration of newer fixed-wing platforms is progressing faster than anticipated. However, the transition to a true CATOBAR concept will require substantial investments in pilot training, deck-handling procedures, and sustainment infrastructure. While the Fujian is unlikely to achieve full operational readiness in the near term, its induction signals Beijing’s intent to field a carrier force capable of extended operations beyond the Western Pacific and highlights the PLAN’s ambition to reduce its technological gap with established carrier powers, and the pace of PLA’s modernization won’t be slowed down by the purge of military leadership.

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship Sichuan Completes First Sea Trials

In mid-November, China’s first Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, departed from Shanghai’s Hudong–Zhonghua Shipyard to conduct its initial sea trial. According to official and state-linked reporting, the ship spent several days at sea testing propulsion, navigation control, power distribution, and integrated platform management systems. The sea trials also included evaluations of the ship’s electromagnetic launch and recovery components, although no aircraft operations were conducted during this phase. State media described the tests as meeting expected objectives.

The Type 076 represents a new class of large-deck amphibious vessels within the PLA Navy and is believed to displace between 40,000 and 50,000 tons, making it significantly larger than the existing Type 075 landing helicopter docks. Unlike earlier platforms, the Sichuan is designed with an electromagnetic-assisted launch system intended to support fixed-wing unmanned aircraft, in addition to helicopters and landing craft. Satellite imagery and prior construction photos indicate a straight-deck configuration similar to a light carrier, with a full-length flight deck and catapult tracks installed.

CCA Analysis: The Sichuan marks a notable evolution in China’s amphibious warfare capabilities by pairing traditional landing functions with fixed-wing unmanned aviation. If the UAV integration proves successful, the Type 076 could provide persistent reconnaissance, wide-area surveillance, and potential stand-off strike coordination in contested littoral environments. The platform also indicates how the PLA envisions future joint-force operations in a Taiwan contingency. A ship capable of simultaneously serving as an aviation node, amphibious staging platform, and command-and-control hub would allow the PLA Navy and Marine Corps to operate more flexibly across multiple axes. It could support early-phase shaping operations, ISR coverage over the strait, and support helicopter-borne or surface landing elements with improved real-time situational awareness. However, the PLAN will need to further invest in layered escorts, air-defense coverage, and electronic-warfare protection if it intends to deploy the Type 076 in high-threat waters.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

Zhang Youxia Commentary Features Achievements and Problems in the PLA

On November 12, Zhang Youxia published a commentary in People’s Daily, called “Advancing the Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces with High Quality (Studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee) [高质量推进国防和军队现代化（学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神）],” laying out the main tasks and requirements of the PLA coming out the 4^th Plenum and 15^th Five Year Plan. Jargon and propaganda aside, it’s a very illuminating treatise on the various problems plaguing the PLA and the challenges ahead. A thread highlighting the key passages, and my initial takeaways.

Here are eight key takeaways from the essay:

1) Political reliability, loyalty, and anti-corruption remain THE key priority for the PLA, given Zhang devotes the first passage to the issue. It is noteworthy that Zhang includes the phrase 两面人 (two-faced people) who “violate Party principles.” Such an emphasis suggests corruption is still the biggest problem facing the PLA, and it’s not getting any better.

2) Zhang called for the PLA to “leverage the inherent Marxist socialism values” to modernize the PLA. Zhang believes the CCP governance system is advantageous over other governance systems to build a modern army and innovate.

3) Xi is strategically planning a “three-step” process for achieving military modernization, starting with 2027, 2035 and then towards the 2049 goal of achieving a “world class military,” but bottlenecks remain. The interpretation here is that much work is needed to meet these benchmarks, which include weaknesses in the Chinese system preventing such goals (note this directly contradicts Zhang’s earlier point about the governance “advantages” that China enjoys.)

4) The PLA needs to adapt the “rapidly changing evolution of warfare,” focusing on “informatization, joint operations, and network-centric warfare.” The translation here is that the PLA is aware of military-industrial trendlines, but how much “change” and “innovation” the PLA can achieve to “be at the forefront” remains to be seen.

5) Tackle the “contradictions” restricting high-quality development. This includes network information systems, unmanned systems, new talent pools, and national R&D systems, to include “killer” weapons (i.e. assassins mace), likely targeting the U.S.

6) Utilize China’s “inherent systemic strengths” through reform, political correctness, ideology, and work style. It is notewrorthy that the means to achieve this – “rectification;” “perfecting military governance;” “reforming” the military budget system management; “strengthening” guidance, evaluation and consultation mechanisms; and “deepening” rule of law and “closing” loopholes – are key words to imply that the PLA has a lot of work to do in all these regards, and has not yet achieved a system that succeeds in military governance.

7) Strengthen civilian-military cooperation. Note that Zhang proposals for “strengthening” the system is a laundry list of all the issues preventing an efficient system that can innovate and industrialize.

8) Finally, Zhang calls for “improving quality and efficiency” of military procurement by “strengthening Party Committee leadership;” “improving cost reduction and sustainability;” and “improving asset management.” This includes “correcting tendencies such as being detached from actual combat, duplication and dispersion, and extensive and inefficient practices.” This includes “the unsatisfactory progress of some planning tasks in the past is partly related to the insufficient matching and improvement of policies and systems.” This is especially noteworthy given the focus of recent PLA purges targeting the equipment and development bureaucracy of the PLA. It’s clear that the current procurement system is deeply flawed and corrupt, and it is striking how much Zhang admits the flaws in the system, which will not be resolved quickly.

CCA Analysis: While Zhang’s essay underscored the PLA’s personnel and governance constraints in adapting to the rapidly changing evolution of warfare, what was most striking was the admission of the myriad systematic constraints within the PLA in achieving these goals. The PLA desires to “be at the forefront” of warfare, but Zhang offered a frank assessment of the bottlenecks in military governance issues facing the PLA. His essay is a sober assessment of the fundamental flaws in Party-army relations, under-performing civ-mil architectures, mismanagement of funds, and incompatibilities in the defense needs of the PLA with its governance structures.

Section III: PLA Modernization

PLAAF Unveils Progress in Integration of Unmanned Systems

The PLAAF released a new film featuring the first public formation flight of a GJ-11 stealth drone, a J-20 stealth fighter, and a J-16D electronic warfare aircraft. The clip shows the GJ-11 emerging from a hangar, taking off, and joining the manned aircraft in a coordinated sequence that highlights the maturing integration of unmanned systems. The GJ-11 features a flying wing configuration, an internal weapons bay, radar absorbing materials, and a shielded exhaust outlet that reduces its radar and infrared signatures. These traits position it for deep penetration, reconnaissance, and precision strike missions in contested environments. Meanwhile, the J-20 contributes to long range sensing and air superiority, along with electronic attack provided by the J-16D through jamming and suppressing hostile radars.

（clip of the original film from 81.cn)

The film implies that the GJ-11 now operates at a stage of practical readiness. Observed testing at major Chinese ranges has included formation control and mission sequencing trials, which reinforce the message that the drone can work as a wingman or forward sensor. The footage also reflects the broader trend within the PLAAF to build a family of stealth oriented unmanned aircraft. China has introduced several flying wing designs since 2019, and recent parades revealed additional wingman drones that support reconnaissance, jamming, and decoy roles. The appearance of the GJ-11 with frontline fighters demonstrates a shift from platform-based development to an integrated manned-unmanned system that supports distributed and persistent operations. The clip also includes a J-20 air-to-air missile launch and an HQ-20 interceptor launch, which underscores PLA’s modernization progress toward a complete air defense and strike network.

CCA Analysis: The manned-unmanned combination gives the PLAAF critical advantages. The GJ-11 can scout ahead of manned aircraft and absorb risk in high-threat zones. At the same time, the J-16D can weaken defensive sensors and create openings for the J-20 and the GJ-11. This structure allows China to plan strike packages that would penetrate air defense systems while preserving manned assets. The teaming model resembles the United States Collaborative Combat Aircraft effort, yet China’s industrial scale may support larger deployment numbers.

These advances could raise concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. In a conflict scenario, such an aerial combination would support saturation tactics against critical sites in Taiwan and against naval forces in the South China Sea – two of the power kegs in China’s periphery. Thus, by demonstrating its new capabilities, Beijing aims to strengthen deterrence by presenting a flexible and resilient strike network that can continue operating under electronic pressure. Nevertheless, this system is not impeccable: reliance on data links and satellite support could introduce vulnerabilities to cyber intrusion and signal disruption. Ultimately, the success of this model will depend on the PLAAF’s ability to secure communications and maintain autonomy under contested conditions in real-life battlefields.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Modeling and Design of Aviation Platform Reconnaissance System Based on Advanced Simulation Framework [基于先进仿真框架的航空平台侦察系统建模与设计]

Authors: Zhao Zhen [赵震]^1,2, Zhao Xiaolin [赵晓林]¹, Li Zongzhe [李宗哲]¹, Li Yunfei [李云飞]¹, Liu Dong [刘东]¹, Zhang Chao [张超]²

Affiliation: 1. Air Force Engineering University, Shaanxi; 2. Unit 93057 of PLA, Jilin

Publisher: Aviation Ordnance [航空兵器]

Date: 2025-11-10

Abstract: A simulation modeling design method for an aviation platform reconnaissance system based on the advanced simulation framework is proposed. The overall architecture design, platform modeling design approach, and behavioral modeling approach of the platform are discussed. Through complete reconnaissance process modeling and multi-sensor fusion simulation, the application development and testing of the aviation platform reconnaissance system are completed. Practical experience shows that the advanced simulation framework can effectively simulate the operational processes of aviation platform reconnaissance systems, supporting the simulation work at various stages of aviation platform reconnaissance equipment, thereby enhancing the research, argumentation, and design capabilities of aviation platform reconnaissance equipment in complex battlefield environments.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/41.1228.TJ.20251107.1440.001

Title: Research on the Development of Intelligence in the Field of US Navy Situation Awareness [美海军态势感知领域智能化发展研究]

Authors: Niu Yalei [牛亚雷]¹, Li Xun [李迅]¹, Ding Peng [丁鹏]²

Affiliation: 1. 91977 Unit of PLA, Beijing; 2. the 28th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Jiangsu

Publisher: Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真]

Date: 2025-11-28

Abstract: As one of the core elements of the naval battlefield, situational awareness plays a vital role in supporting commanders to grasp battlefield information in an all-round way and ensuring the efficient execution of command decisions. Starting from the situation of future wars, this article studies and analyzes the key intelligent projects in the field of situational awareness of the US Navy under the guidance of the new combat concepts of the US Navy, the development strategy of artificial intelligence of the US military, and combat concepts. It also summarizes its key technologies and suggestions for the application of artificial intelligence technology in the field of situational awareness by the navy.

Section V: PLA Observers

James Palmer, “What Are China’s Nuclear Ambitions?” Foreign Policy, November 4, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/04/china-trump-nuclear-weapons-testing-arsenal/.

Jennifer Hlad, “China is already dominating the data war in the Pacific, experts say,” Defense One, November 4, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/11/china-already-dominating-data-war-pacific-experts-say/409310/.

Rupert Schulenburg and Erik Green, “The PLA’s expanding joint-exercise profile and modernisation,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 6, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-china/2025/11/the-plas-expanding-joint-exercise-profile-and-modernisation/.

China Power Team, “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - ChinaPower, November 7, 2025, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-type-003-fujian-aircraft-carrier/.

Gerui Zhang and Brandon Tran, “Political Purification and Strategic Realignment in the PLA,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 14, 2025, https://jamestown.org/political-purification-and-strategic-realignment-in-the-pla/.

Nick Childs and Douglas Barrie, “China’s Carrier Capabilities – Fujian Adds a New Boost,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 14, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/11/chinas-carrier-capabilities--fujian-adds-a-new-boost/.

“The Warcast: China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier”, War on the Rocks, November 18, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/episode/warcast/42118/chinas-newest-aircraft-carrier/.

Andrew Orchard, “How China’s Expanded Operations in the Sea of Japan Are Troubling Tokyo,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), November 20, 2025, https://cimsec.org/how-chinas-expanded-operations-in-the-sea-of-japan-are-troubling-tokyo/.

Allison Martell, David Lague, Clare Farley, and Minami Funakoshi, “Visual Investigation: China’s Shadow Navy Trains to Take Taiwan,” Center for a New American Security (CNAS), November 20, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/press/in-the-news/chinas-shadow-navy-trains-to-take-taiwan.

Raymond Wang and Lachlan MacKenzie, “Golden Dome for America: Assessing Chinese and Russian Reactions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 20, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/golden-dome-america-assessing-chinese-and-russian-reactions.

Tye Graham and Peter W. Singer, “To China’s war planners, AI is just another thing to deceive,” Defense One, November 24, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/11/chinas-emerging-counter-ai-warfare-playbook/409757/.

Suyash Desai, “A ‘Cold Start’ Military Posture with Chinese Characteristics,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - ChinaPower, November 24, 2025, https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/pla-cold-start/.

This month has seen two confrontations involving China in the South China Sea, one with Australia’s air force and another with the Philippines. Meanwhile, China conducted a series of joint exercises with Malaysia to continue its military engagement with the region. China and India held a general-level border talks, continuing their de-escalation efforts. We also unpack the massive purges within the PLA and feature an analysis of the PLA Rocket Force’s recent training exercises.

To help us improve, we’d love to hear your feedback. If you have two minutes, please take a moment to fill out this short survey. Thank you!

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern, Center for China Analysis

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Section I: PLA News

China, Philippines Exchange Accusations After Collision Near Thitu Island

On October 12, China and the Philippines traded accusations after a confrontation near Thitu Island in the Spratlys. Beijing said the China Coast Guard (CCG) “expelled” Philippine vessels it claimed had “illegally intruded” near Sandy Cay and blamed Manila for a “slight collision” with CCG hull 21559. China’s state media described the encounter as a “lawful and necessary measure” to safeguard national sovereignty, insisting that the Philippines bore full responsibility for the collision and warning Manila to refrain from further “provocative intrusions.”

Manila countered that its vessels were operating lawfully within its exclusive economic zone when a Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ship was blasted with high-pressure water and then rammed. Philippine authorities later released photos and video footage of the incident. The United States condemned China’s actions and reaffirmed commitments under the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

CCA Analysis: This latest incident represents a continuation of China’s coercive maritime behavior in the South China Sea, where the CCG and maritime militia frequently employ water cannons, blocking maneuvers, and close intercepts to assert control over disputed waters. Such risky behaviors may cause China to shoot itself in the foot, as illustrated with the August collision of a CCG vessel and a PLA Navy destroyer during the former’s pursuit of a Philippine patrol ship.

China and Australia Trade Barbs over Mid-air Encounter over South China Sea

On October 20, China and Australia exchanged accusations after an encounter over the disputed South China Sea, with the PLA’s Southern Theatre Command Air Force saying that it “drove away” a P-8A military aircraft that illegally intruded into Chinese airspace.

“The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command organized naval and air forces to track and monitor the intruder in accordance with regulations, implement effective countermeasures, and issue warnings to drive it away,” Senior Colonel Li Jianjian, a spokesperson for the command, said in a statement. Li said the incident happened in airspace over the Paracel Islands, which are known as the Xisha Islands in China. Li added that “Australia’s actions seriously infringed upon China’s sovereignty and could easily trigger maritime and aerial incidents,” saying that the PLA warned Australia to “immediately cease its provocations.”

The statement came after Australia’s defense ministry said it expressed “concerns” to Beijing over the “unsafe and unprofessional” maneuvers of a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) jet over the South China Sea, accusing the crew of releasing flares close to an Australian patrol aircraft. According to a ministry statement, a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft encountered the PLAAF’s Russian-made Su-35 fighter aircraft while conducting a maritime surveillance patrol over the South China Sea on Sunday. The Australian defense ministry said it had conducted maritime surveillance activities in the region for decades in accordance with international law and that it “expects all countries, including China, to operate their militaries in a safe and professional manner”.

CCA Analysis: This is not the first time that the PLAAF has released flares near Australian military aircraft in the South China Sea. In February, two Chinese J-16 aircraft deployed flares that passed within 100 feet of another Australian P-8A. China’s foreign ministry said at the time that Australia had “deliberately intruded” into China’s airspace and “jeopardized” its national security. The same month, Beijing and Canberra resumed the China–Australia Defense Strategic Dialogue after a multi-year hiatus, yet the talks did not curb unsafe encounters or rebuild operational trust. Another Chinese fighter jet was also accused of intercepting an Australian Seahawk helicopter in international airspace in May 2024, dropping flares across its flight path. This latest incident continues a trend of PLA operators conducting unsafe or unprofessional behavior against the United States and its allies and partners in the region.

China and Malaysia Conducted “Peace and Friendship-2025” Joint Exercises

From October 19 to 21, China and Malaysia carried out a series of joint drills under the theme of “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Maritime Security.” The exercise included combined land-sea-air operations, live drills on maritime safety, and – for the first time in the series – an air force exchange and seminar. Other ASEAN member states were also invited to observe from the side.

The Chinese contingent is drawn mainly from units under the PLA Southern Theater Command’s Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with personnel from the PLA Hong Kong Garrison and the Guilin Joint Logistic Support Center. The PLA Navy deployed Type 052D destroyer Yinchuan, Type 071 amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan, and Type 056A corvette Jingmen. In the Strait of Malacca, the drills included joint search-and-rescue missions, escort operations, and maritime interdiction exercises conducted under shared command frameworks.

CCA Analysis: The “Peace and Friendship-2025” exercise marks the sixth iteration of this series that previously also involved other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. By focusing on HADR and maritime safety, Beijing presents itself as a regional public-goods provider while strengthening military interoperability with Malaysia, a key stakeholder along the strategically vital Malacca Strait.

However, the bilateral exercise takes place against the backdrop of overlapping maritime claims between China and Malaysia. Luconia Shoals, for example, which lie within Malaysia’s asserted Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), also fall within China’s broader “nine-dash line” claim. While Chinese vessels are frequent visitors to Malaysia’s offshore oil and gas installations, the two countries have been keeping a low profile in dealing with frictions. However, given the recent escalations between China and the Philippines, these engagements may not guarantee zero-aggression from China’s maritime militia.

China and India Held the 23rd General-Level Border Talks

On October 25, China and India held the 23rd round of corps commander-level talks at the Moldo–Chushul border meeting point in eastern Ladakh. The meeting, attended by the Indian 14 Corps commander and the PLA South Xinjiang Military District chief, was described as “friendly and cordial.” Both sides agreed to continue dialogue through existing military and diplomatic mechanisms and reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining “peace and tranquility” along the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It was the first senior-level engagement since the August meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.

Despite ongoing diplomatic contacts, there has been no tangible de-escalation on the ground. Troops from both sides remain forward deployed for a sixth consecutive winter, and India continues to mirror the PLA’s large-scale military presence and infrastructure buildup across the LAC. China, for its part, has expanded runways, shelters, and logistics facilities at key bases such as Hotan, Kashgar, and Shigatse.

CCA Analysis: While Beijing and New Delhi are engaging through diplomacy on their border disputes, China continues to strengthen its deterrence against India at the frontier through infrastructure constructions and regular exercises. For example, recent reports reveal that Ali (Ngari) Prefecture, located close to the disputed area, achieved full power-grid coverage for PLA outposts through the integration of renewable microgrids and state energy infrastructure. These upgrades provide critical advantages for the Chinese military by reducing diesel and coal reliance by over 80 percent and enabling year-round communications and surveillance in the high-altitude region. Meanwhile, Western Theater Command units have intensified all-weather training on the plateau, integrating radar countermeasures, night strikes, and joint helicopter assaults under extreme conditions. Even as Beijing projects an image of restraint, the PLA’s improved energy security, mobility, and combat readiness along the LAC enhance China’s ability to deter India and endure positional advantage in the Himalayas.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

CMC Announces Investigation of Ten PLA Generals and Elevates Zhang Shengmin to Vice Chair of Central Military Commission

On October 17, 2025, just two days ahead of the Fourth Plenum, the Ministry of National Defense of the Communist Party of China (CPC) announced that the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission (CMCCDI) had initiated an investigation into nine senior PLA generals, sending shockwaves through both domestic and international circles. These included He Weidong, a member of the Central Political Bureau and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission; Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and former Director of the Political Work Department; He Hongjun, former Executive Deputy Director of the Political Work Department; Wang Xiubin, former Executive Deputy Director of the Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutang, former Political Commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, former Political Commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin, former Commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, former Commander of the Armed Police Force.

Days later, the CPC issued a Communique of the Fourth Plenum, adding a 10th general under investigation: Zhang Fengzhong, the Director of Political Work Department of the PLA Rocket Force. The Communique also announced the elevation of Zhang Shengmin to Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission.

The CMCCDI statement provided the following rationale for the investigations:

“The investigations revealed that these nine individuals had seriously violated Party discipline and were suspected of serious duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money, of extremely serious nature, and with extremely detrimental consequences. In accordance with relevant Party regulations and laws and regulations, the CPC Central Committee has decided to expel these individuals from the Party and transfer the suspected crimes to military procuratorates for review and prosecution.”

All ten generals are, without exception, core loyalists or trusted confidants of Xi Jinping within the military. Earlier, rumors had circulated online regarding the downfall of Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, Yuan Huazhi, and Wang Houbin. The official confirmation from the Ministry of National Defense not only validated these rumors but also indicated that the internal factional struggles within the Party had entered a new phase of intensification just before the Fourth Plenum.

He Weidong, the second vice chairman of the Military Commission and one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted ally in the military, has been missing for over six months, leaving the public unaware of his fate. In a surprising turn of events, the military announced his corruption-related downfall, with the announcement made by a spokesperson from the Ministry of Defense, which is highly unusual. This suggests that the PLA has circumvented the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and CPC structures. The fall of former Military Commission member Li Shangfu was initially reported by Xinhua News Agency rather than the Ministry of Defense. Similarly, the incident involving Miao Hua was announced by a Ministry of Defense spokesperson on November 28, 2024.

CCA Analysis: The official confirmation of He Weidong’s downfall marks a watershed moment in Xi’s PLA purges. As the first sitting CMC vice chairman from a career military background to be purged since the Cultural Revolution, He’s ouster has reduced the CMC to its smallest size since the founding of the PRC. The purges indicate that despite its rapid modernization, there remains a major trust deficit within the PLA leadership. Presently, four CMC members – Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, and CMC Members Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin – are responsible for making decisions that affect over 2 million PLA members, an unsustainable arrangement in the long term. While Zhang was elevated as the new Vice Chair of the CMC during the Fourth Plenum, Xi will likely be looking to appoint new, younger generals to replace both Zhangs during the next Party Congress.

Section III: PLA Modernization

PLARF Brigade Conducts Confrontation Drill Without Script

A PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) brigade carried out a nighttime confrontation drill in mountainous terrain without scripted scenarios or specific objectives to test soldiers’ combat initiative.

Instead of involving entire battalions or companies in the confrontations, this exercise took place between individual launch units. Moreover, apart from injecting contingencies at random moments, the directing staff did not intervene in the process or preset any training objectives.

Reflecting on the drill, participants highlighted “three differences” compared to previous exercises.

First is the tempo of offense and defense. Instead of the usual stepwise build-up, Platform One opened at full stride, pairing close-in drone reconnaissance with electromagnetic jamming to hit critical nodes from the start. The result was immediate, as Platform Two’s link to its command post lagged and its launch sequence teetered before it could stabilize.

Second, the defense side demonstrated a different campaign mindset. Platform Two did not sit and absorb the loss of communication. While troubleshooting the jamming, its commander pushed a small team of cadres forward on a counter-interference raid, which forced simulated casualties on Platform One and sabotaged their initial harassment plan. Such proactive “attack from defense” flipped momentum and compelled Platform One to improvise with backup channels and a rapid redeployment.

Third, the interval was unexpectedly disrupted, rendering breaks no longer a safe space. After the first phase, Platform One struck during the break, catching Platform Two off-guard during their mid-reset. Multiple positions were overrun in quick succession and over half the force was lost and the mission failed. This episode underscores that vigilance and readiness must now be continuous.

CCA Analysis: While China’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal often draws public attention, the Rocket Force’s effort to refine its operational “soft skills” has been under-evaluated. In recent years, the PLARF has increasingly emphasized more challenging and realistic training to build the combat readiness of not just its systems but also its people. Previously reported exercises gave examples of units rehearsing full-process launch operations under dense contingencies, testing endurance with cross-day-night confrontations, and maintaining communications under electromagnetic jamming and power failures. Following this trend of adding complexities, the October drill stands out for having no preset objectives and minimal controller intervention, which are rare in PLA routines. By breaking conventions, the PLARF is showing signs of modernizing its battlefield simulations for stronger survivability in real life.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Research on Evaluation of Combat Scenario Model for Missile Anti-Jamming Test [导弹抗干扰试验作战场景模型评估研究]

Authors: Liu Dan [刘丹]^1,2,Qi Zhen-heng [齐振恒]¹,Sun Gui-dong [孙贵东]¹

Affiliation: 1. System Engineering Research Institute of Military Sciences, Beijing; 2. Joint Service College of National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, Beijing

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]

Date: 2025-10-21

Abstract: As a core weapon and equipment in the modern national defense system, the technical level and combat effectiveness of missiles are directly related to a country’s strategic deterrence capability, the initiative to control the battlefield, and even the bottom line of national security. According to the requirements of the missile anti-jamming test combat scenario model, following a series of core principles such as systematicness, practicality, stability and dynamics, an index system for evaluating its scenario model was constructed. The credibility of the model is evaluated by using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the CR weighting method. Through standardized index quantification and weighted calculation, the adaptability of the model output results to actual requirements is ensured, ultimately achieving a full chain trusted closed loop from data input to decision output, providing a basis for missile anti-interference tests.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.3019.TJ.20251021.1142.003

Title: Modeling the impact of complex electromagnetic environments on UAV combat effectiveness [复杂电磁环境下无人机作战效能建模与仿真验证]

Authors: Ji Runze [嵇闰则], Wang Ke [王柯],Niu Jiaxin [牛佳鑫], Fan Xiandong [范贤栋]

Affiliation: Unit 32399 of the PLA, Nanjing

Publisher: High Power Laser and Particle Beams [强激光与粒子束]

Date: 2025-10-11

Abstract: [Background] Modern battlefields are increasingly characterized by complex electromagnetic environments (EME), which pose significant challenges to the operational effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). [Purpose] This study aims to quantitatively evaluate the impact of complex EMEs on UAV operational effectiveness through a multi-level analytical framework incorporating key performance metrics, including anti-jamming capability verification. [Methods] A three-tier evaluation model was established, integrating EME complexity, subsystem performance, and overall operational capability. EME complexity was quantified through four weighted metrics derived via the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Critical subsystem indicators—such as communication reliability and navigation accuracy—along with operational capabilities including mission execution and anti-jamming performance, were causally mapped within an environment–effectiveness framework. The model was normalized and integrated using sensitivity coefficients, and stochastic jamming scenarios were simulated in MATLAB to validate the approach. [Results] The results revealed a clear negative exponential relationship between EME complexity and UAV operational effectiveness. Performance declined progressively as EME complexity increased; however, UAVs equipped with advanced anti-jamming systems retained significantly higher effectiveness under identical interference conditions. [Conclusions] The findings underscore the vital role of anti-jamming technologies in sustaining UAV combat capability within complex EMEs. The proposed evaluation framework provides practical guidance for the design and development of resilient UAV systems capable of operating effectively in contested electromagnetic environments.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/51.1311.O4.20251009.2343.019

Section V: PLA Observers

Rowan Callick, “The People’s Liberation Army: Modernised but Still Mistrusted,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2, 2025, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/the-peoples-liberation-army-modernised-but-still-mistrusted/

Garrett Exner, “Parsing China’s Military Parade,” Hudson Institute, October 3, 2025, https://chinausfocus.com/peace-security/parsing-chinas-military-parade

Cole McFaul and Sam Bresnick, “Civilian Tech Is Powering China’s Military,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/07/china-military-civil-fusion-defense-tech-us/

Dan Katz, “Made In China 2025’s Impact on Chinese Shipbuilding,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), October 7, 2025, https://cimsec.org/made-in-china-2025s-impact-on-chinese-shipbuilding/

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Don’t Let Chinese Fears of a U.S. Decapitation Strike Lead to Nuclear War,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/07/china-war-nuclear-risk-beijing-decapitation-strikes/

Jose M. Macias III and Benjamin Jensen, Signals in the Swarm: The Data Behind China’s Maritime Gray Zone Campaign Near Taiwan, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 8, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/signals-swarm-data-behind-chinas-maritime-gray-zone-campaign-near-taiwan

Kevin F. Hsu, “Beijing Has Forgotten Wartime Lessons,” Foreign Policy, October 8, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/08/china-ww2-fascism-communism-nationalists-taiwan/

Gracelin Baskaran, “China’s New Rare Earth and Magnet Restrictions Threaten U.S. Defense Supply Chains,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 9, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare-earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains

Jonathan A. Czin and Allie Matthias, “Purges, Personnel, and Policy: A Primer on China’s Fourth Plenum,” Brookings Institution, October 13, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/purges-personnel-and-policy-a-primer-on-chinas-fourth-plenum/

Major Emily Gill, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Forces,” Air University, October 13, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4315589/the-evolution-of-chinas-nuclear-forces/

Thomas Novelly, “China is ‘pacing threat,’ Army Secretary says—while backing Trump’s homeland defense push,” Defense One, October 14, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/10/china-pacing-threat-army-secretary-sayswhile-backing-trumps-homeland-defense-push/408806/

Tye Graham and Peter W. Singer, “China’s Burgeoning Undersea Sensor Net Aims to Turn the Ocean Transparent,” Defense One, October 15, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/10/chinas-burgeoning-undersea-sensor-net-aims-turn-ocean-transparent/408815/

Commander Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal, “Chinese Submarine Warfare – A Natural Evolution or Game Changing Revolution?,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 16, 2025, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/chinese-submarine-warfare-natural-evolution-or-game-changing-revolution

K. Tristan Tang, “CMC Reshapes PLA Political Work System,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 17, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/cmc-reshapes-pla-political-work-system/

Evans J. R. Revere, “Is China Committed to North Korean Denuclearization?,” Brookings Institution, October 20, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-committed-to-north-korean-denuclearization/

Jeffrey Feltman, Jennifer Hong Whetsell, Patricia M. Kim, Randall G. Schriver, and Andrew Yeo, “Stabilizer or Spoiler? The China Factor in the North Korea Nuclear Dilemma,” Brookings Institution, October 20, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/stabilizer-or-spoiler-the-china-factor-in-the-north-korea-nuclear-dilemma/

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Ivana Ke, Amanda Kerrigan, and Edmund J. Burke, “Mission Command with Chinese Characteristics? Exploring Chinese Military Thinking About Command and Control in Future Warfare,” RAND Corporation, October 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2257-1.html

Sunny Cheung and Kai-shing Lau, “DeepSeek Use in PRC Military and Public Security Systems,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 27, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/deepseek-use-in-prc-military-and-public-security-systems/

Katherine E. Dahlstrand, Securing Space Superiority: U.S. Deterrence Options in a Two-Rival Threat Environment, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), October 28, 2025, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/securing-space-superiority-u.s-deterrence-options-in-a-two-rival-threat-environment

Michael Hanson, “China’s Coming Small Wars,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), October 29, 2025, https://cimsec.org/chinas-coming-small-wars/

Chris Panella, “Former US Fighter Pilot Warns America’s Airpower Edge Is Slipping as China Builds a Bigger, More Capable, and Readier Force,” Business Insider, October 30, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-airpower-lead-slipping-as-china-advances-capability-capacity-readiness-2025-10

Deng Yuwen, “Why Are China’s Generals So Quiet as Xi Purges Them?,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30/xi-purges-china-military-pla-ccp-power-control/

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This month’s issue features a video call between U.S. and Chinese defense leaders, the Pakistani president’s visit to an aerospace conglomerate, and the electromagnetic catapult launch of the J-35. It also delves into the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, an academic report on negative security assurances for non-nuclear states, and a PLA Rocket Force investigation into procurement corruption.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Sheng-wen Cheng, Intern, Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

U.S. and Chinese Defense Heads Hold Video Call

On September 9, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and People’s Republic of China (PRC) Minister of National Defense Dong Jun held their first video call.

The U.S. readout highlighted that “the United States does not seek conflict with China nor is it pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC,” adding that Hegseth “relayed that the U.S. has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific, the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests.”

The PRC readout stated that “it is imperative to uphold an open attitude, maintain communication and engagement, and build a sound, stable China-U.S. military relationship that is based on equality, respect and peaceful coexistence.” Dong reportedly “stressed the importance of respecting each other’s core interests,” to include “any attempts or acts of interference to support ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism.” He said that China is “committed to working with other countries in the region to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea, and firmly opposes acts of infringement or provocation by certain countries, as well as attempts by certain countries outside the region to stir trouble.”

CCA Analysis: China’s release did not feature new talking points or areas of emphasis from the past. Notably, the first sentence of the U.S. readout stressed that the United States is not interested in conflict or regime change. It is also noteworthy that Hegseth used the term “Asia-Pacific,” appearing to move away from the term “Indo-Pacific,” which had been used by the U.S. Department of Defense since May 2018.

Pakistani President Visits AVIC Chengdu

On September 14, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) complex in Chengdu, the first time a foreign head of state has toured China’s flagship military-aviation production hub. Touring the facility where the J-10C fighter is assembled, Zardari was briefed on AVIC’s broader portfolio, including the JF-17 co-production program with Pakistan, the J-20 stealth fighter, and emerging unmanned and automated systems. He praised the J-10C and the JF-17 for strengthening the Pakistan Air Force, citing their performance in the May 2025 clash with India, and pledged to deepen China-Pakistan cooperation in defense production and aviation technology. Besides aircraft, a former Pakistani senior commander also expressed interest in China’s laser weapons as part of further integrating PRC military technologies into Pakistan’s military.

CCA Analysis: Granting access to one of China’s most important state-owned military aircraft enterprises underscores the closeness of Sino-Pakistan military relations. The combat credibility of the J-10C, now battle-tested in South Asia, is a key asset within the Pakistan Armed Forces. The visit also highlighted Pakistan’s role as China’s largest arms client, with PRC systems accounting for 80% of Islamabad’s imports. Moreover, through frequent joint exercises between the Chinese and Pakistani armed forces, Beijing is transferring both platforms and training packages.

New Aircraft Carrier Launch System Tested

China’s latest and most capable aircraft carrier, the Fujian, used its new electromagnetic catapult to successfully launch three types of aircraft, according to the PRC Ministry of National Defense, which published a feature story to mark the technological breakthrough. In footage released by state broadcaster CCTV on September 22, China’s J-35 stealth fighter, J-15T fighter, and KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft were seen taking off from the aircraft carrier using its electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS). State media hailed the tests as a major “success,” marking “another breakthrough” in the development of China’s naval aviation capabilities.

The only other aircraft carrier in the world with an EMALS system is the USS Gerald R. Ford, which was certified for flight deck operations using the system in spring 2022.

The Fujian is China’s third aircraft carrier and its only “flattop” with the EMALS. China’s other two carriers—the Liaoning and the Shandong—use ski jumps for aircraft takeoff, which significantly limit fighter jet payloads.

CCA Analysis: This is no small feat for the PLA Navy, which designs to build a blue-water fleet for far-sea operations. The Fujian’s ability to launch its newest suite of fighters and support aircraft via an EMALS will allow PRC naval aviation to operate farther and with more substantial payloads. The footage of the trials suggests the carrier could be commissioned in the next year.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

China’s Vision for Global Governance at the Xiangshan Forum

The 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, convened on September 17–19 in Beijing, brought together over 1,800 delegates from more than 100 countries and organizations. Framed under “Upholding International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development,” PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun delivered a keynote that blended historical memory with strategic messaging. He declared that “Taiwan’s return is an integral part of the post-war order” and argued that “the stronger China’s military, the stronger the force restraining war.” Dong criticized “small circles of hegemony” led by external powers (i.e., the United States) while positioning the PLA as a stabilizing “ballast” in global security.

The forum’s agenda included plenary sessions on building a “just and reasonable” global security governance system, Asia-Pacific trust and cooperation, and regional peacebuilding, alongside specialized panels on emerging technologies, arms control, and conflict resolution. Participation was notably weighted toward Global South states, with Western representation downgraded to defense attaché delegations from the United States and its allies.

CCA Analysis: The Xiangshan Forum illustrates Beijing’s effort to embed the newly launched Global Governance Initiative (GGI) into international security discourse. By tying the GGI’s “five core concepts” to the UN Charter and WWII anniversaries, Chinese leaders sought to present themselves as defenders of international law while selectively reinterpreting it to justify positions on Taiwan and the South China Sea. The heavy presence of Global South representatives underscores China’s strategy to build legitimacy through inclusivity and South-South solidarity, even as Western participation declines.

Official reports and Chinese experts emphasized the PLA’s defensive posture and the forum’s inclusiveness. Yet the orchestration of panels and repetitive “peace” and “development” rhetoric suggest an exercise in agenda-setting more than genuine multilateral exchange. For Beijing, Xiangshan has become less about bridging divides with the West and more about consolidating an alternative vision of global governance that could amplify China’s influence but also deepen global fragmentation if it hardens into parallel institutions.

First Academic Report on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear States

On September 10, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China National Nuclear Corporation’s Strategic Planning Research Institute jointly released “Negative Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapon States: From Political Commitments to an International Legal Instrument.” This marks the first time Chinese academic institutions have issued a public study focused on negative security assurances (NSA)—commitments by nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.

The report argues that transforming political commitments into a universal, unconditional, and legally binding international instrument is the most effective path forward. It urges the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive negotiations and lays out interim measures: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, abolishing nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, supporting the expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and strengthening existing political commitments. The report also calls for broader international dialogue platforms, including a potential “Friends of NSA” group and greater involvement from think tanks and nongovernmental organizations. While framed as a scholarly initiative, the report aligns with China’s Global Security Initiative and reflects an effort to position itself as a leader in nuclear governance debates.

CCA Analysis: The release is notable against the backdrop of China’s ongoing nuclear modernization and force expansion. Unlike the United States and Russia, which maintain conditional NSA pledges tied to alliance structures and deterrence postures, China continues to highlight its status as the only nuclear-weapon state with a policy of unconditional NSA and “no first use.” By elevating the issue through academic channels, Beijing contrasts its policies with those of Washington and Moscow, presenting itself as a responsible steward in the disarmament process.

However, the report notably avoids any concrete discussion of reducing China’s own nuclear arsenal. Instead, its proposals are framed as risk-reduction measures aimed at constraining others, not as steps toward its own disarmament. This omission illustrates Beijing’s dual-track approach of emphasizing normative leadership in arms control while continuing to expand and diversify its nuclear forces. For non-nuclear states, the report may sound reassuring, but in practice, it reflects China’s preference for declaratory commitments over substantive limitations on its growing nuclear capabilities.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) Bans Hundreds of Defense Suppliers

From August 28 to September 1, the Procurement and Asset Management Bureau (PAMB) of the Rocket Force Logistics Department issued 180 notices terminating the military procurement accreditations of 74 bid evaluation experts and 116 suppliers. These included technical experts held accountable for “evaluation errors that affected results” as well as a lifetime ban of one “broker” (Xu Yuanzhao [许元昭]) for falsifying records and submitting fraudulent bids. The news was made public via the China Military Procurement News (军队采购网) website.

Most striking is the retrospective nature of the bans. The investigation gathered nine years of data to search for irregularities, using big-data analysis and new forensic tools. It also broke new ground by targeting “broker experts”—middlemen who facilitate multi-million-dollar procurement deals between state-owned enterprises and the PLA and who exploited their professional authority to conduct shady transactions.

According to the South China Morning Post, some suppliers and experts were banned from procurement projects, while others were stripped of qualifications that entitled them to bid for projects across the entire PLA. The report noted that two experts were cited for “biased scoring in bidding,” while another was banned for “forging credentials.” Most suppliers were penalized for “collusive bidding” and “submitting false materials.” Among the suppliers banned or fined were the Beijing Engineering Bureau of China Communications Construction (中交集团), which engaged in “bid rigging in military procurement projects,” and the China Postal Express & Logistics (中国邮政速递物流), a subsidiary of China Post, which was disqualified from procurement across the PLA for submitting “false materials in bidding.”

The Central Military Commission (CMC) established the “Sunshine Procurement” (阳光采购制度) system in 2016 to fix flaws in the PLA’s procurement system. The system randomly selected PLA contractors for additional screening and enhanced public price disclosures. But loopholes remained.

Manipulation of technical parameters is a common tactic among PLA contractors. Evaluation experts tailor bids to specific companies by limiting parameters such as equipment interface models. For example, in one telecommunications construction project, three of the five bidding companies were controlled by the same group. Brokerage intermediaries are even more covert. Experts received benefits under the guise of “consulting fees” without directly participating in financial transactions. One expert implicated in the case simultaneously manipulated bids from multiple companies, all while his holding company directly participated in the bidding, creating a closed loop of self-dealing. This is referred to as the “black and gray” (黑灰产) system in PLA procurement.

But the PLA and the PAMB made a breakthrough with the launch of a new procurement big data platform in 2023, which featured intelligent bid document comparisons and supplier relationship analysis. A bid-rigging case involving a central state-owned enterprise was uncovered through bid document fingerprinting technology by revealing unusual similarities between bids from different companies. This big data technology explains this most recent nine-year investigation, allowing for electronic archiving and new traceability of records and contract data.

CCA Analysis: The use of correlation analysis technology was key to this investigation. By collating legal personnel, shareholders, and IP addresses, the system identified the characteristics of bid rigging, such as multiple companies registered by the same group of individuals. There have long been rumors of mismanagement of funds within the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the CMC’s Equipment Development Department (EDD), but this recent report provides a clearer picture of the sources of corruption.

For years, the EDD and the PLARF have been the target of anticorruption efforts. Investigations seemed to start with Li Shangfu, who ran the EDD before becoming defense minister, but have since expanded to include Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo—commander and political commissar of the PLARF—former PLARF commander Zhou Yaning, head of the PLARF Armaments Department Lu Hong, and former PLARF Deputy Li Chuanguang. Wei Fenghe was also investigated. This most recent investigation lifts the veil on what has been happening behind the scenes regarding procurement issues within the PLA.

Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Intelligent Identification Method of Maritime Targets Based on Hierarchical Reasoning [基于分层推理的海上目标智能识别方法]

Authors: XU Yingqi [许莹琪], LI Chao [李超], and QIAN Renjun [钱仁军]

Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 92728 [中国人民解放军92728部队], Shanghai

Publisher: Ship Science and Technology [舰船科学技术]

Date: 2025-09-04

Abstract: Traditional maritime target identification methods relying on manual visual inspection or camera devices can no longer meet modern marine monitoring requirements. Adopting intelligent recognition technology has become a key solution for enhancing maritime safety and resource management efficiency. To meet the demand for real-time and high-precision identification of maritime targets, this paper proposes an intelligent identification method for maritime targets based on hierarchical reasoning. By constructing a hierarchical reasoning model combining YOLOv8 and ResNet50, the study employs a coarse classification and fine recognition logic nested approach to progressively improve identification speed and accuracy. Experiments conducted on the established maritime vessel target dataset demonstrate that our proposed hierarchical inference model achieves 90.2% detection accuracy at 73.0 FPS, outperforming other single-layer image detection models. It effectively balances the precision and efficiency of maritime target image recognition, achieving accurate and rapid identification under fine classification.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.1885.U.20250904.0007.004

Title: FPV Drone Individual Recognition Method Based on Multi-dimensional Features [基于多维特征的 FPV 无人机个体识别方法]

Authors: WANG Zijian [王子健], LI Xinhao [李歆昊], and GU Yewei [谷业伟]

Affiliation: College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology [中国人民解放军国防科技大学电子对抗学院], Anhui

Publisher: Telecommunication Engineering [电讯技术]

Date: 2025-09-28

Abstract: Aiming at the problems of low efficiency and large amount of computation in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) individual recognition, a first person view (FPV) drone individual recognition method based on multidimensional features is proposed. This method constructs a two-layer architecture of “rapid screening of external features – deep analysis of signal multidimensional features.” First, based on the external feature extraction and threshold judgment of signals, rapid detection of analog image signals is realized and suspected signals are screened out. Then, the Residual Network (ResNet) model is used to fine identify and match the screened suspect signals, so as to improve the accuracy and reliability of identification. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is proved by experiments. The experimental results show that the rejection rate of the fast screening layer of the proposed method is more than 85%, and the average recognition accuracy of the deep parsing layer for FPV drone signals in the 5.8 GHz band is 94%.

Link: https://doi.org/10.20079/j.issn.1001-893x.250912001

Title: Reinforcement Learning-Based Cooperative Trajectory Planning Method for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and Decoy UAVs [基于强化学习的无人攻击机与诱饵机协同航迹规划方法]

Authors: QI Haozhe¹ [祁昊哲], ZHENG Mingfa¹* [郑明发], HU Xiaorong²* [胡小荣], and YANG Nan¹ [杨楠]

Affiliation: 1. Air Traffic Control and Navigation School, Air Force Engineering University [空军工程大学空管领航学院], Shaanxi; 1*. Fundamentals Department, Air Force Engineering University [空军工程大学基础部], Shaanxi; 2*. National Innovation Institute of Defense Technology, Academy of Military Sciences [军事科学院国防科技创新研究院], Beijing

Publisher: Journal of System Simulation [系统仿真学报]

Date: 2025-09-28

Abstract: Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) cooperative combat is crucial in modern warfare. The cooperative mode between unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and decoy UAVs has gained significant attention due to its tactical value. This paper proposes a cooperative trajectory planning method based on the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm for UCAV and decoy UAV strike missions against key enemy targets. We construct a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model incorporating dynamic threat assessment, integrating UAV kinematics and battlefield constraints, and design the state/action spaces and a hierarchical reward function. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method effectively guides UCAVs and decoys to achieve efficient cooperation in complex environments, significantly increasing mission success rates while reducing interception risks from enemy air defense systems. This provides theoretical and technical support for intelligent path planning in UAV cooperative operations.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.3092.v.20250928.1109.003

Section V: PLA Observers

Jared McKinney and Robert S. Hinck, Closing the Deterrence Gap in the Taiwan Strait, Air University Press, August 27, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Display/Article/4283778/closing-the-deterrence-gap-in-the-taiwan-strait/

Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart, “China’s Military in 10 Charts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts

Derek Solen, “Beijing’s Response to REFORPAC Projects Calm Confidence,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, September 2, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4287453/beijings-response-to-reforpac-projects-calm-confidence/

Joshua Arostegui, Brennan Deveraux, and Rick Gunnell, “More Than a Numbers Game: Comparing US and Chinese Landpower in the Pacific Requires Context,” U.S. Army War College, September 3, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4292281/more-than-a-numbers-game-comparing-us-and-chinese-landpower-in-the-pacific-requ/

Sam Roggeveen, “China’s Military Is Now Leading,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/03/china-military-parade-technology-pla-weapons/

Joshua Arostegui, “China’s September 2025 Military Parade: How PLA Ground Forces Are Adapting to Future Wars and Force Projection,” U.S. Army War College, September 5, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4294886/chinas-september-2025-military-parade-how-pla-ground-forces-are-adapting-to-fut/

Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek, “Jet fuel, China, and lanthanum: a hidden risk to US military power projection,” Atlantic Council, September 15, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/jet-fuel-china-and-lanthanum-a-hidden-risk-to-us-military-power-projection/

Astrid Young, “Shanghai University’s uncrewed vessels support China’s maritime push,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 18, 2025, https://www.aspi.org.au/strategist-posts/shanghai-universitys-uncrewed-vessels-support-chinas-maritime-push/

Greg Hadley, “Intel Leaders: Beware ‘Expeditionary’ China,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 22, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/intel-leaders-beware-expeditionary-china/

Malcolm Davis, “China may soon reach far into the Pacific with many uncrewed bombers,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2025, https://www.aspi.org.au/strategist-posts/china-may-soon-reach-far-into-the-pacific-with-many-uncrewed-bombers/

Joshua Arostegui, “Adapting to Future Wars: The Reorganization of the PLA Army’s Special Operations Forces and the Move toward Professionalization,” U.S. Army War College, September 26, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4315889/adapting-to-future-wars-the-reorganization-of-the-pla-armys-special-operations/

Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Jack Watling, “How Russia is Helping China Prepare to Seize Taiwan,” Royal United Services Institute, September 26, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russia-helping-china-prepare-seize-taiwan

Matthew Cox, “Industry Reps: US Can’t Go for One-for-One Kills in Drone Warfare with China,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 29, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-china-drone-warfare-one-for-one-kills/

Jeffrey Prescott and Julian Gewirtz, “China Goes on Offense: Beijing’s Plans to Exploit American Retreat,” Foreign Affairs, September 29, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-goes-offense

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue tracks PLA maritime operations, a new publication on Xi’s military thought for a “new era,” merit awards for PLA officers, and commentary on lessons from the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (i.e., World War II). A violent collision in the South China Sea underscored the risks of China’s increasingly aggressive naval behavior, while joint exercises with Russia highlighted growing alignment against U.S. presence in the western Pacific. Ahead of PLA Day on August 1, Xi Jinping awarded first-class merits to both a space command unit and a carrier aviator. Politically, the release of the fourth volume of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military further entrenched Chinese Communist Party control and set doctrinal benchmarks for reaching the 2027 centenary goals. And celebrations marking the end of the World War II show how historical memory is being reinterpreted to guide the PLA’s intelligentized warfare and civil-military integration.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

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Section I: PLA News

Incident: Collision in South China Sea Highlights Risky Chinese Naval Behavior

On August 11, the Philippine Coast Guard shared dramatic footage of China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter vessel 3104 in hot pursuit of Philippine patrol ship BRP Suluan near the contested Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (SCS). As the CCG vessel, which was firing a water cannon at the Suluan, closed in, a larger Chinese Navy Type 052D destroyer crossed its bow, causing a violent collision. The video showed both Chinese vessels bearing significant hull damage, with the bow of CCG 3104 crippled, in one of the worst accidents involving Chinese maritime assets in the SCS.

The involvement of a Type 052D destroyer, a multirole guided-missile ship, rather than a coast guard or maritime militia vessel, marks an escalation for China’s maritime assertiveness in the SCS. In previous Sino-Philippine clashes, Beijing typically relied on maritime assets masquerading as fishing vessels, leaving naval forces on standby.

Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela said that the CCG vessel “performed a risky maneuver” leading to the impact. He said the damage to the Chinese cutter’s bow rendered it “unseaworthy.” China’s Ministry of National Defense issued a statement that its coast guard “had taken measures such as surveillance, external coercion, and interception in accordance with the law to drive [the Philippines] away.” While China did not offer information on the accident, it appears, based on video analysis, that multiple CCG crewmembers may have died.

CCA Analysis: China’s navy and coast guard habitually violate the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and disregard military norms of professionalism. These risky maneuvers increase the likelihood of accidents, including potential friendly-fire incidents. Normally, such an incident would prompt a reassessment of operational safety to ensure such accidents do not happen again. However, in the case of the PLA Navy and CCG, this is unlikely. Beijing appears to view these high-risk tactics in the South China Sea as a means of strengthening deterrence against other claimants, believing that assertive behavior forces opponents, such as the Philippines, to back down in the face of PRC pressure.

Read more: The South China Sea and the Trump Factor by Andrew Chubb (Non-Resident Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis), April 16, 2025.

Exercise: China-Russia Security Ties Deepen with Joint Sea 2025

From August 1 to 5, China and Russia held their eleventh Joint Sea exercise in the Sea of Japan, bringing together a range of modern naval platforms from both sides. Russia deployed destroyer Admiral Tributs, corvette Gromkiy, rescue vessel Igor Belousov, and submarine Volkhov, while China sent destroyers Urumqi and Shaoxing, fleet oiler Qiandaohu, rescue ship Xihu, and submarine Great Wall 210. Building on past iterations that emphasized “safeguarding strategic sea lanes,” this year’s exercise introduced a new theme of “responding to threats in the western Pacific.” Over several days, the two navies carried out a series of complex drills, including joint anti-submarine warfare, air and missile defense, surface combat, submarine rescue operations, anchorage defense, replenishment at sea, and live-fire training.

CCA Analysis: Joint Sea 2025 signals that the China-Russia partnership at sea is evolving from routine coordination into more integrated operations, demonstrating higher levels of mutual trust. The new theme reflects a sharper strategic intent compared to previous Joint Sea exercises, signaling growing Sino-Russian concerns about U.S. military activities in the region. The exercise comes on the heels of large-scale U.S.-led drills, such as REFORPAC 2025 and Talisman Sabre, and coincides with U.S. submarine deployments announced in response to heightened tensions with Moscow. Given this context, Joint Sea 2025 was as much about messaging as training.

The forces committed this year highlight the modernization and operational ambition of both navies. The inclusion of newer vessels, such as Shaoxing and Xihu, showcases the progress of China’s naval modernization. The drills also served as a platform for both navies to experiment with new tactics, exchange operational practices, and gain familiarity with each other’s equipment, thereby strengthening their capacity to handle complex maritime scenarios.

Read more: China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine by Pierre Andrieu (Non-Resident Senior Fellow on China-Russia Relations, Center for China Analysis), August 20, 2025.

Commendation: Xi Awards First-Class Merits to a Space Center and a Carrier Pilot

Before PLA Day on August 1, Xi Jinping signed an order granting commendations to two PLA units and five individuals. Among them, two first-class merits stand out: PLA Unit 63920’s Second Office, widely believed to be part of the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center and central to China’s space command and control, and Ding Yang, a special-grade PLA Navy pilot and carrier-based fighter instructor. Ding has accumulated more than 2,600 safe flight hours, participated in multiple carrier missions and military parades, and has a record of repeated commendations for combat readiness training and technological contributions.

CCA Analysis: Xi’s annual award orders can be viewed as an indicator of priority domains in military modernization. Since 2013, first-class merits have been consistently awarded to both operational units and research institutions, underscoring a dual emphasis on combat readiness and technological advancement. Commending Unit 63920 signals the increasing significance Beijing places on space as a warfighting domain, particularly in satellite communications and counter-space operations. Meanwhile, honoring Ding elevates the profile of carrier aviation, a relatively new but fast-developing pillar of PLA power projection.

Read more: CCA’s Unpacking Chinese Views of Deterrence series.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

In early August, the Central Military Commission (CMC) published and distributed the fourth volume of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening and Rejuvenating the Military (《习近平论强军兴军》), part of a series of authoritative collections of Xi’s speeches, writings, and instructions on military affairs and defense building that adds his imprimatur to PLA doctrine and leadership. This volume is important in four ways:

First, it codifies Xi’s military thought in a “new era” by enshrining Xi Jinping Thought as the guiding ideology for the PLA. It also serves as both a theoretical guide and handbook for military cadres at all levels.

Second, it firmly establishes Xi’s ideological control and reaffirms the Party’s absolute leadership over the military (党对军队绝对领导). It also functions as a political education tool, ensuring PLA officers and soldiers align with the Party center and with Xi as the “core leader” of the CCP and CMC. For example, the book highlights that “following the Party’s command is paramount in our military's development and the lifeblood of our army,” which “fully reflects the dialectical unity between politics and the military and profoundly reveals the natural connection between the Party and the military.”

Third, it offers a blueprint for PLA modernization. The volume repeatedly emphasizes achieving the CCP’s “centenary goals” of military modernization by the PLA’s 100th anniversary in 2027. It also lays out steps toward building a “world-class military” by mid-century, aligned with China’s national rejuvenation strategy.

Finally, it offers practical guidance on training and reform. It covers issues such as combat readiness, training, civil-military integration, technological innovation, and rule of law in the armed forces.

CCA Analysis: The fourth volume is politically significant because it cements Xi’s role as the architect of China’s military modernization and ensures the PLA’s loyalty. Strategically, it outlines the doctrinal and institutional path for China to transform the PLA into a modern, high-tech, globally capable force. The political and leadership elements of Xi’s status as “paramount leader” of the PLA are evident.

Reader Survey

Section III: PLA Modernization

Lessons from the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression for Modern Warfare

To mark the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (i.e., World War II), PLA Daily rolled out a series of commentaries that broke from formulaic tributes to the indispensable leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Authors instead mined the war for lessons to prepare for and seize the initiative in today’s high-tech warfare. Four themes stood out.

First was the imperative of opening new spaces for combat. Writers recalled how Hebei’s tunnel warfare created a “second battlefield” underground, turning a position of weakness into an arena of advantage. Today, they argued, the PLA must do the same in outer space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Second was the lesson of flexibility and asymmetry. The Eighth Route Army offset inferior firepower with night raids, ambushes, and guerrilla tactics tailored to terrain and weather. Commentators suggested that future conflicts will require the same spirit of adaptation. Third was the importance of integrated preparation. Bases not only defended territory but produced weapons in makeshift arsenals, launched mass production campaigns, and ensured self-sufficiency. This experience is recast as a blueprint for modern resilience. Finally, the articles stressed comprehensive mobilization. Political, social, and cultural campaigns once rallied the population into a “people’s war.” Today, the PLA envisions updating that model through cognitive mobilization, dual-use technologies, and civil-military fusion.

Beyond the essays, the PLA has sought to bring history into its training cycle. In a report about wargame exercises, it restaged the Battle of Pingxingguan (平型关) as a testing ground for how to adapt modern equipment to difficult terrain. Officers and soldiers turned to simulation platforms to work through tactics, coordination, and command, gradually shifting the focus from single-branch maneuvers to integrated multidomain operations.

CCA Analysis: The PLA’s effort to mine World War II for lessons provides meaningful insights. Themes of resilience, asymmetric tactics, and civil-military integration remind officers that wars are not won by firepower alone, but through adaptability, endurance, and the ability to mobilize society at scale. In that sense, the PLA’s experience fighting Japan illuminates how to prolong conflict and carve out advantages against a superior foe.

Yet these historical analogies have sharp limits. What ultimately ended World War II in Asia was not guerrilla innovation but the United States’ introduction of the atomic bomb. The implication for modern warfare is clear: if the PLA focuses too narrowly on retooling lessons of “people’s war” without grappling with the disruptive potential of next-generation technologies, it risks preparing for the last war rather than the next.

Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Multi-Agent Aerial Confrontation Autonomous Decision in Incomplete Information Observation [非完备信息观测条件下多智能体空中对抗自主决策方法]

Authors: ZHANG Yuan¹ [张原], LI Xuan¹ [李璇], LI Chao¹ [李超], and ZHOU Xiaoguang² [周晓光]

Affiliation: 1. College of Aviation Fundamentals, Naval Aviation University [海军航空大学航空基础学院], Shandong; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 91475 [中国人民解放军91475部队], Liaoning.

Publisher: Electronics Optics & Control [电光与控制]

Date: 2025-08-05

Abstract: The battlefield environment, engagement situation and information acquisition in modern warfare are highly complex, dynamic and uncertain. Aiming at the problem of air combat decision-making under incomplete information observation, this paper proposes a data filling strategy based on MLP with incomplete information. The research results show that this strategy can effectively complete the incomplete information data. In order to solve the problem of insufficient training guidance caused by low intelligence during opponent selection in air combat, this paper proposes a multi-environment parallel training framework based on population self-game method. The simulation results show that this framework can shorten training time on parallel computing platforms, accelerate algorithm convergence, and guide the gradual improvement of the tactical level of air combat agents.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/41.1227.TN.20250805.1345.002

Title: Analysis of UAV and Passive Radar Collaborative Networking Passive Positioning Strategy [无人机与被动雷达协同组网无源定位策略研究]

Authors: YAN Wenjuan¹^,² [闫文娟], GUAN Zhijun¹ [关志军], TONG Yingyi² [童颖裔], and LIU Su³ [刘苏]

Affiliation: 1. College of Information and Navigation, Air Force Engineering University [空军工程大学信息与导航学院], Shaanxi; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 95894 [中国人民解放军95894部队], Beijing; 3. People’s Liberation Army Unit 94691 [中国人民解放军94691部队], Fujian.

Publisher: Radio Engineering [无线电工程]

Date: 2025-08-15

Abstract: Aiming at the tracking and positioning issues of airborne early warning aircraft and other long-range targets, a high-precision passive positioning strategy based on the collaborative networking of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and passive radar is proposed. By analyzing the impact of the layout of multi-station passive radar on positioning accuracy, a layout strategy that can improve positioning accuracy and reduce layout costs is designed. The Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) positioning method is applied in the study, and on this basis, the Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) for multiple stations is analyzed to evaluate the impact of the layout form on positioning accuracy. A collaborative strategy is proposed that, when the initial direction of the target is unknown, first uses a star-shaped layout for initial positioning and then switches to an inverted triangular layout for high-precision secondary positioning. The optimal secondary stations are selected using the “virtual structure method,” and the flight trajectory of the UAV is optimized using an improved Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm to achieve high-precision layout. Simulation results show that this strategy can significantly improve positioning accuracy. Compared with traditional passive radar systems, the positioning error is significantly reduced, and the system response speed is faster. The research results have certain application value in practice.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/13.1097.TN.20250814.1616.006

Title: Research on the Similarity Evaluation of Complex Electromagnetic Environment [复杂电磁环境相似性评估研究]

Authors: TIAN Miaomiao [田苗苗], PENG Jinxian [彭进先], GENG Dan [耿丹], ZHAO Chao [赵超], WANG Xiao [王晓], and QIN Jianqi [秦剑琪]

Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63611 [中国人民解放军63611部队], Xinjiang

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [复杂电磁环境相似性评估研究]

Date: 2025-08-27

Abstract: Setting up the complex electromagnetic environment is a basic part of training conditions construction. It is important to evaluate the similarity between training electromagnetic environment and required environment. In view of the unclear index system for electromagnetic environment construction and the incomplete similarity evaluation, the similarity evaluation index system is constructed by Euclidean distance. By the way, the similarity characterizations of basic arguments and mode arguments are analyzed based on the basic principles of similarity theory and electromagnetic environment constructing practice. According to the electromagnetic environment properties, the similarity degrees are calculated in multiple dimensions such as threatening electromagnetic environment, objective electromagnetic environment and background electromagnetic environment, the environment mentioned above are aggregated to obtain the expression for evaluating the similarity of electromagnetic environment. The methods can be used to evaluating electromagnetic environment constructing effect, and provide reference to optimize the electromagnetic environment construction.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.3019.tj.20250826.1907.004

Section V: PLA Observers

Tong Zhao, “Is China Changing Its Nuclear Launch Strategy? Certain Behaviors Suggest It May Be Preparing to Adopt One of the Cold War’s Most Dangerous Policies,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/05/china-nuclear-weapons-launch-policy-strategy/.

Jacob Stokes, “How Big Will China’s Nuclear Arsenal Get? No One Knows, but We Can Game Out Potential Endpoints of Beijing’s Buildup,” Defense One, August 6, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/08/how-big-will-chinas-nuclear-arsenal-get/407230/.

Sunny Cheung, “Embodied Intelligence: The PRC’s Whole-of-Nation Push into Robotics,” Jamestown Foundation, August 9, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/embodied-intelligence-the-prcs-whole-of-nation-push-into-robotics/.

John S. Van Oudenaren, “China’s Responses to the U.S. ‘Golden Dome’ Missile Defense Initiative,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, August 11, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2025-08-25%20PRC%20Response%20to%20Golden%20Dome.pdf?ver=3v4D23kFqKZYGkkJx70vXQ%3d%3d.

Shanshan Mei, “The People’s Liberation Army’s Approach to Manned-Unmanned Teaming: Theory and Practice,” RAND Corporation, August 12, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3906-1.html.

Peter W. Singer and Alex Nova, “China Is Working on Reusable Rockets—and a Strategic Leap in Space Power,” Defense One, August 14, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/08/china-working-reusable-rocketsand-strategic-leap-space-power/407453/.

Jonathan A. Czin and John Culver, “Why Xi Still Doesn’t Have the Military He Wants: China’s Force Has Been Remade—but Can It Be Trusted?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/why-xi-still-doesnt-have-military-he-wants.

Tressa Guenov, “Addressing China’s Military Expansion in West Africa and Beyond,” Atlantic Council, August 21, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/addressing-chinas-military-expansion-in-west-africa-and-beyond/.

Nathan McQuarrie, “Why China Has Not Acted on Western Warnings to ‘Disentangle’ Conventional and Nuclear Missile Capabilities,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 22, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/08/why-china-has-not-acted-on-western-warnings-to-disentangle-conventional-and-nuclear-missile-capabilities/#post-heading.

Michael Lynch, “From the Last Frontier to the Final Frontier: The Polar Regions and Space Security,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 25, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4285048/from-the-last-frontier-to-the-final-frontier-the-polar-regions-and-space-securi/.

Maximilian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco, “The Future Is Being Delivered by Chinese Drones: Washington Needs to Move Quickly if It Hopes to Compete in This Critical Industry,” Foreign Policy, August 25, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/25/china-united-states-drones-logistics-military-commerce-technology/.

Matthew Bruzzese and Devon Johanneson, “A ‘Strategic Pivot for Chinese Weaponry?’ PRC Media Responses to Pakistani J-10’s Combat Success,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, August 25, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2025-08-25%20PRC%20response%20to%20J-10%20success.pdf?ver=nBwIqKoNK96BxCP2kKBiPQ%3d%3d.

Kainan Gao and Margaret M. Pearson, “Military Parades and Memory Wars: China and Russia Commemorate History to Reimagine International Order,” Brookings Institution, August 27, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/military-parades-and-memory-wars-china-and-russia-commemorate-history-to-reimagine-international-order/.

Jean-Loup Samaan, “Is the Cautious China-Iran Military Cooperation at a Turning Point?” Atlantic Council, August 29, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-the-cautious-china-iran-military-cooperation-at-a-turning-point/.

Shinji Yamaguchi, “Creating ‘Facts on the Mountains’: China’s Gray Zone Playbook in the Himalayas,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, August 29, 2025, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/creating-facts-on-the-mountains-chinas-gray-zone-playbook-in-the-himalayas/.

Why did China hold the event, and what did it accomplish? This special issue of PLA Watch will examine the diplomatic, historical, and military significance of the parade and what it means for China’s domestic and international image and military ambitions.

Not a “Thing of the Past”

Goose-stepping troops and grandiose displays of tanks, missiles, and fighter jets lumbering through the streets are sights typically associated with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War or the totalitarian regime of North Korea. The West might ridicule such an ostentatious display as wasteful, but for China under Xi Jinping, it holds particular purpose and value. For one, it offers Xi a chance to unveil, in no uncertain terms, the arrival of China as a confident military power on the world stage. It also offers him a chance to showcase, with meticulous choreography, how far the PLA has come in its modernization efforts. Perhaps most importantly, it provides an opportunity for Xi to invite his closest allies and partners to Beijing to celebrate China’s accomplishments.

Of course, none of these were the parade’s official purpose. Officially, it signified China’s dedication to peace in Asia and commemorated the sacrifices made by the Chinese military and people fighting Imperial Japan. Unofficially, the international community saw a display of formidable military muscle, one that stoked nationalistic fervor and showcased the PLA’s “unstoppable rise.” Not incidentally, the parade also doubled as a large advertisement for Chinese arms, particularly to buyers who no longer desire Russian systems or can purchase Western offerings. Regardless of interpretation, the message was delivered loud and clear.

Who Attended the Party?

In total, 26 foreign leaders attended the parade. Headlines focused on the rare international appearance of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin, but other heads of state from Iran, Belarus, Cuba, Indonesia, and more also convened. To that end, the absence of Western leaders was notable and underscored the parade’s role as a stage for nations skeptical of or defiant toward Western influence. In fact, only one EU and NATO head of state attended: Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. The only other European head of state to attend was Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Neither attendance was surprising—Fico has pushed for closer ties with Russia, and Vucic has been critical of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine. Both leaders have recently visited Moscow.

In other words, this was not a showing of nations who fought in World War II standing in solidarity with China. Instead, it manifested, in very clear terms, who China’s “friends” are, with strong representation from Central Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia. A better term might be the “coalition of the willing, with Chinese characteristics.”

As the headlines noted, Kim Jong Un’s attendance was particularly significant. It marked his first trip to China since January 2019 and the first time a North Korean leader had attended a Chinese military parade since 1959. It was also Kim’s first engagement with multiple world leaders in one setting since assuming power in 2011. Xi, Kim, and Putin stood side by side for most of the ceremony in a purposeful signal to Washington. The picturesque moment of the three leaders sharing smiles as they walked through Tiananmen Square underscored their burgeoning alignment against U.S. influence. This alignment is undoubtedly troubling for Washington, Seoul, and Brussels, given North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal and its military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Shiny Objects and New Hardware

If the foreign dignitaries seated beside Xi Jinping symbolized Beijing’s diplomatic reach, the military hardware rolling through Tiananmen Square showcased the other half of the message: China’s demonstration of the material tools to “fight and win” in any potential armed conflict. Assuredly, Beijing also chose to hide some of its cutting-edge platforms for technical and strategic reasons.

The parade marked the first time China publicly unveiled a complete nuclear triad. On land, the PLA unveiled the DongFeng (DF)-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, mounted on a launcher resembling the DF-41, as its newest road-mobile platform. The DF-31BJ, likely linked to silo-loading at China’s new missile fields, also made an appearance, alongside the DF-5C, a liquid-fueled silo-based missile believed to carry a multi-megaton warhead. At sea, the JuLang (JL)-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile signaled longer-range deterrence from Type-094A submarines. In the air, China revealed the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile, which can be loaded on the H-6N bomber.

By showing its nuclear triad, Beijing highlighted improved survivability, second-strike capability, and sophistication in nuclear deterrence. CCTV coverage proudly phrased the reveal as “a strategic ace for safeguarding national sovereignty and defending national dignity.” However, as China flexes, it must also calibrate how this display is framed to remain consistent with its declared no-first-use policy.

Alongside nuclear missiles, the PLA highlighted a new suite of hypersonic anti-ship weapons. Four variants of the YingJi(YJ)-series—YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20—rolled through, three of them hypersonic. Chinese experts boasted of “diverse technological paths”: the YJ-17 and YJ-20 use boost-glide configurations, while the YJ-19 is believed to employ a scramjet engine for air-breathing hypersonic flight. Western analysts noted that if deployed in large numbers, such missiles could overwhelm U.S. naval defenses by arriving at unpredictable angles and speeds, adding credibility to China’s capabilities.

The PLA gave equal prominence to unmanned warfare. Two extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles, the HSU-100 and the mine-laying AJX-002, were revealed. Large truck-mounted drones resembling “loyal wingmen” for jet fighters indicated the PLA’s integration of manned and unmanned aviation. Ground forces showed remote-controlled vehicles capable of mine-clearing and casualty evacuation, while robotic dogs equipped with AI features appeared as part of electronic warfare units.

Near the end of the parade, the J-35 stealth carrier-borne fighter, flanked by upgraded J-15 variants, flew across the sky. The J-35 marks China’s official entry into the fifth-generation era for carrier aviation, with enhanced stealth, range, and payload. Its appearance was paired with carrier-based early-warning and electronic warfare aircraft, showing a more comprehensive naval aviation ecosystem.

Equally telling were the absences. Prototypes of sixth-generation stealth fighters such as the J-36 and the J-50, reportedly tested since 2024, were absent, likely because they are still in an early stage of development and too sensitive to reveal. Although the HongQi-29 missile was displayed at the parade with anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, counterspace systems such as the SC-19 direct-ascent ASAT missile and the DongNeng series were withheld. Their omission could imply Beijing’s desire to avoid international backlash against its stated commitment to the peaceful use of outer space while maintaining deterrent ambiguity.

Conclusion

To summarize, the parade delivered four symbolic messages. First, Xi reinforced the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative that China has emerged from its “century of humiliation” as a strong and powerful nation. Second, it sent a strong message of conventional and nuclear deterrence to the United States and other regional actors that China has the means and intent to militarily intervene in any conflict along its periphery, including over Taiwan. Third, to quell any doubts of Xi’s command of and trust in the PLA, it underscored that he remains in firm control as chairman of the Central Military Commission and leader of the Chinese armed forces. And finally, it drove the narrative that China, Russia, and North Korea are forming an even tighter alliance than previously recognized.

Regarding capabilities, the PLA unveiled several new platforms that were previously unknown to the international community. Most of the capabilities displayed clearly target U.S. military assets and posture, especially in the nuclear domain. However, the scale of deployment and integration of these capabilities into active duty remains uncertain. Ultimately, the parade was more performative than an actual showcase of battlefield capabilities. How effectively China can integrate them into the PLA remains to be seen.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue highlights key developments in PLA operations, diplomacy, and modernization. China demonstrated integrated drone and anti-drone capabilities in a recent exercise, while new footage of a 2024 intercontinental ballistic missile launch showcased its strategic capabilities. The PLA also conducted live-fire drills in response to Taiwan’s Han Kuang Exercise and held its first joint special forces training with Serbia, deepening military ties in Europe. On the political front, the Central Military Commission issued new regulations on political work, further tightening Chinese Communist Party control and linking ideological discipline to combat readiness. The modernization feature examines the PLA’s growing use of robotics, including armed quadrupeds and plans for humanoid systems.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

Weapons: China Showcases Integrated Drone and Anti-Drone Capabilities

On July 21, China North Industries Group (Norinco) staged a large-scale live-fire demonstration in Inner Mongolia, showcasing its latest unmanned and counter-unmanned combat capabilities. The exercise simulated a six-phase border seizure campaign, integrating reconnaissance, strike, and denial operations across multiple domains. Norinco deployed a wide range of platforms, including the BZK-005E long-endurance reconnaissance drone, Feilong-series loitering munitions for deep strike, and Flying Dragon 30 vehicle-mounted swarm launchers. On the defensive side, the company highlighted its modular counter-drone architecture featuring layered interceptors, electronic jammers, and the OW5 high-power laser system, capable of disabling drones within seconds without requiring ammunition resupply.

CCA Analysis: Norinco is positioning itself at the forefront of unmanned warfare by offering a full-spectrum operational architecture. This approach reflects lessons learned from recent conflicts where low-cost drones and loitering munitions have proven decisive in overwhelming traditional defenses. By tightly integrating target acquisition, command and control, and precision firepower, Norinco is promoting a unified “sensor-to-shooter” chain tailored for expeditionary or regional clients. The emphasis on affordable, mobile countermeasures—especially laser and radio-frequency systems—also aligns with the increasing need to defend against drone saturation attacks. As Beijing grows its international arms footprint, Norinco’s systems exemplify China’s broader effort to export battlefield-tested, high-efficiency unmanned solutions.

Diplomacy: China and Serbia Hold First Joint Special Forces Exercise

From July 19 to 28, China and Serbia conducted their first joint special forces training, Peace Guardian-2025, in Hebei Province. The drill involved Serbia’s 72nd Special Operations Brigade and a PLA special operations unit, with mixed combat teams rehearsing urban and rural missions supported by unmanned platforms. According to Serbia’s Ministry of Defense, the training emphasized drone tactics, mountaineering, and firearms proficiency to enhance joint operational readiness “in international environments.” The exercise builds on deepening China-Serbia bilateral defense cooperation in recent years—including Serbia’s purchase of Chinese FK-3 air defense systems and CH-series drones, which makes it the only European country operating Chinese military platforms.

CCA Analysis: Peace Guardian-2025 enhances the China-Serbia defense relationship, evolving it from arms transfers to joint operational training. For China, Serbia has long been a “natural partner” in Europe: a militarily neutral state outside of NATO, politically aligned with Beijing on issues such as Kosovo, and deeply integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative. Since establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016—and pledging to build a “shared future” during Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to Belgrade—the two sides have expanded cooperation in high-tech industries, counterterrorism, and, increasingly, military affairs.

From Belgrade’s perspective, China helps offset growing Western pressure. As Serbia distances itself from a Russia constrained by war and sanctions, China fills the void with its advanced defense systems and training support. The partnership also bolsters domestic narratives of sovereignty and strength. The latest announcement that President Vučić will attend China’s upcoming military parade in September—the first foreign leader to confirm—highlights the symbolic convergence taking shape.

While Serbia continues to profess aspirations to join the EU, exercises like Peace Guardian-2025 and arms cooperation with China signal a more ambiguous alignment. For Beijing, deepening security ties with a European country normalizes its defense presence in the region. This could raise strategic concerns about influence and interoperability in the Balkans among EU and U.S. policymakers.

Exercise: PLA Responds to Taiwan’s Han Kuang Exercise

On July 9, Taiwan conducted its annual Han Kuang Exercise, featuring new scenarios beyond coastal defense to include “gray-zone tactics,” “deep defense,” and “battles of attrition” to simulate how the PLA may carry out a military invasion of the island. The exercise lasted 10 days, making it the largest and longest edition in its 41-year history.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said the drills began with exercises to counter China Coast Guard and maritime militia harassment, along with fortifying ports and potential landing points on the island. Anti-landing exercises featured Taiwan’s regular forces and 22,000 reservists as well as U.S.-procured Abrams M1A2T tanks and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). The Army's 53rd Engineer Group led obstacle placement and remote detonations along the Tamsui River—a critical entry point to Taipei—in the military’s first public demonstration involving live explosives. On July 15, counties and cities across the island took part in an “urban resilience exercise,” the first time Taiwan’s MND worked with central and local governments on an “organized but unscripted” drill testing the resilience and adaptability of Taiwan’s civ-mil architecture.

In response, the PLA launched four days of air and maritime drills around Taiwan, simulating joint fire maneuvers. Exercises included nighttime flight training, sorties that crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered the island’s self-declared air defense identification zone, electronic warfare, and drills responding to mock air and submarine threats. When asked to comment on the Han Kuang Exercise, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense said the Taiwanese exercise was “merely a show” that “cannot change the inevitable demise of Taiwan independence… The more they are performed, the more they expose the DPP authorities' sinister plot to harm and destroy Taiwan under the guise of defending it, and to coerce the people into serving as cannon fodder.”

CCA Analysis: This year’s Han Kuang Exercise is a milestone in Taiwan’s evolution from traditional military deterrence scenarios to urban-based mock battles integrating civilian actors with the Taiwanese military. The PLA has taken note of the shift. This year saw more median-line crossings than in previous years, signaling the PLA’s intent to increase readiness in response to what it views as Taiwan’s provocation.

Exercise: PLA Reveals New Video of September 2024 ICBM Launch

China released never-before-seen footage of its September 25, 2024, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch via a five-episode documentary on August 1. The series, titled Gong Jian (Forging Ahead), shows officers and technicians of the PLA Rocket Force partaking in a full-range test launch of a nuclear-capable ICBM. The video coverage, made public for the first time, unveiled details of one of the PLA’s most sensitive strategic forces.

The clips show the missile launch, scenes of PLA Rocket Force soldiers operating and maintaining large missile launch vehicles, and the firing of multiple short-range ballistic missiles. These scenes are followed by a clip of Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang declaring that the PLA Rocket Force launched an ICBM, carrying dummy warheads, into open waters in the Pacific Ocean on the morning of September 25. The launch was the first time in more than four decades that China publicly released footage of an ICBM flight test. The last public test was in May 1980, when the baseline model of the DF-5 was fired from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center and hit a preset area in the South Pacific.

CCA Analysis: The video’s release coincided with the 98th anniversary of the PLA’s founding. The Gong Jian documentary series is geared toward a domestic Chinese audience and meant to enhance the PLA’s accomplishments and image. The September launch was destabilizing for countries in the region. French Polynesia and Kiribati expressed shock and concern after the launch, stating they had received no prior notice. A Japan Coast Guard official stated that Japan was notified of falling "space debris," but a top Japanese government spokesperson confirmed that China did not inform them of an ICBM launch.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

CMC Issues New Regulations on Political Work in the People’s Liberation Army

The Central Military Commission (CMC) recently issued “Vigorously Promoting Fine Traditions, Fully Eliminating Toxic Influences, and Rebuilding the Credibility and Authority of Political Cadres,” setting new guidelines for implementing Xi Jinping’s “political rectification” in the PLA. According to the PLA Daily, the provisions focus on “restoring and carrying forward the Party and military’s glorious traditions and fine conduct, firmly establishing the authority of political work, and more effectively highlighting its status as the ‘lifeline’ of the military.” They also set strict rules and standards for political cadres, requiring them to lead by example, eliminate “residual toxic influences,” and “rebuild their credibility and authority.”

The measures take a “build before dismantling” approach that combines positive and negative guidance by specifying required and prohibited conduct. Political cadres are reaffirmed as “representatives of the Party” tasked with earning troop trust and confidence through conduct and image. The provisions stress that Party committees at all levels must take primary responsibility, with political organs enforcing these rules rigorously and routinely.

A PLA Daily commentary stressed, “Loyalty to the Party is the soul and true nature of political cadres; it is the foremost political requirement for them. Once loyalty is diluted or falsified, in the face of complex struggles and tests of interest, the ‘self’ will outweigh the ‘greater good,’ even to the point of betraying the original aspiration of joining the military and abandoning the oath of Party membership.”

CCA Analysis: The new provisions are Xi’s way of instilling discipline into the PLA after years of scandal. In November 2024, Miao Hua, former director of the CMC Political Work Department, which manages personnel and Party affairs, was suspended for “serious violations of discipline” before being formally removed from the CMC last month. Two other CMC members, Li Shangfu and He Weidong, have been removed or are rumored to be under investigation for corruption. The PLA Daily commentary is telling in its suggestion of systemic issues with discipline in the senior ranks of the Political Work Department. Miao’s downfall reverberated throughout the PLA and cast doubt on the political future of cadres in his patronage network. The impact of these new provisions on Party-Army relations will be minimal, however, as corruption is an endemic and deep-seated problem in the PLA.

Section III: PLA Modernization

Weaponizing Robotics for the Next Battlefield

On July 13, in a televised exercise by the PLA’s 76th Group Army, robot wolves—a new unmanned ground system—made their public debut. These 70-kilogram quadrupeds, capable of carrying rifles or reconnaissance payloads, maneuvered across rugged terrain alongside human infantry in a joint drone-human assault drill. Developed by China South Industries Group, the robot wolves were deployed in roles ranging from reconnaissance and precision strike to direct support in breakthrough operations. Their integration marks a tangible step in China’s efforts to operationalize human-machine collaboration for ground combat.

Beyond quadrupeds, the PLA is also exploring humanoid robots for urban combat, vehicle operation, logistics, and high-risk environments. A July 10 PLA Daily commentary outlines the phased development plan from non-combat support roles to full-combat autonomy and swarm-enabled operations. The article places strong emphasis on the need for clear rules of engagement and safeguards that ensure human involvement, especially in granting robots lethal authority. Rules of engagement must consider time, space, and target type, with human verification required in some scenarios. The authors also stress legal and ethical safeguards: humanoid robots must obey humans, distinguish between combatants and civilians, and use force proportionally to avoid accidental harm.

CCA Analysis: The increasing visibility of robots in PLA exercises and publications signals a new phase in China’s military modernization. Chinese military experts argue that ground-based robots may offer even greater tactical advantages than aerial drones, including the ability to sustain pressure, conduct persistent assaults, and inflict psychological stress on opposing forces. Meanwhile, the PLA is closely observing recent battlefield developments, including reports from Ukraine, where robotic systems were used to capture enemy soldiers without infantry support. These cases are seen as early signs that unmanned ground systems could redefine battlefield dynamics and accelerate a shift toward machine-dominated warfare.

At the same time, PLA strategists are keenly aware of the risks posed by integrating robotics into combat, as reflected in the July 10 commentary. Other PLA authors have raised additional concerns about the technological and operational limitations of humanoid robots, pointing to unresolved challenges in energy supply, motion control, and the reliability of AI algorithms. High production costs also remain a barrier to large-scale deployment. Despite these constraints, PLA analysts remain optimistic that continued advances will eventually enable humanoid robots to transform logistics systems and reshape future warfare.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Air-based Kill Chain Network Critical Edge Identification Method [空基杀伤链网络关键边识别方法]
Authors: LI Zheng [李争]^1,2, HE Minghao [何明浩]¹, HU Qiaolin [胡乔林]¹, FENG Mingyue [冯明月]¹
Affiliation: 1. Department of Information Countermeasure, Air Force Early Warning Academy [空军预警学院信息对抗系], Wuhan, Hubei; 2. Unit 95786 [95786部队], Chengdu, Sichuan
Publisher: Acta Armamentarii [兵工学报]
Date: 2025-07-09
Abstract: This paper proposes an adaptive key edge detection framework based on deep reinforcement learning to address the challenge of identifying key edges in air-based kill chain networks. This method first uses complex networks to model the air-based kill chain; secondly, a template kill chain search method is proposed by introducing the idea of backtracking search; then, based on deep reinforcement learning, a key edge exploration paradigm was constructed that combines a layered experience replay mechanism with a dynamic ε-greedy strategy. Through multi-dimensional state representation, precise localization of key edges was achieved. The experiment shows that in the simulation of air-based kill chain network testing, the Top-10 recognition accuracy of this method reaches 85%, which is 89.5% higher than the traditional betweenness centrality method and 19.7% higher than the benchmark of deep Q-network (DQN). In terms of network robustness indicators, the global efficiency reduction rate η is 37.4% higher than the edge betweenness centrality, and the prediction error of the maximum connected component retention rate is controlled within 5%.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.2176.TJ.20250709.1124.004

Title: Sensitivity Analysis of Kill Web Operation Effectiveness Based on Simulation Deduction [基于仿真推演的杀伤网作战效能敏感度分析]

Authors: Xiong Rongling [熊蓉玲]^1,2,3, Yang Qing [杨庆]^1,2, Zhang Yanwei [张晏玮]^1,2, Zhang Luyou [张陆游]⁴, Duan Chunyi [段春怡]^1,2

Affiliation: 1. The 10th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation [中国电子科技集团公司第十研究所], Chengdu, Sichuan; 2. National Key Laboratory of Complex Aviation System Simulation [复杂航空系统仿真全国重点实验室], Chengdu, Sichuan; 3. School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China [电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院], Chengdu, Sichuan; 4. PLA 93216 Troops [中国人民解放军93216部队]

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]

Date: 2025-07-10

Abstract: Kill web has the potential to replace kill chain as the primary combat power generation mode in new operational concepts, with its capability to offer dynamic and flexible combination of combat nodes. Addressing the characteristics of kill web such as its multitude of combat nodes, complex interaction relationships, and lack of experimental data, a method for evaluating the operation effectiveness of kill web in typical mission scenarios based on simulation-based modeling is proposed. By comparing operation effectiveness across different performance boundaries of kill web, sensitivity analysis is conducted to quantify the contribution of performance improvements to operation effectiveness. This provides technical means for requirements demonstration and design optimization of kill web performance metrics. The simulation results show that this method effectively quantifies and evaluates the rationality of kill web performance metrics in typical mission scenarios, thereby supporting requirements demonstration and overall scheme development for kill web performance metrics.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.3019.TJ.20250709.1454.002

Title: Combat Effectiveness Evaluation of Air-to-Air Defense Killer Chain Network Based on Order [基于订单的空天防御杀伤链作战效能评估]

Authors: Jiang Longfei [姜龙飞]^1,2, Zhao Jianbing [赵建兵]¹

Affiliation: 1. PLA National Defense University [中国人民解放军国防大学], Beijing; 2. Unit 71352 of PLA [中国人民解放军71352部队], Zhangjiakou, Hebei

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]

Date: 2025-07-22

Abstract: In order to adapt to the changes of operational effectiveness generation mode and evaluation means of informationized intelligent air defense system, this paper adopts military theory and technical practice to combine energy energization, and analyzes the operational mechanism of space defense chain based on order. Two methods of combat effectiveness evaluation—based on system theory positive and negative feedback mechanism, and complex network analysis based on combat cloud—are studied respectively. These are used to quantify the effectiveness of order-based kill chain operations in future air defense operations. The paper describes the complex correlation and dynamic coupling mechanism among operational elements in different operational areas within the system in space defense operations. In addition, it provides data support and theoretical reference for improving the overall operational effectiveness of air defense systems. Finally, the feasibility and effectiveness of the two evaluation methods are verified using a typical air defense kill chain example.

Link: https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.3019.TJ.20250722.1358.003

Section V: PLA Observers

Mike Casey, “China’s Military Satellite Communications,” Orders & Observations, Substack, July 2, 2025.

Kristin Burke, “China’s SJ-6 Satellites—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 7, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4235738/chinas-sj-6-satellitestactics-techniques-and-procedures.

Brendan S. Mulvaney, “China Is Practicing Orbital Warfare to Win in Space,” SpaceNews, July 8, 2025, https://spacenews.com/china-is-practing-orbital-warfare-to-win-in-space.

Kristen Gunness, “What Is the U.S. Doing to Counter China in the Indo-Pacific?” Rand Corporation, Policy Minded, podcast audio, July 8, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/podcasts/policy-minded/2025/what-is-the-us-doing-to-counter-china-in-the-indo-pacific.html.

Derek Solen, “The Truth About the Sino-Russian Combined Patrols,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 9, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4237734/the-truth-about-the-sino-russian-combined-patrols.

John Costello, “PLA Military Aerospace Force: On the Frontier of Innovation and Competition,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 13, July 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-military-aerospace-force-on-the-frontier-of-innovation-and-competition.

“CASI Toolkit for China- PLA Army Article,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 14, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4237911/casi-toolkit-for-china-pla-army-article.

Mike Casey, “Passive Detection and China's Counter-Stealth Radar Capabilities,” Orders & Observations, Substack, July 14, 2025.

Lauren Edson and Phillip Saunders, “Rightsizing the PLA Air Force: Revisiting an Analytic Framework,” National Defense University, Joint Force Quarterly 118, July 15, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4244397/rightsizing-the-pla-air-force-revisiting-an-analytic-framework.

Julia Famularo, “China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait,” U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, July 16, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/48.

Ben Bland and William Matthews, “Beijing’s Dominance of the South China Sea Is Not Inevitable,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/17/south-china-sea-disputes-southeast-asia.

M. Taylor Fravel, “Is China’s Military Ready for War?” Foreign Affairs, July 18, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-military-ready-war-xi-jinping-taylor-fravel.

Brennan Deveraux and Joshua Arostegui, “More Than a Numbers Game: Comparing U.S. and Chinese Landpower in the Pacific Requires Context,” U.S. Army War College, July 22, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4251847/more-than-a-numbers-game-comparing-us-and-chinese-landpower-in-the-pacific-requ.

Yu-cheng Chen and K. Tristan Tang, “PLA Navy Shifts Training Focus from Near-Shore to Blue-Water Operations,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 14, July 25, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-navy-shifts-training-focus-from-near-shore-to-blue-water-operations.

Gregory Poling, “Beijing’s South China Sea Campaign of Intimidation Has Run Aground,” War on the Rocks, July 25, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/beijings-south-china-sea-campaign-of-intimidation-has-run-aground.

Sze-Fung Lee, “Taiwan Bounty: PRC Cross-Agency Operations Target Taiwanese Military Personnel,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 14, July 25, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-bounty-prc-cross-agency-operations-target-taiwanese-military-personnel.

Kris Osborn, “A Look at the J-20 AESA Radar,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 28, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4250249/a-look-at-the-j-20-aesa-radar.

Zachary Burdette, “Why the United States Should Not Fear a Space Pearl Harbor,” Rand Corporation, July 28, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/why-the-united-states-should-not-fear-a-space-pearl.html.

Li Bin, “China and the United States Need a Framework for Nuclear Arms Control. It Isn’t New START,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 30, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/07/china-and-the-united-states-need-a-framework-for-nuclear-arms-control-it-isnt-new-start/#post-heading.

Mark F. Cancian, Matthew F. Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, “Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 31, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/lights-out-wargaming-chinese-blockade-taiwan.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue tracks developments in China’s expanding military footprint, institutional alignment, and defense modernization. The PLA Navy’s first-ever dual-carrier deployment beyond the second island chain signals growing blue-water ambitions and functions as a rehearsal for contingencies involving U.S. and allied forces. In parallel, China continues to institutionalize its defense diplomacy through high-level engagements with South Africa and regional multilateral forums, embedding its operational standards and strategic narratives. On the domestic front, Xi Jinping’s recent Henan tour has prompted a renewed push to align internal discipline with combat readiness. Finally, PLA strategists are sounding alarms over the lack of operational theory guiding the military’s rapidly growing drone force, revealing a broader challenge of integrating new capabilities into coherent strategic planning.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

Exercise: PLA Navy Conducts Dual-Carrier Operations Beyond the Second Island Chain

On June 8 and 9, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported that two PLA Navy carrier strike groups—centered around aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong and accompanied by three Type 055 stealth guided-missile destroyers, three Type 052D destroyers, three Type 054A frigates, and three replenishment ships—were operating in the western Pacific near Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).1 In an unusual public disclosure on June 17, Japan released official tracking data showing that the Liaoning transited the Miyako Strait in late May en route to waters near Minamitorishima, Japan’s easternmost territory, where it conducted around 550 fighter and helicopter sorties. Separately, the Shandong operated near Okinotorishima, Japan’s southernmost point, carrying out approximately 230 sorties. As of June 16, both carrier groups remained in the Philippine Sea.2

In response, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) described the exercises as “routine” and “not directed at any specific country,” adding that they were “in accordance with international law and international norms.”3 The ministry’s spokesperson also accused Japanese aircraft and vessels of repeated close-range interference and of “deliberately creating maritime and air safety risks.”4

CCA Analysis: The dual-carrier operation signals China’s growing proficiency in blue-water naval ambitions. It marks the first time the PLA Navy has simultaneously deployed both of its active-duty aircraft carriers beyond the second island chain, representing both deterrence and operational experimentation. The exercises demonstrated the navy’s maturing ability to conduct “system of systems” joint combat operations at extended distances, supported by layered escort formations, integrated logistics, and sustained flight training in far-seas conditions. Strategically, the operation offered the PLA a valuable opportunity to rehearse scenarios aimed at delaying or disrupting U.S. and allied reinforcement efforts in the early stages of a Taiwan contingency.

Chinese analysts also drew connections between the operation and the USS George Washington’s redeployment to the western Pacific around the same time, characterizing the U.S. move as a “symbolic gesture.” Tang Hua, director of the Cross-Strait Relations Research Institute at Xiamen University’s Taiwan Research Institute, argued that the PLA Navy has now achieved “comprehensive superiority in equipment technology, realistic training, and system integration.” According to Tang, the dual-carrier deployment not only established a “substantial strategic deterrent toward Guam” but also reflects a “profound shift in the strategic balance between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific.”5

Diplomacy: China and South Africa Hold Defense Committee Meeting

On June 10, the 10th China–South Africa Defense Committee meeting was held in Beijing. The assembly was co-chaired by Jing Jianfeng, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Rudzani Maphwanya, chief of the South African National Defence Force. According to the MND press release, the two sides discussed international and regional security issues, military exchanges, and areas of mutual concern. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to “further explore cooperation prospects, broaden cooperation areas, and enhance levels of collaboration.”6

In a separate meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun held talks with General Maphwanya. Dong hailed the longstanding friendship between the two countries and called for both sides to “strengthen strategic communication, optimize cooperation mechanisms, expand pragmatic cooperation,” and “promote deeper and broader mil-to-mil relations.”7

CCA Analysis: The China–South Africa Defense Committee serves as a key institutional mechanism in Beijing’s broader security engagement with Africa. South Africa occupies a distinctive position as a continental military power, a founding BRICS8 member, and one of the top African contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. China’s military ties with South Africa date back to the 1960s and have since evolved to include cooperation in military technology, personnel training, and joint naval exercises. By maintaining regular high-level military dialogues, Beijing is reinforcing its narrative of “mutual respect and non-interference” while fostering interoperability with African armed forces.

At the operational level, enhanced ties with South Africa could offer the PLA expanded access to training environments and logistical hubs in the Southern Hemisphere. The relationship also aligns with Beijing’s broader push to institutionalize its defense diplomacy, transforming ad hoc military exchanges into stable, long-term partnerships embedded in multilateral frameworks such as BRICS, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, and the United Nations.

China–South Africa military ties have been on the U.S. military’s radar for a few years, ever since the U.S. Department of Commerce sanctioned a private, China-owned aviation company in South Africa for recruiting U.S. and allied pilots.9 General James B. Hecker, commander of NATO Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, warned U.S. and allied aircrew members in February 2025 to “avoid employment with privately owned aviation companies backing the People’s Republic of China.”10

Multilateral Engagement: China Hosts 20th ADMM-Plus Peacekeeping Working Group

From June 11 to 14, the PLA Nanjing Army Command College hosted the 20th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in Nanjing. Held under the theme “Technology and Innovation: Enhancing Military Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations,” the event brought together more than 80 representatives from 21 countries and international organizations, including member states, dialogue partners, observer states, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Participants discussed a range of topics, including the use of unmanned and counter-unmanned technologies in peacekeeping operations, the application of artificial intelligence, and the deployment of new technologies and equipment for mission-area security. According to an MND statement, the meeting aimed to “explore the military application of emerging technologies in peacekeeping operations, deepen military mutual trust and security cooperation among regional countries, and enhance their capacities in carrying out peacekeeping operations.”11

CCA Analysis: The meeting underscores China’s desire to play a central role in shaping the institutional frameworks and technical standards of regional peacekeeping. While Beijing has long been a top contributor of peacekeeping personnel among UN Security Council permanent members, it has recently shifted focus toward influencing training norms, doctrine, and operational architecture through multilateral forums. ADMM-Plus serves a dual function. On one hand, it projects an image of the PLA as a responsible, professional force committed to international security; on the other, it functions as a platform for soft-power projection, helping Beijing embed its standards and operational practices into multilateral processes.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

Xi’s “Work Style” Regulations During Henan Inspection Tour Filter Down to PLA

On May 19–20, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour of Henan province, where he emphasized the importance of the “Central Eight Regulations” as a foundational tool for Chinese Communist Party governance in the new era. In response, two scholars from the PLA’s National Defense University, Wei Yukuan (魏玉宽) and Jiang Guangyou (江光友), published a June 13 People’s Liberation Army Daily article, “Using Practical Standards to Test Learning Effectiveness,”12 and argued that the PLA must fully absorb the political spirit of Xi’s speech and translate it into concrete improvements in military governance.

The article highlights two main areas: 1) correcting “bad work styles,” such as unauthorized banquets, gift-giving, and failure to protect grassroots interests; and 2) establishing systems to evaluate the effectiveness of ideological education. The authors link these efforts to earlier regulations issued by the CMC in 2012, framing them as essential to building a “loyal, clean, and responsible” cadre force.13

The inspection tour and commentary may be related to a recently released CMC guidance on military governance called the “Notice on Establishing and Improving the Responsibility System for the Construction of the Rule of Law in the Military.”14 The notice outlines updated duties, responsibilities, and measures for PLA officers in following the rule of law under the CMC Responsibility System (责任体系), to include “strong supervision and precise assessment of responsibilities.”15

CCA Analysis: Though PLA-affiliated scholars frequently amplify Xi’s political messages, this piece goes further by treating discipline reform as a matter of operational urgency. The emphasis on the root causes of misconduct signals dissatisfaction with prior campaigns that failed to produce lasting behavioral change. By calling out issues like lax oversight and formalism in training, the authors make clear that these problems continue to undermine both political authority and combat readiness.

A notable feature is the call for measuring ideological learning through practical outcomes—especially problem resolution, shifts in work style, and troop satisfaction. This reflects growing pressure within the PLA to institutionalize discipline as a foundation for organizational resilience. The piece also underscores a shift from campaign-style governance to law-based management, urging leaders to embed Xi’s expectations into routine decision-making, supervision, and feedback mechanisms.

“Satisfaction” as a barometer of progress also links internal governance to PLA morale and cohesion. The article implies that discipline, trust, and effectiveness must be felt by soldiers at the lowest levels, or else the reforms risk becoming hollow. Whether such reforms take root remains uncertain, but the growing attention to enforcement, supervision, and feedback channels suggests that leadership is seeking more than just rhetorical compliance.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

PLA Strategists Urge a Conceptual Framework for Drone Use

In a People’s Liberation Army Daily article titled “Innovative Operational Theory Needed for Drone Warfare,” PLA scholars Li Jian, Yao Zhihe, and Huang Yonggang call for the urgent development of a systematic theory for unmanned combat operations.16 They argue that as drone technology matures and procurement accelerates, the key challenge has shifted from technical breakthroughs to operational application. Without theoretical guidance, they warn, unmanned systems may fail to deliver on their potential or even become liabilities on the battlefield. The authors stress the need to explore and codify principles of drone employment to stay ahead of rapid changes in future warfare.

CCA Analysis: The PLA’s rapid development of drones is outpacing its ability to integrate unmanned systems into PLA doctrine. On the capability front, China has fielded a comprehensive range of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the Wing Loong II and the stealth CH-7. Drones have been a routine feature of PLA exercises, including Taiwan Strait drills, since 2022.17 A June 2025 report described joint training between PLA Air Force fighter jets and Army drones—an example of cross-service integration of unmanned systems.18

At the same time, PLA-affiliated analysts have closely studied recent conflicts, such as those in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Gaza, to assess emerging UAV tactics.19 These include integrating firepower with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; loitering munition strikes; saturation attacks using swarms; and decoy tactics to degrade enemy air defenses. These innovations underscore the expanding combat value of drones and the importance of clarifying China’s own operational concepts.

However, the PLA’s use of drones remains largely tactical and focused on enabling specific battlefield tasks, with little publicly visible thinking on how drones fit into broader campaign or deterrence frameworks. For instance, the 2020 edition of The Science of Military Strategy makes only a brief reference to using drones for electronic deception and signaling massed forces, mainly framing UAVs as tools for strategic camouflage.20 While tactical integration is progressing, the PLA still appears to lack a coherent vision for how unmanned systems could shape campaign design or strategic posture in future wars.

Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Thoughts on the Military Application and Development Strategy of U.S. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) [美无人潜航器军事应用与发展策略思考]

Authors: DING Lele [丁乐乐]¹^, ², GU Tianjun [顾天军]³, ZHAO Yuxiao [赵宇潇]⁴

Affiliation: 1. Naval Submarine Academy [海军潜艇学院], Qingdao; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 92330 [中国人民解放军92330部队], Qingdao; 3. China Shipbuilding 716 Research Institute [中国船舶716所], Lianyungang; 4. Naval Submarine Academy [海军潜艇学院], Qingdao.

Publisher: Command Control & Simulation

Date: 2025-06-11

Abstract: Based on open-source information from the Internet, this paper reviews the development plans of U.S. unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and analyzes the current state of UUV equipment construction by categorizing them into four classes: super-large, large, medium, and small. It further identifies eight typical military application scenarios in line with operational needs and technological developments: strategic deterrence, battlefield reconnaissance, mine countermeasures, target strikes, payload delivery, acting as network nodes, unmanned teaming operations, and swarm warfare. Drawing from the U.S. military’s experience in UUV development planning, equipment construction, and operational use, the authors summarize five development strategies: cascading development, systematization, generalization, standardization, and automation.

Title: Construction of Intelligent Equipment Capability Evaluation System [智能装备能力评估体系构建方法]

Authors: PENG Jinghui [彭京徽]¹, NI Yuantao [倪远韬]¹, HOU Ping [侯萍]², ZHAO Miao [赵苗]³, QU Lintao [曲林涛]⁴

Affiliation: 1. School of Artificial Intelligence, Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学人工智能学院], Wuhu, Anhui; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 71375 [中国人民解放军71375部队], Harbin, Heilongjiang; 3. Naval University of Engineering, School of Weapon Engineering [海军工程大学兵器工程学院], Wuhan, Hubei; 4. People’s Liberation Army Unit 92767 [中国人民解放军92767部队], Qingdao, Shandong.

Publisher: Journal of Unmanned Undersea Systems

Date: 2025-06-12

Abstract: The development of artificial intelligence promotes the transformation of the form and mode of war, and intelligent equipment has become the protagonist of intelligent war. In order to measure the capability of equipment scientifically, aiming at the shortcomings of the current assessment of intelligent equipment, the research is carried out around the methods, indicators, elements and systems. Firstly, summarized the evaluation methods of equipment capability, and sorted out the ideas of intelligent equipment evaluation. Secondly, analyzed the capability index of intelligent equipment from the aspects of capability requirements, performance parameters and task capability. Then, refined the intelligent multi-dimensional capability, and given the elements of intelligent equipment capability evaluation. Finally, six standard modules are refined, and a capability evaluation system for intelligent equipment is constructed.

Title: Progress in Unmanned Combat Systems Driven by Embodied Artificial Intelligence [具身智能驱动下的无人作战系统展望]

Authors: WANG Pengfei [王鹏飞], LIU Hongqin [刘红琴], CHEN Xiangchun [陈向春]

Affiliation: Army Artillery and Air Defense Academy [陆军炮兵防空兵学院], Hefei, Anhui

Publisher: Aero Weaponry

Date: 2025-06-12

Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive review of the current research landscape regarding embodied artificial intelligence, which represents a new paradigm in the development of artificial intelligence, and prospects its future applications in unmanned combat systems. First, it introduces the concept and historical development of embodied artificial intelligence and extracts three characteristics that distinguish it from traditional artificial intelligence: embodiment, multimodality, and interactivity. Subsequently, it meticulously details the key technologies for embodied artificial intelligence and their recent research progress. The paper then analyzes the urgent need for embodied artificial intelligence technologies in unmanned combat systems from three perspectives: the complexity of the battlefield environment, the complexity of combat missions, and the complexity of multi-domain confrontation, and it envisions the potential implementation forms of embodied artificial intelligence in unmanned combat systems in typical application scenarios. Finally, the paper summarizes the practical challenges associated with integrating embodied artificial intelligence into unmanned combat systems and proposes recommendations for the future development and application of embodied artificial intelligence. This study demonstrates that unmanned combat systems are on the cusp of a technological revolution centered on embodied artificial intelligence, and that deepening its technological application is crucial for gaining a strategic advantage in the forthcoming transformation of unmanned warfare.

Section V: PLA Observers

J.E. Freeman-Mariani, “Checking in on Modernization and Reforms in the People’s Liberation Army,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 2, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4196851/checking-in-on-modernization-and-reforms-in-the-peoples-liberation-army.

Thomas Hader et al., “China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 4, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-gray-zone-infrastructure-strategy-tibetan-plateau-roads-dams-and-digital-domination.

Alex Lewis Richter, “Experts See Risk and Reward to Integrating AI in Nuclear Weapons,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 11, June 7, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/experts-see-risk-and-reward-to-integrating-ai-in-nuclear-weapons.

Adam Dhojnacki, “China Is Carrying Out ‘Dress Rehearsals’ to Take Taiwan. Here’s How the U.S. Should Respond,” Atlantic Council, June 9, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-is-carrying-out-dress-rehearsals-to-take-taiwan-heres-how-the-us-should-respond.

Narantsatsral Enkhbat, “Friends with Benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises,” NATO Defense College, Outlook, no. 7, June 11, 2025, https://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=845.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “China’s Basing Quest in the Gulf: Pipe Dream or Strategic Reality?” Atlantic Council, June 13, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/chinas-basing-quest-in-the-gulf-pipe-dream-or-strategic-reality.

Devon Johannessen, “The Oriental Maritime Space Port: China’s Sea-Based Expansion,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 16, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4196865/the-oriental-maritime-space-port-chinas-sea-based-expansion.

Jake Rinaldi, “China’s Role in a Future Korean War,” Parameters 55, no. 2 (2025), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss2/4.

Daniel Fu, “Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 12, June 21, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/drills-and-experts-suggest-beijing-favors-blockade-on-longer-timeline.

Phillip C. Saunders and Melodie Ha, “Chinese Military Diplomacy,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives 19, June 23, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4222744/chinese-military-diplomacy.

Xiaoke Qi, “China’s Strategic Hinterland: Enhancing New-Quality Combat Capabilities in Sichuan,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 23, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4217375/chinas-strategic-hinterland-enhancing-new-quality-combat-capabilities-in-sichuan.

Ryan D. Martinson, “Exposed Undersea: PLA Navy Officer Reflections on China’s Not-So-Silent Service,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 24, 2025, https://cimsec.org/category/indo-pacific.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue tracks the PLA Air Force’s first long-range joint exercise in Egypt and its largest-ever bilateral drill with Cambodia, underscoring China’s growing expeditionary capabilities; the Liaoning carrier group’s first training near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; and deepening defense ties with Thailand. Beyond the headlines, it offers in-depth analysis of recent PLA writings that highlight data integration, real-time information sharing, and decision-making dominance as critical to future battlefield success. New legal protections for military-industrial facilities amid espionage concerns and increasing civil-military integration are also deciphered.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

Exercise (1 of 2): China and Egypt Conduct Joint Air Force Exercise

From April 19 to May 4, China and Egypt conducted their first-ever large-scale joint air force exercise, codenamed “Eagles of Civilization-2025.” Hosted on Egyptian soil, the drill featured a full spectrum of air combat elements, including fighter jets, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, aerial refueling tankers, and helicopters, and focused on combat simulations designed to establish air superiority and suppress enemy air defenses. Specific operations included aerial refueling, electronic countermeasures, battlefield search and rescue, and precision strikes under an integrated command structure.1 Chinese state media emphasized both the “actual combat” orientation of the drills and the symbolic milestone of flying PLA Air Force assets across continents for extended operations.2

CCA Analysis: The exercise represents a step-change in China’s military engagement in the Middle East. Moving beyond symbolic port visits and low-intensity peacekeeping missions, it centered on joint combat effectiveness and command integration with a non-aligned partner. A Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson characterized the exercise as “deepening substantive cooperation” between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries.3

In addition, the operation showcased the PLA Air Force’s maturing expeditionary capabilities. The deployment of a systematic, integrated force package—including the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, Y-20 transporters, and the YY-20 aerial refueling platform—represented the first such comprehensive projection into Africa. Chinese military analysts portrayed the exercise as a benchmark in “rapid projection, long-range operations, and joint command coordination,” signaling progress in the PLA’s airpower transformation.4

Moreover, the exercise served as a high-profile platform for China to promote its defense exports in a competitive regional arms market. Egypt has reportedly agreed to purchase the HQ-9 air defense system and is rumored to be considering acquisition of the J-10C multirole fighter.5 Such deals, if finalized, would significantly elevate Beijing’s military footprint in the Middle East and potentially alter the regional balance of air defense and strike capabilities.

Meanwhile, the deepening military ties between Beijing and Cairo have raised alarms in Washington, particularly given Egypt’s longstanding role as a major recipient of U.S. defense systems. Although there is no indication that American-made F-16s were involved in the Eagles of Civilization-2025 exercise, U.S. policymakers are likely to interpret any future use of U.S.-origin platforms in combined drills with Chinese forces as a violation of end-use expectations, prompting a reevaluation of U.S.-Egypt defense ties.

Exercise (2 of 2): China and Cambodia Hold Annual Joint Military Exercise

From May 17 to May 28, China and Cambodia carried out the “Golden Dragon-2025” joint military exercise, the seventh iteration of their annual bilateral drills and the most ambitious to date. Held at multiple locations in Cambodia, including the newly expanded Ream Naval Base, the exercise highlighted the growing scale, complexity, and long-term strategic relevance of China-Cambodia defense ties.

For the first time, the PLA deployed radar units and helicopters to a cross-border joint drill, integrating air, land, and sea operations under a single command structure. The drill featured participation from all three PLA branches and included antiterrorism drills, amphibious assault simulations, disaster response operations, and maritime search and rescue training.6[1] Chinese troops also participated in urban warfare training alongside their Cambodian counterparts, simulating hostage rescue and counterinsurgency scenarios. The expanded Ream base, renovated with Chinese assistance and now capable of hosting large warships, served as the exercise’s logistical hub.

CCA Analysis: Golden Dragon-2025 reflects Beijing’s deepening strategic investments in Southeast Asia and ongoing effort to cultivate forward-operating capacity. Beyond practical training value, the exercise signals China’s intent to enhance military access in the Gulf of Thailand, a key transit point between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The first-ever deployment of PLA radar troops and helicopters highlights Beijing’s growing confidence in projecting force and sustaining joint operations in a foreign territory.

In addition, the use of the expanded Ream Naval Base underscores China’s long-term interest in establishing logistical—and potentially rotational—access in the region. While Beijing maintains that it has no plans for a permanent base, the scale and complexity of this year’s exercise indicate a push to normalize the PLA’s presence and embed Chinese security influence within Cambodia’s defense infrastructure.

Training: Liaoning Carrier Holds First Training in the East China Sea

On May 25, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported that five PLA Navy vessels—including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, two Type 052D guided-missile destroyers, and two Type 054A frigates—were operating approximately 149 miles north of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.7 This marks the Liaoning’s first publicly reported presence in proximity to the contested area. During the operation, the carrier conducted flight training exercises of carrier-based fighter jets and helicopters, including takeoff and landing drills. The group later sailed through the Miyako Strait before entering waters southeast of Taiwan. Separately, Chinese media reported that the Liaoning had recently conducted damage control exercises, although the timing and location were not disclosed.8 In response, a Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated that the exercises “were not directed at any specific country or target” and “in accordance with international law and international norms.”9

CCA Analysis: The Liaoning’s deployment appears closely tied to the PLA’s broader exercises in the Taiwan Strait following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s May 20th address. It may also serve as a countermeasure to the USS Nimitz carrier strike group’s presence in the South China Sea. In addition, according to Chinese military commentator Song Zhongping (宋忠平), the concurrent positioning of China’s two active aircraft carriers—Shandong to Taiwan’s east and Liaoning to its north—signals the PLA’s readiness to implement an “effective blockade” of Taiwan. The dual-carrier posture, he argues, is designed to “prevent extraregional intervention and obstruct the U.S. military’s ability to maneuver between the Western Pacific and South China Sea” while simultaneously “cutting off Taiwan’s retreat routes to Okinawa, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.”10

Strategically, this operation reflects China’s effort to “normalize” high-intensity naval activity in contested waters. By staging a carrier exercise near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Beijing not only asserts its claims but also accustoms regional actors to an enduring Chinese naval presence. The Liaoning’s role as a platform for sustained deterrence and operational experimentation in politically charged waters underscores its growing symbolic and strategic value.

Diplomacy: PLA Hosts Senior Thai Delegation in High-Level Military Talks

On May 22, General Liu Zhenli, member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, met with General Songwit Noonpackdee, chief of defense forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, in Beijing. The visit closely followed the conclusion of the China-Thailand Blue Strike-2025 joint naval exercise in April. According to official readouts, the two sides “exchanged views on issues of common concern” and agreed to “strengthen strategic communication and deepen cooperation in joint exercises and training.”11

In a separate meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun also held talks with General Noonpackdee. Dong hailed the military cooperation between the two nations and said China is willing to work with Thailand to “further enhance the level of cooperation in such areas as joint exercises and personnel training.”12

CCA Analysis: The meetings between the two countries’ top military officials reflect China’s ongoing campaign to deepen defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia. While Thailand remains a close ally of the United States, it has increasingly leaned into a hedging posture by balancing military engagements with both Washington and Beijing. From China’s perspective, Thailand serves as a pivotal defense partner: it is central to regional security architecture, has extensive military infrastructure, and bridges the Mekong subregion and the maritime domain.

Strategically, the meetings advance China’s dual-track approach of combining hard-power projection with sustained diplomatic outreach. Amid growing U.S. military activities in the South China Sea and frequent freedom of navigation operations, the PLA’s diplomatic overtures to Thailand allow Beijing to exert influence from within the region’s security network.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

Data Integration Is Key to Battlefield Success

A recent series of articles in the People’s Liberation Army Daily highlights the PLA’s growing emphasis on data as a critical asset in modern warfare. Across seven pieces published in May, PLA writers stress that the success of future military operations depends on the ability to collect, share, and exploit real-time data across services, domains, and platforms. The pieces collectively reveal both PLA aspirations for data-driven joint operations and the persistent institutional and technological challenges it faces.

The series opens with a discussion on the concept of “data thinking” as foundational to improved military decision-making.13 PLA scholars argue that data not only supports accurate judgments and planning but also helps overcome cognitive biases. Quoting Xi Jinping’s call for military cadres to master data collection and analysis, the article underscores that data superiority equates to decision-making superiority. Yet, many officers still rely on intuition or experience over empirical analysis—a gap the PLA acknowledges and aims to address through training and leadership reform.

Another article details efforts by a missile brigade to connect the command chain through improved data links and seamless data sharing for reconnaissance, command, and strike coordination.14 The author emphasizes that the ability to conduct real-time situational assessments and task allocation across services defines modern joint warfare. However, this vision is hindered by significant hurdles: hardware-software incompatibility, siloed data systems, and a lack of data literacy among commanders. Some officers struggle with information overload or over-rely on automated systems, creating risks if those systems fail.

One article focuses on how data influences PLA thinking on enemy planning and operations - a burgeoning field of study within the PLA. It calls for the development of “anti-AI warfare” strategies, recognizing that adversaries such as the United States will rely heavily on AI-driven systems in future conflicts.15 PLA strategists advocate not just adopting AI but also anticipating and countering adversarial algorithms and decision loops through asymmetric, counter-disruption tactics.

Operational planning, another theme in the series, is portrayed as inseparable from data mastery.16 Real-time data transmission is seen as the key to rapidly assessing enemy strengths and weaknesses, thereby enabling faster and more informed strike decisions. One piece emphasizes that knowing the adversary’s force posture, intentions, and systems architecture (e.g., its reconnaissance and communications platforms) is essential to defeating their kill chains.

A final article offers a framework for step-by-step analysis of an enemy’s strategy and force structure.17 It recommends quantifying enemy vulnerabilities and projecting potential actions using effectiveness ratios and modeling. The PLA is particularly focused on identifying and exploiting weak links in adversary systems while protecting its own information networks from disruption.

CCA Analysis: This series of articles underscores the importance of data-enabled warfare in PLA thinking and strategy. Data is the new currency of war. Rapidly collecting, processing, and feeding battlefield data to the warfighter across various platforms and joint command posts is an ongoing priority for the PLA. The dissemination of data enables the PLA to execute what it calls “intelligentized warfare” and achieve information dominance over adversaries. For the PLA, attacking adversary kill chains and waging cognitive warfare remain core operational imperatives for modern warfare success. What is striking about these articles is their frank assessment of shortfalls in integrating data into the sophisticated platforms that the PLA is fielding. The PLA continues to struggle to field technically proficient officers and recruits with the appropriate skill sets to operate such platforms. When AI-infused technology is added into the mix, the problem set becomes even more formidable.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

New Regulation Clarifies Protection of China’s Military Industry Facilities

On May 26, 2025, the State Council and Central Military Commission jointly issued the Regulation on the Protection of Important Military Industry Facilities (重要军工设施保护条例),18 marking the first time China has legally defined and instituted a protection framework specifically for infrastructure operated by defense industry entities tasked with national defense research and production. It fills a longstanding legal gap left by the Law on the Protection of Military Facilities (中华人民共和国军事设施保护法), last amended in 2021, which primarily focused on facilities directly used by the armed forces.19

The new regulation expands protection to facilities operated by both state-owned and private companies that undertake national defense science and technology tasks. These include research and production centers, testing sites, warehouses, communication hubs, and infrastructure such as dedicated railways, airports, and ports. The regulation sets rules for designating protection zones, clarifies the responsibilities of enterprises and local governments, and introduces technical and legal mechanisms to prevent sabotage, espionage, and leakage of classified information. It also mandates security perimeters, approval procedures for accessing restricted areas, and penalties for violations.

CCA Analysis: The new regulation reflects China’s growing concern over the vulnerability of its defense industrial base amid an evolving strategic environment. A major factor is the deepening of civil-military fusion, a policy elevated under President Xi Jinping since 2013. By emphasizing the protection of facilities operated by entities “undertaking national defense research and production,” the regulation responds directly to the integration of civilian and military sectors in weapons development and logistics support.

This shift has presented new challenges for security and secrecy. As defense tasks are increasingly shared with nonmilitary institutions, some personnel may lack adequate awareness or training in preventing leaks of sensitive information. Meanwhile, the expansion of surveillance capabilities among the general public—fueled by smartphones, drones, and widespread internet connectivity—has heightened the risk of unintended or malicious leaks.

Recent years have seen several cases that highlight the urgency of the issue. In one case, an employee at a mapping company used a drone to collect high-resolution geographic data near a sensitive military site without authorization, storing detailed imagery that posed a significant risk to national security.20

Directives such as the Interim Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the Administrative Measures on Military Information Dissemination on the Internet, and the revised Counter-Espionage Law in 2023 have already been enacted to address these issues.21 The new regulation complements these efforts by codifying ground-level protection for physical infrastructure.

The timing of this legal reinforcement also reflects a strategic calculation. As tensions with Washington persist, Beijing has intensified efforts to secure its military advantage. The United States has imposed a series of export controls and investment restrictions aimed at limiting China’s access to advanced technologies that could support PLA modernization. Meanwhile, an arms race is emerging in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic weapons. In this context, strengthening the legal framework around defense infrastructure is part of a broader strategy to reinforce strategic resilience and protect core military-industrial capabilities.

Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Perspective on the Characteristic of the Command and Control of Drone Combat Systems of the Practice in the Ukraine Battlefield [从俄乌战场实践透视无人机作战系统指挥控制特点]

Authors: LI Zhiqiang [李志强]¹, ZHU Yiyong [朱义勇]¹, XU Qingfeng [徐青锋]¹, ZHAO Hongliang [赵宏亮]²

Affiliation: 1. College of Information and Communication, National University of Science and Technology [国防科技大学信息通信学院], Wuhan, Hubei; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 31698 [解放军31698部队], Huludao, Liaoning.

Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]

Abstract: In Ukrainian Crisis, both sides have deployed a large number of drones for offensive and defensive operations. Against the backdrop of the competing development of joint all-domain command and control, the command and control of drone combat systems is characterized by agility, distribution, collective intelligence, integration, and survivability. These characteristics have certain reference significance for the future operations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Title: On the Development of Command Information System from the Perspective of Ukrainian Crisis [从乌克兰危机看未来指挥信息系统建设发展]

Authors: QIU Rongrui [邱荣瑞], ZHANG Zhantian [张占田]

Affiliation: College of Information and Communication, National University of Science and Technology [国防科技大学信息通信学院], Wuhan, Hubei.

Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]

Abstract: The Ukrainian Crisis is a mixed war with intelligent characteristics. Bringing new challenges to the application of military command information system. According to the demand of battlefield command and control guarantee, the construction and application of military command information system in Russia and Ukraine have made new progress, which provides important reference for the construction and development of military command information system in the future. On the basis of analyzing the general situation of Russian-Ukrainian command information system construction, through the characteristics of both parties' application in the war, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the construction and development of command information system in the future, which is of great significance to the construction and development of command information system under the background of new military reform.

Title: Application and Implications of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations in the Ukrainian Crisis [乌克兰危机无人机作战运用及启示]

Authors: YANG Jian [杨俭], CHEN Yijian [陈一剑], GENG Fanjunzhe [耿樊骏喆]

Affiliation: College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology [国防科技大学电子对抗学院], Hefei, Anhui.

Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]

Abstract: Since Ukrainian Crisis, as the battlefield situation has been evolving, both Russia and Ukraine have engaged in intense confrontations in the field of unmanned combat. Unmanned combat forces have even become an important weapon influencing the battlefield situation, demonstrating significant effectiveness in countering traditional weaponry and showcasing a completely different unmanned combat form from traditional combat patterns. In the face of the vigorous development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) military applications worldwide, we must pay attention to the opportunities and challenges brought by UAV combat, fully absorb the beneficial practices and experiences of our opponents, and provide guidance for the construction and application of our own UAVs.

Title: The Problem of Anti -hypersonic Missile Combat [反高超声速导弹作战问题研究]

Authors: XU Tong [徐桐], LIU Xingang [刘新刚], WANG Hui [王辉], LIU Xiangfeng [刘向峰], WANG Song [王松]

Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63610 [解放军63610部队], Korla, Xinjiang UAR.

Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]

Abstract: New combat forces represented by hypersonic missiles are rapidly emerging, which will affect the way of combat and reshape the military struggle pattern. Firstly, the motion characteristics and capabilities of hypersonic missiles were analyzed, and the idea of anti-hypersonic warfare was conceived. Secondly, innovative methods for countering hypersonic missiles were explored. Finally, solutions were proposed for key issues in interception warfare.

Section V: PLA Observers

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Xi Can’t Trust His Own Military,” New York Times, May 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/opinion/china-taiwan-xi-jinping.html.

James Giordano, “China’s Cockpit Advances Pose Challenges for U.S. Combat Pilots,” National Defense, May 7, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/7/analysis-analysis-chinas-cockpit-advances-pose-challenges-for-us-combat-pilots.

Cheryl Yu, “PRC Logistics Firms in the United States and Mexico Support Military-Civil Fusion,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 9, May 9, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/prc-logistics-firms-in-the-united-states-and-mexico-support-military-civil-fusion.

John Chen and Joel Wuthnow, “Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy,” CMSI, May 9, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/18.

Tin Pak and Yu-cheng Chen, “Weaponizing the Electromagnetic Spectrum: The PRC’s High-Powered Microwave Warfare Ambitions,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 9, May 9, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/weaponizing-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-the-prcs-high-powered-microwave-warfare-ambitions.

John S. Van Oudenaren, “Taking Flight: China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Industry,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, May 12, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147816/taking-flight-chinas-military-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav-industry.

Benjamin Frohman and Jeremy Rausch, eds., “The PLA in a Complex Security Environment: Preparing for High Winds and Choppy Waters,” National Bureau of Asian Research, May 15, 2025, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-pla-in-a-complex-security-environment-preparing-for-high-winds-and-choppy-waters.

Sanjay Kannoth, “China’s Strategic Culture and Its Impact on the People’s Liberation Army,” United Service Institution of India, May 16, 2025, https://www.usiofindia.org/pdf/China's%20Strategic%20Culture.pdf.

Kevin Pollpeter, Elizabeth Barrett, and April Herlevi, “Deterring China’s Use of Force in the Space Domain,” CNA, May 19, 2025, https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/05/deterring-chinas-use-of-force-in-the-space-domain.

Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, “China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare,” RAND Corporation, May 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-4.html.

K. Tristan Tang, “Latest PLA Anti-Corruption Campaign Enhances Xi Jinping’s Control over the Military,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 10, May 23, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/latest-pla-anti-corruption-campaign-enhances-xi-jinpings-control-over-the-military.

Joel Wuthnow, “How China Could Counter U.S. Intervention in War over Taiwan,” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/how-china-could-counter-u-s-intervention-in-war-over-taiwan.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China’s Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings,” CMSI, May 28, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/47.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue opens with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flexing its muscles around Taiwan in the Strait Thunder-2025A exercise, followed by the official launch of China’s new naval base in Cambodia. We also track the reported downfall of General He Weidong, delve into the Party’s push for political discipline through its “two polishes” and “rectification” campaigns, and examine persistent quality control issues in China’s defense industry.

Subscribe now

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

Exercise: PLA Sends Strong Deterrence Signals with Latest Drill Around Taiwan

In early April, the PLA Eastern Theater Command carried out a high-profile joint exercise around Taiwan codenamed “Strait Thunder-2025A.” The operation involved warships, fighter jets, and long-range rocket systems and tested key capabilities, including air and maritime blockade, precision strikes on critical infrastructure, and joint command across service branches. Notably, the exercise featured multidirectional encirclement of Taiwan and included participation by the Shandong aircraft carrier strike group east of the island. At least six China Coast Guard vessels carried out “law enforcement measures” around the island to simulate a quarantine.

CCA Analysis: What distinguishes this drill is its shift from the blockade posture seen in past exercises like “Joint Sword” to a more overt simulation of amphibious assault and island seizure operations. Chinese analysts describe the transition as moving from “sealing off” to “taking over”—a reflection of the PLA’s growing confidence and aim to choke off Taiwan from key shipping routes. The exercise also incorporated new elements like “comprehensive control of key domains” and emphasized joint operations involving advanced systems such as the J-35 stealth fighter and Dongfeng hypersonic missiles. The integration of the China Coast Guard signals deeper naval–law enforcement coordination.

This drill further normalizes high-intensity PLA activities around Taiwan, blurring the line between deterrence and preparation for actual combat. Analysts suggest it is not merely a response to Taiwan’s political moves but a calculated demonstration of capability directed at both Taipei and Washington. The absence of a codename on the first day and its sudden announcement are perhaps a signal of heightened readiness and strategic unpredictability.

Strategically, “Strait Thunder-2025A” could test U.S. red lines by showcasing China’s ability to cut off Taiwan’s critical supply routes and deter external intervention. In parallel, it serves as a potent bargaining chip amid rising U.S.-China tensions and ongoing trade disputes. Beijing’s show of force underscores that PLA readiness against Taiwan is now a central tool in its broader competition with the United States.

Learn more: Taiwan Policy Database

Expansion: PLA Navy’s Second Overseas Base Launches in Cambodia

On April 5, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers jointly inaugurated Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, which was renovated and expanded in recent years with Chinese funding. The announcement formally opens China’s second military base abroad.1 The project adds a China‑Cambodia joint logistics and training center and a 650‑meter pier able to berth aircraft carrier–sized vessels—hardware that Cambodia itself does not operate. Ream represents China’s second official overseas military base, following the establishment of a base in Djibouti in August 2017.

Beijing said the complex will support counterterrorism as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster‑relief missions and “does not target any third party.” The annual “Golden Dragon‑2025” China-Cambodia bilateral exercise began at the site following the ribbon-cutting ceremony. Phnom Penh later confirmed a goodwill visit by two Japan Maritime Self‑Defense Force ships on April 19—the first foreign port call at the upgraded base.2

CCA Analysis: The PLA is quick to dispel concerns over China’s regional intentions, framing Ream as a “new model” of joint use that differs from its base in Djibouti. Chinese military analyst Zhang Junshe [张军社] argues that the shared‑operation scheme allows China to provide “public goods” that will “contribute to regional peace, stability, and development.”3

Strategically, the base expands China’s reach into the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean without transiting chokepoints controlled by Vietnam, Singapore, or Indonesia. Beijing hopes that the base will “de‑risk supply chains” at a time when U.S. tariffs and tightening export controls threaten congestion along established routes. Ream also gives the PLA direct access to contingencies in the South China Sea.

Some PLA observers suggest the refurbished base could support the delayed, China‑backed Funan Techo Canal, an inland waterway designed to reduce Cambodia’s reliance on Vietnamese ports.

PLA expert Shao Yongling calls overseas support hubs a “top priority” for the PLA Navy’s blue-water ambitions, saying, “A navy can’t stay at sea forever; ships need a home port.” She notes that China’s amphibious assault ships, aircraft carriers, and Type‑055 destroyers now demand regular overseas maintenance. Ream, she argues, offers an “exploratory model” of joint development that respects host-country sovereignty. Both Shao and Zhang hint that more such centers will follow in the coming years.

Learn more: Jie Gao, “Re-Engaging With the World: China's Military Diplomacy in 2023”

Corruption: He Weidong’s Downfall and Cracks in Xi’s Fujian Military Network

On April 10, the Financial Times reported that Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong (何卫东) had been arrested.4 The article cited five people familiar with the situation, including current and former U.S. officials, which suggests it may be authoritative.

If confirmed, He’ removal as the PLA’s second-ranked officer and third in command would prove one of the largest shakeups in decades. A member of the CCP Politburo, he previously commanded the Eastern Theater Command (ETC), acting as a key military planner of PLA contingencies for Taiwan as well as for potential conflicts with Japan and the United States in the East China Sea. While no longer commander by August 2022, reports indicated that he may have played a role in planning the PLA’s unprecedented military drills and missile launches near Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit.

He’s dismissal comes six months after Xi Jinping suspended Miao Hua, another Central Military Commission member, for “serious violations of discipline”—a euphemism for corruption.

CCA Analysis: He’s apparent downfall is one of the most consequential developments in Party-PLA relations in recent memory and will have reverberations for years to come.

He’s and Miao’s careers overlapped many times. Both served in the 31st (now 73rd) Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, where they established close ties with Xi during his tenure as deputy secretary and governor. They became Xi’s most trusted troops in the PLA and were not only “comrades-in-arms” but close confidants. With their downfall, Xi appears to be targeting the “Fujian clique.”

Given his command of the ETC, He was likely one of Xi’s most important advisors on a Taiwan contingency. What impact his removal will have on the PLA’s planning remains to be seen. At minimum, Xi has lost a trusted advisor; at worst, He’s removal will increase Xi’s doubts that the PLA can execute an invasion of Taiwan in the near term.

Learn more: Lyle Morris, “What China’s New Military Leadership Line-Up Says About Xi’s Plans For Taiwan”

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Section II: PLA Strategy

“Two Polishes” and “Rectification” in Party-PLA Relations

In April and May, the PLA Daily published a series of op-eds under the theme of “deepening political rectification (持续深化政治整训),” authored by personnel from the People’s Armed Policy Force (PAPF), Air Force Engineering University (AFEU) and Hainan Provincial Military District.5 These articles call for greater “ideological unity (统一思想)” at a “critical historical juncture (重大历史关头).” Topics included the “two polishes,” a slogan urging stricter adherence to Party discipline; and recent “rectification” campaigns designed to improve political work across the force.

Liang Jinxiao of the First Mobile Corps of the PAPF authored the first essay of this series titled “Adhere to Strengthening the Foundation and Strengthening Ideological Transformation.”6 At the outset of the article, he put forward the slogan: “polish the weapons in our hands and kill more enemies on the battlefield; polish the ideological weapons and set off a wave of theoretical learning” (擦亮手中武器，在战场上多杀敌人；擦亮思想武器，掀起理论学习的热潮). According to Liang, the two polishes, especially the ideological dimension, were institutionalized at the Seventh National Congress in 1945 and continue to inspire political training in the PLA. He stressed that political training remains “a unique advantage and important magic weapon for our army,” and that at every major historical juncture, “our Party uses political training to enable the people’s army to unify its thoughts, correct its direction, and straighten its ranks while marching.”

Another commentary, “Correct Discipline and Strict Rules to Improve Work Style” by Qiu Xinsong of the Political Science Academy of the National Defense University, focused on the “rectification” (整风) of the PLA’s work to combat “peace malpractices” (和平积弊).7 Qiu offered a candid exposition of the flaws in PLA Party-building and ideological “laziness,” saying that even though progress has been made, the “possibility, stubbornness, and danger of bad work styles resurfacing still exists.”

CCA Analysis: These two commentaries assess that more work is necessary within the PLA to ensure it can build discipline and break through ideological bottlenecks preventing it from executing Xi’s directive to “fight and win” battles. The focus on idleness, waste, and unhealthy trends in Party discipline suggests that senior command officers and lower-level troops alike are not meeting training demands. References to a “peace disease” continue to crop up in PLA strategy and doctrinal writings. While political indoctrination is held up as the “secret weapon,” PLA authors continue to suggest that it remains a work in progress. When coupled with a raft of purges, the Party seems to be doubling down on rectification as a means of instilling discipline—and fear—within the PLA’s ranks to adhere more closely to Party demands, or face stiffer consequences.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

Challenges in PLA’s Defense Product Traceability Management

Two PLA-affiliated authors exposed critical weaknesses in China’s traceability management systems for military products, highlighting persistent gaps in quality control that could undermine the PLA’s ambitious modernization efforts and combat readiness.

In their article, “An Analysis of the Supervision of Traceability Management for Defense Products,” Wu Caijian and Zeng Aimin from the PLA’s 93147 Unit in Chengdu offer a technical yet critical examination of China’s defense industrial base.8 They lay out four major issues and advocate for a transition from manual and fragmented processes to more systematic, automated, and integrated quality management practices.

Among the identified challenges was non-standardized product and process identification. For instance, aviation components were marked using ink that failed to withstand corrosive environments, leading to erasure and complicating quality tracking. Another case involved laser engraving on high-precision parts, where the process itself caused micro-cracks and compromised the parts’ integrity.

A second challenge lies in poor data recording. Wu and Zeng describe systemic weaknesses in dispersed data storage across departments, poor accounting of test records, and a general lack of experience and awareness regarding traceability among civilian contractors. A particularly striking example involved a turbine blade failure in which no record of a critical design dimension was available for post-incident review.

Third, they highlight a lack of system-level integration and planning. Although policies formally require traceability, in practice, many civilian defense firms fail to treat it as a core aspect of technical management. The authors describe cases where QR codes were designed for products without the necessary infrastructure, such as scanners or software. Moreover, production documents like routing cards and inspection sheets often lack standardized fields for key data, making quality investigations difficult and unreliable.

Finally, the authors note that China’s traceability management tools have not kept pace with the demands of modern military hardware. Traceability is fundamental to quality assurance, requiring detailed records across procurement, manufacturing, maintenance, and repair. This ensures effective process control and rapid fault tracing when issues arise. However, many production stages—including machine operation logs, inspection results, and environmental monitoring—still rely on manual data entry and paper records, making the process vulnerable to human error and inefficiencies. Without modern, automated systems to collect, store, and analyze traceability data, civilian defense manufacturers struggle to maintain the high standards needed for the PLA’s increasingly complex military equipment.

CCA Analysis: The article offers a rare and telling window into systemic flaws within China’s defense manufacturing traceability systems and spotlights deeper risks to the PLA’s modernization due to quality assurance.

This is particularly significant given the broader context of corruption and quality control scandals within the PLA. In recent years, several senior officials from defense manufacturers have been investigated for corruption charges.9 This extensive purge has raised suspicions of substandard components and lax enforcement of technical standards in military products, risking the reliability and safety of PLA platforms. Two J-15 accidents in April 2016 caused by flight control malfunctions during takeoff, one of which resulted in the death of the pilot, vividly underscore these risks.10

While the PLA continues the ambitious expansion of its capabilities, these cases serve as a reminder that without robust institutional safeguards and transparent quality control, new capacities remain vulnerable to underlying weaknesses, undermining both combat readiness and the credibility of China’s defense modernization.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: A Review of Intelligent Generation of Combat Simulation Scenarios [作战仿真想定智能化生成研究综述]

Authors: DONG Zhiming [董志明]¹, HU Zhongqi [胡忠奇] ^1,2, LIU Zhaoyang [刘赵阳]³, and ZHOU Heyang [周贺阳]¹

Affiliation: 1. Army Armored Forces Academy [陆军装甲兵学院], Beijing; People’s Liberation Army Unit 31689 [解放军31689部队], Taonan, Jilin; 3. People’s Liberation Army Unit 32292 [解放军32292部队], Mudanjiang, Heilongjiang

Publisher: Journal of System Simulation [系统仿真学报]

Abstract: Currently, the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios has become an urgent need to improve the efficiency of warfare simulation. In recent years, large language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in tasks such as semantic understanding, reasoning and question answering, and text generation, offering new methods and pathways for the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios. To provide theoretical insights for research on the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios, this paper systematically reviews the methods based on large language models. It begins by introducing the basic content of warfare simulation scenarios, analyzing the shortcomings of current mainstream scenario generation methods, and discussing how to leverage large language models to address these issues. Next, it outlines the application paradigms and key supporting technologies for the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios based on large language models. Finally, it looks ahead to the research prospects of intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios, considering both the trends in large language models and the demands of warfare simulation.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: Requirement Analysis of Urban Underground Capture and Control Combat Capability Based on GQFD [基于 GQFD 的城市地下夺控作战能力需求分析]

Authors: FENG Xuanming¹ ² [冯轩铭], ZHAO Gang¹ [赵刚], ZHANG Long¹ [张龙], LEI Zhen¹ [雷震], and YANG Bo¹ [杨波]

Affiliation: 1. Academy of System Engineering, Academy of Military Sciences, People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军军事科学院系统工程研究院], Beijing; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 32178 [中国人民解放军32178部队], Beijing.

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]

Abstract: In response to the increasing importance of underground space operations in future urban warfare, to address the current issues of insufficient research on underground space operations and unclear capability requirements, a Grey Quality Function Deployment (GQFD) method based on grey correlation analysis is adopted. After fully studying and analyzing the concept of urban underground seizure and control operations and the basic “task-capability” requirements, a grey correlation analysis and a House of Quality demand model are established. Through analysis and calculation, the key capability requirement indicators and their importance ranking for urban underground seizure and control operations are obtained, providing a certain basis for the research on urban underground warfare and the demonstration and construction of equipment requirements.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: Analysis and Reflection on the Operational Training of the U.S. Space Force [美国太空军实战化训练分析与思考]

Authors: XIE Wenjie [谢文杰], LIU Yongli [刘永利], ZHAO Yali [赵亚利], and WANG Xia [王霞]

Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63611 [中国人民解放军63611部队], Korla, Xinjiang

Publisher: Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术]

Abstract: Operational training is the fundamental way to generate and enhance combat effectiveness, serving as the most direct preparation for military conflict. To strengthen space warfare readiness, the U.S. Space Force is focusing closely on operational training, clearly requiring its troops to develop space operation mindset, master space operation knowledge and skills, and test space doctrines and tactics. Guided by this, the U.S. Space Force restructures and builds training institutions rapidly, studies and uses digital technology deeply, optimizes and improves effective tactics continuously, cultivates and solidifies combat-focused culture actively, striving to deliver an innovative, professional and world-class joint combat force. Analyzing the training measures and characteristics of the U.S. Space Force, the suggestions are provided by thinking deeply about how to strengthen space force training and develop space deterrence and confrontation capabilities rapidly, in the aspects of training innovation, training close to combat, and condition construction.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: A Novel Mode of Commander Training for Joint Operation Command Teaching [面向联合作战指挥教学的指挥员训练新模式]

Authors: GE Chenglong [葛承垄], WANG Bing [王冰], and JIA Chenxing [贾晨星]

Affiliation: College of Joint Operations, National Defense University [国防大学联合作战学院], Shijiazhuang, Hebei

Publisher: Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真]

Abstract: Aiming at the typical training demands of commander training for joint operations teaching in military academies, such as mass joint operations knowledge inquiry, battle case traceability and re-pushing, combat scene cognition and blue army confrontation, four novel commander training modes are put forward from the perspective of top-level design which are the theoretical teaching oriented commander training mode with question answering, battle case study oriented commander training mode with extension, scenario teaching oriented commander training mode with cognition and countermeasure training oriented commander training mode with confrontation. Then the essential technologies such as military knowledge intelligent answering based on large language model, parallel battlefield and situational cognition, construction and analysis of military event evolutionary graph and blue army behavior tree modeling integrating online learning are analyzed in detail which support the four novel training modes. This study can provide methodological support and implementation reference for military academies to carry out commander training with certain characteristics of digital-intelligence integration.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Section V: PLA Observers

Lucie Beraud Sudreau, Meia Nouwens, and Veerle Nouwens, “China’s Military Aid: A Growing Trend Under Xi Jinping’s First Decade in Power,” Economics of Peace and Security Journal 20, no. 1 (2025): 22–41, https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.20.1.22.

Conor Kennedy, “Behind the Fleet: The PLAN Reviews Logistics Development in the 13th Five-Year Plan,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/behind-the-fleet-the-plan-reviews-logistics-development-in-the-13th-five-year-plan.

Jackson Smith and Cristina Garafola, “PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-perceptions-of-and-reactions-to-u-s-military-activities-in-low-earth-orbit.

Tai-yuan Yang and K. Tristan Tang, “‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/strait-thunder-2025a-drill-implies-future-increase-in-pla-pressure-on-taiwan.

Caroline Y. Tirk and Eli B. Tirk, “PLA Information Support to the Battlefield: UAV Employment Concepts and Challenges,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 14, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147737/pla-information-support-to-the-battlefield-uav-employment-concepts-and-challeng.

Joel Wuthnow, “A New Step in China’s Military Reform,” Joint Force Quarterly 117 (2025): 4–13, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol117/iss2/3.

John Chen and Emilie B. Stewart, “PLA Concepts of UAV Swarms and Manned/Unmanned Teaming,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 21, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147751/pla-concepts-of-uav-swarms-and-mannedunmanned-teaming.

Ryan D. Martinson, “China Maritime Report No. 46: China’s Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia,” China Maritime Studies Institute, April 23, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/46.

Jake Rinaldi, “Waging War Without Disruption: China’s People’s Armed Police in a Future Conflict,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 24, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict.

Josh Baughman, “The People’s Liberation Army at the Nexus of Mind and Technology to Shape the Cognitive Battlefield,” in Human, Machine, War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2025), 223–40, http://media.defense.gov/2025/Apr/18/2003694020/-1/-1/1/B-188%20HMW%20FINAL%204.8.25%20-%20WITH%20508%20CHECK.PDF.

Mina Marcus, “China’s Conceptual Approaches to Counter-UAS and Lessons Drawn from Recent Conflicts,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 28, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147766/chinas-conceptual-approaches-to-counter-uas-and-lessons-drawn-from-recent-confl.

Maud Descamps, Jingdong Yuan, and Yifei Zhu, “Military-Civil Fusion Is a Key Chinese Strategy with Long-Term Implications: An Interview with Jingdong Yuan and Yifei Zhu,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 29, 2025, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/military-civil-fusion-is-a-key-chinese-strategy-with-long-term-implications.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This issue covers U.S.-China defense diplomacy; China’s participation in the Security Belt-2025 joint exercise with Iran and Russia; and new combat drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) near Taiwan. It also analyzes Xi’s speech on PLA modernization efforts within the 14th Five-Year Plan and recent PLA commentary on nuclear stability. The penultimate section features curated papers by Chinese researchers on air and radar technology, followed by analysis from PLA observers on recent PLA activities.

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Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

Section I: PLA News

Diplomacy: U.S.-China Military Leaders Reach Initial Consensus on Dialogue

During his March press conference, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, revealed that the United States and China had “reached some preliminary consensus” on defense relations and that discussions “are advancing as planned.”1 Wu said that “[building] a stable military relationship between China and the United States is in the common interests of both sides” and aligns with the “expectation of the international community.” He added that “the development of China-U.S. military ties should adhere to the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” Wu also called for “enhanced communication and dialogue to properly handle contradictions and differences,” expressing hope that the two militaries “can achieve sound and stable development.”

CCA Analysis: The fact that the two defense departments are communicating just two months into Donald Trump’s presidency is a positive development. The “early consensus” on military-to-military relations suggests that senior officials within the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and China’s Office of International Military Cooperation have discussed defense dialogues at different levels of their respective bureaucracies. Yet fully restoring military communication lines remains contingent on Washington not crossing any of Beijing’s red lines, such as on Taiwan or other sensitive areas.

Learn more: “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States” by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris.

Exercise (1 of 2): China, Iran, and Russia Conduct Joint Naval Exercises

From March 9 to 13, the Chinese, Iranian, and Russian navies conducted Security Belt-2025, a joint exercise near the Iranian port of Chabahar.2

Under the theme of “Creating Peace and Security Together” (共创和平与安全), ten ships conducted joint maritime strikes, damage control, and search and rescue operations featuring special operations teams. China deployed a destroyer and a supply ship. Scenarios included joint counter-terrorism and counter-piracy that tested “tactical command coordination” among commanders and officers. Officers from all three countries conducted ship visits and participated in cultural and sports activities.

CCA Analysis: While the official justification for the exercise was to “strengthen military mutual trust, foster pragmatic maritime cooperation, and strengthen world and regional peace and stability,” the drills punctuate a trend of deepening military relations between Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran to counter the West. Since 2019, China, Iran, and Russia have held five joint maritime exercises, with the most recent featuring a wider range of naval combat capabilities. The trend will continue as long as geopolitical tensions between the United States and the three participating countries persist.

Still, these exercises are more symbolic than practical, especially when compared to the scale of bilateral drills between China and Russia. For example, during Northern/Interaction-2024 last September, they conducted two-stage live drills, including maritime and air escort operations, alert and defense measures, air defense and missile interception, and firepower strikes.3 In contrast, the last China-Iran bilateral naval drill was in 2017.4 Thus, while trilateral military coordination between Beijing, Tehran, and Moscow is increasing, it has yet to reach the levels of bilateral China-Russia defense cooperation.

Learn more: CCA’s China-Russia program Brothers Forever: Unpacking the Conundrum of China-Russia Relations.

Exercise (2 of 2): Eastern Theater Command Drills near Taiwan to “Punish” Lai

In mid-March, the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA conducted joint air and naval combat readiness patrols near Taiwan to “test and improve the combat capabilities of the troops.”5 According to a Ministry of National Defense spokesperson, the operation was a “powerful punishment” (有力惩戒) against “Taiwan independence elements” and a “solemn warning to external interference forces” (对外部干涉势力的严正警告).

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense website noted a large increase in PLA air and naval activity on March 17. This included “59 sorties of PLA aircraft and 9 PLAN ships,” of which 43 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.6

CCA Analysis: The “punishment” came in response to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s March 13 high-level national security meeting, where he introduced a series of new policies to address major national security threats from China, including “threats from infiltration and espionage targeting Taiwan’s military.” In strong rhetoric, President Lai labeled China a “foreign hostile force,” asserting that Taiwan had no choice but to take more proactive measures to protect its interests. The PLA shifted to a much more decisive posture, launching the drills a mere four days after Lai’s speech. This tit-for-tat exchange does not bode well for cross-strait peace and stability.

Learn more: CCA’s Taiwan Policy Database interactive website.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

In early March, four civilian PLA scholars were interviewed by World Military Network—a widely circulated online forum dedicated to military affairs—on how close the world is to nuclear war.7 Among them, Luo Xi (罗曦), associate researcher at the Institute of War Studies at the Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院战争研究院副研究员), provided illuminating commentary on PLA thinking regarding nuclear deterrence. She said that “the threshold for using nuclear weapons is lowering” and that “the boundaries of nuclear war are becoming increasingly blurred.” Luo expounded on this, arguing that the preconditions set by major powers to use nuclear weapons “are being relaxed” and that the scope of using nuclear weapons to deter and retaliate against non-nuclear attacks is “constantly expanding.”

Luo referenced examples such as “large-scale drones flying into [a] country” in scenarios “where nuclear retaliation can be considered”—a reference to Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in response to Ukraine’s drone strikes. She also highlighted Russian threats of tactical nuclear weapons as a novel tactic for nuclear threats against regional non-nuclear actors. Additionally, she noted the United States’ recent doctrinal imperative to counter two nuclear powers simultaneously, which she says “was unthinkable more than a decade ago.” Lumping the United States and Russia together, Luo asserted that “nuclear powers should have assumed the moral responsibility of actively reducing the risk of nuclear conflict”; but when nuclear powers have “made their ideas about nuclear war very concrete,” including “constantly conducting nuclear combat exercises and tactical nuclear weapons exercises with very obvious directions,” such trends will “not have a positive signaling effect on other nuclear-weapon states, but will invariably stimulate a stronger sense of nuclear competition.”

Luo concluded by assessing that the “risk of a large-scale nuclear war is not great in the foreseeable future” and that future wars will “still be more regional conventional wars or conflicts under the background of nuclear deterrence.”

CCA Analysis: Luo’s insights bespeak a general unease with recent Russian nuclear coercion against non-nuclear states like Ukraine, a rarity among PLA scholars. Her assessment that increasing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons injects instability into nuclear dynamics is not new—the PLA has been critical of the U.S. regional nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific for decades. Yet for Luo to highlight Russia and the United States’ propensity to threaten non-nuclear states with nuclear coercion vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine represents a veiled critique of Russia’s role in destabilizing the nuclear architecture.

Learn more: “Understanding China's Perceptions and Strategy Toward Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study Approach” by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

On March 7, Xi Jinping presided over a plenary meeting with a delegation of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police during the conclusion of the 14th National People’s Congress.8 During the meeting, Xi endorsed the PLA’s ongoing modernization efforts tied to the 14th Five-Year Plan and called on the PLA to continue implementing “high-quality development” (高质量发展).

Xi stated that “over the past four years since the implementation of the plan, a series of significant achievements have been made” but also mentioned that “many challenges and issues need to be addressed.” Most of the speech was devoted to the importance of incorporating modern technology and innovative management systems to accelerate military modernization. For instance, Xi called on the need to develop “modern management concepts and methods” (现代管理理念和方法手段) in a more “systematic, holistic, and coordinated manner.” He urged greater efforts to leverage the “strengths and resources” of civilian sectors to enhance the quality and efficiency of military development and also called for the establishment of a sound and effective oversight system to thoroughly investigate and address corruption, with a focus on placing “supervision” in a more prominent position.

Two phrases were particularly noteworthy. Two phrases were particularly noteworthy. First, Xi emphasized the need to more quickly solve blockages and obstructions (堵点卡点) in the plan’s implementation and strengthen cross-departmental, cross-field, and cross-military coordination. Second, he pointed out that the completion of the military objectives “cannot be separated from the support of the national economic and social development system.”

CCA Analysis: Reading between the lines, Xi’s remarks are an admission that the PLA is encountering difficulties in adapting China’s vast civilian and military science and technology infrastructure into operational military platforms. This is unsurprising, given that over the past several years, several senior state-enterprise executives involved in arms procurement, along with engineers and scientists, have been arrested for corruption. These include Liu Shiquan, chair of weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group; Wu Yansheng, chair of China Aerospace Science; and Wang Changqing, executive at China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Further, Hu Wenming, a former chairman of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, who oversaw the country’s aircraft carrier development program, was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment on corruption charges; and Xiao Longxu, former chief engineer of the rocket force’s top research institute and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, was removed as a representative of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Similar to the shake-up in military ranks, a widespread crackdown on senior leaders within China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) responsible for weapons manufacturing and research suggests major issues in China’s spending and procurement process. China’s defense SOEs are integrally linked with the PLA’s overall modernization goals. Upheaval indicates that funds were mismanaged for two of Xi’s most prized military investments: aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. If there was a major misuse of funds within the military procurement system, it may have an effect on weapons systems development cycles and their integration within the PLA.

Learn more: “Xi Jinping’s Purges Have Escalated. Here’s Why They Are Unlikely to Stop” by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Research on Complex Electromagnetic Environment Adaptation Test for Radar Countermeasure Equipment [雷达对抗装备电磁环境适应性试验研究]

Authors: TIAN Miaomiao [田苗苗], PENG Xianjin [彭进先], ZHAO Chao [赵超], GENG Dan [耿丹], YI Tuoyuan [易拓源], and HAN Chunyong [韩春永]

Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63611 [解放军63611部队], Korla, Xinjiang

Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]

Abstract: Complex electromagnetic environment adaptation test is an important reference for the equipment operation application. In view of the requirements of the electromagnetic environment adaptation test and evaluation, this test untangles the environment’s requirement based on the typical operation mission of the equipment, proposes the basic method for constructing the electromagnetic environment in the test, establishes the adaptation evaluation index system, and analyzes the effect of the complex electromagnetic environment on the intercept probability, reconnaissance range, and signal sorting. Considering the energy of jamming signals as reconnaissance’s noise, the distance formula in free space in complex electromagnetic environments is calculated and tested by simulation. The results show the significant decrease of reconnaissance range associated with the alignment between reconnaissance antenna and interference source. Integrating the operation influence of the different complexity of electromagnetic environment with adaptation status, this paper proposes a method for electromagnetic environment adaptation evaluation and shows the feasibility of the method by an example.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: A Rapid Convex Programming Method for Air-to-Air Missile Trajectory Based on Improved Trust-Region Algorithm [基于改进信赖域的空空导弹轨迹快速凸优化方法]

Authors: ZENG Yuwen [曾钰文], ZHANG Huijun [章惠君], and LIAO Xueyang [廖雪阳]

Affiliation: China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute [中国空空导弹研究院], Luoyang, Henan

Publisher: Aero Weaponry [航空兵器], vol. 32, 2025

Abstract: Aiming at the shortcomings of traditional guidance laws for air-to-air missiles in handling multiple nonlinear constraints during the mid-course guidance, this paper proposes an optimization method for mid-course guidance trajectory using sequential convex programming (SCP) and designs an improved trust-region algorithm to enhance the convergence performance of the optimization. Firstly, taking the parabola trajectory of an air-to-air missile in the longitudinal plane as the research object, considering the endpoint constraints, path constraints, and state constraints, after linearizing and discretizing the original state equations and constraints, it establishes the standard convex optimization problem model. On this basis, this paper analyzes the traditional trust-region algorithm and proposes an improved algorithm. It adopts a two-phase solution strategy: the first phase addresses the terminal constraint violation caused by the reference trajectories, while the second phase achieves rapid convergence to the optimal trajectory to significantly improve the solving efficiency and convergence stability of the convex programming problem. Through digital simulation experiments, the optimality and convergence of the proposed algorithm and pseudo-spectral method are compared and analyzed. The results indicate that the proposed algorithm can quickly generate satisfactory mid-course guidance trajectories to provide an effective solution for autonomous online guidance of air-to-air missiles under target maneuvering conditions.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: Collaborative Robot Assisted Assembly System for Aerospace Product Cabin Components [导弹舱内部件的协作机器人辅助装配系统]

Authors: YANG Bo [杨波], WEI Faming [韦发明], GUAN Yajuan [管雅娟], and LIU Chi [刘驰]

Affiliation: Shanghai Spaceflight Precision Machinery Institute [上海航天精密机械研究所], Shanghai

Publisher: Automation & Instrumentation [指挥系统与智能制造], vol. 40, no. 3

Abstract: This article investigates the current application status of collaborative robots in the aviation and aerospace fields. Based on product characteristics and analysis of existing assembly processes, a collaborative robot assisted assembly system is designed. Key contents such as the selection of collaborative robots, end fixture design, collaborative assembly process flow, and collaborative trajectory are elaborated in detail. Assembly process application experiments are conducted, and future optimization prospects are proposed. The application of this system not only reduces the labor intensity of operators but also improves assembly efficiency and overall enhances the automation level of component assembly, providing useful reference for further realizing fully automated assembly operations.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Title: The Impact of the Starlink Program on Helicopter Development [星链计划对直升机发展的影响]

Authors: XU Danqing [许丹青] and DAI Yinfang [戴银芳]

Affiliation: China Helicopter Design Institute [中国直升机设计研究所], Tianjin

Publisher: China Science and Technology Information [中国科技信息], vol. 5

Abstract: Helicopters, as versatile aircraft, possess excellent low-altitude maneuvering capabilities such as vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and hovering in mid-air. They are widely utilized in both military and civilian sectors, demonstrating broad applications and promising development prospects. However, due to limitations in traditional communication and navigation systems, helicopters face challenges such as communication interruptions, navigation difficulties, and inefficient data transmission in certain environments. The launch of the Starlink program provides new possibilities to overcome these issues. This paper discusses the impact of the Starlink program on helicopter development in both military and civilian contexts, as well as its current applications in rescue helicopter operations.

Link to Original Text (CNKI)

Section V: PLA Observers

Joel Wuthnow, “Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA?” China Leadership Monitor, February 28, 2025, https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla.

Eric Hundman, “China’s Air Defense Radar Industrial Base,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, March 10, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4113558/chinas-air-defense-radar-industrial-base.

Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 12, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-03/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2025.

Suyash Desai, “Forceful Taiwan Reunification: China’s Targeted Military and Civilian-Military Measures,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 11, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/forceful-taiwan-reunification-chinas-targeted-military-and-civilian-military-measures.

K. Tristan Tang, “CMSI Note 13: PLA Navy Enhances Realistic Combat Training: Observations of PLA Navy Operations Around Taiwan,” U.S Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, March 13, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/13.

Ryan D. Martinson, “Fujian Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 5 (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/fujians-unveils-incentives-for-militia-training-for-a-cross-strait-campaign.

Kenneth W. Allen, “Senior PLA Leader Military Diplomacy from October 2017 Through December 2024,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, March 17, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4113560/senior-pla-leader-military-diplomacy-from-october-2017-through-december-2024.

Jacob Stokes, “Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses,” Center for New American Security, March 18, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/assessing-chinas-nuclear-decision-making.

J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart, “CMSI Note 14: Bridges over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations,” U.S Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, March 20, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14.

Howard Wang, Jackson Smith, and Cristina L. Garafola, “Chinese Military Views of Low Earth Orbit: Proliferation, Starlink, and Desired Countermeasures,” RAND Corporation, March 24, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3139-1.html.

Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2025, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-shipyard-tiers.