PLA Watch #2: Feb 2025
AMAN-2025; PLARF drills; corrupted official from defense industry; more rules on PLA discipline
Welcome to the second edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest Chinese military affairs and writings using primary sources.
PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.
This issue covers China’s participation in AMAN-2025, intensified combat drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, and the fall of another senior official in the defense industry. It also analyzes new regulations and examines recent PLA commentary on developing talent to adapt to advanced technologies. The penultimate section features curated papers by Chinese researchers on the military applications of low-Earth-orbit small satellites, the effectiveness of large language models in defense science and technology, and their assessment of the core capabilities of the U.S. military’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
Written by:
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis
Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis
With support from:
Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis
Ian Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis
Section I: PLA News
Diplomacy: PLA Navy Flexes Its Muscles at AMAN-2025
From February 7 to 11, China participated in AMAN-2025, a multinational naval exercise hosted by Pakistan and involving over 60 countries, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and regional naval forces.1 The drills comprised antipiracy operations, search-and-rescue missions, and air-defense exercises.
The PLA Navy deployed the Baotou (133), a Type 052D guided-missile destroyer, and the Gaoyouhu (966), a Type 903A replenishment ship, both of which were concurrently engaged in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. Commissioned in 2022, the Baotou is equipped with advanced radar systems and an integrated combat suite capable of engaging surface, aerial, and submarine threats. During live-fire exercises, it demonstrated exceptional accuracy, striking its target in the first round—an achievement that reportedly eluded two previous vessels from other navies.2 Meanwhile, the Gaoyouhu played a crucial logistical role, underscoring the PLA Navy’s emphasis on sustaining extended naval operations through efficient replenishment at sea.
CCA Analysis: China’s participation in the Pakistan-hosted AMAN series reflects its broader approach to military diplomacy and multilateral engagement. Since its first participation in 2007, China has consistently leveraged AMAN to enhance its interoperability with foreign navies—particularly with its closest security partner, Pakistan—and signal its growing role as a key security player in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, showcasing the PLA Navy’s advanced capabilities in front of regional stakeholders fosters cooperation while subtly signaling deterrence. Against the backdrop of rising maritime confrontations, particularly in the South China Sea and the western Pacific Ocean, Beijing’s participation in high-profile exercises like AMAN demonstrates its naval prowess while promoting China’s contribution to safeguarding regional maritime interests.
Exercises: PLA Rocket Force Conducts Intensive Realistic Training
In February, the PLA Rocket Force conducted a series of intensive, realistic combat exercises, highlighting operational readiness and refining war-fighting capabilities. Units conducted specialized drills across varied terrain, including forests, deserts, and highlands.
The exercises simulated a range of battlefield challenges designed to enhance the adaptability and interoperability of PLA Rocket Force units.3 Training scenarios included enemy satellite surveillance, equipment malfunctions, road destruction, and nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. Units also operated under degraded conditions, including disrupted communications, damaged infrastructure, and personnel attrition to ensure resilient missile-launch processes. High-altitude and nighttime drills further emphasized all-weather operational capabilities, with troops reacting to drone reconnaissance exposure, chemical contamination, and command link failures.
CCA Analysis: The PLA Rocket Force has been under the microscope of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and a major target of Xi’s anticorruption campaign in recent years. Several senior leaders have been purged in that time. What makes these exercises notable is their honing of “realistic battlefield conditions” throughout the PLA by stressing real-time adjustments to enemy countermeasures, coordinating under pressure, and integrating emergency response measures. February saw a significant increase in reports on PLA Rocket Force combat training in PLA media outlets, an uptick that suggests a more intensive and diversified training regimen in the new year. While previous exercises emphasized refining specific skill sets through structured, scenario-based training, these drills introduced a higher degree of unpredictability and operational complexity, integrating multiple stressors and adversary disruptions. This evolution reflects a growing emphasis on preparing missile units for high-pressure, multi-domain threats, aligning with broader PLA efforts to modernize training methods and enhance combat realism. Future drills will likely incorporate even more sophisticated adversarial scenarios and cross-service coordination.
Corruption: China’s Defense Sector Faces Intensified Scrutiny
On February 12, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Liu Weidong, deputy general manager of China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC), is under investigation for suspected violations of discipline and law.4 Liu is the latest high-ranking CSGC official to fall under investigation following former chairman of China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco) Yin Jiaxu, who was charged with bribery and illegally profiting his relatives in April 2021.5
Liu’s career has included key roles at Dongfeng Group and Shenlong Motors, where he led major projects such as the Siemens Electric joint venture takeover. His management reforms at Shenlong Motors established him as an influential figure in China’s automotive sector. In 2018, Liu was transferred to CSGC. Liu’s downfall comes amid speculation about a potential merger between Dongfeng Group and CSGC’s automotive division, adding uncertainty to the restructuring.
CCA Analysis: CSGC is one of China’s largest manufacturers of munitions, firearms, artillery, and radar and electro-optical devices. Liu’s investigation is part of a broader crackdown on corruption in China’s defense industry. In recent years, multiple senior officials at CSGC, Norinco, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation have been investigated for corruption and conflicts of interest. This extensive purge has raised concerns about potential disruptions to China’s military modernization goals, particularly its ambition to enhance capabilities by 2027.
Section II: PLA Strategy
Xi Tightens Grip on the PLA
In a significant move to bolster internal discipline and operational readiness, the CMC unveiled two sets of revised military regulations. The first, “Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Chinese Communist Party in the Military” (中国共产党军队巡视工作规定), took effect on February 1, 2025.6 This document, whose full text is not yet available, appears to mirror the substance of “Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Central Military Commission” (中央军委巡视工作条例) issued in 2017, covering the functional positioning of military inspections, work guidelines, overall requirements, and fundamental principles.7 Its guidelines call for standardizing organizational leadership and institutional responsibilities, defining the scope and targets of inspections, and detailing work procedures, methods, and authorities. Additionally, the revised regulations introduce provisions on inspection “rectification” and the utilization of outcomes while further refining mechanisms for personnel management and accountability enforcement.
The second batch of reforms involves the revised “Internal Affairs Regulations” (内务条令), “Discipline Regulations” (纪律条令), and “Formation Regulations” (队列条令), collectively referred to as the “Common Regulations.”8 In particular, they demand stricter loyalty to Xi and increased political oversight, rewards, and punishments for violations of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules. For example, one section adds a requirement for “implementing the decisions and directives of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission” in addition to the “CCP’s theories, guidelines, principles, and policies,”9 implying that the PLA should not only be loyal to the CCP but also loyal to Xi Jinping himself and his consolidated role within the “Chairman Responsibility System.”
CCA Analysis: These revised military regulations are important for several reasons. First, they underscore the CMC’s intensified focus on CCP control, political loyalty, and internal discipline within the PLA. New mechanisms for internal oversight reflect Xi’s ongoing campaign to exert more control over the PLA. Notably, the 2018 version of the regulations emphasized “collective leadership” within CCP committees. This latest version replaces “collective leadership” with “strict adherence to organizational principles and procedures,” reinforcing a more hierarchical, top-down mandate.
Second, the introduction of clearer guidelines on organizational leadership, personnel accountability, and rectification measures attempts to close loopholes and ensure that military discipline aligns with CCP directives. This suggests an increasingly institutionalized approach to military governance, where political compliance is treated as a fundamental security concern.
Finally, the revisions to the Common Regulations, particularly the Discipline Regulations, attempt to solidify the PLA as a “CCP army” that serves both it and Xi Jinping personally as its “core leader.” By embedding political loyalty deeper into the disciplinary framework and refining reward-punishment mechanisms, the new regulations leave little room for ambiguity. Compliance is now a prerequisite for career advancement and institutional survival in the PLA.
Section III: PLA Modernization
Fostering the Development of New-Quality Combat Capabilities
PLA authors published a series of People’s Liberation Army Daily op-eds stressing the need to cultivate “innovative talents” capable of maximizing combat capabilities using new technologies, such as AI and autonomous systems. The series’ three authors explore how the PLA can effectively integrate emerging technologies, reform talent pipelines, and enhance training methodologies to adapt to future warfare. Liu Wang of the PLA Air Force argues that “new-type combat capability” relies not only on advanced weaponry but also on the ability of troops to understand and apply such technology in real combat.10 According to Liu, this can be achieved by using AI-infused platforms in realistic battlefield environments.
Similarly, Kong Jian, editor of the newspaper, focuses on the need to build a modernized military talent pool aligned with Xi Jinping’s directive to comprehensively transform the PLA’s personnel system.11 Kong stresses enhancing recruitment, training, and management systems to produce specialized personnel for different operational domains. This includes creating targeted educational programs, joint training initiatives, and incentive structures that attract and retain top-tier talent. Kong highlights the need to “foster an environment that encourages innovation, risk-taking, and professional growth.”
Finally, in addition to improving tech literacy, Fan Jing of the Academy of Military Sciences calls for the PLA to invest in R&D talent for basic research.12 Fan acknowledges gaps in “key core technologies” and highlights the importance of incorporating fundamental sciences into education to achieve breakthroughs in battlefield technologies. Moreover, Fan argues that effective military modernization requires streamlined technology transfer mechanisms, calling for the PLA to embed combat requirements into R&D from the outset.
CCA Analysis: One of the PLA’s central modernization goals is to incorporate cutting-edge technology. Strikingly, these three op-eds argue that technological superiority alone is insufficient. Instead, human adaptability and expertise in intelligent warfare are still lacking within the PLA. The authors admit that without highly skilled personnel, even the most advanced weapons and autonomous platforms will have limited potential. The PLA has correctly identified the need to improve tech literacy among its troops. By 2020, for example, 29.9% of active-duty PLA personnel held a bachelor’s or advanced degree, up from 24.7% in 2010. By comparison, in 2020, 22.5% of U.S. military members held bachelor’s or advanced degrees.13 The PLA is actively cultivating specialized training pipelines for emerging domains such as AI-driven command and control, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems. However, education remains a key bottleneck to achieving a modern fighting force.
Section IV: PLA Research Highlights
Title: Current Status Analysis of Low-Earth-Orbit Small Satellites and Their Applications Trends in Space Operation [低轨小卫星现状及其在太空作战中的应用趋势分析]
Authors: DU Xiaoyuan [杜晓渊], YANG Mingkai [杨明凯], WANG Zihui [王子卉], ZHANG Le [张乐], and WANG Jingshi [王敬石]
Affiliation: China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, No. 28 Research Institute, Nanjing
Publisher: Informatization Research [信息化研究] 51, no. 1, Feb. 2025
Abstract: In recent years, the rapid development of global low-Earth-orbit (LEO) small satellite constellations, exemplified by Starlink, has gained significant momentum. The mass production, rapid deployment, and global coverage of these satellites have introduced new dynamics for future space warfare. Countries have begun actively deploying LEO small satellite constellations, while many commercial LEO satellite systems already provide communication, remote sensing, and other services to the military. These developments highlight the emerging demand for future space warfare and, to some extent, reflect the application trends of LEO small satellites in military operations. This paper summarizes the technological characteristics and operational status of representative LEO small satellites deployed worldwide in recent years. It then analyzes their role in space warfare and explores application trends in future military conflicts to provide insights for the development of relevant domestic fields.
Title: Research on the Evaluation of Large Language Models in the Field of the National Defense Science and Technology Information [国防科技情报领域大模型应用效果测评研究]
Authors: LI Xiaosong [李晓松], ZHAO Keran [赵柯然], ZHAO Yingxiao [赵英潇], LI Zenghua [李增华], GAO Qiang [高强], LÜ Yifei [吕奕飞], and TANG Shanhong [汤珊红]
Affiliation: Military Science Information Research Center, Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing
Publisher: Information Studies: Theory and Application [情报理论与实践]
Abstract: [Purpose/significance] The field of the national defense science and technology information (STI) has the characteristic of limited open-source training data, high timeliness, and high requirements for professional knowledge, so how to examine the application capability and effect of the large language models (LLMs) for its special needs is an urgent problem. [Method/process] This paper constructs the data set from three dimensions: domain knowledge, dynamic research and thematic research of the national defense STI and selects 1,557 subjective and objective questions to assess the application effect of the eight LLMs developed by commercial organizations, research institutes, and universities in the field. [Result/conclusion] The LLMs perform well in the domain knowledge, but there is still a significant gap in the research of dynamic and thematic information. It is necessary to actively seek and promote the integration, adaptation and application of LLM technical capabilities in the field, so as to provide strong support for high-quality and efficient service of the national defense STI works.
Title: Analysis of Core Abilities and Supporting Techniques in Joint All-Domain Command and Control [联合全域指挥控制核心能力及支撑技术分析]
Authors: SHAN Hongchang [单鸿昌] and WU Lin [吴琳]
Affiliation: College of Joint Operation, National Defense University, Beijing
Publisher: Command Control and Simulation [指挥控制与仿真]
Abstract: In order to push forward “The Third Offset Strategy” and enhance the ability of Globally Integrated Operations, the U.S military proposes All⁃Domain Command and Control (JADC2). JADC2 owns 14 abilities in 4 aspects such as joint all⁃domain situation cognition, joint all⁃domain AI⁃aided decision, joint all⁃domain command and action control as well as joint all⁃domain support. In order to systematize these core abilities in JADC2, the U.S military develops supporting techniques such as advanced system structure, operation cloud, military Internet of Things, military 5G communication, big data and supporting systems from the U.S military multiservice. In the future, the U.S military will promote the ability construction of JADC2 using the ways of four⁃side developing, combat verifying and AI energizing.
Section V: PLA Observers
Jonathan Robinson, “China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy’s Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects,” U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, February 10, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/45.
Xiaoke Qi, “2025 PLA Pilot Recruitment Cycle,” Air University, China Aerospace Studies Institute, February 10, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4024824/2025-pla-pilot-recruitment-cycle.
John Culver, “China, Taiwan, and the PLA’s 2027 Milestones,” Lowy Institute, Interpreter, February 12, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-taiwan-pla-s-2027-milestones.
Arran Hope, “Military Content Restrictions Could Indicate Trouble Ahead,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 3 (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/military-content-restrictions-could-indicate-trouble-ahead.
Zi Yang, “Five Key Factors Behind Irregular Leadership Changes in the People’s Liberation Army,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 3 (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/five-key-factors-behind-irregular-leadership-changes-in-the-peoples-liberation-army.
Jonathan A. Czin, “Thoughts on the Political Demise of Miao Hua,” Brookings Institution, February 18, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thoughts-on-the-political-demise-of-miao-hua.
Ian Easton, “CMSI Note #12: Finally, a PLA Navy Missile Gap?” U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, February 20, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/12.
Jake Vartanian, “Freezing Point: PLA Army Expeditionary Units Lack Readiness for Extreme and Hazardous Cold Weather,” U.S Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 20, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4072033/freezing-point-pla-army-expeditionary-units-lack-readiness-for-extreme-and-haza.
Ryan D. Martinson, “War Without Surprises—Education for Command in the People’s Liberation Army Navy,” Naval War College Review 77, no. 3 (2024), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol77/iss3/4. Published online on February 21, 2025.
Howard Wang, “Toward a Sea-Power Strategy—Chinese Communist Party Debates and Consensus Building Under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping,” Naval War College Review 77, no. 3 (2024), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol77/iss3/5. Published online on February 21, 2025.
Joel B. Predd et al., “Thinking Through Protracted War with China: Nine Scenarios,” RAND Corporation, February 26, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1475-1.html.
Gao Dezheng and Wang Ningchuan, “Multinational Maritime Exercise AMAN-2025 Wraps Up,” China Military Online, February 12, 2025, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16369235.html.
“中国海军本年度首秀为何派出包头舰、高邮湖舰？专家解读” [Why Did the PLA Navy Send CNS Baotou and CNS Gaoyouhu for Its First Deployment of the Year? Expert Analysis], CCTV, February 15, 2025, https://military.cctv.com/2025/02/15/ARTItxQIwCyQORwhFpAddgDj250215.shtml.
Deng Shaohua [邓韶华] and Wang Lingshuo [王凌硕], “新春伊始，记者走进火箭军某旅观摩一场实战化训练——暗夜突击淬剑锋” [At the Beginning of the New Year, Reporters Observe a Realistic Combat Training Exercise of a Rocket Force Brigade: Night Raid Sharpens the Blade], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 6, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-06&paperNumber=03&articleid=948666; Li Bingfeng [李兵峰] and Wang Lingshuo [王凌硕], “战训耦合淬砺打赢本领 ●火箭军多个单位组织专攻精练 ●海军航空兵某部开展精研细训” [Integrating Combat and Training to Hone Warfighting Capabilities: Rocket Force Units Conduct Specialized Drills; Naval Aviation Units Undertake Intensive Training], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 18, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-18&paperNumber=01&articleid=949646; and Chen Lin [陈琳] and Wang Xinglai [王兴来], “火箭军某旅组织实装拉动训练 见招拆招淬剑锋” [A Rocket Force Brigade Conducts Real Equipment Maneuver Training: Countering Moves to Sharpen the Blade], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 21, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-21&paperNumber=01&articleid=949874.
Luo Guoping [罗国平], “中国兵装集团副总刘卫东被查 辉煌时35岁出任东风集团副总” [China South Industries Group Corporation Vice President Liu Weidong Under Investigation: Once Appointed Vice President of Dongfeng Group at 35], Caixin, February 12, 2025, https://www.caixin.com/2025-02-12/102287585.html.
“兵工集团原董事长尹家绪涉嫌受贿、为亲友非法牟利被逮捕” [Former Chairman of NORINCO Group Yin Jiaxu Arrested for Bribery and Illegally Profiting Relatives], Caixin, October 25, 2021, https://china.caixin.com/2021-10-25/101790989.html.
“中央军委印发新修订的《中国共产党军队巡视工作规定》” [The Central Military Commission Issues Newly Revised Regulations on “CCP Regulations on Military Inspection Work”], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 13, 2025, http://www.81.cn/jw_208551/16369327.html.
“中央军委印发《中央军委巡视工作条例》” [The Central Military Commission Issues “CMC Regulations on Inspection Work”], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 17, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jwzb/2018-01/17/content_7911205.htm.
Wang Chuntao [王春涛] and Wu Xu [吴旭], “新修订的共同条令有14个主要改点” [The Newly Revised Common Regulations Have 14 Major Changes], Xinhua, February 28, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16371921.html.
“中国人民解放军纪律条令” [Disciplinary Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 27, 2025, available at http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16371493.html; and “中国人民解放军纪律条令（试行）” [Disciplinary Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (for Trial Implementation)], People’s Liberation Army Daily, April 18, 2018, available at http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4809753.html.
Liu Wang [刘望], “掌握现代战争制胜机理——加强新质战斗力建设系列谈①” [Understanding the Mechanisms of Victory in Modern Warfare: Strengthening the Development of New-Quality Combat Capabilities (Part 1)], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 12, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-12&paperNumber=06&articleid=949051.
Kong Jian [孔健], “加快建设新型军事人才队伍——加强新质战斗力建设系列谈③” [Accelerating the Construction of a New-Type Military Talent Team: Strengthening the Development of New-Quality Combat Capabilities (Part 3)], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 19, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-19&paperNumber=06&articleid=949693.
Fan Jing [范晶], “走好科技创新这步先手棋——加强新质战斗力建设系列谈②” [Taking the First Move in Technological Innovation: Strengthening the Development of New-Quality Combat Capabilities (Part 2)], People’s Liberation Army Daily, February 17, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-02-17&paperNumber=06&articleid=949405.
Wang Pingping, ed., 《2020年人口普查年鉴》 [China Population Census Yearbook 2020] (Beijing: Office of the Leading Group of the State Council for the Seventh National Population Census of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], 2020), vol. 3: appx., https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/pcsj/rkpc/7rp/indexch.htm; Feng Nailin, ed., 《中国2010年人口普查资料》 [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: State Council Population Census Office and National Bureau of Statistics Department of Population and Employment Statistics [PRC], 2010), appx. 1–3, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm; and U.S. Department of Defense, 2020 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community (Washington, D.C., September 2022), 72, https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2020-demographics-report.pdf.