Proposing a "Board of Technology" to Manage U.S.-China AI Tech Competition

By Paul Triolo and Jing Qian

Executive Summary

Competition is inevitable—and, when governed wisely, can be a powerful driver of innovation, resilience, and human progress. Strategic instability, however, is neither inevitable nor desirable. It can and should be managed through better institutions, clearer guardrails, and sustained dialogue. The central challenge of statecraft in the age of artificial intelligence is therefore not whether to compete, but how to govern competition wisely.

Technology competition between the United States and China has entered a fundamentally new phase. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, cloud infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing no longer operate as separate policy domains. They increasingly form an integrated strategic ecosystem in which decisions affecting one technology shape outcomes across many others. Yet the institutions governing this competition remain fragmented across agencies, regulatory authorities, and policy silos that were designed for an earlier era.

Three structural shifts have outpaced the existing governance architecture.

First, technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge. Export controls, industrial policy, AI governance, biosecurity, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience are increasingly interconnected. Policies designed in isolation now generate cascading effects across the broader technology ecosystem.

Second, artificial intelligence has fundamentally changed the nature of technology governance. AI is no longer simply another strategic technology. As a general-purpose capability, it accelerates innovation across semiconductors, biotechnology, scientific research, defense, and advanced manufacturing while introducing new risks related to frontier models, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and CBRN misuse. These challenges cannot be addressed through export controls alone. They require integrated governance.

Third, bureaucratic fragmentation has become a strategic vulnerability. On both the U.S. and Chinese sides, responsibility for technology policy is distributed across multiple institutions with different authorities, incentives, and technical expertise. As technologies converge, fragmented governance limits strategic coordination, slows policy adaptation, and increases the risk of reactive escalation.

These structural changes require a new institutional response.

This special issue proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability (BoTS) as a permanent mechanism for governing technology competition across export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, semiconductor policy, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience. Rather than creating another layer of bureaucracy, the Board would integrate existing capabilities, align political leadership with technical expertise, and provide a standing framework for managing strategic competition with greater discipline, coherence, and strategic foresight.

The Board should pursue four immediate priorities.

First, modernize export controls through a standing technical review process that keeps pace with technological change while preserving restrictions on genuinely strategic capabilities.

Second, strengthen supply-chain stability through reciprocal guardrails for critical minerals and rare earths, including civilian end-use assurances, trusted-company licensing arrangements, and longer planning horizons that reduce unnecessary uncertainty while protecting national-security interests.

Third, place AI governance and biosecurity at the center of technology strategy by integrating frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, biosecurity, cybersecurity, and CBRN risk management into a common governance framework.

Fourth, establish a permanent technology dialogue to support crisis communication, improve policy transparency, and develop confidence-building measures where mutual interests exist, particularly regarding AI safety, biosecurity, and strategic supply chains.

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi provides a timely opportunity to launch such an initiative. A Board of Technology Stability would complement emerging trade and investment mechanisms by providing a durable institutional architecture for the defining technologies of the twenty-first century. Its purpose is not to reduce competition, but to ensure that competition strengthens innovation rather than undermines stability.

Competition is inevitable—and welcome. Strategic instability is optional. Through stronger institutions, wiser governance, and sustained dialogue, technology competition can become not only a source of national strength, but also a foundation for long-term strategic stability.

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I. Introduction

Technology competition is rapidly becoming the defining feature of the U.S.–China relationship. Increasingly, it shapes not only economic competitiveness but also national security, industrial policy, scientific leadership, and the future balance of geopolitical influence. Yet while technology itself has evolved dramatically, the institutions governing it have changed far more slowly.

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, cloud infrastructure, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and supply chains have become deeply interconnected. Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment now influence AI capability; AI accelerates advances in biotechnology; critical minerals underpin both advanced computing and clean technologies; and supply-chain resilience has become inseparable from economic security and national security. Decisions that once affected individual sectors now increasingly reverberate across the broader technology ecosystem.

Existing governance structures were not designed for this rapidly evolving environment.

Most technology policies continue to be developed through separate bureaucratic channels responsible for export controls, industrial policy, AI regulation, public health, scientific research, investment, diplomacy, and national security. These institutions remain highly capable within their respective domains, but increasingly lack mechanisms for integrated decision-making across technologies whose strategic implications have become inseparable.

The rapid emergence of frontier AI further amplifies this challenge. Artificial intelligence is no longer simply another strategic technology. It is becoming a general-purpose capability that accelerates scientific discovery across nearly every frontier discipline, including biotechnology, materials science, robotics, and defense. At the same time, AI introduces new governance challenges involving frontier-model evaluation, cyber resilience, AI-enabled biological design, and CBRN misuse. These issues cannot be addressed through export controls alone. They require sustained coordination among technical experts, regulators, security agencies, and diplomatic institutions.

Institutional fragmentation compounds these challenges. On both sides, responsibility for technology policy is distributed across multiple ministries and agencies with overlapping responsibilities but limited mechanisms for integrated strategic coordination. As technologies become increasingly interconnected, fragmentation itself becomes a source of strategic risk.

The consequences are already visible. Export controls have been followed by reciprocal restrictions on critical minerals and rare earths. Licensing decisions increasingly shape investment, industrial planning, AI infrastructure, and global supply chains. Individual measures may each be justified on national-security grounds, yet collectively they reveal a broader reality: technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge rather than a collection of discrete policy disputes.

The central question facing policymakers is therefore no longer whether strategic competition should continue. It almost certainly will. The more important question is whether existing institutions remain capable of governing that competition in ways that strengthen national security while preserving innovation, reducing unintended economic disruption, and maintaining strategic stability.

This special issue argues that they do not. Instead, it proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability as a permanent institutional mechanism capable of integrating technology governance across export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, critical minerals, supply-chain resilience, and strategic dialogue. Rather than replacing existing agencies, the Board would bridge political authority and technical expertise, align policies that are currently managed through separate bureaucratic channels, and provide a durable framework for governing technology competition in the age of artificial intelligence.

II. Three Governance Gaps in the AI Era

The United States does not lack technology strategy. Nor does it lack technical expertise. What it increasingly lacks is an institutional framework capable of governing technology competition as an integrated strategic challenge.

Three governance gaps have emerged as technology competition has evolved. Together, they explain why existing institutions, while individually effective, are becoming collectively inadequate.

The Integration Gap

Technology competition is no longer organized around individual industries or technologies. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, cloud infrastructure, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and supply chains increasingly reinforce one another.

Semiconductor manufacturing capacity shapes AI development. AI accelerates biotechnology and scientific discovery. Critical minerals underpin advanced computing, clean technologies, and defense manufacturing. Cloud infrastructure determines access to computing power. Supply-chain resilience influences both national security and economic competitiveness.

These interactions have transformed technology competition into an interconnected strategic ecosystem.

Policy, however, remains organized around individual sectors and agencies. Export controls, industrial policy, AI governance, biosecurity, investment screening, and diplomacy continue to operate largely in parallel. Decisions taken within one policy domain increasingly generate consequences across many others.

The result is an expanding integration gap between the technologies themselves and the institutions responsible for governing them.

The Capability Gap

The second gap reflects the emergence of artificial intelligence as a general-purpose technology.

Unlike previous generations of strategic technologies, frontier AI accelerates progress across virtually every scientific and industrial domain. It influences semiconductor design, pharmaceutical discovery, biotechnology, autonomous systems, cyber operations, advanced manufacturing, and military capability simultaneously.

This convergence fundamentally changes the nature of technology governance.

National security now depends not only on controlling access to hardware but also on understanding frontier-model capabilities, evaluating AI systems, mitigating cyber vulnerabilities, managing AI-enabled biological risks, and establishing safeguards against CBRN misuse.

These challenges extend well beyond traditional export-control institutions.

No single agency currently possesses the authority or expertise to integrate AI governance, model evaluation, biosecurity, export controls, scientific research, industrial policy, and international engagement into a coherent strategic framework.

As AI continues to evolve, this capability gap will become increasingly consequential.

The Coordination Gap

The third challenge is institutional.

On both sides, technology governance remains fragmented across multiple ministries and agencies.

In the United States, Commerce, Treasury, State, Defense, Energy, HHS, NIST, the White House, and the Intelligence Community each contribute essential capabilities but operate under different statutory authorities, organizational cultures, and policy objectives.

China faces a comparable challenge. Technology policy spans MOFCOM, NDRC, MIIT, CAC, MOST, the National Health Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the broader Party leadership.

These institutions were designed to optimize individual policy domains rather than govern an increasingly interconnected technology ecosystem.

The consequence is an expertise-authority gap.

Technical institutions often possess the deepest understanding of frontier technologies but lack the authority to coordinate government-wide policy. Political leaders possess decision-making authority but rarely receive integrated assessments spanning AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, industrial policy, and supply-chain resilience simultaneously.

Technology competition therefore risks becoming increasingly reactive rather than strategic.

Why the Current Framework Is Under Strain

These three governance gaps increasingly reinforce one another.

The October 2022 semiconductor controls illustrate both the strengths and limitations of the existing framework. They successfully protected the most advanced technologies while demonstrating unprecedented coordination among allies. At the same time, rapid technological progress has outpaced portions of the original framework. Chinese manufacturers have continued advancing beyond several original thresholds, while subsequent licensing decisions—including H200-class GPUs, high-bandwidth memory controls, and repeated “is informed” letters—have required increasingly case-specific adjustments.

At the same time, China’s response has expanded beyond semiconductors. Export controls on rare earths and magnets have demonstrated that supply-chain leverage now operates in both directions. Decisions affecting semiconductor manufacturing increasingly shape critical-mineral policy, investment decisions, AI infrastructure, and industrial planning.

These developments do not suggest that export controls have failed. Rather, they demonstrate that technology competition has become too interconnected to be governed through export controls alone.

The central policy challenge has therefore shifted. It is no longer simply how to design better export controls. It is how to govern strategic competition across an increasingly integrated technology ecosystem while preserving national security, sustaining innovation, reducing unintended economic costs, and maintaining strategic stability.

This is the role a Board of Technology Stability is designed to perform.

III. A Board of Technology Stability

The three governance gaps identified above point to a common conclusion. The United States does not need another export-control mechanism. It needs a governance architecture capable of integrating technology policy across the strategic technologies that increasingly define economic competitiveness, national security, and geopolitical influence.

This paper therefore proposes establishing a Board of Technology Stability (BoTS) with the Chinese side as a permanent institutional mechanism for governing technology competition in the age of artificial intelligence.

The objective of the Board is straightforward: to strengthen national security while sustaining innovation, reducing unintended economic disruption, and improving strategic stability.

BoTS would not replace existing departments or regulatory authorities. Nor would it weaken legitimate competition or dilute national-security protections. Instead, it would provide the institutional capacity to coordinate policies that are currently managed through fragmented bureaucratic structures despite becoming increasingly interconnected.

Technology competition has become systemic. Technology governance must do the same.

Managing Competition, Not Technology

The phrase Technology Stability deserves clarification.

The Board is not intended to stabilize technological progress. Innovation should continue to accelerate.

Nor is it intended to stabilize geopolitical competition. Strategic competition between major powers is likely to remain a defining feature of international affairs.

Rather, Technology Stability refers to reducing unnecessary instability generated by fragmented governance.

Its purpose is to make competition more disciplined, more predictable, and better aligned with long-term strategic objectives.

Competition without governance increases strategic risk. Governance without competition weakens innovation.

The Board seeks to reconcile both.

Why a New Institution?

Governments have repeatedly created new institutions when technological change has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape.

The National Security Council integrated military, diplomatic, and intelligence decision-making during the early Cold War.

The Financial Stability Board emerged after the global financial crisis to strengthen coordination across national regulators.

The proposed Board of Technology Stability reflects a similar need.

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, cloud infrastructure, critical minerals, and supply chains now interact too closely to be governed independently.

Existing institutions remain indispensable.

But none is responsible for integrating the technology ecosystem as a whole.

The Board would fill that gap.

Five Core Functions

The Board should perform five permanent functions.

First, Integrated Strategic Assessment

Every major technology decision should begin with an integrated understanding of its implications across the broader technology ecosystem.

Rather than assessing export controls, AI governance, critical minerals, biotechnology, and supply chains separately, the Board would evaluate their interaction and long-term strategic consequences.

Integrated assessment should become the foundation of technology statecraft.

Second, Adaptive Export Controls

Export controls remain an indispensable national-security instrument.

Their effectiveness, however, depends upon remaining targeted, technologically current, and strategically coherent.

The Board would establish a standing review mechanism to reassess technological thresholds, evaluate commercial consequences, identify second-order effects, and ensure that controls continue protecting genuinely strategic capabilities while minimizing unnecessary costs to U.S. innovation and allied supply chains.

Export controls should evolve as technology evolves.

Third, AI Governance and Biosecurity

Artificial intelligence has become both the most powerful innovation platform and the most significant governance challenge of the coming decade.

The Board would integrate frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, biosecurity, cybersecurity, CBRN safeguards, and scientific risk assessment into one coherent policy framework.

This would close one of today’s largest institutional gaps: the separation between technical AI expertise and national-security decision-making.

Rather than treating AI governance as a parallel policy discussion, it should become a central pillar of technology strategy.

Fourth, Supply-Chain Stability

Technology competition increasingly operates through global production networks rather than individual firms.

Critical minerals, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, advanced manufacturing, cloud infrastructure, and logistics have become sources of both resilience and strategic leverage.

The Board would coordinate policies affecting these interdependent systems while reducing unnecessary uncertainty for governments, businesses, and allied partners.

Supply-chain resilience should become a strategic objective rather than a crisis response.

Fifth, Strategic Dialogue

Finally, the Board should establish a permanent technology dialogue between the United States and China.

Strategic competition requires communication as much as deterrence.

Technical experts should have regular channels to discuss emerging technologies, AI safety, biosecurity, supply-chain resilience, and reciprocal concerns before they escalate into political crises.

Dialogue should not be understood as an alternative to competition.

It is one of the mechanisms through which competition can be governed responsibly.

A September Deliverable

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi offers an opportunity to move beyond tactical negotiations toward institutional innovation.

Recent discussions have focused appropriately on tariffs, trade, export controls, investment, and critical minerals.

These issues remain important. But they are increasingly symptoms of a larger structural transformation.

Artificial intelligence is reshaping every dimension of technology competition. Biosecurity has become inseparable from AI governance. Critical minerals have become strategic assets. Supply chains have become instruments of national power.

These developments require institutions capable of governing competition across the technology ecosystem rather than negotiating each issue separately.

A Board of Technology Stability would provide precisely such a framework.

It would complement the proposed Boards of Trade and Investment by focusing specifically on the technologies that increasingly determine economic security, national security, scientific leadership, and strategic stability.

More importantly, it would demonstrate that both governments recognize a fundamental reality:

Technology competition is likely to endure.

Strategic instability does not have to.

IV. Immediate Priorities

The Board of Technology Stability should focus initially on a limited set of priorities where technological change has outpaced existing policy and where coordinated action would strengthen national security, preserve innovation, and reduce strategic instability. Early success will depend less on creating new regulations than on improving coordination across existing institutions.

Priority One: Modernize Export Controls for the AI Era

Export controls remain one of the United States’ most important national-security tools. The October 2022 semiconductor controls demonstrated Washington’s ability to protect the most advanced capabilities while coordinating closely with key allies. Those objectives remain valid.

Technology, however, has evolved rapidly. Chinese manufacturers now operate beyond several of the original memory and logic thresholds, while subsequent adjustments—including licensing decisions for H200-class GPUs, new controls on high-bandwidth memory, and repeated “is informed” letters—illustrate the increasing difficulty of governing frontier technologies through static regulatory frameworks.

The objective should therefore be continuous adaptation rather than periodic revision.

The Board should establish a permanent technical review mechanism that regularly evaluates technological thresholds, commercial consequences, allied coordination, and Chinese responses. Export controls should remain targeted, technologically current, and strategically coherent. Their effectiveness should be measured not only by restricting access to frontier capabilities, but also by preserving U.S. innovation capacity, sustaining allied technological leadership, and minimizing unintended incentives for accelerated localization.

Priority Two: Stabilize Strategic Supply Chains

Supply-chain resilience has become a central dimension of technology competition.

Recent Chinese export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets demonstrate that strategic leverage increasingly extends beyond semiconductors. At the same time, the experience of the past several years has shown that not all technological chokepoints are alike.

Rare earth processing, specialized equipment, and magnet production remain highly concentrated and difficult to replicate. Semiconductor innovation, by contrast, is characterized by globally distributed ecosystems, multiple technology pathways, and strong incentives for substitution. Policy should distinguish between these fundamentally different forms of technological dependence.

The Board should therefore pursue a framework of strategic supply-chain stability.

Possible measures include reciprocal civilian end-use assurances, trusted-company licensing arrangements, multi-year licensing horizons, and structured dialogue regarding critical-mineral supply chains. Such measures would preserve legitimate national-security protections while reducing unnecessary uncertainty for governments, companies, and global markets.

The objective is not to eliminate leverage. It is to reduce unnecessary volatility in sectors critical to both strategic competition and global economic stability.

Priority Three: Place AI Governance and Biosecurity at the Center of Technology Strategy

Artificial intelligence should no longer be treated as a specialized technology issue. It has become the enabling platform for virtually every frontier technology.

Accordingly, AI governance and biosecurity should become central responsibilities of the Board rather than parallel policy discussions.

The Board should establish an integrated framework linking frontier-model evaluation, AI safety, cybersecurity, biosecurity, CBRN safeguards, and scientific risk assessment. Technical expertise from institutions such as CAISI/NIST, DOE, HHS, NIH, CDC, ASPR, BARDA, the national laboratories, and other relevant agencies should be coordinated within a single strategic process capable of informing national-level decision-making.

Internationally, the Board should support sustained technical engagement with relevant counterparts in China, including ministries, standards organizations, AI safety institutions, and public-health authorities. Such engagement would not reduce strategic competition. Rather, it would strengthen confidence-building measures in areas where mutual interests exist, particularly concerning frontier AI safety, biosecurity, and catastrophic-risk prevention.

In the age of AI, governance of biological risk should become a core function of technology strategy rather than an afterthought.

Priority Four: Institutionalize Technology Dialogue

Strategic competition increasingly unfolds through technology policy.

Yet bilateral engagement remains largely reactive, organized around successive disputes over export controls, tariffs, investment restrictions, or critical minerals.

The Board should establish a permanent channel for technology dialogue that complements existing diplomatic and economic mechanisms.

This dialogue would enable both governments to communicate policy intentions, discuss emerging technologies before they become crises, coordinate technical assessments where appropriate, and develop reciprocal guardrails in areas of shared interest.

Dialogue should not be viewed as a concession. Nor should it be confused with cooperation.

It is a mechanism for governing competition responsibly.

As strategic competition intensifies, communication becomes more—not less—important.

Priority Five: Build Institutional Capacity for Continuous Adaptation

Perhaps the Board’s most important function is also the least visible.

Technology evolves far more rapidly than government institutions. Policy reviews conducted every several years are increasingly insufficient for technologies whose capabilities can change within months.

The Board should therefore institutionalize continuous learning.

Standing technical working groups, regular strategic assessments, horizon-scanning exercises, engagement with industry and academia, and structured collaboration with allies should become permanent features of technology governance rather than ad hoc responses to individual crises.

The objective is to create an institution capable not merely of responding to technological change, but of adapting alongside it.

In an era of accelerating innovation, institutional agility is itself a strategic advantage.

V. Institutional Design

A Board of Technology Stability should be designed around one principle:

Integrate expertise without centralizing bureaucracy.

The proposal is not intended to create another large department or replace existing agencies. Rather, it seeks to provide the institutional capacity that existing structures currently lack: the ability to integrate political authority, technical expertise, and strategic decision-making across interconnected technologies.

Accordingly, the Board should distinguish clearly between political leadership and technical leadership.

Political Leadership

Political leadership should remain at the Cabinet level.

Its role is to establish strategic priorities, resolve interagency disagreements, oversee implementation, and ensure that technology policy remains aligned with broader national-security and economic objectives.

Given Treasury’s expanding role in economic security and international negotiations, the Secretary of the Treasury would be well positioned to provide overall political leadership while working closely with the White House, Commerce, State, Defense, and other relevant departments.

On the Chinese side, an equivalent political lead would require sufficient authority to coordinate across industrial policy, economic policy, AI governance, and national security. The key point is institutional: successful governance requires a political leader capable of integrating across bureaucratic boundaries.

Technical Leadership

Political leadership alone is insufficient.

The Board should also be led by a senior technical figure with deep expertise across AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, industrial policy, and global technology ecosystems.

Unlike traditional advisory structures, this role should be permanent, independent of individual departments, and capable of translating technical analysis into strategic policy recommendations.

The central purpose is to close the longstanding gap between expertise and authority.

Functional Organization

Rather than organizing the Board around agencies, it should be organized around five enduring functions:

• Technology Strategy and Integrated Assessment

• Export Controls and Industrial Competitiveness

• AI Governance, Frontier Models, and Biosecurity

• Critical Minerals and Supply-Chain Resilience

• Strategic Dialogue and International Coordination

This functional structure would encourage integrated decision-making while preserving the responsibilities of existing departments.

U.S.–China Institutional Mapping

The Board should also maintain a standing institutional map identifying the principal counterparts on both sides.

On the U.S. side, this includes Commerce, Treasury, State, Defense, Energy, HHS, NIST, the Intelligence Community, and the White House.

On the Chinese side, it includes MOFCOM, NDRC, MIIT, CAC, MOST, the National Health Commission, and the relevant Party leadership, together with technical institutions responsible for AI safety, standards, biosecurity, and industrial policy.

Detailed personnel assignments should remain flexible and evolve alongside technological developments. The Board’s strength lies not in organizational charts, but in its ability to convene the right expertise at the right time.

VI. Conclusion

Governing Competition in the Age of AI

Competition between the United States and China is likely to remain a defining feature of the international system for the foreseeable future. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and cloud infrastructure have become central to economic competitiveness, national security, and geopolitical influence. As these technologies converge, technology competition itself is becoming increasingly systemic.

The institutions governing that competition, however, have not evolved at the same pace.

For much of the past two decades, technology policy could be managed through relatively discrete instruments—export controls, industrial policy, investment review, scientific cooperation, and trade negotiations. Today, these instruments increasingly overlap. Decisions affecting semiconductors influence AI capability. AI accelerates biotechnology. Critical minerals shape industrial resilience. Supply chains have become instruments of both economic efficiency and strategic leverage.

Technology competition has become an integrated governance challenge.

This paper has argued that three governance gaps now limit effective policymaking.

The first is an integration gap between increasingly interconnected technologies and institutions that continue to govern them separately.

The second is a capability gap between the challenges created by frontier AI and biosecurity and the institutional tools available to manage them.

The third is a coordination gap between political authority and technical expertise, both within governments and across international partners.

These gaps are unlikely to narrow on their own.

They require institutional innovation.

The proposed Board of Technology Stability is intended as that innovation.

Its purpose is neither to reduce strategic competition nor to slow technological progress. Rather, it seeks to strengthen national security while preserving innovation, improving policy coherence, reducing unintended supply-chain disruption, and lowering the risk of unnecessary escalation.

Technology stability should therefore not be understood as technological stagnation.

It should be understood as strategic stability in an era of accelerating technological change.

The Board would complement—not replace—existing institutions by integrating export controls, AI governance, biosecurity, industrial policy, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience within a common strategic framework. It would connect political leadership with technical expertise, allowing governments to respond to technological change with greater agility, coherence, and foresight.

The anticipated meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi provides an opportunity to begin building such an architecture.

Much attention has rightly focused on tariffs, export controls, investment, and critical minerals. These issues will remain important. Yet they increasingly represent manifestations of a broader transformation rather than isolated policy disputes.

Artificial intelligence is reshaping every dimension of technology competition.

Biotechnology is becoming increasingly inseparable from AI.

Critical minerals have become strategic assets.

Supply chains have become instruments of national power.

Future competition will increasingly be defined by the interaction among these technologies rather than by any single sector.

The challenge facing policymakers is therefore no longer simply how to compete.

It is how to govern competition.

History suggests that major technological revolutions have consistently required new institutions. Nuclear technology led to new arms-control mechanisms. Globalization produced new trade and financial institutions. The AI era will likewise require governance mechanisms capable of integrating scientific innovation, national security, economic policy, and international stability.

Competition without governance increases strategic risk.

Governance without competition weakens innovation.

The challenge of statecraft in the age of AI is to build institutions capable of governing competition wisely.

A Board of Technology Stability represents one practical step toward that objective.